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Characteristic of the most enduring constitutional controversies is
a clash between fundamental but ultimately irreconcilable principles.
Unable to synthesize opposing precepts, we visit and revisit certain is-
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sues in an endless cycle. Each generation marches forward heedless,
and sometimes only dimly aware, of how many times the battle has al
ready been fought. Even the peace of exhaustion achieves only a
temporary respite.
The abiding controversy over the relationship between the treaty
power of the national government and the legislative powers of the
states is paradigmatic in this respect. Beginning as early as in the first
debate over ratification of the Articles of Confederation in the
Virginia state legislature in 1777 - recurring time and time again
throughout the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and early Twentieth centu
ries, building to a climax in the Supreme Court's famous 1920 decision
Missouri v. Holland,1 continuing in the 1950s with the Bricker
Amendment controversy, and reemerging as recently as last year in an
article published in this Review2 - the issue has been among the most
passionately disputed questions in our constitutional history. Al
though temporarily in hibernation, it threatens presently to break out
again into full-blown conflict.3
Can the federal government enter into treaties on subjects that are
otherwise beyond Congress's legislative powers? Consider some typi
cal examples from the nation's past: treaty stipulations overriding tra
ditional state laws preventing aliens from owning real property (circa
1795), impinging on the South's "peculiar institution" (circa 1823),
overriding a state's Plessy-sanctified policy of maintaining separate
but equal schools for resident Japanese schoolchildren (circa 1907),
and mandating a national anti-segregation policy (circa 1950).4 In
1. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The vote was seven to two, with Justices Van Devanter and
Pitney dissenting without opinion. For the full text of this opinion, see Appendix infra pp.
1316-19.

2 See Curtis A. Bradley,
391 (1998).

The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.

3. Most recent articles have defended Missouri. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to
Be a Nation?: Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1277, 1297-316 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 33, 46-49 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1645-47 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Breard, Printz, and the
Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1337-43 (1999); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri
v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726
(1998). Professor G. Edward White, without clearly endorsing a position one way or the
other, seems highly critical. See G. Edward White, The Transfonnation ofthe Constitutional
Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 62-76 (1999); see also Peter J. Spiro, The
States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 576-78 (1997) (arguing
that persistent Senate resistance to human rights treaties affecting the states evidences a
limitation on, or even a repudiation of, Missoun). Professor Bradley's article is one key part
of a wide-gauged states' rights attack on the constitutional law of foreign affairs, which he
and his sometimes co-author Jack Goldsmith have launched in recent years. See, e.g., Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique ofthe Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997).
4. Each of these controversies provoked widespread and impassioned national debate
and a virtual flood of co=entary. For the Jay Treaty debate, see infra Sections II.B.1.a, b,

1078

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

98:1075

each of these cases, it was widely agreed contemporaneously that
Congress's legislative powers were incapable of reaching so far into
the internal affairs of the states. Were treaties? Translated into the
present: Can the national government enter into a treaty outlawing
the death penalty as a violation of universal human rights, even if
Congress's legislative powers would otherwise not extend that far?
Pitted against each other in the debate are two fundamental pos
tulates: on the one hand, the overriding imperative to present a uni
fied national front in negotiations with foreign countries in order to
maximize our influence and protect and advance our national interests
in the perilous realm of foreign affairs; on the other hand, the princi
ple of local decisionmaking embodied in the Tenth Amendment.5 The
potential for collision is obvious and, at least in theory, of the most
portentous character. This prospect has been exacerbated, moreover,
by the highly intermittent character of treaty-making. The sudden ap
pearance of a treaty intruding on a field in which Congress had never
before regulated understandably tended to upset long-settled expecta
tions of exclusive state authority. When the subject matter of a treaty
was tied up with the question of race, as has repeatedly been the case,
the combination of circumstances was apt to, and often did, prove ex
plosive.
The cyclical nature of the debate, however, should not obscure the
essentially straightforward character of the constitutional question.
Nothing said thus far has been intended to intimate that the
Constitution is subject to two equally compelling constructions. Not
withstanding two hundred years of impassioned efforts by states'
rights advocates to deny the obvious, the text and structure of the
Constitution, as well as original intent, leave little room for serious
debate. Faced with overwhelming arguments against their view,
states' rights proponents have understandably chosen to retreat to ar
guments from first principles rather than attend to careful analysis of
text and structure. Nor does history offer them any greater comfort.
Although the issue has never been free from substantial controversy,
the dominant view throughout most of our history has affirmed the so
called "nationalist view." The "states' rights view" predominated, if
ever, only during the antebellum struggle, when the issue became en
tangled with the slavery question and the accompanying states' rights
dogmas of the day.

c; for the controversy over the so-called Negro Seamen Act, see infra Section ll.B.2; for the
Japanese schoolchildren controversy, see infra Section II.B. 3.d; and for the Bricker
Amendment controversy and its roots in segregationist policies, see infra Section IV.C. The
Japanese schoolchildren debate provoked the writing of at least four books and countless
articles on the subject. See infra notes 590-597 and accompanyin g text.
5.

See U.S. CONST. amend. X
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There is, of course, another overriding consideration in favor of
the nationalist view: the Supreme Court authoritatively resolved the
question eighty years ago in Missouri v. Holland and has never shown
any inclination, even in recent decisions, to reconsider that landmark
decision. Indeed, it forcefully reaffirmed the essential holding of
Missouri in the midst of an extended campaign, led by Senator Bricker
during the 1950s, to overrule the decision through constitutional
amendment.6 Given a seven-to-two decision rendered by a Court well
known for its sensitivity to federalism concerns - a decision that has
been on the books for eighty years, repeatedly reaffirmed and never
questioned by the Court, and the object of a highly publicized but
failed effort to amend the Constitution - it is difficult to see what jus
tifi.cation there could be now for overruling such a venerable decision.
Yet, that is precisely what Professor Curtis Bradley forcefully advo
cated in Treaty Power and American Federalism, recently published in
this Review.1 It is to defending the correctness of Missouri that I de
vote the following pages.
To be sure, Justice Holmes's brilliantly compressed opinion - it
spans only five pages in the United States Reports
has been and con
tinues even today to be widely misunderstood. This is due in part to
the opinion's deceptive blandness. It seems almost a parody that a
century and a half of intense constitutional controversy should come
down to Justice Holmes's question: If an act regulating migratory
birds is unconstitutional as beyond Congress's constitutional powers,
can a migratory bird treaty followed by the same act be valid? Even
more puzzling is Holmes's impassioned rhetoric: what provoked him,
in the opinion's most celebrated passage, to invoke the bloodshed of
the Civil War in justification of a migratory bird treaty? As we shall
see, notwithstanding the abiding mysteries, all of the essential reason
ing in support of the nationalist view can be unearthed from the cryp
tic passages of Holmes's brief text.
More importantly, the most recent attacks on Missouri contend
that its holding finds no support in history. This is not a new claim.
Indeed, many have viewed the decision as descending like a bolt of
lightning out of a clear blue sky.8 But this is simply false. Historical
-

6. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion of Black, J.). For discus
sion of the case, see infra notes 692-694 and accompanying text.
7. Bradley, supra note 2.
8. This is by no means limited to proponents of the states' rights view. See, e.g.,
CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 217 (1964 ) (viewing
Missouri as "the breath-taking case in which Justice Holmes, in effect, converted the treaty
making power into a constitutional basis for laws that Congress was not otherwise author
ized to enact " ); Bradley, supra note 2, at 421 n. 178 (characterizing Charles Butler, in 190 2, as
"the first scholar to directly challenge the view that the treaty power was limited by the re
served powers of the states"); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathan
Robbins, 100 YALE LJ. 229, 351 n.464 (1990 ) ("The eternal puzzle of Missouri v. Holland is,
of course, why Holmes went out of his way to intimate that treaty power is not limited by the
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support for the nationalist view goes back as far as the Republic itself,
and Missouri was the climactic finale to an intense national contro
versy over the extent to which the treaty power could override state
laws discriminating against aliens, particularly Chinese and Japanese
residents of the western states.9 Equally important, the Court decided
it under the long shadow of the Treaty of Versailles, which was before
the Senate at the same moment Missouri was being argued. It was
well known that Versailles would soon give birth to the first human
rights conventions on the problem of child labor. The Court thus self
consciously opened up the possibility that its own controversial deci
sion in Hammer v. Dagenhart,10 rendered only two years before
Missouri, might be avoided through the ratification of an international
human rights treaty.
In Part I, I set out the basic textual and structural arguments that
support the nationalist view. In Part II, I turn to the history of the
Missouri issue. I first consider how the problem arose and was dealt
with under the Articles of Confederation. This practice provides an
essential backdrop for understanding how the Framers dealt with the
problem in drafting the Constitution and underscores why they be
lieved that the federal treaty power would necessarily have to be ple
nary in scope. I then examine the discussions in Philadelphia, in the
state ratifying conventions, and in the Federalist Papers for the evi
dence they provide of the Founders' purposes and understandings.
Next, I turn to the post-ratification history, beginning with the great
national debate provoked by the Jay Treaty in 1795-96, running
through the antebellum period, and continuing through the post-Civil
War period and the early twentieth century up to the Court's decision
in Missouri. This survey requires extensive consideration of the prac
tices of the political branches (especially the President and the Sen
ate), the decisions of the Court, the recurring national debates over
the question, and the views of leading commentators. In this Section, I
bring out a good deal of previously unknown, or in some cases little
known, historical material in an effort to shed new light on the subject.

Constitution's ordinary rules of federalism. Holmes could have demurely placed controls on
migratory birds within regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, and then decided only
that treaty power extends at least as far as Congress' enumerated legislative powers."). As
will become evident, these views are radically inconsistent with the facts.
9. It was not, unfortunately, the end of the long struggle over whether state laws dis
criminating against aliens, particUlarly Chinese and Japanese, were unconstitutional viola
tions of equal protection. Even in Oyama v. California, the Court held only that states can
not discriminate against U.S. citizens of foreign descent, but did not answer the question
regarding aliens. 332 U. S. 633 (1948).
10. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a congressional effort to regulate child labor as
beyond Congress's enumerated powers). Of course, it was known that there would be a
whole series of labor conventions on subjects that were, under Hammer, beyond Congress's
regulatory authority.

Treaty-Making and the Nation
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In Part III, I consider the Missouri opinion itself. Once situated in
its historical context, Holmes's heretofore opaque language is trans
formed into a straightforward, and profound, rehearsing of the basic
arguments in favor of the nationalist view. Contrary to the specula
tions of even some of Holmes's most sensitive interpreters, the opin
ion ultimately rests on standard constitutional premises (text, struc
ture, precedent, and history) - indeed, originalist premises - not on
an extraordinary theory of inherent foreign affairs powers or even on
a view of the Constitution as an evolving or living text. In Part IV, I
turn to the post Missouri history, including a brief look at the Bricker
Amendment controversy. Finally, in Part V, I consider the most re
cent arguments in favor of the states' rights view, principally as ar
ticulated by Professor Curtis Bradley last year in this Review.
-

I.

TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND THE TREATY POWER

Missouri famously presented the question of whether the treaty
power is limited to those subjects over which Congress has regulatory
authority, or, more pointedly, whether treaties can deal with matters
which would otherwise be within the "reserved" powers of the states.
I begin by situating this question within the constitutional text and
clarifying the precise issue at stake. Much of the sting in the states'
rights position derives from misunderstandings, bred by the exagger
ated claims about the scope of Missouri's holding. I then set out the
main textual and structural arguments for the nationalist view. Al
though I believe that these arguments are sufficient in themselves to
justify the nationalist position, I leave whatever ambiguities that re
main to be answered by history.
A.

The Constitutional Setting

A number of provisions are directly pertinent to the inquiry. Most
important is the Treaty Clause itself, which resides not in Article I, but
in Article II. It grants the President the "Power, by and with the Ad
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds
of the Senators present concur." 11 The Supremacy Clause, in turn, de
clares that the Constitution, the laws of the United States made pursu
ant thereto, and "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."12
Although these provisions might seem sufficient without more, the
Constitution does not rest with an unqualified delegation of authority
11. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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and express declaration of federal supremacy. Article I, Section 10
explicitly makes the grant exclusive: "No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation."13 It then adds: No state, without
the consent of Congress, shall "enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power."14
Nor is the constitutional division of power over the conduct of
diplomatic negotiations left implicit. The President is given the power
to receive and appoint ambassadors and thus exercise control over all
diplomatic discussions.15 There has never been any serious question
that all formal diplomatic communications with foreign states are to
be under his exclusive control and that not only the states, but Con
gress itself, is entirely excluded from the field.16
It is clear, then, that the whole treaty power is "delegated" to the
federal government and specifically "prohibited" to the states. Never
theless, proponents of the states' rights view rest their textual case on
the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re
served to the States respectively, or to the people."17

13. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
14. U.S. CONST. arl I, § 10, cl. 3. This provision is widely referred to as the "Compact
Clause."
15. In addition to the Treaty Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the
President the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls), and id. § 3
(granting the President the power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers).
16. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND nm CONSTITUTION 41-42 {2d ed.
1996); David M Golove, Against Free-Fonn Fonnalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1890-91
{1998). The Articles of Confederation were explicit in this respect. "No State without the
consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive
any embassy from ... any king, prince, or state ...." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND
PERPETUAL UNION, art. VI (hereinafter ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION]. Nevertheless,
even to the strictest of strict constructionists, it was always clear that the same principle ap
plied under the Constitution:
Now, how is a state to hold communications with [foreign] nations? The states neither send
nor receive ambassadors to or from foreign nations. That power has been expressly confided
to the federal government... . Every part of [the Constitution] shows that our whole for
eign intercourse was intended to be committed to the hands of the general government; and
nothing shows it more strongly than the treaty-making power, and the power of appointing
and receiving ambassadors; both of which ...undoubtedly belong exclusively to the federal
government. It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as re
garded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications
between foreign governments, and the several state authorities.

Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. {14 Pet.) 540, 575-76 {1840) (Taney, CJ.). This does not mean
that state officials cannot co=nnicate with representatives of foreign nations; what they
cannot do is conduct formal diplomatic relations. Where the line should be drawn may
sometimes be difficult to determine. For recent developments challenging traditional under
standings, see EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN U.S.FOREIGN AFFAIRS {1998).
17. U.S. CONST. amend.X.
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Clarifying the Issue

At the outset, it is crucial to specify precisely what is, and what is
not, at issue. States' rights proponents have often made wild claims
about Missouri - most dramatically, that it holds that treaties are not
subject to the Constitution, or at least not to federalism limitations of
any kind. For the most part, these claims have been tactical.18 Be
cause they have nonetheless been misleading, it is necessary to begin
by clearing out some confusing underbrush.
It has been understood from the beginning - and has been re
peatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court before, after, and even in
Missouri - that treaties, like all other governmental acts, are subject
to the Constitution. This means that a provision in a treaty that con
travenes any of the specific prohibitions on governmental conduct
contained in the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, or else
where is unconstitutional and void as a matter of domestic law.19 This
much is common ground.
Likewise, it has always been accepted that treaties are limited by
separation of powers principles. Although treaties create law under
the express command of the Supremacy Clause and in that sense over-

18. Proponents of the Bricker Amendment emphasized this point and included language
in their proposed amendment to emphasize that treaties were subject to the Constitution.
See infra notes 676, 688, 693 and accompanying text. It was fairly clear even then that this
was a political move designed to gamer support for the amendment, which was really fo
cused on other concerns - for example, overruling the actual holding in Missouri. See infra
notes 674-689 and accompanying text. The principal object of the Brickerites was to ensure
that the United States would not become a party to any human rights treaties. Although the
movement was prompted by a number of different concerns - hostility to the United Na
tions and to Franklin Roosevelt, virulent anti-co=unism, and nativism, among others the principal underlying motivation was the concern that human rights treaties would pro
hibit segregation on the basis of race. Missouri would then give Congress constitutional
grounds for adopting national anti-segregation or anti-lynching laws, which, it was then be
lieved, would otherwise be beyond its legislative powers. See infra notes 673-675 and ac
companying text.
19. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 302(2) (1987)
[hereinafter REsTATEMENT {THIRD)]; id. § 302 cmt b & reporter's note 1. For judicial
opinions, see, for example, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), and Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). For early affirmations by co=entators, see, for example, 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1502, at
355-56 (1833), and John C. Callioun, Speech in the Co=ercial Convention with Great
Britain (Jan. 9, 1816), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN c. CALHOUN 123, 132-33 (Richard K.
Cralle ed., 1864) [hereinafter WORKS OF CALHOUN]. For extended discussion of the issue,
see HENKIN, supra note 16, at 185-89. Whether an unconstitutional treaty would be void as
a matter of international law is another question. That question, however, does not tum on
domestic constitutional law, but upon international law, specifically the law of treaties. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 46, 47, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
343-44 (stating the circumstances under which a state can avoid the obligations of a treaty
entered into in violation of its constitution, where the violation was manifest and concerned
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance). For discussion, see HENKIN, supra
note 16, at 188, and Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 814 n.47, 844-45, 902 n.464 (1995).
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ride the ordinary processes for the adoption of legislation,02 they are in
principle subject to the separation of powers restrictions that are ap
plicable to ordinary acts of Congress. For example, just as an act of
Congress could not transfer the power to execute the law from the
President to, say, a committee appointed by Congress, so too a treaty
attempting such a transfer would be unconstitutional.21 More realisti
cally, the Article I, Section 9 injunction that "No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law" applies as much to treaties as to any other act of gov
ernmental authority.22 A treaty cannot appropriate money.23

20. More precisely, under the command of the Supremacy Clause, self-executing treaties
create enforceable domestic law without legislative implementation. Non-self-executing
treaties do not. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 198-204; Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 695 & n.7 {1995). To become
enforceable domestic law, non-self-executing treaties require legislative implementation, and
it is then the implementing legislation, rather than the treaty itself, which creates domestic
law. For current controversy over the self-executing treaty doctrine, compare John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and The Original Under
standing, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 {1999), and John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2218 {1999), with Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Origi
nal Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095
{1999), and Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999).
21. For discussion of the application of the principles of the separation of powers to
treaties, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 16, at 194-96; 1 WESTEL WOODBURY
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF nm UNITED STATES §§ 206, 216, 218, at
480-84, 504, 507 {1910); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS§§ 52-66, at 95-120 {1922). Calhoun said: "No treaty can alter the fabric of our
government, nor can it do that which the constitution has expressly forbidden to be done;
nor can it do that differently which is directed to be done in a given mode, - all other modes
being prohibited." Calhoun, supra note 19, at 133. Even earlier, during the Jay Treaty con
troversy, Hamilton fully endorsed the nationalist view of the treaty power, but explicitly af
firmed, at the same time, that treaties are subject to the separation of powers:
A treaty ... cannot transfer the legislative power to the Executive Department nor the
power of this last Department to the Judiciary; in other words it can not stipulate that the
President and not Congress shall make laws for the U(nited] States; that the Judges and not
the President shall command the national forces &c.

Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1796), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 6-7 (Harold c. Syrett ed., 1974) [hereinafter 20 HAMILTON
PAPERS].
22. U.S. CONST. art I,§ 9, cl. 7.
23. Although a treaty cannot appropriate money, it can promise to make payments.
Carrying out that promise is necessarily left to congressional implementation. See, e.g.,
HENKIN, supra note 16, at 203; 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 21, § 206, at 480-84. Hamilton
agreed:

As to the provision, which restricts the issuing of money from the Treasury to cases of ap·
propriation by law, and which from its intrinsic nature may be considered as applicable to
the exercise of every power of the Government, it is in no sort touched by the Treaty. The
constant practice of the Government, the cause of an expenditure or the contract which in
curs it, is a distinct thing from the appropriation for satisfying it . . . . So, the Treaty only
stipulates what may be a cause of Expenditure. An appropriation by law will still be requi
site for actual payment.
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More important for present purposes, despite the rhetoric of
states' rights proponents, treaties are not immune from federalism
limitations,and nothing in Missouri suggests the contrary.24 Thus,for
example, states are guaranteed "a Republican Form of Govem
ment,"25 and nothing in a treaty can contravene that assurance. Nor,
as Justice Field put it,could a treaty require "a change in the charac
ter ...of one of the States."26 Of course,it is difficult to imagine real
istic scenarios in which treaty stipulations would violate these general
limitations. Were such a case to arise,however, the treaty would un
doubtedly infringe on "an incident of state sovereignty" implicit in the
constitutional structure.27 More pointedly,under the traditional view,

Hamilton, supra note 21, at 20-21. See also Calhoun, supra note 19, at 133. For further dis
cussion of the relationship between treaties and the separation of powers, see infra notes 53,
292, 711-717 and accompanying text.

24. Professor Bradley seems to suggest the contrary. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 391,
400, 409 (referring to "the purported immunity of the treaty power from federalism limita
tions," and claiming that under Missouri "the treaty power is immune from" the limitations
of the Supreme Court's recent decisions protecting state sovereign immunity).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

26. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); see also John C. Calhoun, A Discourse
on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in 1 WORKS OF JOHN C.
CALHOUN 111, 203-04 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851).
[The treaty power] can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the character of the
government; or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making power; or
which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the government, - or the objects for
which it was formed. Among which, it seems to be settled, that it cannot change or alter the
boundary of a State, - or cede any portion of its territory without its consent. Within these
limits, all questions which may arise between us and other powers, be the subject matter
what it may, fall within the limits of the treaty-making power, and may be adjusted by it.
The question of whether a treaty can cede the territory of a state - and if so, un
der what circumstances - has been controversial from the first. For discussion, see
HENKIN, supra note 16, at 465-66; infra notes 159-166, 196-207, 210-211, 216, 431, 564 and
accompanying text.

Id. at 204.

27. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992); see also HENKIN, supra note
16, at 193-94; WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 50, at 88-89 (noting that the "national guarantee of
territorial integrity and a republican form of government to the states limits the treaty
power"). As Professor Henkin explains:

Missouri v. Holland, I stress, did not say that there were no limitations on the Treaty Power
in favor of the states, only that there were none in any 'invisible radiation' from the Tenth
Amendment. The Constitution probably protects some few states' rights, activities, and
properties against any federal invasion, even by treaty. Justice Field (and others) said that
without a State's consent its territory could not be ceded by treaty to a foreign country. Be
cause 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican Form of
Government', the treaty-makers presumably could not adhere to a treaty that would modify
the republican form of government of the states (or of any state). 'A well-regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state', and the right to train the militia and appoint
its officers being expressly reserved to the states (subject to Congressional regulation), could
the United States agree to abolish all state militia, for example in a treaty for general and
complete disarmament? There are perhaps remnants of state sovereign immunity that might
stir questions about a hypothetical treaty - say, a disarmament agreement with inspection
provisions that permits intrusion upon the statehouse, or a treaty that commands state legis
latures to adopt laws or that coopts state officials.
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the treaty power extends only to subjects proper for negotiation and
agreement among nations.28 A treaty that violates this limitation
would be beyond the scope of the treaty power and thus would invade
the sphere "reserved" to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
The fact that treaties are not exempt from normal constitutional
restraints does not necessarily mean that those restraints apply in pre
cisely the same way to treaties as to statutes. Treaties often deal with
subjects that are quite distinct from those typically dealt with in do
mestic regulations, and they are generated in an altogether different
context - they are not edicts issued by a legislative body to the citi
zens but contracts between sovereign powers. As a consequence,
there is a need for greater flexibility in international negotiations,
where the benefits of cooperative relations can only be achieved by
accommodating the interests and views of different political and legal
traditions in mutually agreeable contracts. The prohibitions of the Bill
of Rights and the requirements of the separation of powers may,
therefore, sometimes require a somewhat more forgiving construction
when applied to treaties.29 This same notion applies equally to feder
alism limitations. The differential treatment in these cases arises not
from any immunity from constitutional restrictions, but from the spe
cial considerations that apply in the treaty context. Treaties have no
general license to violate the immunities of states any more than they
may violate the rights of individuals.
In this regard, consider the longstanding debate over whether the
Founders intended the Eleventh Amendment to apply to treaties and,
if so, in what kinds of cases.30 The question is not whether treaties are

HENKIN, supra note 16, at 193-94. By quoting Professor Henkin, I do not mean to endorse
each of the particular limitations he sketches. For discussion as to whether recent Supreme
Court doctrines expanding the field of state sovereign immunity apply to the treaty power,
see infra notes 30-35, 704-705, 741 and accompanying text.
28. For discussion of the traditional limits on the scope of the treaty power, see supra
note 26; infra notes 39, 41-42, 61, 131-134, 256-257, 291-292, 424-431, 435, 480-481, 557, 560,
564, 624, 720-721, 724-739, 747-748 and accompanying text.
29. In Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988), the Court left open the possibility that
First Amendment analysis might have to be adjusted to account for the special needs of the
diplomatic context. Similarly, consider the special difficulties presented by the stipulation in
the treaty purchasing Louisiana from France which granted French vessels calling at the port
in New Orleans exemptions from the ordinarily applicable duties for twelve years. That
provision seemed to violate the prohibition on giving preferences to the ports of one state
over those of another. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. Did the treaty context call for a
more latitudinarian construction? For discussion of the extended controversy over the ques
tion, see EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF TiiE
LOUISIANA PuRCHASE, 1803-1812, at 74-83 (1920). The issue was later revisited in the
Insular Cases. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 253-56 (1901). For a more in-depth
treatment of the application of the separation of powers in the treaty context, see WRIGHT,
supra note 21, at §§ 52-66, at 95-120.
30. Compare John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1899-920 (1983) (arguing the Eleventh
Amendment did not protect states from suits brought under Article

III to enforce

treaties),
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exempt from constitutional or even federalism restrictions generally,
but whether the particular immunities protected by the Eleventh
Amendment should be carried over into the treaty context and, if so,
how. The same applies to state immunities which the Supreme Court
recently found implicit in the constitutional structure - the anti
commandeering principle of New York v. United States31 and Printz v.
United States,32 and the sovereign immunity principle of Seminole
Tribe v. Floridti33 and Alden v. Maine.34 Whether these immunities
apply in the treaty context and to what extent remain open questions
about which there already has been and will continue to be substantial
disagreement.35 It should be clear, however, that nothing in Missouri
purports to provide a definitive answer. The reason is straightforward:
these decisions proclaim affirmative constitutional immunities of
states. That is not to say that some of the concerns that animate
Missouri are not relevant. Plainly, they are. The point is that the
textual and structural considerations that underwrite Missouri, though
overlapping, are also different and that Missouri itself does not compel
any particular outcome.
If Missouri is not about any of these questions, then what exactly is
it about? The most perspicacious formulation of the issue is, in my
view, as follows: The question is whether the treaty power is properly
conceived as an indeP,endent grant of power "delegated" to the na-

and William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation ofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI L. REV. 1261, 1285-87 (1989) (similar), with Calvin R. Massey, State Sov
ereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI L. REV. 61, 114-15 (1989) (ar
guing for the contrary view), and Calvin R. Massey, Correspondence: Exchange on the Elev
enth Amendment, 51 U. CHI L. REV. 118, 119-21 (1990) (responding to Professor Fletcher).
The recent Supreme Court decision in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 37 (1998), tentatively
suggests that treaties may be subject to the Eleventh Amendment. See Carlos Manuel
Vasquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with !CJ Orders of Provi
sional Measures, 92 AM. J. lNT'L L. 683, 688 (1998); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 19, § 302 reporter's note 3 (noting that "[c]onstitutional limitations protecting States'
rights against invasion by the federal government presumably would apply as well to any
such invasion by treaty . . . for example, the limitations in the Eleventh Amendment, or
those implied in the guarantee of a republican form of government").
.

.

.

31. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding an implicit prohibition against Congress "comman
deering" state legislatures into adopting federal regulatory programs).
32. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (extending the anti-commandeering principle to state executive
officials).
33. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that the sovereign immunity of states from suit in federal
court cannot be abrogated by Congress when acting under the commerce power).
34. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (extending Seminole to state courts). I do not consider
Seminole Tribe and Alden to be, strictly speaking, Eleventh Amendment cases, notwith
standing the tortured history of the Court's "Eleventh Amendment" jurisprudence.
35. Compare, e.g., Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, supra note 3, at 165055 (arguing that the anti-commandeering principle is inapplicable), and Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1260 (1995) (same), with HENKIN, supra note 16, at
467 n.75 (suggesting that the principle may apply to treaties).
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tional government or as only an alternative mode of exercising the
legislative powers granted to Congress in Article I of the Constitution.
If it is a separate "delegated" power, then no question of "reserved"
powers under the Tenth Amendment can arise. The power is to be
exercised in accordance with the object of the grant and without re
gard to whether Congress, under some other head of power, could
otherwise regulate the subject matter. Under this view - the nation
alist view - the treaty power is the same as any of the other enumer
ated powers, except that it is granted to the President and Senate in
Article II, rather than to Congress in Article I. In contrast, the states'
rights view, at least in its most plausible formulation, denies that the
treaty power is, in the relevant sense, "delegated." Rather, it is just
another method for exercising the powers given to the national gov
ernment in Article I. For example, since Congress can regulate for
eign commerce by passing tariff laws, so too the President and Senate
can regulate foreign commerce by making tariff treaties. Just like
statutes, however, treaties cannot touch on subjects that are beyond
the enumerated powers granted to Congress and thus "reserved" to
the states.36
36. I do not mean to suggest that this is the way the states' rights position has always
been formulated. Historically, some states' rights proponents have conceptualized the
problem in this way, see infra notes 273-277, 358, 470-471, 530 and accompanying text (dis
cussing examples), but others, including Professor Bradley, see infra notes 698-708 and ac
companying text, have opted for different approaches. Consider three alternatives: First,
there is the view stated in the text. Second, there is a slightly modified, though textually
problematic, version under which the treaty power does extend to subjects beyond Con
gress's legislative authority but only to those subjects prohibited to the states and hence "re
served" not to the states but to the people. This version of the states' rights view thus recog
nizes that the treaty power may itself be the repository of additional powers not delegated to
Congress - that is, that it is an independent delegation of authority under the Tenth
Amendment- but it limits the scope of the treaty power in dealing with subjects falling out
side of Congress's legislative authority to those which the states are also prohibited from
regulating. Third, there is the view that implicit in the Tenth Amendment is an affirmative
grant of exclusive state legislative authority over a fixed set of subjects, which are protected
against any exercise of federal power. See infra notes 470-475, 506, 511-512, 514-519 and ac
companying text (discussing examples). Something like this view was most prominent dur
ing the antebellum period when states' rights dogmas were at their peak. Since then, this
approach to federal power, which finds no support in the text of the Tenth Amendment and
is clearly antithetical to the main line of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence
beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland, has been thoroughly discredited. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 426-27 (1819) ("This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursu
ance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective
States, and cannot be controlled by them . . . . It is of the very essence of supremacy to re
move all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in
subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence."); see
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824). It is surprising, therefore, that
Professor Bradley seems to argue for its revival. See discussion infra at notes 698-708 and
accompanying text.

I also note that there are two other lines of argument for justifying Missouri which I will
not pursue here, but which should at least be acknowledged. The first rests on Justice
Sutherland's famous theory of the foreign affairs powers in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Writing for a seven-to-one majority, Justice Sutherland
claimed that the foreign affairs powers are not enumerated but inherent and that, beginning
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The Textual and Structural Argument for the Nationalist View

The starting point is, of course, the text. From all appearances, the
grant of the treaty power is a "delegation" of power like that of all the
other delegations of power to the federal government included in the
Constitution. Just as Article I, Section 8 provides that "Congress shall
have Power To" regulate commerce, declare war, and so on,37 so the
Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have Power" to make
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate.3 8 This unqualified
grant of power thus incorporates into the text a familiar term bor
rowed from the law of nations. Treaties were (and are) binding
agreements between states entered into for their mutual benefit.39
Certainly, had the Framers wished to limit the subject matter of trea
ties, they could have identified a list of treaties to which the powers of
the President and Senate would extend - for example, treaties of
peace, alliance, commerce, and so on. Alternatively, the Framers
could easily have specified that treaties could be made only on those
with the Declaration of Independence, they belonged to the national government and not to
the states. See id. at 316-18. Therefore, they were not granted in the Constitution and do
not depend upon the powers enumerated in the text. It goes without saying that this view
strongly implies that the treaty power is plenary and is not subject to "reserved" powers limi
tations of any kind. It probably implies a great deal more. Like many other scholars, how
ever, I do not accept Justice Sutherland's notion of unenumerated foreign affairs powers and
am skeptical about whether the Court today would still endorse his views. For criticisms of
Curtiss-Wright, see, for example, Charles Lofgren, The Foreign Relations Power: United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, in GOVERNMENT
FROM REFLECITON AND CHOICE 167 (1986). Thus, I will not rest upon his approach in justi
fying the nationalist view.
The second line of argument is more compelling. Professor Henkin has argued that
Congress's foreign affairs powers, express and implied (not inherent), are plenary and ex
tend to regulating any matter that affects our foreign relations. See Louis Henkin, The
Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law ofthe Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 903, 922-30 (1959). If this is correct, then Missouri is of no moment: a treaty on any
subject of concern to our foreign affairs would ipso facto fall within Congress's legislative
authority, and no question of "reserved" powers could arise. Even were I to accept this
view, however, it would not be appropriate to rely upon it here. Missouri is itself an impor
tant strut supporting the claim, and it would be circular to cite this doctrine in justifying the
ruling in that case. See id. at 908-10, 922-30.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
38. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. Nor is the treaty power the only other federal power
found outside of Article I, Section 8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 1 (granting power to
ordain and establish lower federal courts); id. art. ill, § 3, cl. 2 (granting power to punish
treason); id. art. IV, § 1 (granting power to supervise state compliance with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause); id. art. IV, § 3, els. 1-2 (granting powers to admit new states and to dis
pose of and make rules respecting the territory and other property of the United States).
39. Indeed, the accepted international law definition of a treaty is even broader: a
treaty is "an agreement between two or more states or international organizations that is
intended to be legally binding and is governed by international law." REsTATEMENT
(THmD), supra note 19, § 301(1). For discussion of the international law definition, with
references to earlier formulations, see HENKIN, supra note 16, at 184-85, 455. My qualifying
language is added to suggest implicit (constitutional) limits on the scope of the treaty power.
See infra note 41.
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subjects over which Congress had legislative authority.40 Instead, they
chose to make the grant general. The implication is clear: the Presi
dent and Senate can make treaties on any subject appropriate for ne
gotiation and agreement among states.41
40. Technically, the states' rights view limits not the "subject matter" of treaties but the
subject matter of concessions that the United States can make in treaties. Even under the
states' rights view, there is nothing objectionable about the President seeking to impose ob
ligations on foreign nations that would, if imposed on the United States, fall within the leg
islative competence of the states. The difficulty arises only when those obligations are made
reciprocal. As a practical matter, of course, reciprocal obligations are the norm in interna
tional practice. Thus, for example, even under the states' rights view, the President could
make a treaty that obligated a foreign state to refrain from imposing the death penalty in
return for money or trade or military concessions. For obvious reasons, however, it is ex
tremely unlikely that other nations would be inclined to accept such asymmetrical arrange·
ments. In practice, imposing limits on the subject matter of treaty concessions would ordi
narily amount to the same thing as imposing subject matter limits on treaties.
41. The text gives the traditional formulation of the scope of the treaty power. For
authorities and discussion, see infra notes 61, 131-134, 256-257, 291-292, 424-431, 435, 480481, 557, 560, 564, 624, 720-721, 724-739, 747-748 and accompanying text. I interpret this
requirement to mean that the President and Senate can make any treaty which advances the
national interests of the United States in its relations with other nations. Although interna
tional law may allow a state to enter into a treaty for any purpose it may have (subject to the
principle ofjus cogens), in my view, the President and Senate may not constitutionally enter
into a treaty for the sole purpose of making domestic legislation. See infra notes 720-722,
728, 747-748 and accompanying text. With nuances, Henkin appears to agree:
[T]here must be an agreement, a bona fide agreement, between states, not a "mock
marriage". So, hypothetically, if in order to circumvent the House of Representatives and
the states, the President wrote a uniform divorce law, applicable to the United States alone,
into "a treaty", and the Prime Minister of Canada cooperated in the scheme . . . it would pre
sumably not be a treaty under international law, and therefore not a treaty under the
Constitution . . . . In this hypothetical case, Canada might be estopped from questioning its
character as a treaty; one could nonetheless argue that it is beyond the power of the treaty
makers.

HENKIN, supra note

16, at 185, 455. I would only add that even if Canada agreed recipro·
cally to impose the same uniform divorce law on itself, the treaty would still be unconstitu·
tional if the President and Senate's motivation for making the treaty was unrelated to our
relationship with Canada or our foreign affairs more generally but was solely to override
Congress and the states and impose what they believed was a particularly worthy divorce
code on the United States. If they believed that the United States had no interest in the
character of the divorce laws in Canada, and if Canada had no interest in the divorce laws of
the United States such that concessions by the United States could advance our interest in
good relations with Canada, then the treaty would be a "mock-marriage" and would be un
constitutional whatever its status under international law. Whether a constitutional limita
tion of the kind I have suggested would be judicially enforceable, and, if so, to what extent
and under what circumstances, are wholly separate questions. Nor do I mean to suggest that
the United States ever has, or is likely ever to, enter into a treaty in bad faith, as suggested
by the hypothetical.

Finally, my approach does not imply that the treaty power is limited to the promotion of
the "national interest" in a narrow sense. The national interest certainly includes moral, as
well as economic or military, interests. Thus, for example, the President and Senate may
promote the nation's moral interests by seeking to ensure respect for the fundamental rights
of persons living anywhere in the world and even by deferring on occasion to the views and
interests of other nations and peoples. See infra notes 756, 771 and accompanying text. The
treaty power is thus as compatible with a broadly cosmopolitan, as a narrowly nationalistic,
conception of our international relationships. It might be most accurate to say that the
treaty power delegates to the President and Senate the power to structure the nature of our
relations with other nations through consensual agreement.
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This point is underscored, moreover, by a marked contrast be
tween the treaty power and the powers granted to Congress in Article
I. In the legislative sphere, Congress's powers are carefully enumer
ated by subject matter. Congress has the power to tax and spend for
the general welfare, to regulate commerce, to coin money, and so on.
By direct implication - made express in the Tenth Amendment those subjects which are not included in the enumerated authorities
are left to the states. The very purpose of the enumeration is to divide
the whole of the legislative powers of government between Congress
and the states. The contrast with the treaty power is striking. The
whole treaty power is granted to the President and Senate and specifi
cally denied to the states. There is no enumeration of subject matter
because the whole power, like the power over foreign affairs gener
ally, is lodged in the national government. As Calhoun put it:
The limits of the [legislative power] are exactly marked; it was necessary,
to prevent collision with similar co-existing States' powers . . . . Exact
enumeration on this head is necessary, to prevent the most dangerous

consequences. The enumeration of legislative powers in the constitution
has relation, then, not to the treaty-making power, but to the powers of

the States. In our relation to the rest of the world the case is reversed.
Here the States disappear. Divided within, we present the exterior of
undivided sovereignty. The wisdom of the constitution, in this, appears
conspicuous. Where enumeration was needed, there we find the powers
enumerated and exactly defined; where not, we do not find what would
be only vain and pernicious. Whatever, then, concerns our foreign rela
tions; whatever requires the consent of another nation, belongs to the
treaty-making power . . . .42

Nor is it difficult to understand why the Framers made this choice.
In 1787, they were acutely aware of the need to present a united front
to foreign states. The nation faced menacing perils from abroad,
making a common stand against foreign powers a matter of the most
urgent necessity. As bitter experience had taught, to limit the flexibil
ity of the federal government in conducting foreign negotiations
meant risking war, perhaps even national survival.43 While much has
changed since that time, the international realm is still fraught with
dangers and uncertainties. When it comes to advancing our national
interests in foreign negotiations, the nation can achieve the most fa
vorable results only by presenting itself as a single nation and thereby
maximizing its bargaining position.44 At times, moreover, safeguard-

42. Calhoun, supra note 19, at 132. For a similar analysis, see Calhoun, supra note 26, at
202-03.
43. See infra notes 99-102, 137, 144-157, 172-174 and accompanying text.
44. Centralization is beneficial not only from the perspective of the nation as a whole,
but also from the perspective of the individual states, since better terms can be won by the
national government than could be achieved by the states acting separately. In this respect,
it makes no difference whether the subject matter is one that would otherwise fall within the
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ing the nation's most vital interests may depend on the ability of the
federal government to make treaty concessions on subjects falling
within the exclusive legislative competence of the states.45 Were nego
tiations on those subjects left to the states, the refusal of a single state
to reach satisfactory terms with a foreign nation could embroil the
whole country in difficulties and conflict.46

exclusive legislative authority of the states. Thus, for example, consider negotiations over
the mutual rights of citizens of the United States and a foreign state to own real property in
the territory of the other, and assume, as was the case circa 1795, that the right of aliens to
own real property is a matter within the exclusive legislative competence of the states. In
comparison with the states acting separately, the federal government may be in a better posi
tion to achieve results that are more favorable to the rights of U.S. citizens abroad and less
demanding on the states at home. This advantage results from a combination of enhanced
bargaining strength which accompanies greater size and power and greater expertise in con
ducting negotiations in the delicate and complex realm of foreign affairs. For these reasons,
centralizing the treaty power is beneficial not only from the perspective of the nation as a
whole, but from the perspective of each state separately. Of course, this does not make it an
unmixed blessing. For example, some states might simply prefer to refuse to make conces
sions that would allow aliens to own real property in their territory, notwithstanding the con
sequences for the rights of their own citizens abroad. Others may feel that the federal gov
ernment has sold their interests too short. See Spiro, supra note 3, at 593-95 (expressing
doubts about whether national governments can be expected to represent the interests of
subnational units adequately). Nevertheless, even though at times individual states may dis
agree with federal policy decisions, in the long run all states will be better off, all things con
sidered, having the federal government in control rather than leaving negotiations to the
states acting separately.

45. There may be matters of vital national concern in the conduct of foreign states,
which, when made the subject of reciprocal concessions, would trench on matters within the
exclusive legislative authority of the states. For example, the United States quite arguably
has a compelling national interest in ensuring respect for human rights by other nations.
Among other things, as has been demonstrated repeatedly across the globe, violations of
human rights can lead to instability and can undermine international peace and security.
Human rights treaties are one instrument for preventing such occurrences. The national
government's ability to uphold international stability, then, may depend upon whether we
can enter into human rights treaties that contain mutual concessions on subjects potentially
within the exclusive legislative power of the states. For further discussion, see infra notes
767-772 and accompanying text
Flexibility, moreover, is a crucial ingredient in conducting successful negotiations. The
United States simply cannot control the matters in which other states take an interest. It is
quite possible that a foreign nation will insist on obtaining concessions on a matter within
state legislative competence as the price of making other concessions of a political, eco
nomic, or even military character. Maintaining good relations or even a military alliance
may be on the line. If the national government cannot make the necessary promises, our
interests could be severely threatened. To be sure, there must be limits; for example, the
constitutional rights of individuals place limits on what can be done by treaty. Every exclu
sion, however, raises the possibility of undermining our most important national interests.
For further discussion of limits on the treaty power, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.

46. Even if separate treaties by the fifty states were the equivalent of a single treaty
binding the whole country, leaving negotiations to the states would still enable individual
states to impose externalities on the rest of the union. What would prevent a single state (or
several states) from refusing to grant concessions that were essential to safeguarding the
interests of the rest? If the refusal of a single state to deal seriously offended a foreign
power, it would direct its ire - whether in the form of diplomatic, political, or economic
retaliation, or even the application of military force - on the country as a whole, not on,
say, South Carolina alone. See infra Section 11.B.2. Hence comes the necessity of conceding
to the federal government the power to negotiate treaties even on matters within the
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It is crucial to understand clearly the nature and object of treaty
making. States' rights proponents tend to confuse the purpose of a
treaty with the price paid for realizing that purpose. The purpose of a
treaty is not to adopt domestic regulations at all; that is the price of a
treaty. The national government enters into treaties in order to pro
tect the rights of United States citizens abroad and to further our for
eign policy interests more generally. Those are quintessentially mat
ters within the province of the federal government, over which the
states have never claimed nor exercised responsibility. To limit the
federal government in the means of advancing these national interests
would be to alter the basic theory of the Constitution: federal power
extends to achieving national objects irrespective of the powers of the
states.47
This point bears emphasis. Treaties and legislation are of essen
tially different characters, and to equate them is to make a category
mistake of the first magnitude. It is to misapprehend the difference
between a law and a contract. Legislation is the means by which a
government regulates the behavior of those subject to its jurisdiction.
Treaties, in contrast, are agreements or contracts between sovereign
states to do or to forbear from doing certain acts. As with all con
tracts, they involve mutual concessions by which each party achieves
certain of its aims but only at the cost of promising to forgo others.48
Although the subject matters of treaties and legislation overlap, trea
ties accomplish what legislation never can: an obligation in the nature
of a binding promise on a sovereign, not subject to the legislative julegislative competence of the states. For a classic nineteenth-century statement of the
externalities problem, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278-80 (1876) (noting that if
California "should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of
intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If we should conclude that a
pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the injury, would California pay it, or
the Federal government?"). Although Professor Spiro has argued that in recent years, the
ability of nations to target their sanctions against subunits has increased, see Peter J. Spiro,
Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1259-70 (1999); Spiro, supra note 3, at
585-87, the potentially emerging practices he identifies are still incipient at best, and it is
doubtful whether they will ever result in radically changing the prevailing international
norms about the responsibility of national governments for the conduct of their subunits. In
light of the economic and political interdependence of the states, it is also doubtful whether
sanctions targeted at, say, New York could affect only the interests of New York and its
citizens.
47. That is one of the key points, I take it, of McCulloch and Gibbons. See supra note
36; infra notes 706-755. For discussion of the breadth of the "national interests," see supra
note 41.
48. To be sure, contemporary multilateral treaty negotiations look a great deal more
like legislating than the more traditional bilateral negotiations of the past In the crucial re
spect identified in the text, however, nothing has changed: Legislation is still the act of a
recognized sovereign with jurisdiction over those to whom the legislation applies, and the
validity of legislative acts is still independent of the latter's consent. In contrast, treaties re
main contracts between and among those who recognize no common sovereign with jurisdic
tion to legislate for them, and therefore treaties still depend for their force upon the consent
of each.
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risdiction of another, to act, or forbear from acting, in ways that are
beneficial to the national interests of that other sovereign.49
Treaties, then, are not legislative acts, even though by the
Constitution they are declared to be the supreme law of the land and
thus operate as laws. They are, rather, contracts through which states
promote their national interests in a world made up of other sover
eigns over whom they have only limited control. A nation having only
legislative authority - a nation without the power to make treaties would be as hobbled in pursuing its interests as an individual would be
in pursuing his own were he denied the power to make contracts. The
only difference is that an individual's power to make contracts is less
essential because his rights and property are protected by a back
ground set of institutions and guarantees; in contrast, in the more per-

49. Both Hamilton and Calhoun made this point early on. See Hamilton, supra note 21,
at 8-10; Calhoun, supra note 19, at 127-31. For further discussion of Hamilton's view, see
infra notes 293-294 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Calhoun's views, see
infra note 531 and accompanying text. To illustrate, pursuant to its power to regulate for
eign commerce, Congress may legislatively impose tariffs on imports. But through legisla
tion alone, Congress can never achieve what is the essential characteristic of a tariff treaty: a
binding obligation under international law on another state to lower its tariff rates on U.S.
products in return for the lowering of tariffs on products of that country imported into the
United States. That is the purpose - and the exclusive realm - of the power to make in
ternational agreements. As Calhoun explained:

It is proposed to establish some regulation of commerce; - we immediately inquire, does it
depend on our will? can we make the desired regulation without the concurrence of any for
eign power? If so, it belongs to Congress, and any one would feel it to be absurd to attempt
to effect it by treaty. On the contrary, does it require the consent of a foreign power? is it
proposed to grant a favor for a favor - to repeal discriminating duties on both sides? It is
equally felt to belong to the treaty-making power; and he would be thought insane who
should proposed to abolish the discriminating duties in any case, by an act of the American
Congress.
Calhoun, supra note 19, at 129.
In this respect, moreover, the legislative powers of the states are limited in precisely the
same way as the legislative powers of Congress. In principle, whether exercised by Congress
or the states, legislative power can never accomplish what only a binding agreement can. I
leave aside the so-calle d congressional-executive agreement. As I have sought to demon
strate elsewhere, see supra, the congressional-executive agreement is an innovation of the
World War II-period that established for the first time a power in Congress, in lieu of two
thirds of the Senate, to approve binding international agreements. See Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 19, at 861-96. When Congress acts in this mode, it is not engaged in legislating in
the sense I discuss in the text; it is engaged in international agreement-making, just as the
Senate is when it consents to a treaty. For further discussion of congressional-executive
agreements and their bearing on the Missouri issue, see infra notes 784-791 and accompa
nying text.

Finally, I note that in some cases the President and Senate may agree to a treaty impos
ing binding obligations on the United States without obtaining reciprocally binding promises
in return. Such unilateral treaty obligations would be appropriate in cases where to obtain
concessions of a less formal character, the President and Senate nevertheless need to make
binding promises on our part. Thus, for example, in order to obtain military cooperation
from another nation, the President and Senate may find it necessary to make certain unilat
eral promises in a treaty. Although there is no reciprocal concession of a binding character,
the treaty may still be important in advancing the national interests in our relations \vith for
eign nations.
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ilous, anarchical society in which nations interact, the power to con
tract is a crucial instrument for the securing of their most basic inter
ests. To put it in somewhat archaic nineteenth-century terms, a state
without the power to make treaties across the full range of matters
appropriate for negotiation and agreement would not be "completely
sovereign. "50
Recognition of this simple fact lends powerful support to the na
tionalist view. The real question is not whether there are limits on the
scope of the national interests that the President and Senate can seek
to safeguard and advance through foreign negotiations - that is, on
the purpose of a treaty. In this respect, the President and Senate have
a virtual carte blanche. Rather, the question is whether there are (im
plied) subject matter limits on the concessions which the President and
Senate can make in their efforts to safeguard and advance those inter
ests - that is, on the price that the President and Senate may agree to
pay. Under the states' rights view, irrespective of the importance of
the national interest that the President and Senate seek to achieve even, say, if a military alliance were at stake - and irrespective of the
consequences, they would be precluded from making concessions on a
whole class of subjects simply because legislative power over those
subjects is assigned to the states. The President would have to inform
his foreign counterparts that those subjects are simply and categori
cally off the table.
Hobbling the President and Senate in this way would be all the
more problematic when combined with the Constitution's explicit ex
clusion of the states from the making of treaties.51 Thus, in seeking to
mitigate the damage, the President could not even refer frustrated na
tions to the states to obtain concessions on those matters which are
beyond federal authority. As a practical matter, moreover, if the
President and Senate are precluded from making concessions on sub
jects over which Congress has no legislative authority, then the United
States as a whole - both the nation and its constituent parts - would
be precluded from making treaties on a range of potentially important
subjects otherwise appropriate for treatment by negotiation and
agreement. Insofar as other nations insist (as they usually do) upon
reciprocal obligations, the federal government would be unable to ne
gotiate, and, by express constitutional prohibition, the states would be
unable to pick up the slack.52
50. For a classic statement of the complete "sovereignty" of the United States over all
matters pertaining to its foreign affairs, with citations to many other cases to the same effect,
see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06, 711-15 (1892). See also infra notes
532, 763 (discussing examples) and accompanying text.
51. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from making any "Treaty, Alli
ance, or Confederation").
52. In theory, this potential gap might be partly filled in by the Compact Clause, which
permits states, with Congress's consent, to make "agreements and compacts" not only with
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sister states but with foreign nations as well. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The origins
and meaning of this clause are famously mysterious. See Abraham C. Weinfeld, What did
the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L.
REV. 453, 459-64 (1935). Before the twentieth century, however, no one suggested - and it
has only rarely been suggested since - that this provision was intended to permit states to
conclude all of those international agreements which are beyond the federal treaty power
because they touch on subjects over which Congress has no legislative authority. Indeed, to
my knowledge, in none of the treaty power controversies during the eighteenth and nine
teenth centuries did any states' rights advocate ever suggest that, while the President and
Senate could not make a treaty stipulation on a subject "reserved" to the states, the states
could. The few early discussions of the Compact aause instead sought to explain the differ
ence between a prohibited state "treaty" and a permissible "agreement or compact" along
entirely different lines. See 1 ST. GEORGE TuCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH
NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTII OF VIRGINIA, app., at 310
(Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter 1 TuCKER] (in
voking Vattel's distinction between agreements that are executed once for all and those
which last for a longer period or in perpetuity); 3 STORY, supra note 19, §§ 1396-97, at 270-72
(criticizing St George Tucker's view and suggesting that compacts may deal with "questions
of boundary; interests in land, situate in the territory of each other; and other internal regu
lations for the mutual comfort, and convenience of states, bordering on each other");
Weinfeld, supra, at 464 (suggesting that the Founders intended to permit agreements con
cerning boundaries and other related matters). For discussion, see Golove, supra note 16, at
1910-11, 1914-15 & n.375. It has been widely assumed that the Founders intended to open
only a narrowly limited range of subjects to state negotiations with foreign states. See
WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 156, at 230 (observing that states can make only " 'trifling and
temporary arrangements' " which are " 'without substantial political and economic effect' ");
John M. Mathews, The States and Foreign Relations, 19 MICH. L. REV. 690, 693 (1920) {ob
serving that "the direct contact of the state governments with foreign governments is, under
the Constitution, reduced to a negligible quantity"). Most likely, they had in mind agree
ments between border states, principally by the northern states and Canada, over highly lo
calized matters. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 578-79 {1840) (Taney, CJ.) (seeming
to suggest that compacts might properly be made by the northern states with Canada be
cause of the special needs of border states); 3 STORY, supra note 19, § 1397. Their expecta
tions in this regard have been fully realized. As late as 1922, Quincy Wright could report
that no state had ever attempted to make an agreement with a foreign state under the
Compact aause. See WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 156, at 230. Discussions of the treaty power
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries routinely proceeded as if the states were entirely
excluded from the realm of international agreement-making. See, e.g., Mathews, supra, at
693-94 (quoting cases). See also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 {1886), in which
the Court observed in relation to extradition agreements that:
[a]t this time of day, and after the repeated examinations which have been made by this
court into the powers of the Federal government to deal with all such international questions
exclusively, it can hardly be admitted that, even in the absence of treaties or acts of Congress
on the subject, the extradition of a fugitive from justice can become the subject of negotia
tion between a state of this Union and a foreign government.

Id. Also, in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 573-74, 578-79, the Court recognized a limited
power of states to make compacts under congressional supervision but observed that:
The framers of the Constitution manifestly believed that any intercourse between a state and
a foreign nation was dangerous to the Union; that it would open a door of which foreign
powers would avail themselves to obtain influence in separate states. Provisions were there
fore introduced to cut off all negotiations and intercourse between the state authorities and
foreign nations.

Id. at 573-74. Leaving the theoretical difficulties aside, if modem practice is a guide, the few
actual agreements approved by Congress have involved establishing a port authority for a
bridge over the Niagara River, a highway agreement between Minnesota and Manitoba, and
a cooperative arrangement in the Northwest for dealing with forest fires. See HENKIN, supra
note 16, at 153. In any case, moreover, the state power is so hedged by practical obstacles
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This is not to suggest that it is essential that a nation be able to
make every kind of treaty without limitation. Here, it is crucial to dis
tinguish among various reasons for imposing limits on the treaty
power. Some treaties are objectionable because they contravene fun
damental substantive principles that apply to all governmental acts,
including both legislation and treaties. A treaty that contravenes the
First Amendment, for example, would be beyond the treaty-making
power, just as a law violating the First Amendment would be beyond
the legislative power. The content of such a treaty would be objec
tionable. In contrast, there is nothing objectionable in the content of a
treaty that deals with a subject for which legislative power happens to
be assigned to the state legislatures. Notwithstanding the assignment
of legislative authority to one or another legislative body, a treaty of
this nature may be of great value to the states individually and to the
country as a whole, and be perfectly consistent with the substantive
values embodied in the Constitution. If the treaty power does not ex
tend to making such an agreement (or if the treaty power is limited in
ways that make concluding such agreements impossible as a practical
matter), then there would be a whole class of potentially beneficial,
even essential, international agreements that would simply be beyond
the power of the United States to conclude. Short of clear constitu
tional language, there is no basis for attributing such an intent to the
Founders. It certainly ought not to be presumed in the face of clear
provisions to the contrary.53

that without substantial changes in practice, it could not substitute for a comparable power
in the United States. Besides the difficulties of obtaining congressional consent, states have
no regular means of engaging in diplomatic discussions, and it remains unlikely that the fed
eral government would permit them to establish independent diplomatic ties. The states are
thus seriously handicapped in negotiating international agreements. This helps explain why
they failed to make any such agreements during the first one hundred and fifty years after
adoption of the Constitution. In recent years, some have argued for a change in this respect,
see Spiro, supra note 3, at 590-95, and there is some evidence that states have become more
assertive on the international front See id.; FRY, supra note 16. Whether any substantial
change is likely to emerge - and whether it would be constitutionally permissible - re
mains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that any such change would require a radical
revision of traditional constitutional practices and understandings.
53. Similar considerations also distinguish between treaties that violate the separation of
powers and treaties that incidentally regulate a matter within the exclusive legislative com
petence of the states. It is true that governmental action, whether by legislation or by treaty,
that violates the separation of powers is not objectionable in the same sense as a treaty that
violates the First Amendment. In this respect, the separation of powers and the federal divi
sion of legislative power are similar. They are, however, different in another crucial respect.
Separation of powers restrictions do not limit the subject matter or content of treaties. They
only require that certain subject matters not be regulated in certain ways - that money not
be appropriated except as specified in the Constitution, that wars not be initiated without
congressional declaration, and so on. Treaties can still deal with these subjects - by form
ing defensive alliances or by promising to pay money - limited only by the requirement that
whatever acts are promised must be carried out in the required manner. In contrast, if trea
ties that touch on subjects within the exclusive legislative competence of the states are be
yond the treaty power, then those subject matters are entirely off limits to international ne
gotiation and agreement If the federal government cannot make such treaties, no one can.
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This problem, of course, is not unique to the United States. The
treaty power poses a dilemma for any constitution creating a federal
structure. Although there are many possible solutions, the most ap
pealing is surely not to preclude both the national and the constituent
governments from making beneficial treaties on certain subjects sim
ply because of the peculiar division of powers devised for domestic
legislation. Nor is it practical, in a nation with a large number of sub
units, to subject treaties to the latter's unanimous consent.
Be that as it may, in the case of the United States Constitution, the
Founders' choice is clear: they assigned plenary authority over trea
ties to the national government and excluded the states from any par
ticipation. Their reasons for doing so, moreover, were compelling.
Even leaving aside the collective bargaining advantages that accrue
from a unified negotiating posture, permitting states to carry on for
mal diplomatic contacts and enter into separate relationships with for
eign powers raises the prospect of foreign intrigue, of divided loyalties,
and of conflict and competition among the states.54 The Founders
acted decisively to prevent the realization of this potentiality, and the
unity of the nation in this respect has never been seriously breached.55
The consequence, however, is that the federal government must have
the power to conclude treaties even when they include concessions on
subjects that are within the exclusive legislative authority of the states.
Nor were the Founders insensitive to concerns about how the in
terests of the states would be affected by treaty-making. Out of just
these concerns, they created a procedure uniquely sensitive to, and
capable of safeguarding, state interests.
Treaties are not made
through the ordinary majoritarian legislative process. Instead, they
have to be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate, the organ in
which the states are equally represented (and whose members, under
the initial design, were appointed by the state legislatures). The point
is not that the Senate was assigned the task of policing constitutional
limits on the treaty-power. Like all governmental actors, the Senate of
course has the duty to ensure respect for the fundamental law. The
point, rather, is that the Senate, fortified by a minority veto, was
In any case, however, there is another difference between treaties which violate the separa
tion of powers and treaties which touch on matters within exclusive state legislative compe
tence. Nothing in the constitutional text suggests that treaties are free of the requirements
of the separation of powers. In contrast, the text does strongly suggest that treaties may
cover any subject proper for international negotiation. For further consideration of the rela
tionship between the treaty power and the principles of federalism and the separation of
powers, see supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text; infra notes 292, 698-717 and accom
panying text.

54. See Chief Justice Taney's discussion of this point in Holmes, 39 U.S. at 573-74,
quoted supra note 52. For further discussion, see infra notes 173-174, 179 and accompanying
text.
55. But see infra notes 174, 534-537 and accompanying text (discussing examples where
national unity was potentially threatened by separate state negotiations).
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charged with the special political task of refusing its consent to any
treaty that trenched too far on the interests of the states without serv
ing a sufficiently powerful countervailing national interest. In carrying
out these duties, the Senate was to be guided by political, not constitu
tional, standards because the need for flexibility made it imprudent, if
not impossible, to draw legally defined lines. Although the Founders
may not have fully anticipated developments which would change the
political dynamics in the Senate, they were certainly correct in the bot
tom line: the Senate, under the shadow of the minority veto, has ac
tively protected state interests in treaty-making throughout U.S. his
tory.56 This political safeguard goes a long way in explaining why the
Founders felt content with a system that delegated the whole treaty
power to the national government.
The textual and structural case for the nationalist view is thus
compelling, even overwhelming. Of course, proponents of the states'
rights view have pressed a number of counterarguments that will need
to be considered. I leave those arguments until the end, however until after exploring the rich history that gives these textual and struc
tural considerations their flesh and blood, the real substance of a living
Constitution.
One final point before turning to the historical materials. Under
the Supremacy Clause, some treaties - self-executing treaties - be
come binding domestic law even in the absence of any congressional
implementing legislation. Sometimes, however, treaty stipulations are
not self-executing and consequently only become binding rules of de
cision when executed by Congress.57 Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, it is quite clear that Congress has the power to adopt legisla
tion executing the provisions of any valid treaty.58 That Clause pro
vides explicitly that Congress has the power "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the

Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."59 If the President and Senate have the power to conclude
treaties on subjects that are beyond the scope of Congress's legislative
powers, then the Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that
Congress has the power to adopt legislation implementing the provi
sions of such treaties as domestic law. Otherwise, the federal govern
ment could undertake, on behalf of the nation, binding obligations
which it would find itself powerless to enforce. The treaty power is a
56. For further discussion and authorities, see infra notes 167-170, 178, 425, 695, 748-756,
772 and accompanying text.
57. For discussion of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, see supra note 20
and accompanying text; infra notes 708, 799 and accompanying text.
58. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
59.

Id. (emphasis added).
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power vested in the government of the United States or in a depart
ment thereof.
Hence, the least controversial portion of Justice
Holmes's opinion in Missouri: if the President and Senate had the
power to conclude a migratory bird treaty with Canada, then Congress
had the power to pass legislation implementing the treaty, notwith
standing its lack of authority to pass the same legislation in the ab
sence of the treaty.ro
II.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TIIE NATIONALIST VIEW

A striking feature of the history of Missouri v. Holland is the way
in which controversy over a relatively narrow constitutional question
has recurrently engulfed the nation in controversy, while somehow
successfully resisting final resolution. Equally striking is the way in
which Missouri's doctrine has repeatedly provoked debate over the
fundamental nature of the federal system. The history is therefore in
teresting in its own right as a case study elucidating both the complex
processes through which constitutional conflicts journey in the course
of time and theories of federalism. There are, however, several more
immediate reasons for my extended treatment of Missouri's historical
underpinnings.
First, because the question of Missouri's vitality has been raised
once again, the history necessarily becomes relevant. Constitutional
interpretation does not occur in a historical vacuum, particularly in re
gard to fundamental structural questions.
Insofar as Professor
Bradley relies upon the trend in recent Supreme Court decisions, it is
evident as well that history will play a predominant role should the is
sue ever come before the Court. Second, like many states' rights ad
vocates before him, Professor Bradley claims that Missouri is without
historical foundation.61 As will soon be evident, this claim is simply
60. For further discussion and authorities,

text

see

infra notes 800-802 and accompanying

61. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 450 (asserting that "the nationalist view of the treaty
power is unsupported by history"); id. at 416 & n.148 (asserting that the states' rights view
"appear[s] to have been consistent with the prevailing views" at the time of the Founding);
id. at 421 n.178 (claiming that "the first scholar to directly challenge the view that the treaty
power was limited by the reserved powers of the states" wrote in 1902). At one point, Pro
fessor Bradley is slightly more equivocal. See id. at 410 (noting that the "historical record
may not by itself require contemporary rejection of the nationalist view, but it does under
mine any strong historical claints for that view"). Given his emphasis on history, the absence
of any discussion of evidence supporting the nationalist view also strongly suggests that he
believes that such evidence does not in fact exist. See id. at 409-29.

Professor Bradley complicates the matter by conflating two entirely different questions
- whether the treaty power is limited to those subjects falling within Congress's legislative
powers (the "states' rights" view), and whether there are any limitations whatsoever on the
subject matter of treaties. To be sure, there is widespread historical support for limits of the
latter kind; indeed, they have been so widely recognized from the beginning that it would be
difficult to find any historical support for the contrary view. However, Professor Bradley
does not argue for general subject matter limitations of the kind that have been recognized
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false. Moreover, although defenders of the nationalist view long ago
mustered enough history to validate Missouri's pedigree, to a surpris
ing extent they too have been ignorant of a great deal of the relevant
historical materials.62 Finally, at the core of Professor Bradley's cri
tique of Missouri is the claim that contemporary treaties somehow
trench more deeply into areas of state sovereignty than their more
traditional forebears. This claim too is false. As we shall see, from the
beginning, treaties have invaded the most sensitive spheres of state
autonomy and consequently have periodically provoked intense re
sentment and controversy. Indeed, the most serious conflicts have
arisen from treaties affording rights to aliens and hence interfering
with state and local policies concerning race - a subject which, to put
it mildly, was at the core of traditional notions of state autonomy.
Contemporary human rights treaties, which bear a close family resem
blance to the most controversial treaties of the past, offer nothing new
in this critical respect.
History provides strong support for the nationalist view. It is true
that there have always been proponents of the states' rights view, oc
casionally even leading figures. As we shall see, however, much of the
support for that view has been strongly politically motivated; some re
flected a conception of the limited nature of the Union that did not
survive the Civil War; some arose out of confusion, occasioned by ju
dicial dicta that also stemmed from the controversy over slavery; some
was simply disingenuous, remarks made to foreign nations in justifica
tion of politically motivated refusals to deal. To be sure, comparable
claims might be made about the authorities supporting the nationalist
view, but not as pervasively or persuasively. My claim is that from the
beginning the nationalist view has been dominant; that this dominance
was seriously threatened only during the antebellum struggle over
slavery; and that there is a strong line beginning with the Articles of
Confederation, running through the Philadelphia and state ratifying
conventions, through the great debates of the first generation, con
tinuing on (though more threatened) during the antebellum struggle,
revived in the aftermath of the Civil War, and culminating ultimately
in Missouri. Missouri is an originalist decision.

traditionally. His argument is that Missouri was incorrectly decided and that the treaty
power is limited in a very particular way - viz, that it cannot, without the consent of the
states, touch upon matters that are beyond the legislative powers of Congress. For further
discussion, see infra notes 696-742, 794-806 and accompanying text.
62. For leading historical accounts arguing in favor of the nationalist view, see CHARLES
HENRY BU1LER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (2 vols. 1902);
EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY (1913); and ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE
TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1908). For the most
elaborate effort at a historical rebuttal, see HENRY ST. GEORGE TuCKER, LIMITATIONS ON
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER (1915).
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Original Intent and the Treaty Power

I begin with the materials bearing on original intent. In order to
appreciate fully the discussions in Philadelphia and the state conven
tions, it is essential to begin with the practice under the Articles of
Confederation. First, the Framers were acting against the backdrop of
the previous decade, and they drew heavily upon the extensive store
of practical experience that they had gained in the realm of foreign
negotiations. It was famously the difficulty of obtaining state compli
ance with treaties that was among the foremost reasons impelling the
movement toward Philadelphia, and that experience left an unmistak
able imprint on the text adopted.63 More than that, however, the
Framers self-consciously sought to correct the loopholes and ambigui
ties in the Articles of Confederation that had repeatedly given rise to
states' rights controversies which sometimes threatened seriously to
embarrass the conduct of foreign affairs. Second, notwithstanding
these controversies, there was, by 1787, a fairly widespread consensus
on the broad scope of the treaty power, especially among the most in
fluential figures, and this consensus carried over into the construction
of the new system. Finally, the disputes that did arise continued to fes
ter even after the old Confederation died, and, as we will see, they ul
timately played a central role in prompting resolution of the Missouri
issue during the years after the adoption of the Constitution. After
examining the experience under the Confederation, I turn to the
Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the Virginia Rati
fying Convention, where the discussions of the treaty power was by far
the most extensive.
1.

The Experience Under the Articles of Confederation

It has often been observed that the pattern for the conduct of
American foreign relations for a century or more was established
during the Articles of Confederation. In no field is this observation
more warranted than in relation to the treaty power. No doubt the
explanation lies at least in part in the remarkable assemblage of
talents among those who shaped and supervised our foreign affairs
during those early years, particularly our principal negotiators among them, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, John Adams, and Thomas
Jefferson. Be that as it may, the lessons learned during the crisis
ridden decade following the Declaration of Independence inevitably

63. On this point, see the useful discussion in FREDERICK W. MARKS III,
INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1973).
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played a decisive role in shaping the Constitution drafted in
Philadelphia in 1787.64
It should be no surprise that events quickly provoked conflict over
the relationship between the power of the national government to
make treaties and the powers of the state governments. Although the
treaty power was lodged in the Continental Congress, Congress's leg
islative powers were highly restricted. Most saliently, it had no power
over foreign commerce. Thus, the states retained virtually the entire
power of legislation. This division of authority was a recipe for con
flict. Charged with the conduct of American foreign affairs, Congress
would inevitably seek to make treaties on subjects falling outside the
scope of its limited legislative authority. The inevitable quickly be
came the real, as our negotiators aggressively pursued a commercial
treaty with our patron and ally, France, immediately following the is
suance of the Declaration.
However, it was not only the inevitable clash between the powers
of the states and the subject matter of the various treaties that were
proposed, negotiated, and concluded that provoked dispute over the
scope of the treaty power. Ambiguities in the provisions of the Arti
cles dealing \vith treaties seriously exacerbated the problem, giving
rise to plausible claims in favor of the states. Moreover, in the agi
tated politics of the times, it was inevitable that some would be
tempted to raise states' rights objections to treaties they opposed prin
cipally on other grounds. Even our negotiators would find it hard to
resist the expedient of seeking to avert undesirable treaty stipulations,
pressed upon them by powerful foreign interlocutors, by claiming con
stitutional incapacities.
Thus, conflicts over the treaty power and states' rights were recur
rent under the Confederation, and while the national government uni
formly reaffirmed the broad scope of its authority in each confronta
tion, states' rights proponents did succeed in creating controversy and
uncertainty and sometimes even in seriously subverting Congress's
foreign policy initiatives - indeed, so severely as to place the peace of
the nation in jeopardy. By 1787, the leading figures responsible for
conducting our foreign affairs had learned three crucial lessons: first,
that any rigid limitations on the treaty power in favor of the states cre
ated a serious potential to embarrass the conduct of our foreign affairs
with the most grave possible consequences; second, that the federal
government had to have sufficient power to ensure that any obliga
tions it undertook to foreign countries would be observed by the
64. For accounts of the foreign affairs experience under the Confederation, see, for ex
ample, SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF Tiffi UNITED STATES 15-84
(4th ed. 1955); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 1943 (1904); 1 GEORGE nCKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF TIIB ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND
ADOPTION OF Tiffi CONSTITUTION OF Tiffi UNITED STATES 276-90 (New York, Harper &
Bros. 1854); MARKs, supra note 63.
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states; and third, that to ensure state compliance with the stipulations
of treaties, it was essential that treaties supersede any conflicting pro
visions of state law. All three of these lessons were incorporated into
the Constitution they drafted in Philadelphia.

a. The First Confrontations and the Recurrent Problem of Alien
Land Ownership. The first confrontation over the treaty power arose
even before the ink was dry on the Articles of Confederation. The
Continental Congress finally agreed upon a text in mid-November
1777 and sent it to the states with a request that the legislatures grant
their delegations a power of ratification.65 Much like the Constitution,
the Articles lodged the foreign affairs powers in Congress. Included in
Article IX were, most importantly, the "sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on peace and war," "of sending and receiving
ambassadors," and of "entering into treaties and alliances."66 Beyond
foreign affairs, however, Congress's legislative powers were strictly
limited, and it was denied authority even to implement its foreign af
fairs powers, consigning it to reliance on the states to carry out the
measures decided upon and the obligations incurred.67

65. See 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., 1774-89, at 907-25, 932-35 (Nov. 15·
17, 1777) (1907). For an account of the prolonged negotiations, see MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1774-81, at 126-84 (1940). Because of disputes over the
extensive western land claims of some of the states, the Articles were not finally ratified until
March 1, 1781. See id. at 198-238.
66. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 16, art. IX. Among the other foreign
affairs powers which the Articles conferred on Congress were the powers to establish rules
for captures, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to establish courts for the trial of pira
cies and for deciding on appeals in cases of captures, to build a navy, to agree on the number
of land forces and make requisitions from the states for their quotas, to appoint officers for
the land and naval forces, to make rules for their government and regulation, and to direct
their operations. See id. In Article VI, the states were precluded from doing the following
without Congress's consent: engaging in war or sending any embassy to, or receiving any
embassy from, or entering into "any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any
King, Prince, or State." Id., art. VI. At the same time, however, Congress's treaty power
was limited by a proviso which provided "that no treaty of commerce shall be made,
whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such
imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting
the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever." Id., art.
IX. Correspondingly, the states were prohibited from laying "any imposts or duties which
may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in Congress
assembled, with any King, Prince, or State, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by
Congress to the courts of France and Spain." Id., art. VI. For further discussion of these last
two provisions, see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. Congress could conclude trea
ties only with the votes of nine states. See id., art. IX.
67. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 16, art. IX. Most important, Con·
gress had no power to regulate foreign commerce, which was thus left to the states. Article
II provided that "[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled." Id., art. II. Of course, the Articles left Congress de·
pendent on the states in a number of other crucial respects - for example, for raising money
to fund the war.
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Under the leadership of then Governor Thomas Jefferson,
Virginia was the first state to act. The Virginia Assembly promptly
took up the Articles and, on December 16, overwhelmingly adopted a
resolution lending them its approbation.68 During the discussions,
there was only one point which provoked substantial dissension. As
Jefferson reported to Adams in a letter, "[o]ne objection only, stuck
with them." According to Jefferson, some members of the legislature
were concerned that under the treaty power "the congress would have
the whole regulation of our trade."69 Advocates for the Articles, in
turn,

insisted that Congress would have no such power by the confederation:
that a power to treat, did not include ex vi termini a power to pass away
every thing by treaty which might be the subject of a treaty; and conse

quently no more gave such power over our commerce than over every
thing else.70

Jefferson reported that the majority was satisfied with this explana
tion, a view in which he concurred. Out of evident uncertainty about
the matter, however, he requested that Congress pass an explanatory
resolution "declaring that the Confederation will give them no such
powers."71
It is striking that the Virginia legislators immediately perceived the
apparent implications of the treaty power, and it remains unclear just
how Jefferson and the majority believed the treaty power would be
limited. Nothing came of their request for clarification, and their con
cerns were quickly lost in the mists of time.72 Indeed, Jefferson him
self shortly became one of the foremost advocates of aggressive efforts
to regulate commerce through comprehensive commercial treaties.73

68. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Dec. 17, 1777), in 2 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 120, 120-21 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
69. Id. at 120.
70. Id. The opponents were worried that the commercial states would use treaties to
bargain away the interests of the agricultural states in return for commercial privileges. See
id. In response, proponents pointed to Article II, which limited Congress to those powers
which were expressly granted. They argued that such a move could not be justified by a
mere "implication" from the proviso to the treaty power. See id. The proviso, however, only
made even more explicit what was already evident in the general grant of the treaty power
- that Congress could make commercial treaties, subject to the limitations specified in the
proviso.
71. Id. at 121. "There remains," Jefferson wrote Adams, "great anxiety that an article
so important should not be laid down in more express terms, and so as to exclude all possible
doubt." Id. at 120. He then appealed to Congress for its cooperation in easing Virginia's
agitation: "If the confirming in their affections an assembly which have ever witnessed the
highest respect for congress, would be an object with them, I know nothing which would
produce that effect more powerfully than such vote passed before the final ratification of the
instrument." Id. at 121.
72. Adams never received Jefferson's letter. Before it arrived, Adams had proceeded to
the north to embark on a diplomatic mission to France. See id. at 121.
73. See infra notes 148-155 and accompanying text
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For its part, Congress answered Virginia's concerns with the negotia
tion and ratification of an extensive commercial treaty with the
French, signed in February 1778.74 Even before the Articles were for
mally ratified, then, Congress openly declared its authority to make
treaties on subjects that were within the sole legislative powers of the
states.
Notwithstanding the potential for controversy, however, the com
mercial stipulations in the 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with
France ("French Treaty") failed to raise any serious objections. It had
been contemplated that Congress would make commercial treaties, at
least with France and Spain, and both Articles VI and IX of the Con
federation had indirectly affirmed this expectation.75 Following the
conclusion of the French Treaty, Congress appointed a large number
of commissioners to negotiate commercial treaties with most of the
leading powers in Europe, modeling their commissions on the terms of
the French Treaty.76
One article in the French Treaty, however, did prove to pose more
delicate concerns. Article XI provided that subjects of the two coun
tries could own real and personal property in the territory of the other
and dispose of it by testament, donation, or otherwise to whomsoever
they chose.77 This stipulation altered the traditional common law rule

74.

See

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr.,

in

2 TREATIES AND

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Hunter Miller ed.,
1931) (hereinafter TREATIES]. In fact, Congress began plans for a commercial treaty with
France at the same time as it began work on the Declaration of Independence. See
CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 19-25.
75. See 1 CURTIS, supra note 64, at 279. The reference to commercial treaties in the
proviso to Article IX's grant of the treaty power clearly signaled Congress's plans, and the
point was made even more explicitly in Article Vi's reference to "treaties already proposed
by Congress to the courts of France and Spain." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note
16, art VI.

id.

76. See CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 25-26. Few of these negotiations bore fruit.
For further discussion, see infra notes 93-95, 150-158 and accompanying text.

See

77. See 2 TREATIES, supra note 74, art. XI, at 11-12. The article numbers here refer to
the renumbered version of the treaty, denoted by the bracketed numbers in this printing.
See id. at 32 (note regarding Articles IX and XI). Article XI provided:
The Subjects and Inhabitants of the said United States, or any one of them, shall not be
reputed Aubains in France, & consequently shall be exempted from the Droit d'Aubaine or
other similar Duty under what name soever. They may by Testament, Donation, or other
wise dispose of their Goods moveable and immoveable in favour of such Persons as to them
shall seem good; and their Heirs, Subjects of the Said United States, residing whether in
France or elsewhere, may succeed them ab intestat, without being obliged to obtain Letters
of Naturalization, and without having the Effect of this Concession contested or impeded
under Pretext of any Rights or Prerogatives of Provinces, Cities, or Private Persons. And
the said Heirs, whether such by particular Title, or ab intestat, shall be exempt from all Duty
called Droit de Detraction, or other Duty of the same kind • • • . The Subjects of the most
Christian King shall enjoy on their Part, in all the Dominions of the sd States, an entire and
perfect Reciprocity relative to the Stipulations contained in the present Article.

Id., art. XI, at 11-12.

The Droit d'Aubaine and the Droit de Detraction were special rules
under French law that imposed taxes on alien owned property and in some cases required its
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of the states, which denied aliens the right to own real property.78
Given the close relationship between real property and state sover
eignty, the provision was bound to raise questions about the scope of
the treaty power. Indeed, as we shall see, this provision, found in the
very first treaty of the new nation and repeated in countless treaties
thereafter, raised the single issue over which the states' rights and na
tionalist views of the treaty power would most recurrently contend for
the next century and a half. It is somewhat surprising, then, that it
passed through Congress without immediate comment.
This silent acquiescence, however, did not last long.79 When
Congress modeled the commissions given to its negotiators on the
1778 French Treaty, it had included provisions similar to Article XI.
Thus, for example, on December 29, 1780, it charged John Adams
\vith negotiating a treaty of amity with the Netherlands and specifi
cally directed him in Congress's plan for the treaty to seek reciprocal
rights for the subjects of each nation to dispose by will or otherwise of
their real and personal property in the territory of the other.80 A year
and a half later, a few members of Congress, among them most nota
bly James Madison, developed doubts about the advisability of this in
struction. On behalf of a committee of three, on July 5, 1782, Madison
prepared a report recommending that Adams's instructions be modi
fied to direct him to decline to include any provision which would

forfeiture altogether. For later discussions of this provision, see infra notes 78, 80, 82-89, 9698, 257, 280, 283, 287-288, 301-302, 411-413, 483, 532 and accompanying text.

78. For extended discussion of the common law rules concerning alien ownership of real
property, see 1 TUCKER, supra note 52, at 53-65. For an excellent exploration of the persis
tence of this traditional common law rule throughout the antebellum period, see Polly J.
Price, Alien Law Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative Auton
omy Paradigm, 44 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author).
79. The first sign of doubt appeared the following year. Apparently, some of the state
legislatures were slow to implement Article XI, causing friction with the French. On
January 14, 1780, Congress brought the matter directly to the attention of the state legisla
tures, adopting a resolution reiterating the terms of the provision and recommending that
they "make provision, where not already made, for conferring like privileges and immunities
on the subjects of his most Christian Majesty, agreeable to the form and spirit of the above
recited article." 16 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 54, 57 (Jan. 14,
1780) (1910).
80. See 18 JOURNAI.S OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 1204-10 (Dec. 29,
1780) (1910). Adams's commission was apparently similar to an earlier commission given to
Henry Laurens for the same purpose. See id. at 1204. Congress adapted the language for
this provision from Article XI of the French Treaty. Article VI of the proposed "project," as
draft treaties were then called, provided that the subjects of each nation could "devise or
give away to such person or persons as to them shall seem good, their effects, merchandise,
money, debts or goods, moveable or immoveable, which they have or ought to have at the
time of their death, or at any time before." Id. at 1209. In accordance with the practice of
the time, Congress often developed elaborate plans for the treaties which it charged its
commissioners with negotiating. They were essentially full draft treaties, from which the
commissioners were given more or less discretion to diverge in reaching final agreement.
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grant subjects of the Netherlands the right to own real property in the
United States.81
In the committee's report, Madison objected to this provision on a
number of grounds.82 Most important for present purposes, he ob
served:
That in the opinion of the Committee it is not altogether clear that the
stipulation of the right above stated to the subjects of his M.C.M.
[France] does not encroach on the rights reserved by the federal articles
to the individual States; And very clear, that on extension of it to subjects
of other powers than of Spain, will be chargeable with such encroach
ment.83

One should not be misled by this language. Contrary to first impres
sions, Madison's constitutional objection did not arise from implicit
limits on the treaty power, in favor of the power of the states, of the
kind contended for in the states' rights view. Although Madison was
less than explicit in explaining his view, he was in fact alluding to a ba
sic ambiguity in the Articles - an ambiguity that would provide the
textual foundation for future states' rights objections to Congress's
treaties. The problem arose out of an apparent conflict between the
two Articles dealing with treaties. In Article IX, Congress had been
granted the sole and exclusive power to make treaties and alliances
subject to the proviso "that no treaty of commerce shall be made,
whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be re
strained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their
own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or
81. See James Madison, Report Revising John Adams' Instructions (July 5, 1782)
[hereinafter Madison, Report of July 5], reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
391-94 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1965) [hereinafter 4 MADISON
PAPERS]; James Madison, Report on Treaty with the Netherlands (July 12, 1782) [hereinaf
ter Madison, Report of July 12], reprinted in 4 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 410-12. The
committee proposed that Adams be directed to avoid any such stipulation provided that he
had not already taken steps toward conclusion of the treaty in accordance with the original
instructions. See id. at 411. Madison actually prepared two reports. The first, dated July 5,
was recommitted by Congress on July 8. See 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG.
1774-1789, at 376 n.1 (July 8, 1782) (1914). The revised report, dated July 12, was then pre
sented on July 17. See 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 393-96
(July 17, 1782) (1914).
82. First, he doubted whether it would be equally beneficial to both sides and ques
tioned the advisability of granting aliens an "indefinite licence" to hold real property in the
country. See Madison, Report of July 12, supra note 81, at 411. Even more important, re
calling the difficulties in obtaining state compliance with Article XI of the French Treaty, he
thought it extremely doubtful that the states would comply with a similar stipulation in a
treaty with the Netherlands, to whom their loyalty was not engaged as it was toward France.
See id.
83. Id. The first draft of the report had been more tentative, asserting instead that "it is
at least questionable whether the extension of this privilege to the subjects of other powers
than of France, and Spain will not encroach on the rights reserved by the federal articles to
the individual states." Madison, Report of July 5, supra note 81, at 392. When Congress
decided to recommit this version, Madison amended it to go a step further, as indicated in
the text.
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importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever."84
The inclusion of the proviso obviously created an explicit, but limited,
states' rights restriction on the treaty power. At the same time, how
ever, it strongly implied the nationalist view. On those few subject
matters where Congress was to be restrained from invading the legis
lative powers of the states, Article IX was explicit. Congress could
thus make treaties on other subjects without regard to the legislative
authority of the states.
But if Article IX suggested an expansive power, Article VI sug
gested just the reverse. In exceedingly confusing language, it prohib
ited the states from laying "any imposts or duties which may interfere
with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in
Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of
any treaties already proposed by Congress to the court of France and
Spain."85 Thus, Article VI explicitly asserted the supremacy of federal
treaties over state law, but it did so only as to the imposition of im
posts and duties in violation of treaties entered into "in pursuance" of
the treaties proposed with France and Spain. Here, the possible nega
tive implication was clear: the states were restrained only as to the
treaties with France and Spain (and those "in pursuance" thereof) and
only as to stipulations concerning imposts and duties. They were not
otherwise restrained from violating Congress's treaties.
Given the horns of this interpretive dilemma, Madison opted for
the reading favorable to state power. Article VI, he seemed to think,
precluded Congress from making treaties which limited the power of
the states to impose imposts and duties, excepting only the treaties
proposed to France and Spain at the time the Articles were drafted
and treaties with other powers incorporating the commercial terms of
the proposed French and Spanish treaties.86 More important, even as
to the treaties with France and Spain, the legislative power of the
states could be constrained only as to imposts and duties, not as to
other matters such as real property; a fortiori if this was the case as to
France and Spain, it was certainly the case as to other powers. Hence,
insofar as the instructions to Adams directed him to include stipula84.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 16, art. IX.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 16, art. VI. See JENSEN, supra note 65,
at 177 n.3 (noting that the inclusion of this language "left the restriction rather ambiguous").
85.

86. Although Madison gave broad scope to the possible negative implications of Article
VI, he did not similarly narrowly construe the Article's "in pursuance" language. Read nar
rowly, that language could have been taken to mean that commercial treaties could be made
only with France and Spain and perhaps with those other nations that the French and
Spanish treaties somehow made necessary. If Madison had so interpreted Article VI, then
the whole project of making a commercial treaty with the Netherlands would presumably
have been beyond Congress's powers. George Ticknor Curtis took this view. For discus
sion, see infra note 87. Madison's broader reading seemed to allow Congress to make any
commercial treaty which included the same provisions that had been proposed for the
French and Spanish treaties.
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tions regarding real property, the proposed treaty was beyond
Congress's powers. As Madison recognized in his report, even Article
XI in the French Treaty ran afoul of this understanding of Article VI.
To be sure, Madison's construction of the Articles of Confedera
tion was not wholly implausible.87 Nor does the negotiating history
fully clear up the matter.88 It does, however, suggest that Madison was

87. The language of Article VI leant itself to at least three alternative constructions.
First, Article VI might have been simply an inelegant restatement of the limitation found in
the proviso to Article IX and not have been intended to impose any further limitation. In
the proviso, the limitation was directly stated; in Article VI, it was made clear that the states
were not obliged to follow a treaty that violated Article IX. Crandall took this view of the
two provisions. See CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 27-28; see also JENSEN, supra note 65, at
177-78 (adopting a similar view). Second, Article VI might have been read instead as an ad
ditional restriction on the treaty power beyond the limitations of the proviso to Article IX.
Congress could not make treaties that limited the states as specified in the proviso, and it
was also prohibited from agreeing to any stipulations regarding imposts and duties that went
beyond those included in the French and Spanish treaties. Finally, Article VI might be read
the way Madison seemed to suggest: as limiting Congress from going beyond the stipula
tions on imposts and duties contained in the proposed French and Spanish treaties and as
prohibiting it from making stipulations on any other subject, including alien ovmership of
real property, that restrained the legislative powers of the states in any area outside of
Congress's very limited legislative authority. George Ticknor Curtis adopted an even more
extreme version of Madison's view. He claimed that the power to make treaties dealing with
imposts and duties was limited to the French and Spanish treaties "and such as were de
pendent upon them." 1 CURTIS, supra note 64, at 280. Congress was constitutionally in
competent to conclude "others which should have the effect of restraining the legislatures of
the states from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or mer
chandise, or laying whatever duties or imposts they thought proper." Id. As a result, the
other commercial treaties entered into by Congress, with the Netherlands in 1782 and
Sweden in 1783, were unconstitutional, even though they contained the same stipulations
regarding imposts and duties as the 1778 French Treaty. See id. at 279-82. Moreover, Curtis
agreed that Article VI did not permit Congress, even in the French and Spanish treaties, to
include provisions dealing with real property. See id. at 281. Something like this view seems
to have been at the root of much of the subsequent state resistance to Congress's treaties.
See infra notes 126, 127-142, 149-156 and accompanying text. It also helps explain the close
relationship in the Founders' minds between the Supremacy Clause, which replaced Article
VI with a blanket declaration of the supremacy of national treaties, and the nationalist view
of the treaty power. See infra Section 11.A.2 and infra notes 234, 294, 403-405, 412, 437, 464
and accompanying text.
88. The negotiating history is most supportive of the view that Articles VI was merely
meant to reinforce the limitations of Article IX. In the initial draft, Congress was given the
sole and exclusive power of "Entering into Treaties and Alliances" without limitation, see 5
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., 1774-1789, at 545, 550 (July 12, 1776) (1906),
while the states were explicitly given the power to regulate foreign commerce. It was the
latter grant which the drafters may have thought necessitated clarification. Each state was
permitted to
assess or lay such Imposts or Duties as it thinks proper, on Importations or Exportations,
provided such Imposts or Duties do not interfere with any Stipulations in Treaties hereafter
entered into by the United States assembled, with the King or Kingdom of Great Britain, or
any foreign Prince or State.

Id. at 547-48. By August, the latter provision had been redrafted to remove the direct grant
to the states of regulatory authority over foreign commerce (presumably on the assumption
that it was already implicit), leaving only the prohibition on the states from laying "any im
posts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties" with foreign powers.
Id. at 676 (Aug. 20, 1776). This change, however, inadvertently seems to have created the
possible negative implication that Madison later drew: by removing the grant of power over
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wrong in thinking that Article VI was a general limitation on Con
gress's power to make treaties restraining the state legislatures. Most
likely, it was meant only as a cognate to the proviso to Article IX. If a
treaty violated the limitations of the proviso, then Article VI freed the
states of any obligation to restrain the exercise of their legislative dis
cretion. In any case, even if, arguendo, Article VI was intended to
prohibit Congress from agreeing to stipulations limiting the rights of
the states to impose imposts and duties beyond those limitations con
tained in the French and Spanish treaties, it is doubtful that it was
meant as a general prohibition on all other treaty stipulations that in
any way constrained the state legislatures. Such a construction was di
rectly at odds with the language of Article IX, which was far clearer in
its apparent intent. Moreover, Madison's construction would have se
riously undermined Congress's ability to conduct foreign policy. That
it necessarily called into question the validity of Article XI of the
French Treaty was no doubt alone sufficient to condemn it in the eyes
of his colleagues. Not surprisingly, then, Congress was singularly un-

foreign commerce, which had necessitated the exception for treaty stipulations, the new lan
guage might be construed, via the canon expressio unius, to express the only restrictions that
treaties could impose on the legislative power of the states. There is no reason to think that
Congress had any such intention in mind.

In any case, when discussion resumed a year later, advocates of restrictions on
Congress's power to make commercial treaties made their move. On October 21, 1777,
echoing the limitation that would ultimately be included in Article IX, they proposed an
amendment to Article VI which would have only prohibited the states from imposing im
posts or duties
upon goods, wares or merchandise, imported or exported by any foreign nation with whom
the United States assembled shall enter into any commercial treaty, other than what shall be
laid upon the inhabitants of such state; provided that any state may totally prohibit the ex
portation or importation of any particular species of goods, wares or merchandise; and pro
vided also, that if any foreign nation shall not allow the same privileges, exemptions or ad
vantages, to the people and vessels of any state trading in their ports, as to their own people
and vessels, the said state may disallow the like privileges, exemptions and advantages to
those foreigners.

9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 65, at 824, 826-27 (Oct. 21, 1777).
This amendment failed. See id. at 828. At the legislative session two days later, however, its
proponents tried again. This time, however, they proposed two amendments. The first in
cluded the language ultimately included in Article VI; the second included most of the lan
guage from the defeated amendment from the previous session, only this time attached as a
proviso to Article IX. See id. at 833-34 (Oct 23, 1777). Congress adopted both, thus pro
viding the final language that became Articles VI and IX. See id.

In light of this history, it seems reasonably clear that Article VI was not meant as a com
prehensive limitation on the power of Congress to bind the state legislatures by treaty, but
rather as a specific limitation on commercial stipulations. Likewise, in context, the amend
ments to both Articles appear to have been parallel in intention. Article IX limited the
commercial stipulations that could be included in treaties. Article VI, in turn, achieved the
same result by limiting the obligation of the states to comply with treaties that violated the
restrictions in Article IX. The peculiar language of Article VI probably reflected the under
standing of the delegates concerning the nature of the treaties proposed by Congress to
France and Spain. Those proposed treaties, they must have believed, were consistent with
the restrictions in the proviso to Article IX. By referring to the proposed treaties, therefore,
they were incorporating the restrictions that they had made express in Article IX.
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impressed with Madison's report. It resoundingly defeated his pro
posed modification of Adams's instructions, with Madison able to
muster the votes of only six out of the twenty-nine delegates present.89
In a twist, when Adams completed the negotiations only a few
months later, he sent back a treaty which, though perhaps ambiguous,
seemed to grant subjects of the two nations only the right to own and
dispose of personal, not real, property in the territory of the other.90
Adams, in fact, had resisted a Dutch proposal to extend that right to
the ownership of real property. In doing so, moreover, he established
a somewhat dubious precedent that would be followed repeatedly in
the future by our negotiators when pressed to accept undesirable
treaty stipulations: although he objected to such a provision on policy
grounds, he laid the heaviest emphasis on an asserted lack of constitu
tional power. "What rendered all other considerations unnecessary,"
he informed the Dutch ministers, "was that Congress had not author
ity to do this, it being a matter of the interior policy of the separate
States."91 Although Congress approved the treaty, it disagreed with

89. See Madison, Report of July 12, supra note 81, at 412 n.9 (noting that "every state
delegation except New Jersey's rejected the resolution. . . . Of the twenty-nine delegates in
Congress, only six favored the proposal"); see also 22 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL
CONG., supra note 81, at 396 (July 18, 1782). Even Virginia's delegation overrode Madison
and voted to uphold the existing instructions.
90. See 24 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 64, 70 (Jan. 23, 1783)
{1922). The treaty as signed by Adams had removed the language in Congress's draft refer
ring to "goods, moveable or immoveable," 18 JOURNALS OF TIIB CONTINENTAL CONG., su
pra note 80, at 1209 (Dec. 29, 1780), and replaced it with the words "effects" and "succes
sions," 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra, at 70-71. At a minimum,
however, these words were equivocal. See CURTIS, supra note 64, at 281 (noting that these
expressions "would probably exclude real property, but . . . might possibly be construed to
include it"). Moreover, Adams retained in full Article II of the Congress's draft treaty,
which had provided that the subjects of each nation shall "enjoy all the rights, liberties,
privileges, immunities and exemptions in trade, navigation and commerce . . . which the
[most favored) nations do or shall enjoy. 18 JOURNALS OFTIIE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra
note 80, at 1207-08 (Dec. 29, 1780). Compare this with the entry on 24 JOURNALS OF TIIE
CONTINENTAL CONG., supra, at 69 (Jan. 23, 1783). Madison had warned that this most fa
vored nation provision might give rise to the claim that subjects of the Netherlands were en
titled to the same rights to own real property that had been granted to French subjects in the
Treaty of 1778, and he had recommended that it be clarified to avoid that result. See
Madison, Report of July 12, supra note 81, at 410.
91. Letter from John Adams to Robert Livingston (Oct. 8, 1782), in 5 THE
UNITED STATES 803, 804
(Francis Wharton ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1889). Oddly, Adams re
ported that it was the Dutch who had proposed "that a right should be stipulated for the
subjects of this republic to purchase lands in any of our States," and Adams claimed that
such a right "was not even stipulated for France." Id. Perhaps he understood the Dutch
proposal to be different in some important respect from what Congress had included in the
draft treaty and what was already promised in Article XI of the French Treaty for French
subjects. Be that as it may, his position was not a little ironic in light of the recent discus
sions on the subject in Congress. For further discussion of the tendency of U.S. commission
ers to invoke constitutional constraints, see infra notes 104-116, 550-552, 667-672 and ac
companying text.

REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF TIIE
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Adams's constitutional claim.92 Leaving no doubt about its view, a
short time later it approved a similar treaty with Sweden. The princi
pal difference between the two was that the Swedish treaty did grant
the subjects of each nation the right to hold not only personal but also
real property in the territory of the other.93
Nevertheless, the conflict over these provisions had its effect. Al
though Congress stuck to its constitutional position, its political enthu
siasm was chastened somewhat. Shortly after ratifying the Swedish
treaty, it adopted an elaborate set of instructions for its commissioners
to use in negotiating commercial treaties with most of the powers of
Europe. Once again, it directed the commissioners to seek provisions
granting reciprocal rights in real property. This time, however, it was
more sensitive to the concerns of the states, taking note of their uni
form policy to prohibit aliens from owning real estate. Rather than
directing the commissioners to pursue the unqualified right included in
the French and Swedish treaties, it instead instructed them to seek a
more limited right, though one still in conflict with the laws of the
states:
where on the death of any person holding real estate within the territo
ries of one of the contracting parties, such real estate would by their laws
descend on a Subject or Citizen of the other, were he not disqualified by
alienage, there he shall be allowed a reasonable time to dispose of the
same, and withdraw the proceeds without molestation.94

The commissioners immediately undertook negotiations under the
new set of instructions. Despite vigorous efforts, in only one case,
with Prussia, was a treaty finally concluded. It faithfully included the
provision envisioned by Congress.95
92. When Congress thereafter took up the treaty, its committee, which included James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Oliver Ellsworth, took note of the discrepancy between
the treaty and Congress's instructions to Adams. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONG., supra note 90, at 65 (Jan. 23, 1783). Rather than embracing Adams's constitutional
views, however, the committee merely noted that the treaty "seems more cautiously" to ex
clude the privilege of holding real estate. Id. Upon the committee's recommendation,
Congress, in turn, approved the treaty. See id. at 66.
93. See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, U.S.-Swed., in 2 TREATIES, supra
note 74, at 123, 127-28 (retaining in the official French version the use of the term "biens,"
translated as "goods," but which includes both real and personal property). For later con
flicts over how this language should be interpreted, culminating in a Supreme Court decision
upholding the view that it applies to both real and personal property, see infra notes 421, 664
and accompanying text.
94. 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., 1774-1789, at 352, 360-61 (May 7, 1784)
(1928); see also id. at 357-63 (approving instructions to commissioners to negotiate commer
cial treaties with Russia, the Court of Vienna, Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Great
Britain, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, Venice, Sardinia, and the Ottoman
Porte).
95. See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Prussia, in 2 TREATIES,
supra note 74, at 162, 168-69. It should be noted that the various commercial treaties con
cluded during the Confederation invaded the sphere of the states in a number of respects
beyond those dealing with alien property rights. The Prussian treaty, for example,
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In late 1785, the French Minister Count de Vergennes complained
to Jefferson, then American ambassador to France, about a lack of
compliance with Article XI of the 1778 French Treaty. According to
Vergennes, Georgia had never passed any law implementing Article
XI and had refused to recognize the rights of the Chevalier de
Mezieres as heir to the Georgia estate of one General Oglethorpe, a
British subject. For technical reasons, Jefferson denied that Mezieres
had any rights under the treaty but, in the course of his extended re
ply, affirmed the full scope of Article XI: "The Treaty has placed the
Subjects of France on a footing with Natives as to Conveiances [sic]
and Descent of Property."96 More important, far from questioning the
validity of this stipulation, he proclaimed that treaties were the law of
the land in the states, would be enforced by their courts, did not need
an act of the state legislature to bring them into effect, and would even
supersede inconsistent state laws.
The Judges['] . . . . Guide is the Law of the Land, of which Law its Trea
ties make a Part . . . . There was no occasion for the Assemblies to pass
Laws on this Subject, the Treaty being a Law, as I conceive, superior to
those of particular Assemblies, and repealing them where they stand in
the Way of its Operation.97

allowed aliens to hold personal property and to dispose of it by testament, donation, or oth
erwise, and to succeed to it, and [it] prohibited the exaction in such case by any State of dues,
except such as the inhabitants of the country were subject to . . . . The right to aliens to fre
quent the coasts and countries of each and all the several States, and to reside there and to
trade in all sorts of produce, manufactures, and merchandise was granted by the national
government; and the States were prohibited from imposing upon such aliens any duties or
charges to which the citizens of the most favored nation were not made subject. Resident
aliens were also assured against State legislation to prevent the exercise of an entire and per
fect liberty of conscience, and the performance of religious worship; and, when dying, they
were guaranteed the right of decent burial, and undisturbed rest for their bodies.

J.C. Bancroft Davis, Treaties and Conventions Concluded Between the United States of
America and Other Powers, printed in S. Ex. Doc. No. 47, 48th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1, Part 2
1221-22 (1889). Similar provisions were contained in the Treaty of 1778 with France, the
Treaty of 1782 with the Netherlands, and the Treaty of 1783 with Sweden.
96. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Amplification of Subjects Discussed with Vergennes
(circa Dec. 20, 1785), in 9 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 107, 110 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1954) [hereinafter 9 JEFFERSON PAPERS]. Jefferson explained at great length why, under
any construction of the applicable law, Oglethorpe's property would not have gone to
Mezieres, even were both Mezieres and Oglethorpe U.S. citizens. The treaty never entered
into the question. See id. at 107-10.
Later, as Secretary of State, Jefferson would again affirm the importance of the liberal
policy embodied in Article XI. When France refused to extend the Article XI privilege to
real property owned by Americans in French colonies, he instructed his ambassador to try to
reverse this policy. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Aug. 26, 1790), in
17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 431-35 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) [hereinafter 17
JEFFERSON PAPERS] (referring to the droit d'Aubaine as "this odious law . . . this fragment
of barbarism" and instructing his Minister to seek its abolition so "as to relieve our citizens
from this species of risk and ruin hereafter").
97. Id. at 107, 110. Jefferson gave a detailed report to John Jay and Congress on his
discussions with Vergennes. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, with Report on
Conversation with Vergennes (Jan. 2, 1786), in 9 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 136,
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By affirming the validity of this treaty stipulation, Jefferson thus
squarely placed himself in favor of the nationalist view and prefigured
the Supremacy Clause to the Constitution of 1787, anticipating by a
year a doctrine that Jay would incorporate into his famous report on
state infractions of the Treaty of Peace and that would later be associ
ated with Jay's, rather than Jefferson's, name.98 Jefferson's affirma
tion of the nationalist view is particularly striking, moreover, because
he would later become the foremost proponent of the states' rights po
sition. It is all the more striking because the question of alien owner
ship of real property would prove to be the issue over which the scope
of the treaty power would later be fought.

b. The Treaty of Peace. Far more consequential than treaties
about the rights of aliens to hold real property was the Treaty of Peace
with Great Britain of 1782.99 Even today, it remains the most momen
tous treaty ever concluded by the United States. Among other things,
of course, it secured recognition of both the nation's independence
and its claim to expansive boundaries.100 Notwithstanding its impor
tance, however, the treaty was dogged from the outset by questions
about whether its principal concessions to the British infringed upon
the authority of the states. Resistance by the states to carrying out the

143-44. He also corresponded with Adams on the subject. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to John Adams (Dec. 27, 1785) , in 9 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 126,
127; Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 19, 1786), in 9 JEFFERSON PAPERS,
supra note 96, at 181-82; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Feb. 23,
1787) , in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 177 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (affirming
that acts of the Continental Congress are supreme law of the land). In 1792, Jefferson as
Secretary of State again reaffirmed this view in his famous diplomatic note to British
Minister George Hammond, responding to Hammond's clainl that the states were breaching
the Treaty of Peace ending the Revolutionary War. For discussion, see infra notes 121-122
and accompanying text. For discussion of later controversies over whether treaties under
the Confederation were self-executing supreme law of the land binding on state court judges,
see infra notes 98, 121, 138-140, 152, 230-231, 233-234, 261-264, 272-273, 290, 293, 295, 305,
318-319, 329, 349, 431, 436 and accompanying text.
98. For discussion of Jay's report, see infra notes 120, 132, 137-141 and accompanying
text. As early as 1784, Hamilton had articulated this position in the course of litigation of a
celebrated case in the New York courts, Rutgers v. Waddington, challenging the so-called
Trespass Act as void because it was in conflict with the Treaty of Peace. For Hamilton's dis
cussion of the case, see Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus No. 3 (Aug. 12, 1795) , reprinted
in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALExANDER HAMILTON 124, 131-33 (Harold c. Syrett ed., 1973)
[hereinafter 19 HAMILTON PAPERS]. For further discussion, see infra notes 134, 295.
99. There were actually two treaties. The first, see Preliminary Articles of Peace, Nov.
30, 1782, U.S.-Gr. Brit, in 2 TREATIES, supra note 74, at 96, contained all of the terms of the
final settlement but was considered preliminary. The terms of the alliance with France re
quired the United States to await the conclusion of a peace treaty between Great Britain and
France before concluding a permanent treaty of peace with the British. The final treaty was
the Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., in 2 TREATIES, supra note 74, at

151.
100. For Justice Iredell's moving, and remarkably prescient, appraisal of the importance
of the treaty in U.S. and even world history, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256, 270
(1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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treaty's painful financial and amnesty stipulations - the same obliga
tions which had been challenged on states' rights grounds - led to se
vere tensions with Great Britain. Claiming that the United States was
in violation of the treaty, it refused to carry out its promise to with
draw British troops from military posts in the northwestern territory.
Relations soured, and tensions grew severe. At times, war seemed
imminent.101 The difficulties with the British were not finally resolved
until the Jay Treaty of 1796. In the meantime, the whole issue had
sharply divided Americans and had significantly contributed to the
split between Federalists and Republicans.102
Crucial for present purposes, the problems that arose in connec
tion with the Treaty of Peace had an immediate and dramatic impact
upon the framing of the Constitution. They concretely demonstrated
the need to avoid states' rights subject matter limitations on the treaty
power and the imperative for a mechanism that could ensure state
compliance with treaty stipulations. The controversy over the treaty,
moreover, persisted even after adoption of the Constitution. States
still resisted, and the treaty continued to be a subject of debate and
controversy, including over constitutional issues pertaining to the
treaty power. The whole subject repeatedly came before the Supreme
Court, first in Ware v. Hylton, and then again on a number of subse
quent occasions.103 In each instance, the Court rejected arguments in
favor of the states and upheld the treaty. As we shall see, the Treaty
of Peace disputes ultimately led the Court to affirm the nationalist
conception of the scope of the treaty power.
During the early round of the peace negotiations in the fall of
1782, the American Commissioners, Franklin and Jay, faced a number
of thorny issues.104 None were more delicate than the British demands
that American debtors pay their pre-War debts to British creditors de
spite war-time confiscation decrees issued by the states, and that the

101. For one of the most famous of the British diplomatic protests against state viola
tions of Article IV of the treaty, see Letter from British Minister Carmarthen to John
Adams (Feb. 28, 1786), in 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF 1HE CONGRESS OF 1HE
CONFEDERATION 187-203 (Boston, Thomas B. Wait 1820) (hereinafter SECRET JOURNALS
OF CONGRESS]. For discussion of the growing possibility of war, see infra notes 137-142,
235-240, 242 and accompanying text.
102. For discussion of increased tensions with the British and its relation to the Jay
Treaty, see infra notes 235-242 and accompanying text.
103. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). For discussion of Ware and subse
quent decisions, see infra notes 120, 123-125, 226-234, 311, 367-369, 401-421 and accompa
nying text.
104. The leading account of the negotiations of the Treaty of Peace is RICHARD B.
MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, THE GREAT POWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
(1965) [hereinafter MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS]; see also BEMIS, supra note 64, at 46-64;
Richard B. Morris, The Durable Significance of the Treaty of 1783, in PEACE AND 1HE
PEACEMAKERS, THE TREATY OF 1783, at 230 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds.,
1986).
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confiscated estates of British Loyalists be restored or their prior own
ers compensated. These demands raised highly emotional issues for
the Americans, particularly in light of the depredations which the
British army and their Loyalist allies had committed during the War.
Franklin and Jay felt constrained to resist British demands on this
front.105 Following Adams's precedent, they chose to stand on, among
other grounds, constitutional incapacity. Congress, they claimed,
lacked the power to deal with these subjects.106
When Adams arrived at the end of October to join the negotia
tions, however, he inadvertently tipped their hand. In his initial ses
sion with the British commissioners, and before he had time to consult
with Franklin and Jay, he declared that the debts should be treated
differently from the Loyalists. "I have no notion of cheating any
Body," he asserted.107 With that, the American commissioners were
forced to abandon their constitutional objections and agree to what
became Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, which provided that "Credi
tors on either side, shall meet with no lawful Impediment to the Re
covery of the full value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts here
tofore contracted." 108 As events would later unfold, this provision
would prove to have the most far-reaching consequences not only for
the future course of Anglo-American relations, but also for the shape
the Constitution ultimately would take and even for the later devel
opment of the partysystem in the United States.109
105. See MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 361-80. The main points at
issue were the recognition of American independence, the settling of the boundaries, ques
tions pertaining to the rights of American fishermen in the Newfoundland fisheries, naviga
tion on the Mississippi River, the pre-War debts owed British creditors which had been con
fiscated by the states, and the problem of the Loyalists. As to the last, several questions
emerged. The British bottom-line demand was amnesty for all Loyalists. Under strict in
structions from London, the British commissioners also pressed for compensation for the
confiscation of Loyalist estates. They tried a number of expedients, including distinguishing
between those who had taken up arms and those who had not, and also between those who
had committed particularly notorious outrages on the civilian population. They also pressed
for the reservation of some territory for British Loyalists. See id. at 364-72, 375-82.
106. See 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 43 (L.H. Butterfield ed.,
1961) [hereinafter ADAMS'S DIARY] (reporting Franklin's comment to Adams that Franklin
and Jay had been resisting British demands for payment of the debts and the compensation
to the Loyalists by clainling "We had not Power, nor had Congress"); MORRIS, THE
PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 361 (noting that Franklin and Jay "for months had been
insisting that both the commissioners and Congress lacked the power to deal with the sub
ject" of the debts).

107. 3 ADAMS'S DIARY, supra note 106, at 43. Adams acknowledged that when he
made this statement to the British commissioners, "I saw it struck Mr. Stretchy with peculiar
Pleasure, I saw it instantly smiling in every Line of his Face. Mr. 0. was apparently pleased
with it too." Id. at 44.
108. Preliminary Articles of Peace, supra note 99, art. IV, at 98. Adams later defended
his concession by arguing that it would drive a wedge between the British creditors and the
Loyalists and thus ease the opposition to the treaty in Britain. See MORRIS, THE
PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 361.
109. See infra notes 236-243, 259-267 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the concession forced upon them by Adams's
misstep, the American commissioners nevertheless persisted in their
claim that Congress at least had no power over confiscated estates. As
they explained to the British commissioners, "as this is a matter evi
dently appertaining to the internal polity of the separate States, the
Congress, by the nature of our constitution, have no authority to inter
fere with it."110 Indeed, Adams advised his British counterparts
that we are instructed against it; that Congress are instructed against it,
or rather have not constitutional authority to do it; that we can only write
about it to Congress, and they to the States, who may, and probably will,
deliberate upon it eighteen months before they all decide, and then every
one of them will determine against it.111

No doubt this parry must have looked unconvincing to the British,
especially after the concession on the debts, and their negotiators, un
der instructions from London, continued to press the point urgently.112
In response, the Americans, although unyielding, eventually retreated
to new and potentially even more treacherous ground, arguing that if
the Loyalists were to be compensated for their losses, the Americans
should be compensated for the damages they had suffered at the
hands of the British and Loyalist forces.113 After an intense round of

110. Letter from John Adams, B. Franklin, and John Jay to Richard Oswald, British
Commissioner (Nov. 4, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS 219, 219 (Walter Lowrie &
Matthew St. Clair Oarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833).
111. Extract from Mr. Adams' Journal Respecting Peace (Nov. 11, 1782), in 1
AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110, at 219, 219; see also Extract from Mr. Adams'
Journal Respecting Peace (Nov. 15, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110,
at 219; Extract from Mr. Adams' Journal Respecting Peace (Nov. 17, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN
STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110, at 220; Extract of a Letter from Doctor Franklin to Richard
Oswald, Esq. (Nov. 26, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110, at 221; Ex
tracts from Dr. Franklin's Journal of Negotiations for Peace with Great Britain, in 1
AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110, at 222. For the demand of the British commis
sioners for restoration of, or compensation for, the confiscated Loyalist estates and for a
general amnesty, see Letter from Richard Oswald to J. Adams, B. Franklin, and J. Jay (Nov.
4, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra note 110, at 219. In response to earlier de
mands in favor of the Loyalists, Franklin had written Congress, which, in tum, on September
10, 1782, adopted a resolution declaring that
in the opinion of Congress, the great loss of property which the citizens of the United States
have sustained, by the enemy, will be considered by the several States as an insuperable bar
to their making restitution, or indemnification, to the former ovmers of property, which has
been or may be forfeited to, or confiscated by, any of the States.

Extract of a Letter from Doctor Franklin to Richard Oswald, Esq., supra, at 221.

112 See MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 367-68, 372.
113. See MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 375, 378-79; Extract from Mr.
Adams' Journal Respecting Peace (Nov. 29, 1782), in 1 AMERICAN STAIB PAPERS, supra
note 110, at 220; Extract of a Letter from Doctor Franklin to Richard Oswald, Esq., supra
note 111, at 221-22. Although Adams and Jay were more disposed to be flexible, Franklin
was uncompromising on the Loyalist issue and read the British commissioners a letter he
had drafted vividly recounting the atrocities that had been committed against the Americans
during the War. The record would show not only
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further negotiations, the British finally relented, opening the door to a
final compromise.
If the American commissioners' constitutional objections had al
ready seemed half-baked, the final agreement made a complete hash
of their pretensions. In Article IV, they agreed to resuscitate debts
that had been discharged under state law, clearly implying that
Congress did have power to override state laws even retrospectively.
In contrast, in Article V, they agreed only that Congress would rec
ommend to the state legislatures the restitution of confiscated estates,
on the plea that the restitution of estates confiscated under state law
was beyond Congress's powers.114 In still another part of Article V,
however, they agreed that certain interests in land that the states had
confiscated would be revived after all: "all Persons who have any In
terest in confiscated Lands, either by Debts, Marriage Settlements or
otherwise, shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the prosecution of
their just Rights."115 Finally, in Article VI, the commissioners agreed
that there would be no further confiscations, prosecutions, or other ac
tions taken against Loyalists and that those still in prison would be
immediately released.116 But this necessarily implied that Congress did
in fact have the power to override state laws concerning confiscations,
to say nothing of their criminal laws.

the enormities committed by [the Loyalists], under the direction of British generals, but of
those committed by the British troops themselves, [and] will form a record that must render
the British name odious in America to the latest generations. In that authentic record will
be found, the burning of the fine towns of Charlestown, near Boston, of Falmouth just be
fore winter, when the sick, the aged, the women, and children, were driven to seek shelter
where they could hardly find it; of Norfolk, in the midst of winter; of New London, of
Fairfield, of Esopus, &c &c besides near a hundred and fifty miles of well settled country
laid waste, every house and barn burnt, and many hundred of farmers, with their wives and
children, butchered and scalped.
Extract of a Letter from Doctor Franklin to Richard Oswald, Esq., supra note 111, at 221.
He then proposed that the claims on both sides be submitted to commissioners for their de
termination of the total losses and that the side with lesser losses compensate the other. See
id.; MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 378-79.

114. See Preliminary Articles of Peace, supra note 99, art. V, at 98-99. Article V pro
vided that Congress would recommend to the state legislatures the restitution of the estates
of "real British Subjects" and of those "Persons resident in Districts in the Possession of his
Majesty's Arms; and who have not borne Arms against the said United States." Id. As to
the rest of the Loyalists, there was to be a similar, though more qualified, recommendation
and a right on their part to spend twelve months unmolested in the United States seeking
full restitution of their estates. See id.
115. Id. at 99.
116. See id. at 99.

Article VI provided:

That there shall be no future Confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced against
any Person or Persons, for or by reason of the Part which he or they may have taken in the
present War, and that no person shall on that account suffer any future Loss or Damage ei
ther in his Person, Liberty or Property; and that those who may be in confinement on such
charges, at the time of the Ratification of the Treaty in America, shall be immediately set at
Liberty, and the Prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.

Id.
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It was clear, then, that no coherent construction of the Articles of
Confederation could explain how Congress could have authority to
make the definite commitments agreed upon but not the more exten
sive commitments the British sought. The strategic character of their
arguments was obvious, as the commissioners' subsequent conduct
strikingly revealed. Immediately communicating the Treaty of Peace
to Secretary for Foreign Affairs Robert Livingston, the commissioners
reversed course. As to Article IV, they now claimed that the right to
confiscate debts "appertains solely to Congress, in whom exclusively
are vested the rights of making war and peace."117 As to Article VI,
they took a different tack. Acknowledging how deeply it intruded into
the "sovereign rights of the States,"118 they believed that it was suffi
cient simply to point out that it was "as little unfavorable . . . as any
that could in reason be expected."119 Four years later, Jay, now Secre
tary for Foreign Affairs, publicly reaffirmed this position in his cele
brated 1786 report on state infractions of the Treaty of Peace. Re
peating the view asserted by the commissioners, he now claimed that
the right to confiscate the debts of wartime enemies belonged exclu
sively to Congress and that state laws confiscating British debts were
therefore invalid.120

117. See Letter from John Adams, B. Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens, to Robert
Livingston (Dec. 14, 1782), in 6 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 131, 132 (Francis Wharton ed., 1889).
118. Id. It was the "respect which both in London and Versailles is supposed to be due
to the honor, dignity and interests of royalty," that had forced the commissioners to agree to
the article even though it was "so near to the views of Congress and the sovereign rights of
the States as it now stands." Id.
119. Id.
120. Jay's October 13, 1796, report [hereinafter Jay's Report (Oct. 13, 1796)], reprinted
in 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 101, at 185-287. He contended that:
The rights to make war, to make peace, and to make treaties, appertaining exclusively to the
national sovereign, that is, to Congress, your secretary is of opinion that the thirteen state
legislatures have no more authority to exercise the powers, or pass acts of sovereignty on
those points, than any thirteen individual citizens.

Id. at 209. Thus, he concluded, ''your secretary is exceedingly mistaken if there ever was a
period since the year 1775, to this day, when either of the then colonies, now states, were in
capacity to pass state laws for sequestering or confiscating the debts or property of a national
enemy." Id. To be sure, this claim was extraordinary, since the right of the states to pass
confiscatory decrees against British property had been widely exercised by the states and
never previously been challenged by Congress. Jay's conclusions in this respect were explic
itly rejected by Justices Chase and Iredell, and upheld only by Justice Wilson, in Ware v.
Hylton. Compare Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.), 199, 220, 222, 229 (1796) (Chase, J., con
curring) (rejecting Jay's view), and id. at 256, 266 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (same), with id. at
281, 281 (Wilson, J., concurring) (agreeing with Jay). For further discussion, see infra notes
226-234 and accompanying text.
Notwithstanding Jay's claim of exclusive congressional authority, his discussion reveals
just how deeply the Treaty of Peace penetrated into the sphere of state authority. Thus, for
example, he branded an act passed by the New York legislature on May 12, 1784, a violation
of Article VI of the Treaty of Peace. See Jay's Report (Oct. 13, 1796), supra, at 269-74. The
act recited that "it is of great importance to the safety of a free government, that persons
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Nor were the commissioners the only ones forced to renounce
their claims. When the issue of state violations of the Treaty of Peace
arose again in 1792, Jefferson, now Secretary of State, felt compelled
to find a way to reformulate more plausibly the constitutional objec
tions the American commissioners had pressed in the negotiations.
His note in reply to the British Minister George Hammond's diplo
matic protest is an impressive piece of work.121 On this point, how
ever, Jefferson could manage only a face-saving gesture. According to
Jefferson, the problem had not been, as the commissioners had
claimed, that the matter rested exclusively with the states. Rather, the
problem was that any restitution of confiscated estates would perforce
operate retrospectively and therefore be in violation of the substantive
constitutional constraint against retroactive legislation. The commis
sioners had agreed only to recommend restitution of the confiscated
estates " [b]ecause the things here proposed to be done were retro
spective in their nature - would tear up the laws of the several States,
and the contracts and transactions, private and public, which had
taken place under them."122 Why it was permissible to recommend but
not pledge to adopt retrospective legislation was left unclear. More
important, Jefferson's point about retroactivity obviously applied
equally to the restitution of the debts, but that had been promised
unequivocally in Article IV.

holding principles inimical to the constitution should not be admitted into offices or places of
trust, whereby they might acquire an immediate influence in the direction of its councils,''
and further that
some of the citizens of this state, entertaining sentiments hostile to its independence, have
taken an active part in the late war, in opposition to the present government, and it would be
improper and dangerous that such persons should be suffered to hold or enjoy any such of
fice or place of trust within this state.

Id. at 269. The act then prohibited any person who had sided with the British during the war
from "holding, exercising or enjoying any legislative, judicial or executive office or place
whatsoever within this state" or from voting "at any election to fill any office or place what
soever, within this state." Id. at 272. This act, Jay charged, "clearly violates the sixth article
in various respects too obvious and decided to require enumeration or discussion." Id. at
274. But if determining who is qualified to hold state office and vote in state elections was
not within the exclusive legislative authority of the states, what was? By linrlting the way a
state could treat its own citizens, Article VI was a true forerunner to the modem human
rights treaty. For further discussion, see infra notes 127-136.
121. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond, British Minister (Apr. 6,
1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 200, 200. Hammond, the British
Minister, once again raised the lack of state compliance with the Treaty of Peace. In con
trast to Jay, Jefferson sought to show that there were no violations. In order to justify this
claim, Jefferson relied in large part on the contention that state laws in conflict with the
treaty were ipso facto void and would not be enforced by state court judges. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond, British Minister (May 29, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 201, 209-11.
122. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 29, 1792), supra note
121, at 202.
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Perhaps most revealing, however, was the later 1796 decision in the
great case of Ware v. Hylton,m which involved a direct challenge to
the validity of Article IV of the Treaty of Peace. The Court had no
difficulty in finding that a provision for the restitution of confiscated
debts fell within the scope of the treaty power. Noting that the treaty
power granted in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation "has no
restriction, nor is there any limitation on the power in any part of the
confederation," Justice Chase could imagine no basis upon which to
find Article IV of the Treaty of Peace invalid: "Surely, the sacrificing
public, or private, property, to obtain peace cannot be the cases in
which a treaty would be void . . . . I am fully satisfied that Congress
were invested with the authority to make the stipulation in the 4th ar
ticle. "124 In a separate opinion, moreover, Justice Cushing specifically
rejected the argument that the unwillingness of the American commis
sioners to agree in Article V to anything more than a recommendation
for the restoration of the confiscated estates demonstrated that they
did not believe that they had power to repeal state laws confiscating
property. According to Justice Cushing, who sat with Chief Justice
Jay on the Supreme Court from 1789 to Jay's retirement in 1795, "[i]t
would be hard upon [the American commissioners], to suppose they
gave up all, that they might think they strictly had a right to give up.
We may allow somewhat to skill, policy and fidelity."125

123. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The Justices in Ware issued seriatim opinions in accor
dance with the then practice. The plaintiffs were British creditors suing Virginia debtors on
the basis of Article IV. The debtors defended on the ground that, pursuant to a Virginia
state law, they had paid the debt into the Virginia loan office, thereby discharging their obli
gation under state law. For further discussion of Ware, see infra notes 226-234 and accom
panying text.
124. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 220, 236-37 (Chase, J., concurring).
125. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 281, 283 (Cushing, J., concurring). Cushing was
responding in part to an argunient of John Marshall's, who, in his only appearance before
the Supreme Court, was representing the Virginia debtors. Marshall argued that Article IV
ought to be interpreted as not applying to debts that had been discharged by Virginia upon
the debtor's payment, prior to the treaty, of the amount owing into the state loan office.
Resting on the same concern for vested rights that Jefferson had invoked in regard to Article
V, he argued that the opposing construction of Article IV would invade such rights:
It is evident, that the power of the government, to take away a vested right, was questionable
in the minds of the American conunissioners, since they would not exercise that power in re
storing confiscated real estate; and confiscated debts, or other personal estate must come
within the same rule.
Ware v. Hylton, Argunient in the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 9, 1796) [herein
after Marshall's Oral Argunient in Ware (Feb. 9, 1796)), in 3 1iIE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 7, 13 (William C. Stinchcombe et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter 3 MARSHALL
PAPERS]. For obvious reasons, the Justices, with the exception of Justice Iredell, were en
tirely unconvinced by Marshall's construction of Article IV. Compare Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
at 220, 238-45 (Chase, J., concurring), and id. at 245, 249-55 (Patterson, J., concurring), and
id. at 281, 281 (Wilson, J., concurring), and id. at 281, 282-83 (Cushing, J., concurring), with
id. at 256, 278-80 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
It is noteworthy that Marshall, even in his argunient on behalf of the debtors, could not
resist expounding on the necessity for a broad construction of the treaty power because of
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In light of this history, it is ironic, though perhaps not surprising,
that the self-denying protestations of the admittedly nationalist com
missioners - strategically asserted to resist unacceptable British de
mands - would later be relied upon by states' rights proponents as
authority for their view.126 Immediately following the peace, state leg
islatures were under intense pressure to favor local interests over
those of British creditors and hated Loyalists, and the sentiments ex
pressed in the Commissioner's remarks reappeared in the arguments
of those who wished to justify state resistance to the obligations im
posed by the Treaty of Peace. In New York, for example, Article VI's
promise that Loyalists would suffer no further losses as a result of
their part in the war could not control the passions inflamed by the
long years of revolutionary battle.127 Just as the American commis
sioners had foreseen, in late 1783, as Patriot forces assumed control
over New York City from departing British troops, the legislature be
gan to pass a series of harsh measures designed to punish those who
had remained behind British lines.128 A number of these laws were in

the need for flexibility in international negotiations. The treaty might properly have di
vested a vested right, he noted, but that power would "have arisen from the necessity of the
case." Marshall's Oral Argument in Ware (Feb. 9, 1796), supra, at 13. Had such a necessity
existed, however, "the American commissioners, explicitly avowing it, would have justified
their acquiescence to the nation." Id. Justice Iredell agreed: "Though Congress possibly
might, as the price of peace, have been authorized to give up, even rights fully acquired by
private persons during the war . . . yet, nothing but the most rigorous necessity could justify
such a sacrifice . . . ." Ware, 3 U.S. (Dall.) at 256, 279 (Justice Iredell, dissenting). Both also
seemed to think that such an invasion of vested rights ought to be mitigated by paying com
pensation to the private debtor. See Marshall's Oral Argument in Ware (Feb. 9, 1796), su
pra, at 13-14; Ware, 3 U.S. (Dall.) at 256, 279 (Justice Iredell, dissenting). For further discus
sion of Marshall's views, see infra notes 261, 331, 367-3F:7, 402, 484 and accompanying text.
126.

See infra notes 148-152, 393 and accompanying text.

127. Following the evacuation of New York City, the revolutionary Council for the
Soutllern District called elections, and the treatment of Loyalists became an incendiary is
sue. The Patriot press called for the voluntary departure or exile of all Loyalists, and denun
ciations of the Loyalists were virulent See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A LETTER FROM
PHOCION TO THE CONSIDERATE CIT!zENS OF NEW YORK (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in 3
THE pAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483, 483 n.1 (Harold c. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962) (editorial comment by editors) [hereinafter 3 HAMILTON PAPERS]. For discus
sion of the treatment of the Loyalists in New York, see PlnLIP RANLET, THE NEW YORK
LOYALISTS 153-74 (1986).
128. The legislature began passing anti-Loyalist measures during the war. See Francis
K. Decker et al., Aftermath ofRevolution: Patriots v. Loyalists, in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 197, 197-202 (Julius Goebel,
Jr. et al. eds., 1964) [hereinafter Decker et al., Aftermath ofRevolution]. The Trespass Act,
which gave rise to considerable litigation, was passed just as Congress was approving the
Preliminary Treaty of Peace. See id. at 200; Francis K. Decker et al., The Trespass Act, in
THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra, at 282, 2F:7-88 [hereinafter Decker
et al., The Trespass Act]; supra note 120. A number of others were passed in late 1783 and
early 1784, including one disenfranchising Loyalists and another declaring them to be aliens.
See Decker et al., The Trespass Act, supra, at 288. After a veto by the Council of Revision,
the legislature dropped the latter. See HAMILTON, supra note 127, at 484 n.1. For further
discussion of these measures, see Jay's remarks in his report on state infractions of the
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patent violation of Article VI and prompted vigorous, but only par
tially effectual, objections by the Council of Revision.129 The legisla
tive sponsors of the measures purported to find no inconsistency with
the treaty. More importantly, echoing the American commissioners,
some asserted that, in any case, the treaty was irrelevant: Article VI
was beyond Congress's authority and thus null because it interfered
with the internal police powers of the state.130
Outraged, a young Alexander Hamilton, writing as Phocion, leapt
into the fray.131 In characteristic fashion, he offered a wide-ranging
and comprehensive response to the anti-Loyalist agitators. The argu
ments asserting that the anti-Loyalist laws were consistent with the
treaty, he claimed, were nothing more than "fraudulent subter
fuges."132 At least equally indefensible, however, was the challenge to
the scope of congressional authority:
Does not the act of confederation place the exclusive right of war and
peace in the United States in Congress? Have they not the sole power of
making treaties with foreign nations? Are not these among the first
rights of sovereignty, and does not the delegation of them to the general
confederacy, so far abridge the sovereignty of each particular state? . . .
What reasonable limits can be assigned to these prerogatives of the un
ion, other than the general safety and the fundamentals of the constitu
tion?133

Thus, Congress's treaty power extended to all subjects which impli
cated the "national safety" and was limited only by the fundamental
liberties of the people. Nor was the treaty's interference with the in
ternal police powers of the states a legitimate objection:

Treaty of Peace. See Jay's Report (Oct. 13, 1796), supra note
of the act disenfranchising Loyalists, see supra note 120.

120, at 266-74. For description

129. For discussion of the Council's vetoes of anti-Loyalist legislation, see Decker et al.,
The Trespass Act, supra note 128, at 288 (noting that the Council objected to these measures,
inter alia, on the ground that they were in violation of the Treaty of Peace). In some cases,
the legislature nevertheless overrode the Council's veto. See id.
130. See HAMILTON, supra note 127, at 486-91 (describing the argunients of the anti
Loyalists); Decker et al., Aftermath of Revolution, supra note 128, at 211-14 (same); Decker
et al., The Trespass Act, supra note 128, at 303-04 (same).
131. Hantilton wrote two lengthy essays. See HAMILTON, supra note 127; ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, SECOND LEITER FROM PHOCION (Apr. 1784), reprinted in 3 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 127, at 530-58.
132. HAMILTON, supra note 127, at 489. Hantilton devoted the greater part of his argu
ment to the interpretive dispute over Article VI. See id. at 486-89; HAMILTON, supra note
131, at 535-39, 541-47, 555-56. In his later report on state infractions of the Treaty of Peace,
Jay concurred in Hamilton's view. The Trespass Act was "so destitute of even resemblance
to reason, that a particular exposition of its demerits would be an unnecessary, and therefore
an improper application of time and attention. In a word, this act is • . . a direct violation of
the treaty of peace." Jay's Report (Oct. 13, 1796), supra note 120, at 268. Likewise, the law
disenfranchising Loyalists was an "intemperate act" that "clearly violates the sixth article in
various respects too obvious and decided to require enumeration or discussion." Id. at 274.
133. HAMILTON, supra note 127, at 489.
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When in order to procure privileges of commerce to the citizens of these
states in foreign countries, they stipulate a reciprocity of privileges here,
does not such an admission of the subjects of foreign countries to certain
rights within these states operate, immediately upon their internal po
lice? And were this not done, would not the power of making commer
cial treaties vested in Congress, become a mere nullity? In short if
nothing was to be done by Congress that would affect our internal police,
in the large sense in which it has been taken, would not all the powers of
the confederation be annihilated and the union dissolved?134

Given the agitated state of affairs, Hamilton may not have con
vinced everyone, but he did at least quiet some of the attacks on the
constitutionality of Article VI. Thus, for example, while his chief an
tagonist in the newspaper debate, Mentor, continued to argue for a
narrow reading of the treaty, Mentor seemed to forgo any further in
sistence on the claim that Article VI was beyond Congress's author
ity.135 Still, that claim never died entirely, and ironically, as we shall
134. Id. at 490-91. Hamilton returned to this argument in his second letter. The need
for flexibility in negotiating treaties was particularly evident, he noted, in peace treaties:

The exigencies of a community, in time of war, are so various and often so critical, that it
would be extremely dangerous to prescribe narrow bounds to that power, by which it is to be
restored. The consequence might frequently be a diffidence of our engagements, and a
prolongation of the calamities of war.
HAMILTON, supra note 131, at 540. Hamilton also developed the argument as an attorney in
the celebrated Rutgers v. Waddington case, in which he sought to avoid application of the
Trespass Act to his Loyalist client. See Decker et al., The Trespass Act, supra note 128, at
296, 299-300, 305; supra note 98; infra note 295. For Hamilton's brief on the issue, see id. at
362, 373-80. The Mayor's Court agreed. In an opinion by Chief Judge James Duane, the
court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's argument that "Congress could form no treaty of
peace to reach our internal police." OPINION OF THE MAYOR'S COURT (Aug. 27, 1784), re
printed in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALExANDER HAMILTON, supra note 128, at 393, 412.
The treaty

we hold to be sacred and shall never, as far as we have power, suffer it to be violated or
questioned.
It is the great charter of America
it has formally and forever released us from foreign
domination - It has confirmed our sovereignty and independence; and ascertained our ex
tensive limits.
. The foederal compact hath vested Congress with full and exclusive powers to make
peace and war. This treaty they have made and ratified, and rendered its obligation perpet
-

• .

ual.
And we are clearly of opinion, that no state in this union can alter or abridge, in a single

point, the foederal articles or the treaty . . . .

Id. at 413.
135. See Mentor's Reply to Phocion's Letter; with Some Observations on Trade, Ad
dressed to the Citizens ofNew York (printed by Shepard Kollock, No. 22, Hannover Square
1784). Mentor persisted in claiming that the act declaring Loyalists to be aliens was consis
tent with the treaty. See id. at 7-11. Although alluding to the issue, however, he seemed to
abandon the claim that Article VI was beyond Congress's powers. See id. at 10-11 (noting,
somewhat ambiguously, that "for my own part, I cannot see the inconsistency" between the
treaty and Congress's powers and further noting, in reference to a related question, that "[i]f
the treaty have not this power, then have we played the cheat, not only with England, but
with every power that was represented in that Congress, which settled the terms of peace").
Hamilton interpreted Mentor as having "conceded this point." HAMILTON, supra note 131,
at 539.
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see, states' rights proponents would later rely directly on the strategic
remarks of the American commissioners.136
New York's violations of the Treaty of Peace, however, were only
the beginning of the troubles. After completing the negotiations in
Paris, Jay became Secretary of Foreign affairs and, under intense pres
sure from the British, now found himself in the embaITassing position
of trying to persuade the states to cease violating Articles IV and VI.137
Continuing state resistance led directly to Jay's famous report of 1786.
Undertaking a general review of the relationship between the federal
treaty power and the powers of the state governments, he now as
serted the broad principle of national supremacy with which he has
ever after been associated:
Your secretary considers the thirteen independent sovereign states as
having, by express delegation of power, formed and vested in Congress a
perfect though limited sovereignty for the general and national purposes
specified in the confederation. In this sovereignty they cannot severally
participate . . . for the ninth article of the confederation most expressly
conveys to Congress the sole and exclusive right and power of determin
ing on war and peace, and of entering into treaties and alliances . . . .
When therefore a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified and published
by Congress, it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and
superadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention, consent or
fiat of state legislatures. It derives its obligation from its being a compact
between the sovereign of this, and the sovereign of another nation; but
laws or statutes derive their force from being acts of a legislature compe
tent to the passing of them.138

Congress agreed and, on March 21, 1787, unanimously adopted a
resolution incorporating Jay's recommendations.139 Among these was
the suggestion that the states pass general acts declaring any laws in
consistent with the Treaty of Peace repealed, and authorizing state
courts to determine in individual cases whether any particular law was

136.

See infra notes 148-152, 393 and accompanying text.

137. In a diplomatic note to Adams, the British made clear that they would not consider
withdrawing from the western posts, as stipulated in Article VII of the Treaty of Peace, until
state violations of Article IV were corrected. "I can assure you," the British Minister said,
"that whenever America shall manifest a real deterntination to fulfil her part of the treaty,
Great Britain will not hesitate to prove her sincerity." Letter from British Minister
Carmathen to John Adams, supra note 101, at 189. For discussion of this episode, see
CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 40-42. See also MARKS, supra note 63, at 5-15.
138. Letter from British Minister Carmathen to John Adams, supra note 101, at 203·04.
139. For Congress's resolution, see 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 101,
at 294-96 (Mar. 21, 1787). For Jay's recommendations, see Jay's Report (Oct. 13, 1796), su
pra note 120, at 282-83. Jay had recommended that Congress make three resolves: first, af
firming that treaties are law of the land binding on the states and not subject to their legisla
tive authority; second, that all acts of the states inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace should
be forthwith repealed; and third, that each state should pass a general law repealing any laws
inconsistent with the treaty and leaving to the courts the deterntination of which particular
laws ran afoul of the obligations of the treaty. See id.
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in conflict with the treaty.140 Congress then sent an elaborate circular
letter to the states, communicating its resolution and justifying the un
derstanding of the constitutional division of powers on which the
resolution was based.141 A number of states quickly responded by
passing legislation. Virginia, however, whose citizens owed the largest
portion of the debts, continued to resist.142 In Virginia's view, it was
ultimately the state, not Congress, that had the power to decide when
national treaties should be complied with and when they should be
violated. That is where the matter lay when the delegates began their
discussions in Philadelphia just a little over a month after Congress
sent its circular letter.

c. The Effort to Regulate Foreign Commerce Through the System
atic Conclusion of Commercial Treaties. To the American commis
sioners, the embarrassments which their inconsistencies might cause
must have seemed insignificant compared to the potential benefits,
given the overriding importance Americans placed on the debt and
Loyalist issues. In retrospect, however, it appears that they were not
fully aware of the depth of the waters in which they were swimming,
failing to anticipate how Great Britain might make use of their puta
tive concessions to its own advantage.143 After recognition of inde
pendence, the most pressing American concern was to establish com
mercial relations between the United States and Britain on favorable
terms.144 Initially, there were strong grounds for optimism. Pitt pro-

140. See 4 SECRET JOURNAIS OF CONGRESS, supra note 101, at 295-96 (Mar. 21, 1787)
(recommending that the states "pass an act declaring in general terms that all such acts . . .
repugnant to the treaty of peace . . . shall be and thereby are repealed; and that the courts . . .
in all causes . . . touching the said treaty, shall decide and adjudge according to the true in
tent and meaning of the same, any thing in the said acts . . . to the contrary thereof in any
wise notwithstanding").
141. See 4 SECRET JOURNAIS OF CONGRESS, supra note 101, at 296, 329-38 (Apr. 13,
1787) . Congress essentially adopted the views Jay had expressed in his report with some

further amplification. Its circular letter is often cited as the source of the Supremacy Clause.
See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 27-28 & n.5; Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No.
1, 1795), reprinted in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 77, 83. Although
Virginia actually passed repealing legislation, the operation of the act was suspended until
the Governor of the state issued a proclamation declaring that Great Britain had ceased
violating the Treaty of Peace in two crucial respects: that the British had surrendered the
western posts, the main grievance on the American side, and that it had agreed to return, or
to pay compensation for, the slaves that the British army had carried away allegedly in viola
tion of the Treaty.
142

IV (Aug.

143. During the Treaty of Peace negotiations, one of the British negotiators had dis
creetly warned the Americans about how dangerous states' rights linlitations on the treaty
power might prove to be. See Letter from Benjamin Vaughn to John Jay (Nov. 18, 1782), in
2 JOHN JAY: THE WINNING OF THE PEACE 423, 424 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1980) . The
British government, unsurprisingly, repeated the commissioners' clainis to Parliament in jus
tification of its failure to obtain more extensive guarantees for the Loyalists.
144. For discussion of the negotiations and the British attitude toward trade, see BEMIS,
supra note 64, at 63-64; CURTIS, supra note 64, at 282-85; and MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS,
supra note 104, at 429-33. The bulk of U.S. foreign trade remained with the British. Par-
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posed a measure in Parliament to establish trade on highly liberal
terms, preparatory to the negotiation of a commercial treaty. How
ever, his government quickly fell, and his successors took a different
view of British interests.145 Rather than encourage American com
mercial development, they preferred a divide-and-conquer strategy:
"They determined . . . to deal with this country as a collection of rival
States, with each of which they could make their own terms, after the
pressure of their policy, and the impossibility of escaping from its ef
fects, had begun to be felt."146 In justification, they cited the very
claims the American commissioners had made during the peace nego
tiations. Pointing to Articles VI and IX of the Articles of Confedera
tion, Lord Sheffield, in an influential argument against making any
further treaties with the United States, contended:
No treaty can be made with the American States that can be binding on
the whole of them. The act of Confederation does not enable Congress
to form more than general treaties: at the moment of the highest
authority of Congress, the power in question was with-held by the several
States. . . . When treaties are necessary, they must be made with the

ticularly crucial for the new nation was trade with the British colonies in the West Indies,
which had been open to the colonists before independence.
145. The Treaty of Peace had been negotiated under Lord Shelburne's enlightened gov
ernment, and Lord Shelburne initially anticipated adopting a liberal trade policy toward the
new nation. His proposed bill would have permitted American produce to enter British
ports as though British-owned, would have treated American ships carrying such produce
the same as other foreign vessels, and would have opened up the West Indies trade to
American goods and shipping on the same terms as British goods and shipping. After the
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, however, his government fell, and the new government
under Fox reversed directions entirely. Instead of adopting Shelburne's bill (which had been
introduced by Pitt), Parliament vested discretionary power over the subject in the King in
Council, which in turn issued a series of orders progressively limiting the scope of American
commerce, until the West Indies trade was altogether shut off. British policy was heavily
influenced by the publication of Lord Sheffield's 1783 pamphlet, Observations on the Com
merce ofthe American States. JOHN LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON TIIE COMMERCE
OF TIIE AMERICAN STATES (Dublin, Luke White 2d ed. 1784). Marshaling a wide array of
statistics, Lord Sheffield argued vigorously that granting liberal terms of trade to American
produce and shipping would seriously underntine British commercial strength. It was also
entirely unnecessary. In light of the weakness of the American governmental system, British
commercial interests would have no difficulty dominating the American market. See BEMIS,
supra note 64, at 69; CURTIS, supra note 64, at 282-84; MARKS, supra note 63, at 52-56;
MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104, at 429-30. According to Bemis,
[T]he mercantilist Lord Sheffield . . . contended that now that the United States had become
independent Great Britain should not concern itself in extending to the former colonies the
commercial privileges they had enjoyed under the old empire. There was no danger,
Sheffield showed, of the United States being able to retaliate with tariffs or navigation laws
of its own against British trade which continued to dominate the American market. The
American Confederation was too feeble for this . . . • Confidential observers of the Ministry
in the United States pointed out that the union was really on the point of dissolution.

BEMIS, supra note 64, at 69.
146.

CURTIS, supra note 64, at 284.
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States separately. Each State has reserved every power relative to im
ports, exports, prohibitions, duties, &c. to itself.147

Notwithstanding Lord Sheffield's (probably deliberate) miscon
struction of the Articles, his argument demonstrated the grave poten
tial for embarrassment which even the hint of states' rights limitations
on the treaty power could create. His view, moreover, received a faint
echo even on the other side of the Atlantic. After the conclusion of
the Treaty of Peace - and in light of the outright British refusal to
agree to consider reasonable commercial terms - Congress in late
1783 began energetic efforts to negotiate commercial treaties
throughout Europe. The first task was to develop a model plan for
such treaties, name commissioners, and formalize their instructions.
Jefferson, then in Congress, took the lead, but progress was snagged
by a small number of opponents who argued that any treaties success
fully negotiated should, before becoming valid, be submitted to the
legislatures of each of the thirteen states for their approval.148 Oppo
nents also fought a provision, included to answer the doubts raised by
Lord Sheffield, that "these United States be considered in all such
treaties . . . as one nation upon the principles of the federal
Constitution. "149
Jefferson was outraged and urgently sought a solution.150 To
prompt immediate action, in April 1784, he submitted a resolution to
Congress reciting the harms which would be caused by further delay

147. SHEFFIELD, supra note 145, at 199-200; see also id. at 40-41 n.§ (analyzing Articles
VI and IX of the Confederation but badly mischaracterizing them).
148. See Resolution on Treaties of Amity and Commerce (Apr., 1784), in 7 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 118, 119 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954) [hereinafter 7 JEFFERSON
PAPERS] (reprinting Jefferson's draft resolution opposing states' rights advocates on this
point). Jefferson had prepared a report recommending a draft commercial treaty and had
submitted it to Congress on December 20, 1783. See id. at 204 (note following the Resolu
tion). Although he regarded the matter as one of great urgency, the report was recommitted
three times, see id., and the model treaty was not finally agreed to until May 7, 1784, see 26
JOURNALS OFT.HE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 94, at 357 (May 7, 1784).
149. Resolution on Treaties of Amity and Commerce, supra note 148, at 204 (note fol
lowing the Resolution). Opponents' efforts to strike this provision was defeated on March
26, 1784. See 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 94, at 169 (Mar. 26,
1784).
150. Writing to Madison, Jefferson claimed that the entire delay was the result of the
efforts of one delegate who was motivated solely by his ambition to become Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. According to Jefferson,
Tho' he could not change the vote of his state, he intrigued with a young fool from North
Caroline and an old one from New York, got them to divide their states by voting in the
negative, and there being but eleven states present, one of which was known before to be di
vided the whole set of instructions were rejected, tho approved by twenty one out of twenty
five members present. The whole business has been in the dust for a month . . . . He takes
now about one half of the time of Congress to himself and in conjunction with Read [and]
Spaight obstruct business inconc[e]ivably.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, (Apr. 25, 1784), in 7 JEFFERSON PAPERS,

supra note 148, at 118, 119.
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and declaring that ."the federal constitution does not require that trea
ties before their conclusion should be communicated to the thirteen
legislatures and should receive all their several approbations. "151 His
strategy seemingly worked. Congress quickly solved the problem.
Just as Jefferson had urged, it approved the model plan, including the
provision asserting the national character of the United States in
treaty-making; named commissioners, including Jefferson himself; and
approved instructions giving them authority to conduct the necessary
negotiations.152
With the difficulties in Congress settled, Jefferson energetically
pursued his assigned task in Europe. At home, Congress's lack of
authority over commerce was precipitating a growing economic and
political crisis. Jefferson hoped to find a solution through the conclu
sion of a comprehensive system of commercial treaties with all of the
commercial powers of Europe. In a letter to James Monroe, he gave a
rather frank defense of the nationalist view of the treaty power:
Congress, by the Confederation have no original and inherent power
over the commerce of the states. But by the 9th. article they are author
ised to enter into treaties of commerce. The moment these treaties are
concluded the jurisdiction of Congress over the commerce of the states
springs into existence, and that of the particular states is superseded so
far as the articles of the treaty may have taken up the subject . . . .
Congress may by treaty establish any system of commerce they please.
But, as I before observed, it is by treaty alone they can do it. Tho' they
may exercise their other powers by resolution or ordinance, those over
commerce can only be exercised by forming a treaty . . . . If therefore it
is better for the states that Congress should regulate their commerce, it is
proper that they should form treaties with all nations with whom we may
possibly trade. You see that my primary object in the formation of trea
ties is to take the commerce of the states out of the hands of the states,
and to place it under the superintendance of Congress, so far as the im
perfect provisions of our constitution will admit . . . . I would say then to

151. Resolution on Treaties of Amity and Co=erce, supra note 148, at 203. Lack of
co=ercial treaties, Jefferson claimed, led to "the suppression of every effort for the admis
sion of our citizens to their ports on an equal footing with those of other countries, to a con
tinuance of the occlusion of the West Indian markets against the produce of these states;
[and] loses a crisis of favourable disposition in the European powers in general to enter into
connections of amity and co=erce with us." Id.
152 See 26 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 94, at 356-61 (May 7,
1784). The frustrating experience in opposing the states' rights uprising on the question of
the national character of the United States in treaty-making, especially in light of the deni
grating nature of the British attitude on this point, may well explain Jefferson's later impa
tience with Adams for having spoken of Congress as a "diplomatic assembly." Chiding
Adams, Jefferson observed that "[s]eparating into parts the whole sovereignty of our states,
some of these parts are yeilded to Congress . . . . It has accordingly been the decision of our
courts that the Confederation is a part of the law of the land, and superior in authority to the
ordinary laws, because it cannot be altered by the legislature of any one state. I doubt
whether they are at all a diplomatic assembly." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Adams (Feb. 23, 1787), supra note 97, at 177.
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every nation on earth, by treaty, your people shall trade freely with us,
and ours with you, paying no more than the most favoured nation, in or
der to put an end to the right of individual states acting by fits and starts
to interrupt our commerce or to embroil us with any nation.153

Unfortunately, the efforts of Jefferson and his fellow commission
ers caine to naught, yielding only a limited commercial treaty with
Prussia in 1785.154 Other nations, following Great Britain's lead, were
doubtful about the extent of Congress's power and of its ability to en
force treaty obligations against the states.155 Indeed, the British were
deliberately insulting, responding to the entreaties of the American
commissioners with outright skepticism.156
The commissioners,
moreover, could do nothing to command greater respect. Without the
power to regulate commerce, Congress was powerless to retaliate
against the discriminatory trade policies of other nations by imposing
discriminatory duties on their products and vessels. Yet, the states
were utterly incapable of developing an effective coordinated strategy,
instead finding themselves locked in their own trade wars and con
flicts. As a result, foreign nations saw no advantage in entering into
commercial treaties with the United States.157
Notwithstanding

153. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (June 17, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953). Madison fully concurred in
Jefferson's view of the scope of the treaty power. See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON,
THE NATIONALIST, 1780-87, at 379 (1948).

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 227, 230-31

154. For discussion, see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
155. See BEMIS, supra note 64, at 66 (noting that "[a]bortive negotiations with other
powers, notably Austria and Denmark, failed because the growing ineptitude and power
lessness of the Confederation to enforce its treaties against the thirteen component states
convinced foreign nations that the Continental Congress had ceased to be a responsible
body and that the United States itself might soon cease to be a nation").
156. See CURTIS, supra note 64, at 289-90; MARKS, supra, note 63, at 66-71. In response
to the American commissioners' request to open negotiations, the Duke of Dorset replied:
Having communicated to my court the readiness you expressed in your letter to me of the
9th of December to remove to London, for the purpose of treating upon such points as may
materially concern the interests, both political and commercial, of Great Britain and
America; and having at the same time represented that you declared yourselves to be fully
authorized and empowered to negotiate, I have been, in answer thereto, instructed to learn
from you, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested, whether you are merely commissioned by Congress, or whether you have received separate
powers from the respective States . • . . [R]epeated experience having taught . • . how little
the authority of Congress could avail in any respect, where the interest of any one individual
State was even concerned, and particularly so where the concerns of that State might be
supposed to militate against such resolutions as Congress might think proper to adopt. The
apparent determination of the respective States to regulate their own separate interests ren
ders it absolutely necessary . • • that my court should be informed how far the commissioners
can be duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain, which it may not
be in the power of any one of the States to render totally fruitless and ineffectual.

CURTIS, supra

note 64, at 289-90 n.1 (quoting Letter from Duke of Dorset to American
Commissioners (Mar. 26, 1785)).

157. See CURTIS, supra note 64, at 284-90; MARKS, supra note 63, at 69-95. Marks per
suasively argues that it was the British trade restrictions that provided the impetus leading
first to the Annapolis Convention and ultimately to Philadelphia. See id.
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Jefferson's heroic exertions, the solution could not be found in the
treaty power alone but awaited more fundamental changes that could
be achieved only through constitutional reform.

2.

The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution of1787

The stage was thus set for the great national debate over the pro
posed Constitution. Through grueling experience, those who took the
lead in drafting, debating, and ratifying the Constitution had learned a
number of lessons that had a crucial bearing on their deliberations on
the treaty power: the overriding importance of maximizing the na
tion's influence in negotiations with foreign states; the imperative of
flexibility and the uncontrollable nature of negotiations; the unavoid
able necessity at times of deferring to friends and foes alike on treaty
stipulations even when they conflicted with local policies and laws; the
potential embarrassment which states' rights limitations on the scope
of the treaty power could cause the nation in its ability to pursue the
national interest, sometimes on matters of the greatest consequence;
the serious dangers posed by state noncompliance with national trea
ties; and the imperative of affording the federal government the power
to carry out the obligations which it undertook to foreign nations.
No doubt it was the forcefulness with which these lessons had been
brought to the attention of the Founders that accounts for the sur
prisingly minimal discussions of the scope of the treaty power both in
Philadelphia and in the ensuing national debates from 1787 to 1789.
Without provoking serious controversy, the Framers granted the fed
eral government the power over treaties in unqualified terms and
framed the Supremacy Clause to express the relationship between
treaties and state law in the most unequivocal fashion. For the Con
federation's treaty power burdened by Article !X's states' rights pro
viso, they substituted an outright grant of power. Likewise, for the
confusing and limited affirmation of the supremacy of federal treaties
in Article VI, which had given rise to arguments for states' rights limi
tations on the treaty power, they substituted the Supremacy Clause's
sweeping declaration that all treaties made under the authority of the
United States were to be supreme law of the land and binding on the
states.
Remarkably, these changes provoked no controversy. The issue
on which debate focused was how such a momentous power could be
properly safeguarded, a point which understandably left many feeling
unsatisfied. These debates, however, simply served to underscore the
widespread consensus on the necessity of broad discretion in the fed
eral government over treaties. Indeed, those who participated in the
debates in Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions seem
uniformly to have understood the grant of the treaty power as com
prehensive, excluding the states altogether and placing the national
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government in the same position as other sovereign nations. This did
not mean that the treaty power was unlimited: like all exercises of
governmental authority, it was to be subject to fundamental principles
protecting individual rights and could not contravene any constitu
tional prohibitions. Its scope, however, was to be determined in ac
cordance with international practice and the law of nations. States'
rights limitations on its scope were not to apply. Indeed, with only one
arguable exception, no one suggested that the treaty power would be
limited to those subjects over which Congress could otherwise regulate
pursuant to its legislative powers.
By way of background, two points were at the center of the
discussions concerning the treaty power and require brief explanation.
First, the absence of a bill of rights in the proposed Constitution raised
serious concerns in relation specifically to treaties. Could treaties
violate individual rights that were secured by the state constitutions
but which the Framers in Philadelphia had not seen fit to secure
explicitly against the federal government? Second, recent negotiations
with Spain over the right of Americans to navigate the Mississippi
River had provoked portentous sectional conflict. When Jay, as
Foreign Secretary, had requested that Congress amend his instructions
to permit him to cede navigation rights for twenty-five years in return
for commercial privileges, he had prompted a near split in the
Confederation. The American position was that the Treaty of Peace
with the British had given the United States the right to free
navigation, but Spain, which then held New Orleans, disagreed.
Navigation was crucial to southern state interests because further
expansion to the west depended upon access to the Mississippi. These
states viewed Jay's request as an inexcusable betrayal of the national
interest. Although Article IX of the Confederation required the
approval of nine states for treaties, only seven states voted in favor of
Jay's request. The majority, however, insisted that the nine-state rule
was inapplicable to instructions, and so Jay proceeded to negotiate
with Spain on the basis of the amended instructions. If he had
succeeded, the country would have found itself in a precarious
position. Under the then law of nations, the United States could have
been charged with a breach of faith for refusing to ratify a treaty which
it had instructed its commissioner to conclude; yet, the instructions
had not been approved by the requisite majority for approving
treaties. Continuing fear that the northern states would make another
attempt to cede the nation's territorial rights in the Mississippi River
played a major role in the discussions of the treaty power.158
158. There are many accounts of the Mississippi controversy, in which both Madison
and Jay played central and opposing roles. See, e.g., BEMIS, supra note 64, at 78-80; RALPH
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 176-80 (1971) ; Arthur Bestor, Respective
Roles ofSenate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original In
tent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 60-68
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a. The Philadelphia Convention. The discussions in Philadelphia
are notable for their paucity of material directly addressing the scope
of the treaty power. What nevertheless emerges is a shared supposiM
tion that the power was general and would extend as far as was cusM
tomary under international practice. Those comments which referred
to the extent of the power emphasized, sometimes anxiously, its
breadth. Thus, for example, George Mason, with the Mississippi situaM
tion in mind, observed that the President and Senate could "already
sell the whole Country by means of Treaties."159 James Wilson emM
phasized that "the Senate alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the
Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one particular port."160
Elbridge Gerry noted that "[i]n Treaties of peace the dearest interests
will be at stake, as the fisheries, territory &c. In treaties of peace also
there is more danger to the extremities of the Continent, of being sacM
rificed."161 He feared "putting the essential rights of the Union in the
hands of so small a number."162
Crucially, these comments were met with acquiescence, not denial.
They were not criticisms made in support of proposals to limit the
scope of the treaty power, but arguments for the necessity of providing
adequate safeguards for its exercise.163 Thus, in pointing out that the
king of Great Britain had to obtain Parliament's approval for certain
treaties, most importantly those dismembering the empire, Madison
assumed that the scope of the treaty power in the Constitution was as
extensive as the king's in Great Britain; Madison's point was that the
British practice furnished precedent for the further safeguard of legisM

(1979); Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 434, 443 (1975). The subject was discussed endlessly during the Virginia Ratifying Con
vention, see infra notes 194, 196-200, 202-211 and accompanying text, and underlay the dis
cussion of the treaty power during the whole period.
159. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 297 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
160. Id. at 393.
161. Id. at 541. Corresponding to the profound Southern interest in navigation of the
Mississippi, the Northern states were urgently concerned about access to the Newfoundland
fisheries. American rights to the fisheries had been the subject of intense dispute during the
peace negotiations with the British. See, e.g., MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS, supra note 104,
at 346-81. These two concerns created a co=on sectional interest in a minority veto over
treaties, forming the political basis for the two-thirds rule. For helpful discussion, see
Slonim, supra note 158, at 443-47. See also Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the
Treaty Clause ofthe Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 297 (1934).
162. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 548.
163. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 392-95,
534, 540-41, 543, 548-50. Even on the crucial question of whether the treaty power could
dismember the empire - that is, whether territorial rights to navigation of the Mississippi
could be ceded - no one proposed a limitation on the scope of the treaty power. Rather,
the effort was to provide additional safeguards, which ultimately led to the adoption of the
two-thirds rule. Other proposals, however, failed. See id. at 548-50.

March 2000]

Treaty-Making and the Nation

1135

lative ratification for certain kinds of treaties.164 This view, moreover,
was consistent with a general assumption that the scope of the treaty
power would be determined by reference to international practice.
Thus, in explanation of his claim that a "treaty might alienate territory
&c.," Mason pointed to precedent: the British cession of islands in the
West Indies by treaty "were an example."165 Thus, he opined, if Spain
should conquer Georgia, "the Senate might by treaty dismember the
Union."166
The Framers, moreover, were fully cognizant that the interests of
the states would be seriously affected by treaties. No more dramatic
example was necessary than the possibility that part or all of the terri
tory of a state might be ceded away by treaty. They responded to this
concern, however, not by narrowing the scope of the treaty power, but
by vesting the power in the Senate, where the states were equally rep
resented, and, despite Wilson's cogent objection to putting "it in the
power of a minority to controul the will of a majority,"167 by subjecting
treaties to a minority veto. Thus, John Dickinson, in discussing a pro
posal to require legislative ratification of treaties, noted that it would
be "unfavorable to the little States; [which] would otherwise have an
equal share in making Treaties."168 Likewise, Hugh Williamson re
called to Madison how Wilson's majoritarian objection had been met
by the reply "that the Navigation of the Mississippi after what had al
ready happened in Congress was not to be risqued in the Hands of a
meer Majority."169 At no point did concern over the interests of the
states lead to proposals to restrict the scope of the treaty power.170

164. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 394-95. Later,
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, when pressed hard on the Mississippi question,
Madison would insist, somewhat inconsistently, that at least in some cases the treaty power
did not extend to dismembering the Union because treaties ceding territorial rights were in
conflict with the law of nations. See infra notes 205-206, 209 and accompanying text. The
question of cessions of territory was a pervasive theme during the Founding debates and was
never satisfactorily resolved. It has remained a vexed question ever since. See, e.g., 1
WILLOUGHBY, supra note 21, § 219; supra notes 26, 159-163 and accompanying text; infra
notes 165-166, 196-207, 210-211, 216, 431, 435, 524 and accompanying text.
165. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 297-98.
166. Id. at 298.
167. Id. at 540.
168. Id. at 393.
169. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2, 1788), in 3 RECORDS OF
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 306, 307; see also 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 392 (remarks of James Madison) (arguing for
inclusion of the President in treaty-making because "the Senate represented the States
alone"). As William Davie explained to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention:

THE

[T)he extreme jealousy of the little states, and between the commercial states and the non
importing states, produced the necessity of giving an equality of suffrage to the Senate. The
same causes made it indispensable to give to the senators, as representatives of states, the
power of making, or rather ratifying, treaties . . . . [T)he small states would not consent to
confederate without an equal voice in the formation of treaties . . . . Every man was con-
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The discussions also emphasized other related points. In light of
the experience under the Confederation, there was widespread
agreement about the necessity of requiring states to conform to trea
ties concluded by the national government. Madison, for example,
noted the "constant tendency in the States . . . to violate national Trea
ties,"171 and that:
[V]iolations of Treaties . . . if not prevented must involve us in the ca
lamities of foreign wars[.] The tendency of the States to these violations
has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs. contain
complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have
been formed . . . . A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of
national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no
part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole.172

Finally, the reasons for excluding the states from participation in
treaty-making were laid bare with Madison's customary, devastating
clarity: foreign intrigue, the "pernicious machinations" of foreign
states, would otherwise divide the Union with possibly catastrophic
consequences.173 Thus, Madison asserted it was crucial that any plan
secure the Union agst. the influence of foreign powers over its members.
He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet been tried: but
it [was] naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it. As les
sons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practiced

vinced of the inflexibility of the little states in this point. It therefore became necessary to
give them an absolute equality in making treaties.

3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 348; see also id. at 342 (re
marks of Spaight in North Carolina Ratifying Convention) (noting that power had been
given to Senate because of equal representation of the states); MAx FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 131 (1913) (noting that the treaty
power was vested in the Senate because it wa& "the body which most nearly corresponded to
the old congress as the representative of the states"). In fact, however, it was not only the
interests of the little states that required lodging the power in the Senate under the protec
tion of the two-thirds rule. In light of the Mississippi experience and the Northern states'
concerns about the Newfoundland fisheries, the two-thirds rule was aimed most importantly
at protecting sectional interests.
170. It did, however, prompt proposals to provide further procedural safeguards for
state interests. For example, an amendment was proposed which would have subjected trea
ties ceding territorial, navigation, or fishery rights to the additional requirement of approval
by the House:
But no Treaty (of peace) shall be made without the concurrence of the House of Represen
tatives, by which the territorial boundaries of the U.S. may be contracted, or by which the
common rights of navigation or fishery recognized to the U. States by the late treaty of
peace, or accruing to them by virtue of the laws of nations may be abridged.

4 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 58; see also id. at 534, 543
(noting proposal, at moment when peace treaties were exempted from the two-thirds re
quirement, that peace treaties depriving the United States "of their present Territory or
rights" be subject to two-thirds rule).

171. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 164.
172 Id. at 316; see also id. at 164 (remarks of Pinkney).
173. See id. at 319.
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among the Amphictionic Confederates first by the Kings of Persia, and
afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the Achaeans, first by
Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: Among the Swiss by
Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring Powers; among the members
of the Germanic <Body> by France, England, Spain & Russia -: and in
the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers.174

b. The Federalist Papers. These same themes were addressed and
amplified upon in the Federalist Papers.175 Madison, Hamilton, and
Jay emphasized, among other things, the special role of the federal
government in the field of foreign affairs,176 the imperative of mar
shaling the resources of the nation to maximize its influence in foreign
negotiations,m the vesting of the treaty power in the President and
two-thirds of the Senate as an extraordinary safeguard for state inter
ests,178 the exclusive character of the treaty power,179 and the urgent
174. Id. In fact, despite Madison's delicacy, during the Confederation, Great Britain
and, to some extent, Spain had plotted with disaffected elements to break off the northern
and southern portions of the country.
The Governor-General of Canada, aware of the imminent contingency of a break-up of the
United States, entered into secret negotiations with a separatist element in Vermont,
tempting them with especial trade privileges via the Champlain-St. Lawrence system, which
were denied to the thirteen states. It was hoped that when the break-up came, Vermont
could be easily attached to Canada, and also the entire territory north of the Ohio River . . . .
It would then be only a matter of time before British sovereignty would be restored over the
lost colonies.

BEMIS, supra note 64, at 73.

175. By focusing on the Federalist Papers, I do not mean to give them undue weight.
Nevertheless, their importance is widely recognized.
176. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
As Madison famously put it: "If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be
in respect to other nations." THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 42, at 264.
177. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 452.
Thus, in defending the inclusion of the President in the treaty-making process in his own
right, rather than as an agent appointed by the Senate when it thought useful, Hamilton
noted:
[T]he ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and re
spect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representative of the na
tion, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy.
While the Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management
of its external concerns, the people would lose the additional security which would result
from the co-operation of the executive.

Id.
178. See, for example, the Federalist Papers, in which Jay notes that:
[a]s all States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most
willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of in
fluence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper per
sons, and to insist on their punctual attendance.

THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 64 (John Jay), at 395.
179. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No . 44 (James Madison), at 281. Madison
thought the reasons for excluding states from making treaties so obvious that he need not
even repeat the overriding considerations he had laid out in Philadelphia. See id. (noting
that "[t]he prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the ex-
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need to prevent state violations of treaties concluded by the national
government.180 For present purposes, however, the crucial point was
their repeated stress upon the breadth of the treaty power, their im
plicit affirmation that its scope was to be determined in accordance
with international practice, and, indeed, their explicit rejection of
states' rights limitations.
In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton sought to demonstrate the weakness
of the federal executive in comparison with the British monarch. Con
trasting power for power, he argued that the President's powers were
uniformly inferior to the king's.181 In this context, his discussion of the
treaty power is particularly illuminating because it offered him the
perfect opportunity to specify any limits on the President's treaty
powers which were inapplicable to the king's. Yet, the only difference
on which he focused was the lack of any Parliamentary check on the
king in contrast to the requirement of Senate advice and consent in
the case of the President.182
The king's power of making treaties, Hamilton noted, was plenary:
He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance,
and of every other description . . . . Every jurist of that kingdom, and
every other man acquainted with its Constitution knows, as an estab
lished fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in
its utmost plenitude . . . .183

In this respect, however, the President's powers were to be the same.
What differed were the safeguards by which they were to be pro
tected: "The one can perform alone what the other can only do with
the concurrence of a branch of the legislature."184 Thus, rather than
specifying limitations on the scope of the treaty power, Hamilton as
serted that it would be as extensive as the king's and, implicitly, as that
of other nations, and he focused instead on the special procedural re
quirements imposed by the Constitution.

isting articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new
Constitution"); see also supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.

180. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 151; THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), at 476. By their violating treaty
stipulations, "[t]he faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union are thus continually at
the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is
composed." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), at 151.

181. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). Among others, he surveyed
the terms of office, impeachment, the veto power, the commander-in-chief power, the par
don power, and the appointment power. He compared these powers of the President,
moreover, not only to the powers of the British monarch but also to the powers of the Gov
ernor of New York.
182 See id. at 419-20.
183. Id. at 419-20.
184. Id. at 420.
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Federalist No. 75, moreover, is to the same effect. Here, too,
Hamilton emphasized the breadth of the treaty power. Noting that
the Constitution granted the President and Senate "the entire power
of making treaties," he recognized that this committed to them "inter
ests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern [the
nation's] intercourse with the rest of the world.mss Since it would not
be safe to lodge such extensive powers in the President alone, the
Senate was to be conjoined with him in the treaty-making process.186
Madison's comments are even more revealing. Given his extensive
experience with treaty-making under the Confederation, and his per
sonal involvement in the controversies over the scope of Congress's
treaty powers in relation to the powers of the states, we have every
reason to take seriously his affirmation in Federalist No. 42 that the
treaty power under the Constitution was to be the same as under the
Articles of Confederation.187 We have already seen that states' rights
limitations, though sometimes invoked, were uniformly defeated un
der the Confederation. Indeed, recalling the difficulties that the
states' rights limitations in Articles VI and IX had precipitated,
Madison observed that the power was the same "with this difference
only": the treaty power "is disembarrassed by the plan of the conven
tion, of an exception under which treaties might be substantially frus
trated by regulations of the States."188 Thus, the Framers, rather than
embracing states' rights limitations on the scope of the treaty power,
self-consciously removed the only provisions that had made states'
rights limitations even plausibly defensible! Those provisions had em
barrassed the nation in its dealings with France and Great Britain and
had delayed, and even threatened to undermine, the plan for con
cluding commercial treaties with the European powers.189 Madison
thus made clear that after adoption of the Constitution, the federal

185.

THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 451.

186. See id. at 451-52. Jay also emphasized the broad scope of the power and the consequent need for adequate safeguards:
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and
commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as
will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the pur
pose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good.

THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 64 (John Jay), at 390.

The President and Senate, he
claimed, would be among those "who best understand our national interests, whether con
sidered in relation to the several states or to foreign nations." Id. at 391.

187. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison). Madison indicated that the grant
of the power to make treaties and to receive ambassadors "speak their own propriety. Both
of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation." Id. at 264. For a subsequent
co=ent by Madison to the same effect in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, see infra note
209 and accompanying text.
188.

THE FEDERALIST, supra

note 176, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264 (emphasis

added).

189. See supra notes 79-102, 106-116, 127-157 and accompanying text.
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government was not again to find itself in a similarly embarrassing po
sition.
Equally significant, moreover, Madison's discussion demonstrates
how the nationalist conception itself was simply one of the set of
background assumptions with which the Founders were working.
Immediately after observing that the states' rights limitations on the
treaty power had been removed, Madison turned to the provision in
the Constitution giving the national government the power to send
and receive consuls.190 The Confederation, he noted, had failed to in
clude a corresponding grant of power, giving the old Congress only the
power to send and receive ambassadors but not consuls. As a result,
the old Congress could at most only appoint consuls to be sent abroad
pursuant to its general powers of appointment.191 It could not, how
ever, receive consuls from abroad. There was one exception to this
rule:
It is true that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual ap
pointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the
admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making com
mercial treaties . . . . But the admission of consuls into the United States,
where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in
which the convention have improved on the model before them.192

Implicit in Madison's point, of course, is precisely the nationalist view
of the treaty power: even where Congress is othenvise without legisla
tive power over a particular subject matter - and therefore power
over that subject must reside in the states - Congress's power to
make treaties may still enable it to deal with the subject through nego
tiation and agreement with foreign states. The treaty power is a sepa
rate delegated power in its own right, which is not confined to those
subjects over which Congress has otherwise been deJegated author
.
1ty 193
•

c. The Virginia Ratifying Convention. By far the most extensive
discussion of the scope of the treaty power occurred during the
190. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264-65.
191. As Madison observed, Article IX of the Confederation gave Congress the power to
appoint such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United
States. See id.
192 Id. at 265.
193. Madison made the same point during the Philadelphia convention. Thus, in dis
cussing a proposal to permit states, with Congress's consent, to intpose tonnage duties for
the purpose of clearing harbors and erecting lighthouses, Madison expressed some lingering
doubts about whether such a grant was necessary because the power to regulate foreign
commerce might not prevent such state regulation in any case. Even if not, however, the
states "may certainly be restrained by Treaty." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 159, at 625. For Madison, it seems, the thought that treaties might go beyond the
legislative powers of Congress was unproblematic.
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Virginia Ratifying Convention. This was due in part to Virginia's pas
sionate attachment to the Mississippi, a subject which occupied a sub
stantial bulk of the debates.194 Given the recent efforts by Jay and the
northern majority in Congress to cede navigation rights to Spain, the
whole question of the Mississippi was tightly bound up with the treaty
power. Thus, it is not surprising that Virginians were among the most
apprehensive about the potential lurking dangers, and their concerns
are evident throughout the discussions.
It is all the more significant, then, that the Virginia debates power
fully reaffirmed and made more explicit the views which had already
emerged both in the Philadelphia Convention and in the Federalist
Papers. Here, too, there were repeated assertions on both sides about
the vast extent of the power. Opponents were unrelenting in their
characterizations of the power as unbounded.195 Crucially, however,
this concern did not lead to proposals to limit the scope of the power.
Federalists and anti-Federalists alike recognized the imperatives that
impelled the Philadelphia Convention to make the grant unqualified.
Instead, they focused on a proposed amendment to increase the pro
cedural safeguards that secured it. After ratifying the Constitution,
Virginia thus recommended for the consideration of Congress a pro
posed amendment:
That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of
two thirds of the whole number of the members of the Senate; and no
treaty ceding, contracting, restraining, or suspending, the territorial rights
or claims of the United States, or any of them, or their, or any of their
rights or claims to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the
American rivers, shall be made, but in cases of the most urgent and ex
treme necessity; nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concur
rence of three fourths of the whole number of the members of both
houses respectively.196

194. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHlLADELPlllA IN 17'0/, at 311-67 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937)
[hereinafter DEBATES] (discussing the Mississippi question). Debate on the Mississippi oc
cupied fully 10% of journal pages of the discussions. See Warren, supra note 161, at 297.
195. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 315 (remarks of Patrick Henry) (clainling
that the treaty power is "unlimited and unbounded"); 3 id. at 500 (remarks of Patrick Henry)
(asserting that "if any thing should be left us, it would be because the President and senators
were pleased to admit it"); 3 id. at 513 (remarks of Patrick Henry) (clainling that "they can
make any treaty . . • . [t]hey have a right, from the paramount power given them"). Oainis
that the treaty power was unlimited were commonplace among Anti-federalists. See, e.g.,

Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed by the
Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary Alternations in It In a Number of
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican [hereinafter Letters from the Federal
Farmer], in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, 246-47 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(declaring that the President and Senate are empowered to make treaties "indefinitely" and
that the power is "absolute").
196. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 660.
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Focusing on two principal criticisms, Patrick Henry and George
Mason led the attack on the treaty power. First, they claimed that the
procedure for approving treaties was inadequate to safeguard the
"dearest and most valuable rights" of the nation and of the South,
which were vulnerable because of the unlimited character of the treaty
power.197 Their main fear, or course, was that the President and
Senate would cede the Mississippi, and Henry and Mason argued that
it would be easier to do so under the Constitution than it had been
under the Confederation.198 In this regard, there were endless discus
sions about the mathematical possibilities: under the Confederation,
nine states were required to approve a treaty, whereas under the Con
stitution, only two-thirds of a quorum was sufficient. That meant that
the votes of ten Senators, or only five states, might be sufficient to
consent to a treaty ceding the Mississippi.199 Moreover, there was no
guarantee that the President would notify the Senators from each of
the states whenever he planned to submit a treaty, and thus he might
arrange for the Senate to consider a treaty when the Senators from the
Southern states were absent.200
Their second concern was the possibility that treaties might in
fringe individual rights. The Supremacy Clause made treaties su
preme over state constitutions and laws; hence, the bills of rights in the
state constitutions would provide no protection. Yet, the proposed
Constitution contained no bill of rights of its own. What prevented a
treaty from violating the most fundamental rights of the individual,
such as the free exercise of religion, or freedom from cruel and un
usual punishments? In this respect, Henry and Mason's arguments
were part of the more general anti-Federalist attack on the Constitu
tion for its failure to include a bill of rights.201
The Federalist response was equally energetic. Led by Madison
and Governor Edmund Randolph, the Federalists' foremost aim was
to provide some needed reassurance about the Mississippi. Engaging
197. See 3 id. at 353 (remarks of Patrick Henry); see also 3 id. at 315-16 (remarks of
Patrick Henry).
198. See, e.g., 3 id. at 316-17, 352-53, 355, 500-01 (remarks of Patrick Henry); 3 id. at 340
(remarks of James Momoe); 3 id. at 341-43, 350-51 (remarks of William Grayson); 3 id. at
499, 507-09 (remarks of George Mason).
199. See, e.g., 3 id. at 340 (remarks of James Momoe); 3 id. at 343, 351 (remarks of
William Grayson); 3 id. at 353 (remarks of Patrick Henry); 3 id. at 499 (remarks of George
Mason). In Philadelphia, motions had been made to require two-thirds of all the members
of the Senate to consent, to require a majority of the whole number of the Senate, and to
raise the quorum to two-thirds in the Senate. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 549. All three motions failed.
200. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 502 (remarks of William Grayson). This
claini echoed another failed motion made in Philadelphia "that no Treaty shd. be made witht
previous notice to the members, & a reasonable time for their attending." 2 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 159, at 549-50 (Sept. 8) .
201. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 503-04, 512-14 (remarks of Patrick Henry).
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in the numbers game, they effectively revealed the highly unrealistic
assumptions that underlay the anti-Federalist worries and emphasized
the extra security provided by the addition of the President to the
treaty-making process.202 Even more effectively, they pointed out that
even though the nine-state rule had prevented the cession of the
Mississippi thus far, the national government under the Confederation
was too weak to enforce American rights. What good was security if
the Mississippi was still off limits to the western settlers? According to
Madison, our ability to realize our rights will "be far better secured
under the new government than the old, as we shall be more able to
enforce our right."203 Indeed, acknowledging the crucial importance of
maximizing the negotiating strength of the national government,
Madison rightly claimed that it was the very weakness of the Confed
eration that had produced Jay's project: "A strong system will remove
the inducement."204
More important for present purposes was another of the Federalist
strategies, which revealed a great deal about the common under
standing of the treaty power. The Federalists denied that the treaty
power extended to the cession of territory. Why? Not because the
power was any less comprehensive than the anti-Federalists claimed
but, rather, because its scope was to be determined by reference to in
ternational practice and the law of nations. The law of nations, they
claimed (albeit with some equivocations and inconsistencies), invali
dated treaties dismembering a nation.
"I readily confess," said
Madison, "that neither the old Confederation nor the new Constitu
tion involves a right to give up the navigation of the Mississippi. It is
repugnant to the law of nations."205 It was also inconsistent with the
practice of states:

202. See, e.g., 3 id. at 347-48, 500 (remarks of James Madison); 3 id. at 357-59 (remarks
of Wilson Nicholas); 3 id. at 362-63 (remarks of Edmund Randolph); 3 id. at 364-65, 509-11
(remarks of Corbin); 3 id. at 240, 499 (remarks of George Nicholas).
203. 3 id. at 331.
204. 3 id. at 348; see also 3 id. at 239 (remarks of George Nicholas); 3 id. at 331 (remarks
of James Madison) ("Our weakness precludes us from it. We are entitled to it; but it is not
under an inefficient government that we shall be able to avail ourselves fully of that right.");
3 id. at 500 (remarks of James Madison); 3 id. at 356-61 (remarks of Wilson Nicholas) (ob
serving that what the western country needs is "a government which will force from Spain
the navigation of that river . . . . [Kentucky] can expect support and succor alone from a
strong, efficient government, which can command the resources of the Union when neces
sary"). This crucial point underscores the keen awareness of the Founders of the impor
tance of maximizing the strength of the federal government in negotiations with foreign
countries.
205. 3 id. at 345 (remarks of James Madison); see also 3 id. at 357 (remarks of Wilson
Nicholas); 3 id. at 362 (remarks of Edmund Randolph) (noting that "[i]t will • • . be contrary
to the law of nations to relinquish territorial rights"); 3 id. at 511 (remarks of Corbin).
Madison acknowledged, however, that relinquishment of territory might be permissible un
der extreme circumstances:
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The king of Great Britain has the power of making peace, but he has no
power of dismembering the empire, or alienating any part of it. Nay, the
king of France has no right of alienating part of his dominions to any
power whatsoever. The power of making treaties does not involve a
right of dismembering the Union.206

Although the right be denied, there may be emergencies which will make it necessary to
make a sacrifice. But there is a material difference between emergencies of safety in time of
war, and those which may relate to mere commercial regulations.
grounds, deny, in peace, what you give up in war.

You might, on solid

3 id. at 345-46. Even in the old Congress, the argument had been strenuously pressed that
the law of nations forbade ceding the Mississippi by treaty. See 3 id. at 342 (remarks of
William Grayson) (describing the debate in the old Congress). For discussions of the power
to cede territory by treaty, see supra notes 26, 159-166, 193-204 and accompanying text; infra
notes 206-207, 210-211, 216, 431, 435, 564 and accompanying text.

206. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 501. Like Hamilton in The Federalist, see supra
notes 181-184 and accompanying text, George Nicolas emphasized that the powers of the
President and Senate were parallel to the powers of the British monarch:
He compared the king of England's power to make treaties to that given by this clause. He
insisted they resembled each other . . . . The power was as unlimited in England as it was
here. Let gentlemen, says he, show me that the king can go so far, and no farther, and I will
show them a like limitation in America.

3 id. at 502; see also infra notes 211-212, 221 and accompanying text.
It is at least open to question, however, whether Madison and the other Federalists were
being wholly candid. In the Philadelphia Convention, no one had suggested that the treaties
ceding territory would be invalid, despite the concerns about the Mississippi and the fisher·
ies. See supra notes 159, 161-166 and accompanying text. In any case, it is unclear whether
they really meant to deny that a treaty could cede territory, or whether they meant that a
treaty could only do so for certain purposes or with the consent of the whole legislature not
just the Senate or only with the consent of the part ceded. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note
194, at 509, 511 (remarks of Corbin) (suggesting alternately consent of the part ceded and
consent of the whole legislature); id. at 508 (remarks of George Mason) (noting that the king
of Great Britain could cede territory with the consent of the Parliament). But see id. at 602
(remarks of Edmund Randolph) (denying the power of even a unanimous Congress to cede
territory).
The Federalists had other grounds for their claim that treaties could not cede territory.
Governor Randolph asserted a natural law bar:
There is a prohibition naturally resulting from the nature of things, it being contradictory
and repugnant to reason, and the law of nature and nations, to yield the most valuable right
of a community, for the exclusive benefit of one particular part of it.

3 id. at 362. At the time, of course, the law of nations and the law of nature were closely
linked. In addition, he cited the Property Oause of the Constitution, which empowers Con
gress to dispose of the territory and other property of the United States but with the proviso
that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the
United States, or any particular state." 3 id. at 363 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2);
see also 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 504-05 (remarks of Edmund Randoph). According
to Randolph, this prohibited the national government from ceding territory and bound the
treaty power unless "you establish another doctrine - that the creature can destroy the
creator, which is the most absurd and ridiculous of all doctrines." 3 id. at 363; see also 3 id. at
504-05 (remarks of Edmund Randolph). Randolph's interpretation of Article IV, however,
is highly questionable, as was effectively pointed out. See 3 id. at 505 (remarks of William
Grayson). For an even less credible claim that the prohibition on giving preferences to the
ports of any state would prevent cession of the Mississippi, see 3 id. at 239-40 (remarks of
George Nicholas). Madison too claimed on general principle that neither the treaty power
nor any other power gave the national government the right "to dismember the empire, or to
alienate any great, essential right." 3 id. at 514.
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Nor did the anti-Federalists disagree. They feared instead that the
President and Senate would abuse their power, and, in that event, "the
law of nations cannot be applied to relieve you."207 This point, how
ever, argued in favor of greater procedural safeguards, not for re
stricting the scope of the treaty power.
Furthermore, the Federalists explicitly recognized the overriding
importance of flexibility in international negotiations and denied that
the treaty power could be limited or defined more narrowly. Re
sponding to the claim that "there is no restriction with respect to
making treaties," Governor Randolph replied: "The various contin
gencies which may form the object of treaties, are, in the nature of
things, incapable of definition. The government ought to have power to
provide for every contingency . . . . I defy the wisdom of that gentle
man to show how they ought to be limited."208 Madison was equally
vehement:
As to its extent, perhaps it will be satisfactory to the committee that the
power is, precisely, in the new Constitution as it is in the Confederation.
In the existing confederacy, Congress are authorized indefinitely to make
treaties . . . . Does it follow, because this power is given to Congress, that
it is absolute and unlimited? I do not conceive that power is given to the
President and Senate to dismember the empire, or to alienate any great,
essential right. . . . The exercise of the power must be consistent with the
object of the delegation. . . . The object of treaties is the regulation of in
tercourse with foreign nations, and is external. I do not think it possible
to enumerate all the cases in which such external regulations would be
necessary. Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress
could exercise this authority? The definition might, and probably would,
be defective. They might be restrained, by such a definition, from exer
cising the authority where it would be essential to the interest and safety

207. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 503 (remarks of Patrick Henry); see also 3 id. at 512
(remarks of Patrick Henry). Henry was not entirely consistent on this point, as on others.
Sometimes, as above, he appeared to agree that the law of nations was a limit, but one which
could not be counted on in practice. Other times, he appeared to claim that the constitu
tional grant was entirely unlimited and therefore gave the President and Senate the power to
cede the Mississippi. See, e.g., 3 id. at 315-16 (arguing that the power is "unlimited and un
bounded" and will result in ceding of the Mississippi); 3 id. at 353 (challenging the Federal
ists to "[s]how me any clause in that paper which secures that great right"); 3 id. at 501
(claiming that the President and Senate will have a greater power in this respect than the
king of Great Britain). William Grayson's views were similarly inconsistent. Like the Fed
eralists, he, too, at times concurred in the view that the law of nations prohibited the cession
of the Mississippi and limited the treaty power, see 3 id. at 342, 350, but he also doubted its
efficacy, see 3 id. at 350. At other points, however, he proposed a novel theory about what
he called the "particular law of nations." See 3 id. at 506-07; see also 3 id. at 501-02. In his
view, although the general law of nations might prohibit such treaties, nations could create a
particular law of nations which applied only to themselves and which differed from the gen
eral law. The Constitution, he claimed, would create such a particular law and would allow
cessions of territory by treaty. See 3 id. At still another point, joining Mason, he seems to
have thought that the treaty power did extend to ceding territory. See 3 id. at 613. For
Mason's views, see 3 id. at 507-09.
208. 3 id. at 363, 504 (emphasis added).
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of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to leave it to be exercised as
contingencies may arise.209
Most revealing of all, however, were the extended comments of
George Mason, who led the anti-Federalists on the treaty question.
Though opposed to the Constitution, Mason had participated in the
Philadelphia Convention and had paid particularly close attention to
the treaty power. Like Randolph and Madison, he recognized the im
perative of flexibility and opposed putting a straitjacket on the treaty
power. In his view, even treaties ceding territory were permissible;
what was needed were stricter safeguards:
[Y]et I acknowledge such a power must rest somewhere. It is so in all
governments. If, in the course of an unsuccessful war, we should be
compelled to give up part of our territories, or undergo subjugation if the
general government could not make a treaty to give up such a part for
the preservation of the residue, the government itself, and consequently
the rights of the people, must fall. Such a power must, therefore, rest
somewhere. For my own part, I never heard it denied that such a power
must be vested in the government. Our complaint is, that it is not suffi
ciently guarded . . .210
.

But Mason was not yet through. The problem was not only with trea
ties of cession. Recalling the states' rights controversy over whether
treaties could permit aliens to own real property in the territories of
the states, Mason was equally emphatic. The treaty power would nec
essarily extend that far but ought to be subject to stricter supervision:
Will any gentleman say that they may not make a treaty, whereby the
subjects of France, England, and other powers, may buy what lands they
please in this country? This would violate those principles which we
have received from the mother country. The indiscriminate admission of
all foreigners to the first rights of citizenship, without any permanent se
curity for their attachment to the country, is repugnant to every principle
of prudence and good policy. The President and Senate can make any
treaty whatsoever. We wish not to refuse, but to guard, this power, as it is
done in England. The empire there cannot be dismembered without the
consent of the national Parliament. We wish an express and explicit
declaration, in that paper, that . . . . [n]o treaty to dismember the empire

209. 3 id. at 514-15 (emphasis added). Madison's reference to the similarity of the treaty
power under the Confederation recalls his position in the Federalist Papers. See supra notes
187-189 and accompanying text.
210. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 507-08 (emphasis added); see also 3 id. at 613 (re
marks of William Grayson) (noting, like Mason, that the power to cede territory "must be
lodged somewhere" because it "may prevent the annihilation of society by procuring a
peace"; the point is to secure it more safely). Other anti-Federalists had made this point as
well. The Federal Farmer, for example, noted that the power of the President and Senate
was "absolute," Letters from the Federal Farmer, supra note 195, at 247, and that "the judges
will be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article or thing the president and senate
shall establish by treaty,'' id. He questioned, however, "whether it [would] be practicable to
set any bounds to those who make treaties,'' noting that "if not, it proves that this power
ought to be more safely lodged." Id.
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ought to be made without the consent of three fourths of the legislature

in all its branches. Nor ought such a treaty to be made but in case of the
most urgent and unavoidable necessity.211

In England, moreover, a treaty permitting "foreign subjects to pur
chase lands, and have an hereditary indefeasible title . . . would re
quire an express act of Parliament."212
Against all of this evidence, there is only one statement in the
course of the Virginia debate - and, indeed, in the whole debate over
the Constitution - that even arguably supports the states' rights view.
Even this statement, moreover, when considered in context, is best in
terpreted otherwise. As the debate wore on, Patrick Henry focused
with increasing fervor on the claim that treaties could violate individ
ual rights.213 As already noted, because the Supremacy Clause de
clared treaties supreme over state constitutions and laws, Henry
claimed that treaties would not be subject to the state bills of rights;
yet, the federal Constitution did not contain a bill of its own. Individ
ual rights, he asserted, were thus unprotected against the treaty
power.214 Citing a case where the Czar had demanded that Queen
Anne summarily execute an officer who had improperly arrested the
Russian ambassador, Henry remarked: "A treaty may be made giving
away your rights, and inflicting unusual punishments on its viola
tors."215
This was a powerful argument, and while the Federalists were
quick to strike back, denying that treaties could override fundamental
rights, their reasoning was less than clear. Randolph immediately re
plied with a flat denial: "[N]either the life nor property of any citi
zen . . . can be affected by a treaty . . . . Being creatures of that
Constitution, can [the President and Senate] destroy it? Can any par
ticular body, instituted for a particular purpose, destroy the existence
of the society for whose benefit it is created?"216 Madison also
brushed the objection aside:
I conceive that, as far as the bills of rights in the states do not express any
thing foreign to the nature of such things, and express fundamental prin-

211. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 509.
212. 3 id. at 508.
213.

See 3 id. at502-04, 512-14.

214.

See 3 id. at 502.

215. 3 Id. at 503.
216. 3 Id. at 504. Replying once again to the claint that the President and Senate would
cede the Mississippi, Randolph also denied that "the particular right of any state" could "be
affected by a treaty." 3 Id. Though states' rights advocates have sometimes pointed to this
comment in support of their position, see, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 413, in context it is
clear that Randolph was addressing the persistent anti-Federalist claint which Grayson and
Henry had just once again made about the Mississippi, see 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at
501-02, 503.
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ciples essential to liberty, and those privileges which are declared neces
sary to all free people, these rights are not encroached on by this gov
ernment.217
Only George Nicholas attempted a more elaborate response, di
rectly addressing Henry's argument. Under the Supremacy Clause, he
claimed, the President and Senate can
make no treaty which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution,
or inconsistent with the delegated powers. The treaties they make must
be under the authority of the United States, to be within their province.
It is sufficiently secured, because it only declares that, in pursuance of the
powers given, they shall be the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding
any thing in the constitution or laws of particular states.218
To be sure, taken literally this statement could be read to endorse the
states' rights view of the treaty power. There are several reasons,
however, why it ought not to be so understood. Nicholas was re
sponding specifically to Henry's claim that treaties could violate indi
vidual rights,219 and his response was consistent with the general ap
proach many Federalists had taken when this claim was made in
relation to Congress - that Congress could not violate individual
rights because it was limited to exercising the delegated powers.220 It is
quite likely that Nicholas meant only to refer to this general argument
rather than to propose new states' rights limits on the scope of the
treaty power. Indeed, any other construction would render his re
marks internally inconsistent. Immediately prior to the quoted state
ment, he was at pains to express the breadth of the treaty power. He
drew a parallel between the power of the king of Great Britain and that
of Congress, with respect to making treaties. He contended that they
were on the same foundation . . . . To prove that there was no constitu
tional limit to the king's power of making treaties . . . he quoted the fol
lowing lines in Blackstone's Commentaries . . . "It is also the king's pre
rogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances, with foreign states and
princes . . . . And yet, lest this plentitude of authority should be abused,
to the detriment of the public, the constitution has interposed a
check . . . ." How does this apply to this Constitution? The President and

Senate have the same power of making treaties; and when made, they are
to have the same force and validity.221

217. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 516. Madison's reasons for believing that a bill of
rights was unnecessary were, of course, complex, but not necessary to consider here.
218.

3 id. at 507.

219. Immediately following the quoted passage, Nicholas argues that Henry's citation of
the Russian ambassador case was therefore inapplicable to the Constitution. 3 id. at 507.
220. Indeed, this was the position that Nicholas hinlself had taken earlier in the debate.

See 3 id. at 246; see also 3 id. at 466-69 (remarks of Edmund Randolph).
3 id. at 506 (emphasis added). He had made the same point just a short time ear
See supra note 206.

221.
lier.
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It is thus exceedingly doubtful that Nicholas had in mind the possible
implications of his comments for the scope of the treaty power in rela
tion to the states, or that he would have endorsed states' rights limita
tions on " 'this plentitude of authority' " had he considered the ques
tion. He, like the other Federalists and even the anti-Federalists, was
fully convinced that the whole treaty power had to be vested in the na
tional government, just as it existed in other sovereign states.222
B.

1789 to 1920: The Dominance of the Nationalist View
Through Cyclical Conflicts

With the adoption of the Constitution, the treaty power was
launched on its long and tortured path through American history. For
the reasons we have seen, the Constitution gave a decided advantage
to those who advocated for the nationalist view. Nevertheless, only
rarely has a generation avoided controversy and debate over the fun
damental questions which the treaty power necessarily raises.

1.

The First Generation

a. The Nationalist View Receives Quick Recognition by the Political
Branches and the Supreme Court. Once the new government was es
tablished, debates over the treaty power briefly retreated from view.
From the outset, however, the potential clash between the treaty
power and the powers of the states could not be entirely avoided, es
pecially because of leftover business from the Confederation. Two
early events quickly helped consolidate the nationalist view.
First, the old Congress had left a Consular Convention with France
to the new government, and Washington promptly submitted it to the

222. Nevertheless, Professor Bradley cites his remarks
rights position. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 413.

as

clear support for the states'

Professor Bradley finds four themes in the Founding materials important: that the
Founders wished to make it difficult to make treaties; that they contemplated that treaties
would govern "truly inter-national" matters, see id. at 411; that they expected the Senate to
play a special role in protecting the interests of the states; and that they were committed to
the principle of delegated and limited powers, a principle for which "[t]here is no evidence"
to suggest that "the Founders believed the treaty power to be exempt," id. at 412. See id. at
410-12. How these themes are thought to support the states' rights view is unclear. In any
case, moreover, pitched at this level of generality they provide little or no interpretive guid
ance. What emerges from the Founding materials is that the Founders well understood that
treaties could affect domestic matters of the greatest sensitivity, including matters within the
sphere of state authority; that they recognized the necessity of broad discretion in the federal
government with respect to the subject matter of treaties; that they acted vigorously to en
sure that states' rights would not stand in the way of foreign policy initiatives and embarrass
the conduct of foreign affairs, as it had done repeatedly under the Confederation; and that
they lodged the advice and consent power in the Senate, fortified by a minority veto, in sig
nificant part to protect state interests in light of the necessity for a broad grant of authority.
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Senate in 1789 for its advice and consent.223 The Convention was un
doubtedly the most vexed treaty negotiated during the Confederation
and had prompted vigorous opposition. It trenched more deeply on
state prerogatives than any of the other previous treaties negotiated
under the Confederation. Among other things, it granted consular of
ficials and employees and consular premises extensive immunities
from the operation of state laws (though not compelled to do so by the
law of nations); ceded consuls jurisdiction over a number of different
kinds of legal disputes involving French nationals, including the right
in certain cases to administer estates of deceased French nationals;
opened up the state courts to French nationals; granted consuls the
powers of notaries; and empowered consuls to call upon the courts to
aid in the arrest of deserters and the execution of consular judgments
and orders.224 Notwithstanding fierce political resistance to the treaty
during the Confederation, the Senate seems to have gone along with
out further controversy. Even John Jay, the first Secretary of State,
who had previously been a vigorous opponent, now reluctantly sup
ported the treaty.225

223. See Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls
and Vice Consuls, Nov. 14, 1788, in 2 TREATIES, supra note 74, at 228. The Senate resolu
tion granting consent was passed on July 29, 1789. See id.
224.

See id. at 229-39.

225. For a full discussion of the background, see The Consular Convention of 1788, Edi
torial Note, in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 67 {Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). In the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778, France and the United States had agreed to permit
the other to appoint consular officials in their ports and promised to work out the details of
their functions and powers in a subsequent agreement. From the outset, this was a matter of
some urgency to the French and of considerable ambivalence to the Americans. The com
mercial states in New England in particular were strongly opposed. When the French Minis
ter pressed the matter in 1781 at a critical juncture in the war, Congress responded by ap
pointing a committee to draft a model convention. It then instructed Franklin to negotiate a
treaty in Versailles on the basis of its detailed "Scheme." See 22 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 81, at 46-54 (Jan. 25, 1782). Trouble, however, was
brewing from the outset. Repeated efforts were made in Congress to delay, modify, and
even abandon the negotiations. An infuriated Madison, himself a strong supporter of the
proposed Convention, just managed to stave off the threatened interference with Franklin's
negotiations. See James Madison, Instructions to Benjamin Franklin in re Consuls (Jan. 2,
1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 5, 5 {William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.
Rachal eds., 1969) [hereinafter 6 MADISON PAPERS]; James Madison, Notes on Debates
(Jan. 6, 1783), in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 15, 15-16 (describing the various conflicting
views about the treaty negotiations and observing that "[e]ven to have suspended the con
vention after it had been proposed to the Court of France & possibly acceded to would have
been indecent and dishonorable"). Franklin, in turn, completed the negotiations and in 1784
sent back the proposed treaty for Congress's assent. See The Consular Convention of 1788,
supra, at 70 & n.13.
By the time the treaty arrived, Jay was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In part, his fierce
opposition was based on policy objections to foreign consular jurisdiction in general. In at
least equal part, however, he acted from intense distrust of the French and a desire to pre
vent the creation of a French consular establishment in particular. See The Consular Con
vention of 1788, supra, at 71, 80. Franklin's negotiations, however, put him in a difficult
spot. With only minimal deviations, Franklin had followed the Scheme that Congress had
approved and directed him to use as the basis for the Convention. As a result, under the
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Second, although not without its ambiguities, the Supreme Court's
1796 decision in the landmark case Ware v. Hylton226 seemed to settle
the issue. British creditors sued to recover pre-War debts owed by
Virginia debtors. The Virginians defended their position on the
ground that the debts had been discharged under a wartime Virginia
statute passed in 1777. The statute had authorized debtors to pay the
amounts due on their British debts into a state loan office and, upon
making the payments, had discharged them from any further liability.
As we have already seen, one of the principal questions in the case
was the validity of Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, which promised
that British creditors would "meet with no lawful Impediment to the
Recovery" of their debts. Notwithstanding the states' rights contro
versy which this provision had provoked, the Court unanimously up
held its validity and agreed that it was a self-executing obligation that
nullified any conflicting state laws. The only disagreement was over
its proper interpretation. The majority ruled that it resurrected the

practice of the time, the French had every right to expect, and even demand, that Congress
to approve. See 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 500, 508 (July 6,
1785) (1933). Jay thus opted for the only available argument: in an elaborate report, he
made a lengthy series of hyper-legalistic arguments to demonstrate the various technical re
spects in which the text that Franklin had agreed upon diverged from the Scheme. See id. at
501-08. Jay methodically uncovered every deviation in language no matter how trivial and
often greatly exaggerated their significance. See The Consular Convention of 1788, supra, at
73-75 (describing in detail the "dominant legalistic tone of [Jay's] report"). At the end of
this report, he then added some observations of his own. See 29 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONG., supra, at 509-15. Among his many objections, he pointed to Articles
6 and 7 of the Convention, "establishing Consular and Vice consular Chanceries," which he
claimed, "create[d] an lmperium in Imperio, which in several respects must clash with the
internal Policy of these States, and with which it is not clear that Congress can authorize any
Persons to interfere." Id. at 512.
In thus vaguely invoking, without endorsing, unspecified limits on Congress's powers,
Jay was no doubt seeking to take advantage of any states' rights sentiment that might be
percolating in Congress. Jay did not elaborate on the basis for his concerns. He pointed
only to the conflict between the provisions of the Convention and state laws. But that hardly
distinguished the provisions on which he focused from others in the Convention itself and in
the other treaties which Congress had concluded. He was forced to concede, however, that
the two articles corresponded precisely to the text which Congress had itself adopted in its
Scheme for the Convention. See 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra, at 504.
When Congress delayed acting on the Convention in response to Jay's report, France finally
ran out of patience and sent a thinly veiled ultimatum, letting Congress know that good rela
tions (and continued liberality on overdue loan payments) depended upon definite action.
See The Consular Convention of 1788, supra, at 77. Rufus King wrote to Elbridge Gerry,
both strong opponents of the Convention, that "France has required a ratification of the con
sular convention." Id. (quoting a letter dated April 30, 1786). Congress therefore instructed
Jefferson, now ambassador to France, to renegotiate the Convention on the basis of the
Scheme. See id. at 78. In the end, Jefferson once again proved his adroitness as a diplomat
and, to everyone's surprise, successfully negotiated a new treaty that was a significant im
provement over the 1784 version in several respects, meeting at least some of the many ob
jections which Jay had articulated. See id. at 81-82.
226. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
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debt owed by the debtors. The sole dissenter, Justice Iredell, dis
agreed.227
In the lead opinion, Justice Chase began by affirming that the
power to confiscate debts during the war belonged exclusively to the
states: "I am of opinion that the exclusive right of confiscating, during
the war, all and every species of British property, within the territorial
limits of Virginia, resided only in the Legislature of that common
wealth."228 Nevertheless, the treaty's Article IV was valid under Arti
cle IX of the Confederation because the latter
grant has no restriction, nor is there any limitation on the power in any
part of the confederation. A right to make peace, necessarily includes
the power of determining on what terms peace shall be made . . A war
between two nations can only be concluded by treaty. Surely, the sacri
ficing public, or private, property, to obtain peace cannot be the cases in
which a treaty would be void.229
.

.

Furthermore, Article IV was self-executing and thus required neither
an act of Congress nor that of the state legislature to make it effec
tive.230 Indeed, as the old Congress had claimed in its circular letter of
1787, the treaty was self-executing even under the Confederacy. The
Supremacy Clause made that a foregone conclusion under the
Constitution.231
Justice Iredell was largely of the same view. He too made clear
that the power to confiscate debts belonged to the states:
Congress could have passed no act on this subject, but if they had wished
for an act, must have recommended to the States Legislatures to pass it.
227. For citations, see infra notes 228-234 and accompanying text. In accordance with
the then practice, the five Justices issued seriatim opinions. As a result, determining the
view of the Court requires careful analysis of the various views expressed by the Justices.
On the interpretation question, see Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 238-45 (Chase, J., concurring);
id. at 245, 247-56 (Paterson, J., concurring); id. at 256, 278-80 (Iredell, dissenting) (opinion
delivered in the Circuit Court); id. at 281 (Wilson, J., concurring); and id. at 281, 282, 284
(Cushing, J., concurring). For background on the litigation over the British debts preceding
the Court's decision in Ware, see NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHEsAPEAKE PoLmcs 1781-1800,
at 452-54 (1978).
228. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 222; see also id. at 229 ("Before the establishment of the
national government, British debts could only be sued for in the state court. This, alone,
proves that the several states possessed a power over debts."). Likewise, Justice Chase ex
plicitly held that tile old Congress had no power over tile debts. See id. at 232-33 (noting
tllat prior to tile effective date of tile Articles of Confederation, Congress had only those
powers which it actually exercised and tllat it "is an incontrovertible fact that Congress never
attempted to confiscate any kind of British property witllin the United States
and tllence I
conclude tllat Congress did not conceive tile power was vested in tllem"). In this respect,
Justice Chase was rejecting tile claim Jay had made in his report on state infractions of tile
Treaty of Peace - that war time confiscations of debts were exclusively witllin Congress's
powers. See supra note 120.
. • •

229. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 236; see also id. at 237-38 (elaborating on the Treaty of
Peace's constitutional validity).
230. See id. at 236-37, 242-43.
231. See id. at 236-37.

March 2000]

Treaty-Making and the Nation

1153

And the very nature of a recommendation implies, that the party rec
ommending cannot, but the party to whom the recommendation is made,
can do the thing recommended.232
In contrast to Justice Chase, however, Justice Iredell rejected the
claim that under the Confederation treaties were self-executing. Thus,
to bring the treaty into operation, it would have been necessary for the
states of their own accord to repeal any conflicting laws.233 Under the
Constitution, however, there was no question that the treaty was valid
and would supersede all conflicting state laws. That was the point of
the Supremacy Clause.234

232.

Id. at 266.

233.

See id. at 271-76 (analyzing the question in depth).

234. See id. at 272, 276-77. The other opinions were similar. Justice Patterson deemed it
unnecessary "to enter on the question, whether the Legislature of Virginia had authority to
make an act, confiscating the debts due from its citizen to the subjects of the king of Great
Britain, or whether the authority in such case was exclusively in Congress." Id. at 246. Ei
ther way, the treaty was valid. See id. at 249. Likewise, Justice Cushing declined to consider
any question about the authority of the state to confiscate debts. The treaty was in any case
valid, "having been sanctioned, in all its parts, by the Constitution of the United States, as the
supreme law of the land." Id. at 282; see also id. at 281, 282, 284. Justice Wtlson, in contrast,
agreed with Jay that the power to confiscate was solely in Congress. See id. at 281. Never
theless, "even if Virginia had the power to confiscate, the treaty annuls the confiscation." Id.
Admittedly, the decision in Ware does present some interpretive difficulties that counsel
restraint in making definite claims about its implications. Not only did the Justices issue
lengthy seriatim opinions, focusing on different aspects of the case, but there were other
complexities as well. Three legal regimes were arguably relevant to the analysis - the pe
riod from 1776 until the final adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, the period
of the Confederacy, and the period beginning with the adoption of the Constitution. Al
though the division of powers in the relevant respects between Congress and the states po
tentially differed during each of these successive regimes, the Justices were not always clear
about which period they were considering. See, e.g., id. at 232-33 {Chase, J.) (analyzing the
power of Congress during the war, but not mentioning that the war continued after the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation). Moreover, they did not always carefully distin
guish between exclusive and concurrent powers. The fact that the states had a power to con
fiscate, for example, did not necessarily mean that Congress did not. Exacerbating this diffi
culty was the peculiar system of the Confederacy. Even when Congress had certain powers,
legislative authority over those subjects ordinarily remained in the states. How to charac
terize the nature of the powers remaining in the states, as well as the powers in Congress, in
these areas was itself a vexed question, and it helps account for the less-than-sharp way the
issues were presented. Nevertheless, this very lack of clarity strongly suggests that the Jus
tices did not think that these distinctions were of significance. Whether the power to confis
cate debts was exclusively in Congress or in the states or held concurrently - and whether
this was so in the period before, during, or after the Confederacy - did not matter. Either
way, the treaty was a valid exercise of the treaty-making power. This reading is also sug
gested by the uniformly reverential tenor of all of the opinions on the high respect due the
sanctity of treaties. See, e.g., id. at 237-38 (Chase, J., concurring) ("I shall never exercise [the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional], but in a very clear case indeed. . . . If Congress
had no power {under the confederation) to make the 4th article of the treaty, and for want of
power that article is void, would it not be in the option of the crown of Great Britain to say,
whether the other articles, in the same treaty, shall be obligatory on the British nation?"); id.
at 270 {Iredell, J., dissenting) {"None can reverence the obligation of treaties more than I do.
The peace of mankind, the honour of the human race, the welfare, perhaps the being of fu
ture generations, must in no inconsiderable degree depend on the sacred observance of na
tional conventions. . . . [The Treaty of Peace] presented boundless views of future happiness
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b. Brewing Controversy. The relatively peaceful interlude that
greeted the new government was only the calm before the storm. Up
ahead loomed one of the sharpest and most traumatic political contro
versies the nation has ever weathered: the great national debate of
1795-96 provoked by the Jay Treaty. In characteristic fashion, pro
tagonists on both sides invoked the Constitution and sought to level
the opposition by branding them constitutional heretics. In the ensu
ing controversy, the relationship between the treaty power and the
legislative power of the states was once again to be a central issue in
dispute.235
During the first half of the decade, the portentous split between
Federalists and Republicans was rapidly widening. A major compo
nent of the emerging battleground was the new nation's foreign policy.
This development first surfaced in the debate over President
Washington's decision in 1793 to declare neutrality in the war between
revolutionary France and Great Britain.236 Washington's unilateral
edict could easily be seen as a betrayal both of our legal obligations
under the treaty of alliance of 1778 and of our moral obligations given
the vital role France had played in supporting the revolutionary effort.
Most importantly, it revealed a potentially explosive dividing line in
foreign affairs: should the country tilt toward France, with its revolu
tionary republican ideology, or toward the mother country? Republi
cans were strongly inclined toward the French, and Federalists toward
and greatness, which almost overpower the imagination, and which, I trust, will not be alto·
gether unrealized.").

235. There are a number of accounts of the Jay Treaty controversy, covering the subject
from different perspectives. Among the best, notwithstanding occasional errors, are JERALD
A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: PoLmCAL BATILEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
159-88 {1970); ALExANDER DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 101-40 {1958); STEPHEN
G. KURTZ, THE PREsIDENCY OF JOHN ADAMS, THE COLLAPSE OF FEDERALISM 1795-1800,
at 19-77 {1957); JAMES TAGG, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BACHE AND THE PHILADELPHIA
AURORA 239-74 {1991); ALFRED F. YOUNG, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANS OF NEW
YORK: THE ORIGINS, 1763-97, at 445-67 {1967); and Thomas J. Farnham, The Virginia
Amendments of1795: An Episode in the Opposition to Jay's Treaty, 75 VA. MAG. 75 {1967).
For the standard account of Jay's negotiations with the British, see SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS,
JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY {1923).
236. For discussion of the proclamation of neutrality and the ensuing debate, especially
the famous exchange between Hamilton and Madison, writing as Pacificus and Helevidius
respectively, see EDWARD s. CORWIN, THE PREsIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 7-32 {1917). In response to British attacks on neutral shipping in its war with
France, Madison and Jefferson strongly advocated retaliatory commercial measures, in
cluding the imposition of discriminatory duties and tonnage. The Federalists in Congress,
however, had successfully blocked their strategy. See, e.g., The Jay Treaty, 1795-96, in 2 THE
REPUBLIC OF LETIERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 881, 883 {James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter
REPUBLIC OF LETIERS]; Madison in the Fourth Congress, Editorial Note, in 16 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 141, 141 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter 16 MADISON
PAPERS]. Part of the intense hostility of Madison and Jefferson to the treaty was due to the
provisions which prohibited the imposition of the discriminatory duties and tonnage and
thus blocked the policy which they had promoted.

March 2000]

Treaty-Making and the Nation

1155

the British.237 Furthermore, Republicans were also more and more in
clined to view with suspicion both the potentially "monarchical"
presidency and the "aristocratic" Senate. No doubt this development
was connected to the alignment of political power in these branches,
which favored the emerging Federalist party, but it was more than
that. Jeffersonians placed increasing faith in the House (where, to be
sure, Republicans were strongest) as the most representative branch
and as the embodiment of the principle of popular sovereignty. As a
result, for Republicans, the treaty power, assigned to the President
and Senate, came under an increasingly dark cloud.238
By 1794, tensions with Great Britain had reached the breaking
point. To avoid war, Washington sent Jay, then Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, to London to negotiate a treaty settling the many out
standing disputes and establishing terms for commercial intercourse.
Jay, a high Federalist, was notoriously anti-French and pro-British,
and from the outset Republicans feared that the treaty would effec
tively place the nation in the British camp in the wars then raging in
Europe.239 When the treaty was finally published in late June 1795,
their worst fears were fully realized. To Republican eyes, the treaty
was nothing less than a national humiliation and, even worse, a sure
and calculated means of provoking a calamitous breach in relations
with France, which would correctly see the treaty as forming a tacit al
liance between the Americans and the British.240
In response, Republicans unleashed a torrent of impassioned pro
test across the nation. Jay was vilified and regularly burned in effigy.
Even Washington, previously untouchable and above the spirit of
party wrangling, came under sustained attack. Town meetings were
237. See, e.g., TAGG, supra note 235, at 239-40; Farnham,
Wedgwood, supra note 8, passim.

supra note 235, at 76, 80-81;

238. For an engaging account of the eighteenth-century disputes over the treaty power
and its connection to the contending Republican and Federalist ideologies, see Wedgwood,
supra note 8, at 248-68, 311-53.
239. See, e.g., DECONDE, supra note 235, at 66-100; TAGG,
Farnham, supra note 235, at 75-76.

supra note 235, at 241;

240. See, e.g., COMBS, supra note 235, at 159-64; YOUNG, supra note 235, at 445-54;
Farnham, supra note 235, at 77-82. The Republican criticisms were so extensive that they
cannot easily be summarized. Some of the main points were that the treaty failed to obtain
indemnification for the taking of slaves by the British when they evacuated American terri
tory, even though the British had allegedly acted in violation of the Treaty of Peace; that it
did not obtain immediate withdrawal from the posts in the Northwest which the British had
retained as a countermeasure for alleged violations of Articles N and VI of the Treaty of
Peace by the states; that it abandoned the policy of free ships make free goods, which dealt
with the rights of neutral shipping during war; that it failed to secure trading privileges in the
West Indies; that it prevented the United States from imposing retaliatory duties and ton
nage on British trade and shipping; that it was strongly pro-British and anti-French; that the
promise to treat Great Britain as the most favored nation in commercial matters gave the
British the benefit of all commercial concessions which were granted to other nations with
out requiring any reciprocal concessions on its part; and that in many other respects the
treaty was non-reciprocal and humiliating to the United States.
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called, resolutions adopted, petitions circulated, and countless essays
and pamphlets written expressing revulsion against the treaty and the
Federalist leaders who had planned, negotiated, and finally approved
it.241 These were matched, at first weakly and later more aggressively,
by counter-meetings, resolutions, petitions, and essays defending the
treaty and attacking the Republican "jacobins" for their tactics, dema
goguery, and misunderstanding of the national interest. In the end,
the Federalists proved more skillful.
Never failing to place
Washington's towering figure in the foreground, and insisting that re
jection meant war and the abandonment of efforts to open navigation
on the Mississippi, the Federalists finally wore down the fierce Re
publican opposition. By late April 1796, the Republicans were inca
pable of holding onto their numerical majority in the lower House. In
a devastating defeat, the House voted 51 to 48 to carry the treaty into
effect, bowing to the shift in popular sentiment and the looming sense
that rejection could mean a collapse of the government and possibly
even of the Union itself.242

241. See, e.g., COl\IBS, supra note 235, at 159-64; YOUNG, supra note 235, at 445-54;
Farnham, supra note 235, at 77-82. For the vicious attacks on Washington in Benjamin
Bache Franklin's Aurora, see TAGG, supra note 235, at 251-52, 275 (quoting Bache's declara
tion that "[t]he President has rewarded the people of the United States for their confidence
and affection by violating their constitution, by making a treaty with a nation that is their
abhorrence, and by treating their applications to him against the treaty vii.th the most
pointed contempt. Louis XVI, in the meridian of his power & his splendor never treated his
subjects with as much insult"). For the widespread attacks on Jay and other Federalist lead
ers like Hamilton and Rufus King, see YOUNG, supra note 235, at 447-49, 451. Hamilton, it
was claimed, was stoned when he attempted to speak during a protest meeting in New York.
The story may be apocryphal, but the intensity of the hostility was entirely real. Hamilton
nearly came to blows with leading Republicans, and only the energetic efforts of his friends
averted a duel at the last moment See id. at 451-53. Hamilton's correspondence regarding
the planned duel is found in Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Nicholson (July 20,
1795), in 18 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 471 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973)
[hereinafter 18 HAMILTON PAPERS]; Letter from James Nicholson to Alexander Hamilton
(July 20, 1795), in 18 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra, at 472; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
James Nicholson (July 20, 1795), supra, at 473; Letter from James Nicholson to Alexander
Hamilton (July 21, 1795), in 18 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra, at 473; Alexander Hamilton,
Drafts of Apology Required from James Nicholson (July 25-26, 1795), in 18 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra, at 501. The intensity of the early protests is vividly captured, from opposing
perspectives, in writings of Hamilton and Madison. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence
No. 1, reprinted in 18 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra, at 479-86; Letter from James Madison to
James Monroe (Dec. 20, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 168, 168-69.
242. For discussion, see, for example, COMBS, supra note 235, at 179-87; KURTZ, supra
note 235, at 25-33, 51-58, 61-77; and YOUNG, supra note 235, at 454-55, 460-66. For the final
vote in the House, see 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1291 (1796). Madison had counted a majority of
more than twenty, which slowly dwindled away to his horror and dismay. For his letters to
Jefferson recounting events as they occurred, see Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 18, 1796), in 2 REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 236, at 933; Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 23, 1796), in 2 REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note
236, at 934; and Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 1, 1796), in 2
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 236, at 936-37. For Madison's post-mortem, see Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 22, 1796), in 2 REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, su
pra note 236, at 938 ("The name of the President and the alarm of war, have had a greater
effect, than were apprehended . . . . A crisis which ought to have been so managed as to for-
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c. The Jay Treaty Controversy. The Jay Treaty is today associated
principally with the great House debate of March and April 1796, fo
cusing on the House's role in the treaty-making process. When a
treaty touches upon subjects over which the Constitution has given
Congress legislative authority, does the treaty become effective as
domestic law even without the approval of the House? If the House's
approval is necessary, does it have any discretion in deciding whether
to adopt implementing legislation, or must it in good faith, and with
out reconsidering the merits, carry out any treaties which the Presi
dent and Senate have approved? These and other related questions
were the subject of the remarkable, and remarkably able, debates that
ensued.243 Their deep resonance in the ideological disputes of the day
should be apparent.
Yet, the received wisdom about the Jay Treaty controversy among
legal historians is unfortunate. It has successfully deflected attention
from the fact that the House debate was only the tail end of a much
wider and richer national debate over the scope of the treaty power
which held the country spellbound during the nine-month period pre
ceding the House deliberations.244 Most important for present pur
poses, legal historians seem never to have noticed that a key element

tify the Republican cause, has left it in a very crippled condition."). For disunion sentiment,
see KURTZ, supra note 235, at 67-68; TAGG, supra note 235, at 250; and Farnham, supra note
235, at 81-82 (quoting a Richmond newspaper notice declaring that "Notice is hereby given,
That in case the Treaty entered into by that d. . . . .d Arch Traitor J. . . .n J. .y with the British
tyrant should be ratified - a petition will be presented to the next General Assembly of
Virginia at their next session, praying that the said state may recede from the Union"). The
Federalist campaign was particularly effective at recruiting the merchants in favor of the
treaty. See COMBS, supra note 235, at 178-84. As Jefferson explained to Madison, "the gen
eral expression of indignation has alarmed them for the strength of the government. They
have feared the shock would be too great, and have chosen to tack about & support both
treaty & government, rather than risk the government . . . ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (Sept. 21, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 88, 88.
243. The debate over the House's role consumed over 350 pages in the Annals of
Congress. See 5 ANNAIS OF CONG. 426-783 {1796). In response to a resolution requesting
that he provide the House with Jay's instructions and the diplomatic correspondence con
cerning the treaty, Washington famously denied that the House had any discretion in decid
ing whether to implement treaties approved by the Senate and ratified by the President. See
5 ANNAIS OF CONG., 760-62 {1796) (reprinting Washington's message). Under Madison's
leadership, the House responded in kind, adopting a resolution disclaiming "any agency in
making Treaties," but at the same time insisting that "when a Treaty stipulates regulations
on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must de
pend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress."
Furthermore, in all such cases, the House had a "right and duty . . . to deliberate on the ex
pediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect." 5 ANNAIS OF CONG. 771-72
{1796). The vote was 57 to 35. See id. at 781-83.
244. The single best source for the debates is THE AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER; OR AN
IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF EsSAYS, REsOLVES, SPEECHES, &c., RELATIVE OR HAVING
AN AFFINITY TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN (Mathew Carey ed., 1795) {3 vols.)
[hereinafter AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER]. It reprinted in serial form some of the more
important essays produced during the Jay Treaty controversy and was widely distributed
during the controversy.

1158

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

98:1075

in this impassioned debate - second in significance only to the dis
pute over the role of the House - was precisely the conflict between
the nationalist and states' rights views of the treaty power.245 Indeed,
they seem never to have noticed that Hamilton himself, in his most
celebrated constitutional essays after the Federalist Papers, explicitly
and forcefully endorsed the nationalist conception. 246 By any fair
measure, the year-long controversy reaffirmed the nationalist view as
the dominant understanding of the Constitution.
i. The Treaty in the Senate. The immediate provocation for con
troversy was an already familiar provision. Like Article XI of the
French Treaty of 1778, Article 9 of the Jay Treaty provided
that British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of the United
States . . . shall continue to hold them according to the nature and Ten
ure of their respective Estates and Titles therein, and may grant Sell or
Devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if they were Na
tives.247

Overriding the common law principle subjecting alien-owned real
property to forfeiture, this provision was among the most controver
sial in the treaty. It raised particularly urgent concerns in Virginia and
North Carolina, where the enormous Fairfax and Granville estates, al
ready embroiled in controversy, were potentially affected.248
When Washington submitted the treaty to the Senate in June 1795,
Article 9 immediately met fierce resistance. Led by Senator Henry
Tazewell of Virginia, opponents fixed on a familiar argument: Article
9, they claimed, was unconstitutional because it infringed on the leg
islative powers of the states. Indeed, in an effort to defeat the treaty,
Tazewell specifically moved that the Senate decline its consent, inter
alia, "[b]ecause the rights of the individual States are by the 9th article

245. Some non-legal historians have noticed this aspect of the debate, but have not fo.
cused on its significance for constitutional law. See GEORGE DANGERFIELD, CHANCELLOR
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK, 1746-1813, at 272 {1960); Farnham, supra note 235,
at 78-79.
246. Hamilton collaborated with Rufus King in writing, under the pseudonym Camillus,
thirty-eight essays entitled The Defence. See The Defence No. 1: Introductory Note, in 18
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 475, 475-77 (introducing the essays and identifying
the twenty-eight written by Hamilton and the ten written by King). The bearing of these
essays on a number of constitutional questions has been missed, I suspect, partly out of igno
rance of the nature of the arguments to which Hamilton was responding. For discussion, see
infra notes 284-303 and accompanying text.
247. The Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., in 2 TREATIES, supra note 74, at 245,
253-54. Jay had completed the negotiations in 1794, but the treaty did not reach
Philadelphia until March 1795. To the consternation of Republicans, Washington kept the
terms secret, and called for a special session of the Senate to consider the treaty, which
convened on July 8, 1795. See COMBS, supra note 235, at 159-60.

248. See RISJORD, supra note 227, at 456; Farnham, supra note 235, at 78-79. For fur
ther discussion of the Fairfax and Granville estate issue, see supra note 245 and accompa
nying text; infra notes 278, 311-314, 367, 374-410 and accompanying text.
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of the treaty, unconstitutionally invaded."249 The Senate was un
moved. With Rufus King and Oliver Ellsworth (shortly to assume
Jay's seat as Chief Justice) taking the lead, the Senate, on June 24, re
jected Tazewell's motion by a vote of 19 to 10.250 It then proceeded to
approve the treaty by 20 to 10.251
Article 9, of course, had not found its way into the treaty by acci
dent. Jay's instructions had specifically directed him to propose "that
the disabilities, arising from alienage in cases of inheritance, should be
put upon a liberal footing, or rather abolished."252 This instruction,
modeled after Article XI of the French Treaty, was in fact substan
tially broader than the provision to which Jay actually agreed. Indeed,
given the intensity of the reaction to Article 9, Hamilton feared that
revelation of this instruction would seriously embarrass the admini
stration and advised Washington, months later, to resist House efforts
to obtain it.253
249. (Authentic) Treaty ofAmity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannick
Majesty, and the United States ofAmerica. By Their President, with the Advice and Consent
of Their Senate with an Addition of TWO IMPORTANT MOTIONS Made During the
Discussion of the Question of Ratification by MESSRS. BURR AND TAZEWELL
(Philadelphia 1795), reprinted in 18 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 391 [hereinafter
(Authentic) Treaty]. Tazewell's motion was printed in the Annals of Congress without
attribution. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 861-62 (1795). He sent a letter reproducing the
motion to Momoe. See Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Momoe (June 27, 1975) (MSS
James Momoe Papers, Library of Congress) (on file with author). Tazewell's motion
specified a number of other familiar objections to the treaty, including that it was
unconstitutional for another reason: "Because the Treaty asserts a power in the President
and Senate, to control and even annihilate the constitutional right of the Congress of the
United States over their commercial intercourse with foreign nations." (Authentic) Treaty,
supra, at 392. This became a standard Republican charge against the treaty. Aaron Burr
made a sinillar resolution, also detailing a number of objections and urging, inter alia, that
Article 9 be rejected. See id. at 391. It is likely that his constitutional objections were sinillar
to Tazewell's, but the motion did not specify.
250. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 862 (1795). Unfortunately, no official records were made
of the Senate's deliberations. Senator Pierce Butler kept cursory notes during the first part
of the debate and sent copies to Madison, along with copies of the treaty provisions, even
though the Senate had imposed an injunction of secrecy. See Letter from Pierce Butler to
James Madison (June 26, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 24; see also
Senator Pierce Butler's Notes of the Debates on Jay's Treaty, 62 S.C. HIST. MAG. 1 (1961).
Butler's notes indicated that Article 9 had been debated on June 16 and that King and
Ellsworth had supported it See Letter from Pierce Butler to James Madison, supra, at 27.
For the injunction of secrecy and its partial lifting after approval of the treaty, see 4 ANNALS
OF CONG. 855, 867 (1795).
251.

See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 865 (1795).

252. Instructions to Mr. Jay, by Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State (May 6, 1794), in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 110, at 472, 473. Although the instructions were
penned by then Secretary of State Randolph, Hamilton was intimately involved in the whole
project
253. The young New York Republican Edward Livingston provoked the famous House
debate by moving for a resolution calling upon the President to lay Jay's instructions and
other diplomatic papers before the House. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 400-01 (1796); COMBS,
supra note 235, at 175-76; Madison in the Fourth Congress, Editorial Note, supra note 236, at
144-45. Following the advice of Hamilton and others, Washington refused. See COMBS, su
pra note 235, at 176-78; Madison in the Fourth Congress, Editorial Note, supra note 236, at
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Washington, characteristically, was sensitive to the points made on
both sides of the Senate debate and, after the vote, hesitated briefly
before ratifying the treaty. Writing to Hamilton, he asked for an in
depth analysis of the treaty and the arguments pro and con as to each
article.254 Although no longer in the government, Hamilton quickly
obliged, forwarding a comprehensive analysis of the treaty in all of its
dimensions.255 Crucial for present purposes, in the course of his analy
sis, he explicitly affirmed the nationalist view of the treaty power. Re
ferring to Tazewell's charge that Article 9 unconstitutionally "en
trenched upon the authorities of the States," Hamilton replied:
But this objection is inadmissable. It would totally subvert the power
of making Treaties. There can hardly be made a Treaty which does not
make some alteration in the existing laws and which does not, as to its
objects, controul the legislative authority - and from the nature of our
constitution this must apply to the State laws and legislatures as well as
to those of the Union.
A Treaty cannot be made which alters the constitutions of the country
or which infringes any express exceptions to the power in the constitu
tion of the United States. But it is difficult to assign any other bounds to

146. For letters of Hamilton to Washington arguing against complying with the House's re
quest, see Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 26, 1796), in 20
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 82; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George
Washington (Mar. 28, 1796), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 83; Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, su
pra note 21, at 85. In a letter urging Washington to deny the House's request, Hamilton
noted, among other things, that
(t]he negotiator is expressly instructed to accede to the intire abolition of alienism as to in
heritances of land You have seen what clamour has been made about the moderate modifi
cation of this idea in the Treaty & can thence judge what a load would fall on this part of the
instruction.

Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 28, 1796), supra, at 83-84.
254. See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (July 3, 1795), in 18
241, at 398, 398-99 (noting that it "is not the opinions of
those who were determined (before it was promulgated) to support, or oppose it, that I am
sollicitous to obtain; for these I well know rarely do more than examine the side to which
they lean . . . . My desire is to learn from dispassionate men, who have knowledge of the
subject, and abilities to judge of it, the genuine opinion they entertain of each article of the
instrument; and the result of it in the aggregate"); see also Letter from George Washington
to Alexander Hamilton (July 29, 1795), in 18 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 524.
Later in August, after having decided in favor of the treaty, Washington again hesitated be
cause of a new British order-in-council which had reimposed restrictions on neutral shipping.
When a scandal involving his Secretary of State Edmund Randolph erupted - which led to
suspicion that Randolph had taken a bribe from the French Minister Adet - Washington
fired Randolph and abruptly decided to ratify the treaty. On the Randolph affair and its
relation to Washington's decision to ratify the treaty, see COMBS, supra note 235, at 165-70,
and Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, to Alexander Hamilton (July 30, 1795), in 18
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 526.

HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note

255. See Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Naviga
tion Lately Made Between the United States and Great Britain (July 9-11, 1795), in 18
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 404-54 [hereinafter Hamilton's Remarks on the
Treaty].
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the power. It may certainly alter the provisions of the statute and mu
nicipal laws & modify the rules of property.256
For support, Hamilton pointed to practice under the Confederation.
In the Treaty of Peace, and even more dramatically in the French
Treaty, he noted, the old Congress had approved stipulations limiting
the power of the states to confiscate real property on the basis of al
ienage. Provisions of this kind, moreover, were common in both
peace and commercial treaties. Since the treaty power "is plenary un
der our present constitution, more so than it was under the confedera
tion [given the proviso to Article IX of the Confederation]," Hamilton
concluded, "the objection to the constitutionality of this article is
manifestly futile. "257
Washington apparently agreed. Notwithstanding the raging public
controversy, he subsequently ratified the treaty.258 The Jay Treaty
thus established a precedent of enormous significance in favor of the
nationalist view. All the more so because it was the first treaty with a
foreign nation to be negotiated and approved under the new
Constitution and because its approval demonstrated the concurrence
of both the Executive and the Senate in that view. Hamilton's explicit
affirmation, moreover, utterly belies the oft-repeated claim that the
nationalist view was beyond the ken of the Founding Fathers.

ii. The Public Debate. The story of Article 9, however, did not end
with the debates on the floor of the Senate Chamber and the secret
deliberations of high executive officials. Just after the vote, Virginia's
other Senator, Stevens Thomson Mason, leaked a copy of the treaty to
a leading Republican newspaper which published it along with
Tazewell's motion.259 The reaction was incendiary. By the time the

256. Id. at 428. Hamilton noted that Article 9 had been misunderstood and "caused at
first much uneasiness." Id. at 427. The echo of Hamilton's argument a decade before, writ
ten as Phocion, should be evident. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
257. Hamilton's Remarks on the Treaty, supra note 255, at 429. Hamilton cited Articles

V and VI of the Treaty of Peace, both of which secured British subjects certain rights in real

property. See id. at 428. As we shall see, Article VI subsequently played a major role in the
debate over the nationalist and states' rights views of the treaty power. See infra notes 377420, 432-439 and accompanying text. For its role in debates under the Confederation, see
supra notes 104-140 and accompanying text. As to the French Treaty, he cited Article XI.
See Hamilton's Remarks on the Treaty, supra note 255, at 428. Provisions of this kind were,
moreover, co=on in treaties of peace and co=erce. See id. at 429.
258.

See supra note 254.

259. For discussion of the sensational publication of the treaty by Bache in the Aurora,
see COMBS, supra note 235, at 162; TAGG, supra note 235, at 246-47; and Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior (June 26, 1795) (notes following), in 18
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 241, at 389-90. The Washington administration made a seri
ous blunder in failing to publish the treaty at an earlier point. The Senate had approved the
treaty on June 24, and the administration had arranged for its publication on July 1. Bache,
however, published an abstract of the treaty on June 29 and circulated the entire treaty, in
pamphlet form, on July 1. On July 3, Bache released a second wave of pamphlets, which
included the entire treaty and Tazewell's motion. By this time, of course, the public was in

1162

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1075

dust finally settled a year later, however, the Republican challenge
had only served to consolidate even more clearly the nationalist con
ception as the dominant view.
With the presses still warm, Republican activists throughout the
country rushed to organize protest meetings and rallies. The first step
was to draft elaborate memorials to the President, which identified the
treaty's various constitutional infirmities and specified its grave short
comings in upholding national rights, interests, and honor. The next
step was to take the battle to the press. Republican polemicists of all
stripes produced a massive outpouring of articles and essays critically
scrutinizing the treaty's provisions and providing support for the con
stitutional attacks already underway. The hope was that under the
pressure of intense popular discontent, Washington would refuse to
ratify the treaty.260 When that failed, the next line of defense was the
House: it had to be convinced to assert its authority and block imple
mentation of the hated and unconstitutional treaty.261 In the wake of

an uproar.
n.2.

See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, supra, at 389-90

260. See, e.g., COMBS, supra note 235, at 162-63; TAGG, supra note 235, at 248-56;
YOUNG, supra note 235, at 447-57. Washington's response to the large number of memorials
was uniformly curt, asserting that he had to make his own judgment on the merits of the
treaty. See, e.g., Draft of the Petition to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Editorial Note, in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 62, 64 [hereinafter Draft
of Petition to General Assembly]; COMBS, supra note 235, at 163-64. For Bache's energetic
efforts, and inflammatory rhetoric in the Aurora, see TAGG, supra note 235, at 252-60.
Newspapers throughout the country were operating at a feverish pitch. See, e.g., Farnham,
supra note 235, at 78-82.
261. The Republican leadership worried that the members of the House would resist
discussing the treaty out of a concern that the House had no discretion to exercise in connec
tion with treaties. See Farnham, supra note 235, at 82-83. With Madison's active efforts kept
carefully in the background, Republicans turned to the Virginia General Assembly as the
focus of their efforts. For Madison's role, see Draft of Petition to General Assembly, supra
note 260, at 62-69; Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Oct. 29, 1795), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 113-14 (correspondence concerning the Virginia leg
islative debate and Madison's role); Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Nov. 22,
1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 132-36 (same); infra notes 326-333 and
accompanying text. If the General Assembly would condemn the treaty, it would encourage
timid Republicans in the House to take a more assertive stance. See KURTZ, supra note 235,
at 24-25; RISJORD, supra note 227, at 457-60; Farnham, supra note 235, at 82-85. Republi
cans made their move as soon as the legislative session began in November, proposing a
resolution lauding their two Senators, Tazewell and Mason, for having voted against the
treaty in the Senate. A lengthy debate then ensued in which John Marshall gave a famous
three-hour constitutional oration, but the Republicans nevertheless easily carried the resolu
tion. See KURTZ, supra note 235, at 22-23; RISJORD, supra note 227, at 457-58; Farnham,
supra note 235, at 83-84. In December, they then pushed through a resolution recommend
ing that Congress adopt four constitutional amendments. The first, and most important,
would have required that any treaty on a subject within the powers delegated to Congress
had to be ratified by the House as well as the Senate. That was just a reiteration of the main
Republican attack on the treaty. The second and third were designed to express dissatisfac
tion with the Senate by transferring the Senate's impeachment powers to a special tribunal
and reducing the Senators' terms to three years. The fourth was a personal slap at John Jay,
prohibiting federal judges from holding any other office. Apparently, the main purpose of
the proposed amendments was to force the House to take up the whole question of the
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the treaty's publication, the Republicans clearly had the upper hand.
For a time, Federalists, stunned by the force and intensity of the re
sponse, remained silent, encouraging the inflammatory rhetoric of
some of the extremists in the Republican camp. Quickly, however, the
Federalists regrouped and soon matched the Republicans, meeting for
meeting, memorial for memorial, and article for article.262
The main focus of discontent on the constitutional front was the
exclusion of the House from the process. Even among Republicans,
though, a wide variety of different and conflicting views were ex
pressed. On the moderate side was the minimalist position ultimately
adopted by the House, which insisted only that treaty stipulations
touching on subjects within Congress's legislative authority required
an act of Congress to bring them into force as domestic law and that
the House could exercise discretion in deciding whether to adopt any
necessary implementing legislation.263 On the extremist side were
resolute denials that the treaty power could ever extend to subjects of
congressional power.264 Republicans, however, were not content to
identify this constitutional defect alone. Their uncontainable enthusi
asm found constitutional infirmities in virtually every provision in the
treaty, a point which Federalists were ultimately to use to devastating
advantage.
Article 9 was no exception; indeed, for some, it was a central
case-in-point. Perhaps prompted by Tazewell's motion, Republican
firebrands - like the young Virginian, John Thompson - loosed their
cannons at the usurpation of state authority which Article 9 repre
sented. "The ninth article, " Thompson claimed in a widely publicized
speech during a Petersburg, Virginia, protest, "invades the rights of

treaty. Virginia then sent the proposed amendments to the legislatures of the other states.
See KUR1Z, supra note 235, at 5; RISJORD, supra note 227, at 458; Farnham, supra note 235,
at 84-85.
262. For the federalist response, see, for example, COMBS, supra note 235, at 178-85, and
KUR1Z, supra note 235, at 33, 51-55, 71-74. The most telling early indication that the Re
publicans were losing public support was the nearly uniformly hostile reaction to Virginia's
amendment proposals in the other state legislatures. See KUR1Z, supra note 235, at 25-30;
RISJORD, supra note 227, at 460-62; Farnham, supra note 235, at 85-88. For the disappoint
ment of Madison and his lieutenants to the reaction, and its forebodings for the House de
bate, see Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 241, at 170; Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 31, 1796), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note
236, at 208, 209; and Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1796), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 224, 224-25, 232-34 (Joseph Jones had played a central
role in promoting the Virginia resolutions).
263. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. By dubbing this position "moderate," I
do not mean to suggest that it was the best, or even a persuasive, interpretation of the Con
stitution - only that it was moderate in comparison to the positions of other Republicans.
For recent debate over this question, see supra note 20.
264. See infra notes 272-274, 278, 290, 296-297, 305, 318-320, 328-333, 338-350, 388-398,
431, 436-439 and accompanying text; supra note 249 and accompanying text (describing
Tazewell's proposed resolution disapproving the treaty).
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this commonwealth, by contemplating the case of Denny Fairfax."265
Likewise, in New York, a town meeting adopted a resolution con
demning, inter alia, Article 9 for permitting British subjects to hold
lands previously purchased in the United States, which, they claimed,
would override New York State's laws confiscating Tory land and
prohibiting alien landholding.266
Republican fury was forged into more reasoned efforts than these
conclusory public pronouncements in the flood of essays filling news
papers across the country.267 This is not to suggest that there was a
carefully coordinated strategy or even that the various authors were in
agreement on many crucial points, although they all reviled the treaty.
Attacks on the constitutionality of Article 9, however, were raised by
enough writers at least to suggest that many of the more strident Re
publicans affirmed the states' rights view. On the other hand, the si
lence of others equally suggested that, even among Republicans, there
was serious doubt about the cogency of the states' rights conception.
In the tremendous outburst of writing immediately following pub
lication of the treaty, the influential Livingston family of New York
played a particularly notable role. Robert Livingston had been a
leading revolutionary in the generation of 1776, served as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the Confederation, and was among the most
passionate opponents of the treaty.268 With the help of his younger
brother Edward, who as a member of the House was shortly to play a
265. John Thompson, J. Thompson's Speech, in
note 244, at 27.

1

AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra

266. See YOUNG, supra note 235, at 453-54. The resolutions were adopted at a follow
up to an earlier meeting at which Hamilton had attempted, unsuccessfully, to address the
assembly. That meeting had nearly ended in violence. See id. at 449-53; supra note 241. The
influential Livingston family took the lead in organizing and conducting the meetings, and
the resolutions closely followed the line of argument which Robert and Brockholst
Livingston had taken in a series of essays published in New York newspapers and carried
widely around the country. For discussion of the essays, see infra notes 269-277, 279-280,
283, 286-288, 291, 309, 344, 355, 407, 502 and accompanying text. Another resolution con
demned the treaty for usurping the powers of Congress. See YOUNG, supra note 235, at 454;
see also Resolutions, 1 AMERICAN REMEt.IBRANCER, supra note 244, at 102-03 (reprinting
similar resolutions of a town meeting in Peterburg, Virginia).

For discussion of some of the Republican writers, see TAGG, supra note 235, at 252The Aurora published essays, inter alia, by Hancock, Valerius, Belisarius, Atticus,
Pittachus, Diplomaticus, and Americanus. Writers of a more serious character were Cato,
Cinna, Decius, Columbus, as well as the author of the series "Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty."
For discussion, see infra notes 269-280, 438-439 and accompanying text. There were count
less others. For Hamilton's efforts to obtain information about the identities of some of
these writers, see Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior (Sept. 20,
1795), in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 278, 278-79 & n.2 (inquiring about identi
ties, with note indicating that Valerius wrote eleven articles, Hancock wrote five, Belisarius
wrote five, and Atticus wrote at least nine); Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Junior to Alexander
Hamilton (Sept. 26, 1795), in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 294 (providing
speculations).
267.

54.

268. On Robert Livingston and the Livingston family,
245, at 268-73, and YOUNG, supra note 235, at 447-54, 458.

see DANGERFIELD, supra note
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key part in the debate over the role of the House in treaty-making, he
penned a series of sixteen widely circulated essays under the pseudo
nym Cato, which were among the most influential and most elabo
rately reasoned.269 Brockholst Livingston, a close relative, likewise
produced two sets of widely distributed essays under the signatures
Decius and Cinna.270 During the Jay Treaty controversy, aii three ad
hered to some version of the states' rights view. Ironically, however,
as we shall see, all three were more or less explicitly to renounce that
view in later political crises.271
As with many Republican writers, Cato adjudged large portions of
the treaty to be unconstitutional.272 Most important for present pur-

269. See DANGERFIELD, supra note 245, at 272. The Cato essays were ultimately pub
lished in pamphlet form and widely circulated. See YOUNG, supra note 235, at 458.
270. See DANGERFIELD, supra note 245, at 272. On the attribution of the Livingstons as
authors of Cato, Cinna, and Decius, as well as detailed publication information, see The De
fence No. 1: Introductory Note, supra note 246, at 475-77.
271. See infra note 355 and accompanying text (describing Robert Livingston's role in
negotiating the Louisiana Purchase and the states' rights dilemmas thereby created); infra
note 407 and accompanying text (noting then Supreme Court Justice Brockholst
Livingston's concurrence without comment in a decision upholding Article 9 of the Jay
Treaty); infra notes 503-507 and accompanying text (describing the endorsement of Edward
Livingston, then Secretary of State in the Jackson administration, of the nationalist view and
explicitly of the power to make treaty stipulations dealing with alien ownership of real prop
erty).
272. The Jay Treaty, he clainied, was "at war with every check, with every provision, by
which [the Constitution] guards against the intrusion of one branch upon the rights of an
other, and which, if suffered, would terminate in despotism." Robert Livingston, Cato No.
XIII, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at 246-47. A treaty can
not, he claimed, touch on any subject within Congress's legislative authority without obtain
ing the prior approval of the House as well as the President and Senate. See id. at 249-50.
Thus, innumerable provisions of the treaty were bad on this ground: those which stipulated
for the payment of money, for example, in settling claims for unpaid debts to British credi
tors and even for the salaries of commissioners who were assigned to arbitrate disputed
cases, see id. at 248, 252; those which promised commercial advantages, for example granting
Great Britain most favored nation status, see id. at 248; those which created crimes (dealing
principally with piracy), see id. at 248; and those which created new offices, for example
commissioners to arbitrate disputed claims, and which vested their appointment in the
President and Senate, see id. at 250-51. The provisions for appointment of five commission
ers to resolve outstanding disputes were also unconstitutional because they invaded the
rights of the judiciary under Article III, which has jurisdiction of all cases arising under trea
ties (notwithstanding the "inconveniences [which] may arise from there not existing a power
in the United States to determine controversies arising under treaties by the intervention of
commissioners"), id. at 252; see id. at 250-52; Robert Livingston, Cato No. XIV, in 2
AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at 3; violated the appointments clause be
cause they allowed the British government (as well as the United States) to appoint two
commissioners with a fifth being determined by lot, see Observations on Mr. Jay's Treaty, 2
AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at 3; disregarded the principle of due process
because the commissioners were permitted to consider evidence that would be inadmissible
in a court of the United States, see id. at 4; and violated an unspecified principle which pro
hibited the assumption of responsibility for private debts, see id. at 4. Furthermore, the
treaty was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited the export of certain goods from the
states. See Robert Livingston, Cato No. XIII, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER,
supra note 244, at 248. Remarkably, however, Cato was at this point only beginning to warm
up. An outbreak of yellow fever in New York compelled him to leave the city and "lay aside
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poses, he found a parallel between the relationship of the treaty power
to congressional power and to state legislative authority. Treaties, he
claimed, could not touch on subjects that the Constitution assigned to
Congress without obtaining the prior approval of the House. So too
the treaty power could not interfere with the legislative powers of the
states on matters beyond congressional authority without first obtain
ing the individual consent of the states: "It will be found that no ratifi
cation by the president and senate can carry this treaty into effect,
without the concurrence of congress; nor, in some points, even with
such concurrence, without the aid of the state legislatures."273 This
was remarkable doctrine and was all the more remarkable because
Cato failed even to make a passing reference to the Supremacy
Clause. If Congress needed to pass legislation to execute treaty
stipulations on subjects falling within its legislative authority, and the
states to pass legislation for stipulations falling within their legislative
authority, what was the point of including treaties in the Supremacy
Clause?274
For Cato, Article 9, of course, was a case in point.275 This Article,
he noted,
appears to infringe the constitutional independence of the respective
states. - Congress alone have the power to naturalize; but neither con
gress, nor any member of the federal government, appear to me to have
any right to declare the tenure by which lands shall be holden in the terrimy pen," even though "[s]everal articles, which appear to me exceptionable, remain to be
discussed . . . ."
Robert Livingston, Cato No. XVI, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN
REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at 65. Never completing his essays, he was thus abruptly
forced to break off his constitutional analysis.
273. Robert Livingston, Cato No.
He continued:

XIII, reprinted in

1 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER,

supra note 244, at 247.

Whatever has been said with respect to the rights of the president and senate, as opposed to
the exclusive rights of congress, applies with equal force to the rights of states; where the
treaty is made relative to objects not surrendered by them, the treaty that is binding upon
them, must be constitutionally made, and consist with the powers yielded to the federal gov
ernment; otherwise the president might barter away the independence of individual states,
which makes a necessary part of the constitution of the United States, and which is expressly
guaranteed.

Id. at 250.
274. Even Livingston's biographer found him "most bizarre when he declared that a
treaty might well depend, not upon the advice and consent of the Senate, or even upon the
concurrence of the whole Congress, but upon the agreement also of individual states."
DANGERFIELD, supra note 245, at 272. In the House debate, Madison gently rejected this
claim. See infra notes 338-346 and accompanying text. Indeed, in order to avoid the over
powering force of the Supremacy Clause in making treaties self-executing, Madison carefully
pointed out that the Oause in terms applies only to state judges and state laws and constitu
tions. See id.
275. It was not the only case, however. According to Cato, the provisions for commis
sioners authorized them to consider evidence that would be inadmissible in this country.
"[T]he rules of evidence," he then declared, "not being given to congress, I presume are ex
clusively invested in the state legislatures." Robert Livingston, Cato No. XVI, reprinted in 2
AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at 3.
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tories of the individual states, without naturalization. This is an act of
sovereignty which is confined to the state legislatures, and which they
have not ceded to congress, about which, therefore, I am led to doubt the
right of the president and senate to treat . . . .276

Quoting the Tenth Amendment, he then asked: "Is this right of the
state abridged by the power of the president and senate to make trea
ties? Are not their powers to treat confined to such objects as the
constitution entrusts to the federal government?"277
Cato was probably alone in suggesting that the consent of the
states might be required to validate a treaty. In the first blush of ex
citement generated by publication of the treaty, however, he had
company in asserting a states' rights subject-matter limitation on the
scope of the treaty power. Alexander Dallas, a leading Pennsylvania
Republican, and Brockholst Livingston, for example, agreed.278 Writ-

276. Robert Livingston,

Cato No. XVI, reprinted in

3

AMERICAN

REMEMBRANCER,

supra note 244, at 63.
277. Robert Livingston, Cato No. XVI, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER,
Cato further claimed that under Article 9, half of the lands in New
York could be owned by British subjects. See id. at 64-65. Moreover, if valid, it would per
mit the federal government to agree to transfer all of the vacant lands in every state to the
British king. See id. at 65. Finally, he also claimed that the stipulation violated Article 4, § 3
of the Constitution which provides that nothing in the Constitution shall prejudice any
claims of the United States or of any particular states. See id.

supra note 244, at 63-64.

278. Dallas wrote an important series entitled Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty. See
GEORGE MIFFLIN DALLAS, LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS 160-204
(1871):
It may not be amiss here to intimate a doubt of the power of the federal government to
regulate the tenure of real estates; it is nowhere expressly given, and therefore cannot be
constitutionally implied; and it seems to be among the necessary and natural objects of State
legislation. . . . [I]s every man whose estate was liable to confiscation as a traitor or as an
alien, in consequence of the Revolution, entitled now to hold lands as a native? The Fairfax
claim in Virginia, the claim of the Penns in Pennsylvania, and the claims of Galloway, Allen,
etc., may hence derive a dangerous principle of resuscitation. Look to it well.
Id. at 190-91 (emphases in original). For a description of Dallas's role in the anti-treaty
campaign, see Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior (Sept. 20, 1795),
supra note 267, at 278-79, and Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior
(Sept. 26, 1795), in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 294-95 n.1. Dallas dropped out
of the campaign when Washington decided to ratify the treaty.
Dallas was, if anything, even more comprehensive than Cato in finding constitutional de
fects in the treaty. Jay's appointment had been unconstitutional, since he was then sitting on
the Supreme Court, see DALLAS, supra, at 161; the appointment of commissioners to hear
matters within the judicial power violated Article ill, see id. at 188-90; the public assumption
of private debts violated fundamental principles, see id. at 189-90; the naturalization of cer
tain British subjects, the extensive regulations of commerce, the provisions dealing with
trade with Indian tribes, the removal of duties on certain products, and the definition and
punishment of certain offences violated Congress's powers, see id. at 190-94; the imposition
of limitations on the conduct of Americans abroad (in joining in foreign attacks on the
British) violated their liberty, see id. at 192-93; the prohibition on exports of certain goods
violated the provision preventing the imposition of duties on exports from the states, see id.
at 193-94; and the probable ceding of territory to the British under a provision settling the
border violated the guarantee of a republican form of government to every state, see id. at
194.
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ing as Decius, Brockholst Livingston declared that Article 9 "infringes
the rights of the different States. "279 He also mistakenly claimed that it
was unprecedented, since all previous treaties, including the French
Treaty of 1778, had, in his view, covered only personal property.280
Still another writer, Atticus, noted:

The 9th article of the treaty contains the following extraordinary stipula
tion: By what part of the constitution have the president and senate the
power of regulating the tenure of real estates? We look in vain for such
a grant in the constitution, even to congress itself; this right then, not be
ing delegated to the United States, nor "prohibited" by the constitution to
the states, is "reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Shall
the president dare to invade the chartered rights of the states?281
Republicans, however, had moved too fast with too little serious
thought, and Federalists were quick to exploit their vulnerability.
Noah Webster as Curtius was first to respond: "It has been said that
this article infringes the rights of the states. As I have never seen any
argument to prove this assertion, it will be sufficient to answer it by
another assertion, and say it does not.'"282 He then demonstrated the
gross errors in Decius's claim that the French Treaty did not include
protection for real property.283
Federalists, however, left their heavy lifting to Hamilton. In a se
ries of thirty-eight masterful essays entitled The Defence, Hamilton,
under the signature Camillus and with the aid of Rufus King, under
took a sweeping defense of the treaty. It is not possible here to convey
the magnitude or brilliance of Hamilton's achievement or its profound
impact on the shape of the public debate. Even a dispirited Jefferson,
vainly imploring Madison to oppose him, acknowledged that

279. Brockholst Livingston, Decius No.

II, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER,

supra note 244, at 125.
280. See id., at 126-27. Decius interpreted the term "immoveable property" in the
English version of the French Treaty not to include real property. For this error, Hamilton,
with Rufus King's aid, effectively tore him to pieces. See infra notes 283, 285-288 and ac
companying text.
281. Atticus No. IX, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN REME?>.IBRANCER, supra note 244, at 15253 (emphases in original). For other minor Republican writers apparently objecting to Arti
cle 9 on states' rights grounds, see, e.g., TAGG, supra note 235, at 253.

282. Noah Webster,

Curtius No. V, reprinted in NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLEcnON OF
LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS 194, 195 (1843) (emphasis in
original). Curtius was defending the observations made by William Loughton Smith in his

PAPERS ON POLITICAL,

Candid Remarks on the Treaty ofAmity and Commerce Between the United States and Great
Britain, which appeared in The New York Daily Advertiser, July 4, 1795. See Brockholst
Livingston, Decius No. II, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244, at
127. For attribution of the latter essay to Smith, see Letter from John Beckley to James
Madison (Sept. 10, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS supra note 236, at 85, 86 n.3 . Curtius also
defended Article 9 on policy grounds.

283. See Noah Webster, Curtius No.V, supra note 282, at 196-97.
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"Hamilton is really a colossus to the antirepublican party. Without
numbers, he is an host within bimself."284
Hamilton spent the greater part of his essays defending the treaty
on the merits, leaving his response to the constitutional objections for
the last three numbers. In The Defence No. XVII, he specifically ad
dressed all but the constitutional arguments that had been made in re
sponse to Article 9.285 The "loud and virulent clamour" which this Ar
ticle had raised was based, he claimed, largely on misrepresentations
about its scope.286 Most important, after undertaking a painstaking
analysis of the provision and its proper construction, he demolished
Decius's claim that the French Treaty of 1778 did not protect real
property. Decius was obviously unfamiliar with French law, and
Hamilton spared him no embarrassment in meticulously demonstrat
ing the errors into which he had fallen.287 "Where now DECIUS,"

284. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 242, at 88. After
noting that the Republicans have "only midling performances to oppose to him" and that
"[i]n truth, when he comes forward, there is nobody but yourself who can meet him," he
concluded: "For god's sake take up your pen, and give a fundamental reply to Curtius &
Camillus." Id. at 88-89. Jefferson employed strikingly similar language in 1793 when he ur
gently suggested that Madison write in opposition to Hamilton's Pacificus letters in the con
troversy over Washington's declaration of neutrality. That time, however, Madison reluc
tantly followed his advice. See CORWIN, supra note 236, at 16 (quoting Jefferson's
exhortation that "[n]obody answers him and his doctrines will therefore be taken for con
fessed. For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the most striking heresies, and
cut him to pieces in face of the public. There is nobody else who can and will enter the lists
against him"). On differing evaluations of the weight of the Camillu s letters, see The De
fence No. 1: Introductory Note, supra note 246, at 478-79.

285. Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XVII {Sept 22, 1795), reprinted in 19
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 279. Hamilton based this essay on extensive notes
prepared by King. See id. at 279-81 n.1. In writing the Camillus letters, Hamilton was re
sponding to Cato, Decius, and Dallas, among others.
286. Id. at 285; see id. at 282 (noting that the "misapprehension of this article . . . did
more, it is believed, to excite prejudices against the Treaty, than any thing that is really con
tained in it").
287. See id. at 282-90. Decius's error was in interpreting the English translation of the
French term "biens" ("goods") as having the same meaning assigned that term in the English
common law. See id. at 285-88. As Hamilton demonstrated, however, the terms "goods or
'biens' in the French law [included] all kinds of property real as well as personal." Id. at 286.
Hamilton's final riposte was to quote Jefferson's unequivocal construction of Article XI of
the French Treaty as including real property in his diplomatic discussions with the French
and in reporting to Congress. See id. at 290-91. For discussion, see supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text He then answered the policy-based arguments against the provision.
See Hamilton, supra note 285, at 292-94. In an earlier essay, Hamilton had addressed similar
arguments against Article 2 of the Jay Treaty, which provided British subjects in the areas
around the newly ceded posts the right to continue to hold their real property, irrespective of
whether they became U.S. citizens. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. IX (Aug. 21,
1795), reprinted in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 163. Among other things, he
pointed out that property held at the time the Treaty of Peace was concluded was already
protected by Article VI of that treaty, which prohibited further confiscations of British es
tates. Recognizing that the territory around the posts had been ceded to the United States,
the British had refrained from making any further grants of property after the Treaty of
Peace. They continued to hold the posts only as a countermeasure to the violations of the
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Hamilton asked, "is thy mighty Triumph? . . . Learn that in political as
in other science 'shallow Draughts intoxicate the Brain, And drinking
largely sobers us again.' "288
Hamilton, however, saved his most devastating remarks for last.289
His aim was to provide a comprehensive reply to the myriad constitu
tional arguments advanced against the treaty. As he framed the issue,
the central question was whether, as the more extreme Republicans
had claimed, "all objects upon which the legislative power may act in
relation to our own Country are excepted out of the power to make
Treaties.''290 Although this question principally involved the relation
ship between the treaty power and Congress's legislative powers,
Hamilton noted the same parallel which Cato had drawn: the subject
matter of treaties overlaps with the legislative objects assigned not
only to Congress but to the states as well. Thus, in the course of his
argument, he addressed both aspects of the question.
His first move was to emphasize the broad terms of the grant:

It was impossible for words more comprehensive to be used than those
which grant the power to make treaties. They are such as would natu
rally be employed to confer a plenipotentiary authority. A power "to
make Treaties," granted in these indefinite terms, extends to all kinds of
treaties and with all the latitude which such a power under any form of
Government can possess. . . . With regard to the objects of the Treaty,
there being no specification, there is of course a charte blanche. The

treaty's Article IV by the states, which had blocked recovery of British debts.
71.

See id. at 169-

288. Hamilton, supra note 285, at 292 (quoting ALEXANDER POPE, AN EsSAY ON
CRITTCISM II. 217-218, reprinted in ALEXANDER POPE, PASTORAL POETRY AND AN EsSAY
ON CRmCISM 239, 264-65 (E. Audra & Aubrey Williams eds., 1961)).
289. The last three essays were dedicated solely to constitutional questions.
See
Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1796), reprinted in 20 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 21, at 3; Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796),
reprinted in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 13; Alexander Hamilton, The Defence
No. XXXVIII (Jan. 9, 1796), reprinted in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 21, at 22.
290. Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI, supra note 289, at 7. In so framing the ques
tion, Hamilton chose to focus on the more extreme Republican claims that denied altogether
that the treaty power extended to treaty stipulations on subjects falling within Congress's
legislative powers. In so doing, he certainly lowered the burden which he would have to
overcome. That position, as he effectively argued, was virtually indefensible and would
clearly destroy the treaty power. At the same time, however, the weakness of Hamilton's
argument was that it did not address what he could have, and had, already anticipated would
be the position that Republicans would stake out in the House - that the House had discre
tion in deciding whether to carry into effect any stipulation falling within one of its delegated
legislative powers. At the very beginning of his argument, Hamilton did briefly respond to
this point, resting on the terms of the Supremacy Oause. See id. at 4-5. It was only later,
when the House first asserted its position, that he turned his full attention to this crucial
question. Writing a lengthy essay for Washington to use in responding to the House, he ar
gued against the House position in much more elaborate terms. See Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796), supra note 253, at 85.
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general proposition must therefore be that whatever is a proper subject
of compact between Nation & Nation may be embraced by a Treaty.291
Of course, Hamilton acknowledged that, as with any other delegated
power, a treaty cannot violate the Constitution, and he further con
ceded a natural law limitation which prevents any palpable abuse of a
granted power. "Beyond these exceptions to the Power," however,
Hamilton found "none . . . that [could] be supported."292
Turning directly to the claim that the treaty power could not touch
on objects assigned to legislative authority, he underlined the funda
mental distinction between legislation and treaties: legislation regu
lates persons and things falling within the jurisdiction of the nation
and can have no binding effect on foreign nations or persons and
things outside its jurisdiction; treaties, in contrast, are contracts based
on consent that impose mutually binding obligations on independent
sovereigns.

It follows that there is no ground for the inference pretended to be
drawn . . . . It is the province of the [treaty-making power] to do what
[legislation] cannot do. Congress . . . may regulate by law our own Trade
and that which foreigners come to carry on with us, but they cannot
regulate the Trade which we may go to carry on in foreign countries, they
can give to us no rights [and] no privileges there. This must depend on
the will and regulation of those countries; and consequently it is the
province of the power of Treaty to establish the rule of commercial inter
course between foreign nations and the U[nited] States. The Legislature
may regulate our own Trade but Treaty only can regulate the mutual
Trade between our own and another Country.293
This was sufficient, moreover, to demonstrate the fallacy of the
states' rights view. What was true of congressional powers, he ob-

291. Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI, supra note 289, at 6.
292 Id. at 7; see id. at 6-7. Because "a delegated authority cannot rightfully transcend
the constituting act," treaties were bound by constitutional limitations. As an example, he
cited the separation of powers: "A treaty for example cannot transfer the legislative power
to the Executive Department nor the power of this last Department to the Judiciary; in other
words it can not stipulate that the President and not Congress shall make laws for the
U[nited] States; that the Judges and not the President shall command the national
forces . • • •" Id.
293. Id. at 8-9. He further explained:
Though a Treaty may effect what a law can, yet a law cannot effect what a Treaty may.
These discriminations are obvious and decisive; and however the operation of a Treaty may
in some things resemble that of a law, no two ideas are more distinct than that of legislating
and that of contracting.
Id. at 8. This point led to his final conclusion:

In considering the power of Legislation, in its relations to the Power of Treaty, instead of
saying that the objects of the former are excepted out of the latter, it will be more correct,
indeed it will be intirely [sic] correct to invert the rule and to say that the Power of Treaty is
the power of making exceptions in particular cases to the power of Legislation. The stipula
tions of Treaty are in good faith restraints upon the exercise of the last mentioned power.
Hamilton,

The Defence No. XXXVII, supra note 289, at 21.
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served, was equally true of the legislative powers assigned to the
states. The same reasoning
extend[s] the power of Treaties to those objects which are consigned to
the legislation of individual states; but here the constitution has an
nounced its meaning in express terms, by declaring that the treaties
which have been and shall be made under the authority of the U[nited]
States shall be the supreme law of the land any thing in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. This manifestly recog
nises the supremacy of the power of treaties over the laws of particular
states and goes even a step farther. The obvious reason for this special
provision in regard to the laws of individual states is that there might
otherwise have been room for question whether a Treaty of the Union
could embrace objects the internal regulation of which belonged to the
separate authorities of the States.294
Furthermore, critics of Article 9 had been ostentatiously inconsistent:
they had denied that state laws imposing impediments to the recovery
of the British debts amounted to violations of Article IV of the Treaty
of Peace because, they claimed, "Treaties controul the laws of states."
Yet, " [t]o impeach the constitutionality of [Jay's] Treaty it is objected
that in some points it interferes with the objects of state-legislation.
The express provision of the constitution in this particular quoted
above has not been sufficient to check the rage for objection. "295
Hamilton's argument did not stop here. Although hereafter ad
dressed principally to the main Republican claim about the relation
ship of the treaty power to Congress's legislative authority, his further
arguments were equally applicable to the states' rights position. The
Republican view, he observed, would render the power to make trea
ties, "granted in such comprehensive and indefinite terms and guarded
with so much precaution . . . essentially nugatory. "296 Since virtually all
treaties overlap with legislative powers, this construction would "frus
trate one principal object of the institution of a General Government"

294. Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII, supra note 289, at 15-16.
295. Id. at 17. Hamilton was referring to arguments made by Republicans that state
laws passed during the Confederation, which imposed legal obstacles to the collection of
British debts, did not place the United States in violation of Article IV of the Treaty of
Peace because under the Confederation treaties were self-executing and overrode conflicting
state laws. Jefferson had made this argument in 1792 in response to British Minister
Hammond's diplomatic protests, see supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text, and Re
publican polemicists like Cinna (Brockholst Livingston) reasserted it strenuously. Hamilton
responded vigorously to the point in several essays - not to deny the doctrine but to dem
onstrate that, given its uncertain status, the British justifiably refused to rely on the state
courts to vindicate the treaty against state laws. For Hamilton's essays, see Alexander
Hamilton, The Defence No. IV (Aug. 1, 1795), reprinted in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
note 98, at 77; Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus No. 3 (Aug. 12, 1795), reprinted in 19
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 124; Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus No. 4 (Aug.
19, 1795), reprinted in 19 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 98, at 153. See also supra notes 98,
134.
296. Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII, supra note 289, at 18.
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and "would then exhibit the ridiculous spectacle of a Government
without a power to make Treaties with foreign nations: a result as in
admissible as it is absurd, since in fact our Constitution grants the
power of making Treaties in the most explicit and ample Terms." 297
Furthermore, the Framers in Philadelphia had intended to give the
treaty power "the most ample latitude to render it competent to all the
stipulations, which the exigencies of National Affairs might require."298
This intent was confirmed, moreover, by the discussions in the
Federalist Papers and in the ratifying conventions.

Its great extent & importance . . . were mutually taken for granted and, upon this basis, it was insisted by way of objection - that there
were not adequate guards for the safe exercise of so vast a power - that
there ought to have been reservations of certain rights, a better disposi
tion of the power to impeach, and a participation, general or special, of
the House of Representatives. The reply to these objections, acknowl
edging the delicacy and magnitude of the power, was directed to shew
that its organisation was a proper one and that it was sufficiently
guarded.299
Finally, he compared the treaty power under the Constitution with
the power under the Articles of Confederation. The powers were
similar, but the Constitution's grant was more comprehensive, "for it
is divested of the restriction in the proviso." "This is evidence, (as was
the fact)," he noted, "of a disposition in the Convention to disembar
rass and reinforce the power of making Treaties."300 In any case, the
old Congress had repeatedly made treaties on subjects that were
within the exclusive legislative authority of the states. Among many
other examples, the French Treaty permitted French subjects to own
real property in the United States, and the Treaty of Peace had inter
fered with the legislative authority of the states in the same and a
number of other critical respects.301
297. Id. at 18-19. Through exhaustive analysis and illustration, Hamilton demonstrated
how virtually every imaginable treaty stipulation would run afoul of a rule prohibiting trea
ties to be made on subjects within the legislative powers. See id. at 17-21.
298. Hamilton,

The Defence No. XXXVII, supra note 289, at 22.

299. Id. at 24. In making this point, Hamilton surveyed much of the material discussed
previously in connection with the Founders' intent. See supra notes 175-222 and accompa
nying text. Among other things, he discussed the objections of Mason and Gerry to the
treaty power, the relevant passages from the Federalist, and the debates in the ratifying con
ventions, particularly in Virginia. See id. at 23-25.

300. Id. at 26.
301. See id. at 29.

Article VI of the Treaty of Peace, Hamilton pointed out,

prohibits the future confiscation of the property of adherents to G Britain, declares that no
person shall on account of the part he took in the war suffer any future loss or damage in his
person liberty or property and provides for the release of such persons from confinement &
the discontinuance of prosecutions against them. It is difficult to conceive a higher act of
controul both of the legislative & judiciary authority than by this article. These provisions
are analogous in principle to those stipulations which in the [second and ninth] articles of the
Treaty under examination have given occasion to a constitutional objection.
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[T]he principle legislative powers with regard to the objects embraced by
the Treaties of Congress were not vested in that body but remained \Vith
the individual states. Such are the power of specific taxation, the power
of regulating Trade, the power of naturalization &c. If in theory, the
objects of legislative power are excepted out of the power of Treaty, this
must have been equally, at least, the case with the legislative powers of
the state Governments, as with those of the U[nited] States. Indeed the
argument was much stronger for the exception, where distinct Govern
ments were the depositories of that power and of the power of Treaty.
Nothing but the intrinsic force of the power of Treaty could have enabled
it to penetrate the separate spheres of the State Governments. The prac
tice under the confederation, for so many years acquiesced in by all the
states is therefore a conclusive illustration of the Power of Treaty and an
irresistible refutation of the novel and preposterous doctrine which im
peaches the Constitutionality of that lately negotiated.302
iii. The Treaty in the House. Hamilton had begun his constitu
tional argument with a challenge to the members of the House who
would soon take up the treaty. It is difficult to believe, he said, "that
any man in either House of Congress who values his reputation for
discernment or sincerity will publicly hazard it by a serious attempt to
His prediction
controvert" the constitutionality of the treaty.303
proved on the mark. The uncontainable fervor of the period immedi
ately following publication of the treaty gave way to more sober re
flection. By the time of the House debate in March and April 1796,
Republicans had performed a volte face and now limited themselves to
defending their minimalist position. In a retreat from the position
earlier staked out by Republican polemicists, the House, Republicans
now declared, "do[es] not claim any agency in making Treaties."31»

Id. For Hamilton's 1784 remarks, written as Phocion, to the same effect regarding Article
VI of the Treaty of Peace, see supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. Hamilton also
invoked the Consular Convention with France, which had been so controversial during the
Confederation:
The Consular Convention with France • • • grants to the Consuls of that Country various
authorities and jurisdictions, some of the judicial nature, which are actual transfers to them
of portions of the internal jurisdiction and ordinary judiciary power of the Country the exer
cise of which our Government is bound to aid with its whole strength. It also grants exemp·
tions to French Consuls from certain kinds of taxes & to them and French Citizens from all
personal services; all which are very delicate interferences with our internal police and ordi
nary jurisdiction. . • . Though all reflecting men have thought ill of the propriety of some of
them, as inconveniently breaking in upon our interior administration, legislative, executive
and judiciary; only acquiesing in them from the difficulty of getting rid of stipulations en·
tered into by our public agents under competent powers, yet no question has been heard
about their constitutionality.

Id. at 28, 32. Hamilton noted as well that the Convention had been negotiated under the
Confederation but approved under the Constitution, making it illustrative of the treaty
power under both. See id. at 32.
302

Id. at 30.

303. Hamilton,

The Defence No. XXXVI, supra note 289, at 3.

304. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796).
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Rather, they claimed only that a treaty stipulation on a subject within
Congress's legislative authority could not become domestic law until
implemented by legislation approved by the House, and that in con
sidering such legislation the House could exercise its discretion.305
The significance of this retreat should not be underestimated. As
Hamilton had predicted (or perhaps dared), when the House finally
turned in mid-April to debating the merits of the treaty, the countless
constitutional charges so vigorously asserted only months before had
disappeared. This was certainly not for lack of opportunity or motive.
Republican opposition to the treaty was as furious as ever. Federal
ists, moreover, readily conceded that if the treaty was unconstitu
tional, it ought not be implemented by the House,306 and they repeat
edly challenged Republicans to make good on their earlier claims.307
Hearing no response, Federalists then concluded, without contradic
tion, that the constitutionality of the treaty was now "allowed on all
hands."308 As Representative Tracy noted, "[a]t first the cry had been,

305. For the House resolution, see 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771-72 (1796). For discussion,
see supra notes 243, 249, 263-264 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CoNG. 436-37 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Murray); id. at 438
(remarks of Rep. Smith of South Carolina); id. at 593 (remarks of Rep. Smith of New
Hampshire); id. at 989 (remarks of Rep. S. Lyman) (noting that if the treaty was unconstitu
tional, "we ought to prevent its operation, for we are sent here as the guardians of the rights
of our fellow-citizens, and for that purpose are sworn to support their Constitution; if it is
unconstitutional, it is a nullity; it is not binding upon the nation; we ought to reject it").
307. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 438-39 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Smith of South
Carolina) (author of the newspapers essays "A Vindication . . ."); id. at 989 (remarks of Rep.
S. Lyman); id. at 1103 (remarks of Rep. Bourne) (challenging opponents of the treaty to
"come forward at once, and show the instrument to be unconstitutional"); id. at 1155 (re
marks of S. Smith).
308. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1204 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Gilbert). The only exception
simply underscored the general abandonment of the constitutional objections to the Jay
Treaty. Republican outlier, Representative Page of Virginia, summarily espoused a number
of the constitutional claims made by Cato and Dallas. Several of the articles were unconsti
tutional, he claimed, because they dealt with foreign commerce, a subject which belonged
exclusively to Congress and power over which it could not alienate; Article 2 was unconstitu
tional because by granting British subjects naturalization in certain cases it overrode Con
gress's powers and was also not uniform; and Article 8 was unconstitutional
because it interferes with the authority of the Judiciary, by establishing a Court of Commis
sioners, a kind of supreme court of appeals, within the United States, with powers to pro
ceed, unknown to our laws; with temptations to defendants to make no defence; with a right
to bind the United States to pay debts which they owe not, and to any extent or amount
which that Court may think fit to decree; and it is unconstitutional, because it authorizes the
PRESIDENT to create certain offices, and annex salaries thereto.

Id. at 1098-99; see also id. at 558-62 (remarks of Rep. Page) (demonstrating the extreme, and
untenable, positions he held, including the view that the Founders had not expected there to
be any commercial treaties). The response to Page was immediate and derisive, see id. at
1102-03 (remarks of Rep. Bourne) (denying the plausibility of Page's claims), and the sole
Republican to come to his aid was willing only to defend his integrity, not the constitutional
positions which he had staked out, see id. at 1108-09 (remarks of Rep. Findley) (refusing to
comment on the constitutionality of the appointment of commissioners). Thereafter, Page's
remarks were ignored, except for occasional comments affirming the constitutionality of us
ing commissioners to settle the dispute over the debts. See id. at 1143-46 (remarks of Rep.
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the Treaty was unconstitutional, that ground was now given up."309
Even Republicans were willing to concede that a fair investigation of
the treaty "could not be obtained from the passionate publications
which were produced by the first impression of the Treaty."310
This Republican silence, moreover, was nowhere more deafening
than in their discussion of Article 9 of the Jay Treaty. Not a voice was
heard on the floor of the House hazarding the earlier loudly pro
claimed position that Article 9 abridged the rights of the states. Nor
was this from any lack of concern about the impact of the provision. It
was widely discussed - and fiercely opposed - throughout the de
bate, particularly by members of Congress from states like North
Carolina and Virginia.311 Thus, Representative Macon claimed that if

Coit); id. at 1178 (remarks of Rep. Griswold); id. at 1264-65 (remarks ofN. Smith). Near the
end of the debate, Representative Smith asked:
[I]s the Treaty Constitutional? On that point he had held himself open to conviction, and
waited its discussion. He had not heard any gentleman declare it unconstitutional, except
one, [Mr. Page,] who seemed to give his opinion as if he still doubted; and having carefully
considered the subject, he was now of opinion that there was nothing directly repugnant to
the Constitution in the instrument

Id. at 1155 (remarks of S. Smith) (bracketed materials in original).
309. 5 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1224 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Tracy); see also id. at 438-39
(remarks of Smith of South Carolina) (noting that "it had not been said that the Treaty was
unconstitutional . . . that ground was therefore abandoned even by the friends of the resolu
tion [opponents of the treaty] . . . the question of constitutionality was renounced"); id. at
1166 (remarks of Rep. Henderson) (noting that it "is generally admitted, that, upon Consti
tutional ground, it may be supported"). Representative Edward Livingston (brother of
Robert, and collaborator in the Cato essays) had provoked the House debate when he pre
cipitously moved for a resolution asking the President for all papers concerning the negotia
tion of the treaty. In introducing the resolution, he had justified it by pointing out that the
discussion "must give rise in the House to some very important constitutional questions."
Id. at 426. When challenged, however, he quickly retreated and asserted other justifications
instead. See id. at 427 (remarks of Rep. Livingston); id. at 438-39 (remarks of Smith of South
Carolina). In the end, Livingston, somewhat pathetically, identified the constitutional ques
tion to which he had referred as whether the Senate had in fact given in advance its advice
and consent to the negotiation of the treaty, which he claimed had been the previous prac
tice. See id. at 628 (remarks of Rep. Livingston).

In addressing the merits of the treaty, Republicans generally transformed the constitu
tional objections asserted by Cato, Dallas, and others into substantive criticisms of the treaty
provisions and made no reference to the original formulation of these arguments in constitu
tional terms. See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1029-34 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Giles) (making
criticisms of Articles 2, 6, and 9 in terms reminiscent of the objections of Cato and Dallas but
without the constitutional grounding); id. at 1108-09 (remarks of Rep. Findley) (similar); id.
at 1191-93 (remarks of Rep. Gallatin) (similar). Following the Republican lead, Federalists
likewise defended against these criticisms without referring to any constitutional objections.
See, e.g., id. at 1143-46 (remarks of Rep. Coit); id. at 1178-81 (remarks of Rep. Griswold).
310. 5 ANNALS OFCoNG. 1004 (1796) (remarks of Nicholas).
311. Thus, Republicans argued that the provision was susceptible to a broad interpreta
tion which would revive the proprietary estates given by the Crown to British aristocrats
during the colonial era. This would have meant that huge tracts of land in a number of states
would be returned to British ownership. Most dramatically, in North Carolina, Lord
Granville's estate could claim approximately half of the territory of the state. See, e.g., 5
ANNALS OF CoNG. 1033-34 (1796) (remarks of Rep. Giles); id. at 1062-63 (remarks of Rep.
Heath); id. at 1121-24 (remarks of Rep. Moore) (noting that in some states half of the state's
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Article 9 should receive a broad construction, as many Republicans
claimed it would, it "would be of greater importance to the State of
North Carolina than the Declaration of Independence itself."312 His
colleague Representative Holland concurred, asserting, in the last re
mark before the final vote, that "if the construction of the 9th article
were to extend to the lands in North Carolina, late Lord Grenville's,
as had been supposed by some gentlemen, the claim would certainly
be resisted by force."313 Despite the many hours of impassioned de
bate - and pages in the Annals - dedicated to issue, no one breathed
a word questioning its constitutionality.314 The fair inference would
property will be transferred back to British ownership); id. at 1136-37 (remarks of Rep.
Kittera) (worrying that Article 9 "might be attended with more melancholy effects, particu
larly upon the citizens and State [North Carolina] he had the honor to represent, than all the
other exceptionable clauses contained in the instrument" and, referring to the Supreme
Court's decision only a month earlier in Ware v. Hylton, noting that "the decisions are in
favor of Treaties and ancient claims"); id. at 1191-93 (remarks of Rep. Gallatin) (making
sinillar claims); id. at 1233-34 (remarks of Rep. Preston) (noting that this "extremely objec
tionable, and inlmensely important" Article will cause "this country [to be] thrown into a
scene of litigation and confusion. Sir, it will never be submitted to, if this construction be
right, and I can see no other meaning it can have"); id. at 1281 (remarks of Reps. Macon,
Holland, and Gillespie) (sinillar); id. at 1290-91 (remarks of Rep. Holland) (same). In the
face of these claims, several representatives from the affected states understandably became
hysterical. See, e.g., id. at 1281 (remarks of Reps. Macon, Holland, and Gillespie); id. at 1281
(remarks of Rep. Holland). Federalists quite rightly criticized this interpretation of Article 9
and accused Republicans of being deliberately alarmist. See, e.g., id. at 1126 (remarks of
Rep. Kittera); id. at 1146 (remarks of Rep. Coit); id. at 1178 (remarks of Rep. Griswold); id.
at 1211-12 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert). In some instances, they devoted lengthy speeches to
addressing the complex legal issues and the history of state laws dealing with the old proprie
tary estates. See, e.g., id. at 1213-19 (remarks of Rep. Tracy). In all of this discussion, there
was no suggestion of a states' rights constitutional objection to this Article. For further dis
cussion of the Lord Granville estate, see infra notes 312-314, 375.

312. 5 ANNMS OF CONG. 1281 (1796). Representatives Holland and Gillespie con
curred. See id. Note that the proper spelling is "Granville," but "Grenville" was improperly
used throughout in the Annals.
313. 5 ANNMS OFCONG. 1290-91 (1796).
314. Gallatin strongly supported the broad construction of Article 9 and suggested that
it could seriously prejudice Virginia (the Fairfax estate), Delaware (the Penn estate),
Maryland, and especially North Carolina (Lord Granville's estate). See 5 ANNMS OF CONG.
1191-93 (1796). He further recognized the delicate interference which it would work on
state prerogatives, stating that it was
a restriction over the Legislative powers; and an exception to the Jaws of the different States
on a subject of a delicate nature, might involve not only some of our citizens, but even sev
eral of the States, in complex Jaw suits and serious embarrassment, and, although it might
thus create much mischief, would give us no possible benefit.

Id.

at 1193. Nevertheless, he did not claim it was unconstitutional. See also Letter from
James Monroe to James Madison (Sept. 8, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at
77, 78 (beginning his discussion of the treaty by criticizing Article 9 but making no sugges
tion of an objection of constitutional dimension).

Even Representative Page, while asserting a number of the Cato and Dallas claims, did
not argue that Article 9 was unconstitutional. See supra note 308. Indeed, in his somewhat
ambiguous remarks, he seemed to construe the Supremacy Clause, with its roots in the expe
rience of state obstruction of Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, as "intended to remove all
obstacles, which had arisen or might arise from State Legislatures." Id. at 558. He thus
seems to have accepted the nationalist view of the treaty power and for that reason have re-
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seem to be that even the Republicans now recognized that the states'
rights view could not withstand the light of public scrutiny.315

iv. The Views ofJefferson and Madison. There is one further as
pect of the debate that merits consideration - the views of Jefferson
and Madison. When the Jay Treaty controversy broke out, Jefferson
was in "retirement" in Monticello but nevertheless played an active
behind-the-scenes role in prompting the Republican response.
Madison, on the other hand, was generally acknowledged as the lead
ing Republican in Congress and was widely expected to play a promi
nent role in attacking the treaty. Both were uncompromising in their
opposition to the treaty.316
Jefferson's views about the treaty power had undergone a slow
shift after the adoption of the Constitution. At first, he seemed to re
tain the broad view that he had repeatedly expressed - and, as dip
lomat, implemented - under the Confederation; but this attitude be
gan to shift in 1793, during the crisis over Washington's declaration of
neutrality in the British-French war.317 Now is not the time for a full
frained from condemning Article 9 on constitutional grounds, even as he attacked many of
the treaty's other provisions.
315. Ironically, at the same time that the House was considering the Jay Treaty,
Washington also referred to the House a treaty with Spain which was hugely popular with
Republicans. See Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, Oct. 27, 1795, U.S.-Spain, in
2 TREATIES, supra note 74, at 318. Most important, the treaty with Spain contained a provi
sion permitting American navigation on the Mississippi, see id., art. IV, at 321-22, but it also
contained a provision comparable to Article 9. Under Article XI, subjects of Spain were
allowed to inherit real property so long as they sold it to an American citizen within a rea
sonable time. Id., art. XI, at 326-27. Federalists attempted a strategic link of the two treaties
in order to gain support for the Jay Treaty. Although this effort may have borne fruit in
public sentiment in the western territories, it failed in Congress. For a discussion of the rela
tionship between the treaty with Spain and the Jay Treaty, see, e.g., COMBS, supra note 235,
at 180-81.
It is noteworthy that Professor Bradley cites the Jay Treaty controversy as establishing
the principle that the treaty power is limited in scope. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 414-15.
He says nothing about the debate's bearing on the states' rights view.
316. For discussion of the roles of Jefferson and Madison, see ADRIENNE KOCH,
JEFFERSON AND MADISON, THE GREAT COLLABORATION 155-60 (1950); KURTZ, supra
note 235, at 19-21; and The Jay Treaty, reprinted in 2 REPUBLIC OF LETIERS, supra note 236,
at 881-95.
317. In 1791 and 1792, as Secretary of State, Jefferson seemed to accept the view that
the House had no constitutional role in treaty-making. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
-- (unaddressed letter) (Mar. 13, 1816), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442,
443-44 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (describing his own views in the context of the first
federal treaty, concluded with the Creek Indians); The Anas, 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra, at 262, 305-07 (describing same in relation to a 1792 treaty with Algiers).
By 1793, however, he adopted an extremely hostile stance in a cabinet debate with Hamilton
over Washington's neutrality declaration. See id. at 407-08 (noting that though "I was sensi
ble of the weak points in this position," the treaty power extends only to those "powers [the
President and Senate] might constitutionally exercise," which would exclude, inter alia,
"treaties of neutrality, treaties offensive and defensive, &c"). As to the indefensibility of
this view, see 3 STORY, supra note 19, § 1502, at 356 n.2 (asking "What are such powers
given to the president and senate? Could they make appointments by treaty?").
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exploration of Jefferson's complex constitutional thought. Surely,
there were a number of factors that prompted the evolution in his
views. His dedication to strict construction; his commitment to a cer
tain conception of popular sovereignty, impelling him to adopt a fa
vorable stance toward the House and a less favorable stance toward
the Executive and Senate; and his assessment of short and medium.
term political considerations - all these and more necessarily played
a role in his increasing insistence on a role for the House in treaty
making.318 In any case, during the heated period leading up to and in
cluding the Jay Treaty controversy, he developed a legendary hostility
to the treaty power, which he routinely expressed in his private corre
spondence with Madison, Monroe, and others.319 As he expressed to
Madison in support of the House's position in the Jay Treaty dispute,
"I see no harm in rendering [the House's] sanction necessary, and not
much harm in annihilating the whole treaty making power."320
Madison was characteristically more circumspect than Jefferson.
Indeed, although he ultimately defended - indeed, probably formu
lated - the relatively moderate position adopted by the House in
March and April 1796, he failed, both in public and in private, to sup
port any of the constitutional claims made by his less cautious friends
and allies during the raging newspaper wars of the summer and fall of
1795. This fact alone gives rise to an inference that, unable to offer his
concurrence, he found silence the more palatable option. All the
more so, since he repeatedly expressed in detail his opposition to the
treaty on the merits.
318. Throughout the Jay Treaty controversy, Jefferson asserted that the powers as
signed to Congress were exceptions from the treaty power. He was not careful, however, to
specify his position precisely or consistently. Sometimes he seemed to accept the extreme
Republican position, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1795), in
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1896); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles (Dec. 31, 1795), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra, at 41; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar. 21, 1796), in
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 67-68; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Mar. 27, 1796), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 6869; at others he articulated the more moderate position ultimately asserted by the House, see
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (Nov. 30, 1795), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 40. For a thoughtful discussion of Jefferson's constitutional
views, see Edward Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson and American Constitutional Law, 2 J. PUB.
L. 370 (1953). See also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPIDNX: THE CHARACTER OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1997).
319. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Tazewell (Sept. 13, 1795), in 7

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 318, at 30 (indicating with irony that "I
am not satisfied we should not be better without treaties with any nation"); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar. 21, 1796), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 318, at 67-68 (noting sarcastically that Federalist doctrine would
transfer the legislative power "from the P. Senate & H. of R. to the P. Senate & Piamingo or
any other Indian, Algerine or other chief').
320. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 27, 1796), in 16 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 236, at 280, 280. Jefferson did recognize an exception for peace treaties.
See id.
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The strength of this inference is increased, moreover, when his ac
tual activities are examined. Even when the treaty was still before the
Senate - and under an injunction of secrecy - Madison began re
ceiving correspondence asserting the unconstitutionality of the treaty
and urgently requesting his views.321
On July 6, 1795, Robert
Livingston strongly urged him to write both to the President and to
the public "to shew the evils the unconstitutionality of the treaty. "322
After Hamilton's Camillus essays began to appear, Jefferson, fearful
that the "midling performances" of the Republican polemicists would
only "give time to his talents & indefatigableness to extricate [the
Federalists]," declared: "For god's sake take up your pen, and give a
fundamental reply to Curtius & Camillus."323 Yet, Madison refused
every request. Although both he and Jefferson avidly followed the
newspaper wars, Madison strictly avoided touching on the constitu
tional issues in the many letters he wrote, including to those who had
specifically asked for his views.324 Instead, he worked assiduously to

321. See Letter from Pierce Butler to James Madison (June 12, 1795), in 16 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 236, at 14, 14-15 (providing Madison with copies of the treaty, sheet by
sheet; informing him that Butler, a Republican Senator from South Carolina, "have in Con·
templation to Question . . . the Constitutionality" of the treaty in several respects; and en·
treating Madison to "oblige me by giving me Your free opinion of it," which, with Butler,
"shall be as in Your own breast").
322. Letter from Robert R. Livingston to James Madison (July 6, 1795), in 16 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 236, at 34, 34-35. Livingston could barely contain his rage, asserting that
the treaty "sacrafices every essential interest & prostrates the honor of our country" and
blaming it on Jay's "hatred to France." Id. at 34. In this case, however, "I own that our dis
grace & humiliation has . . . greatly exceeded my expectations," and he warned of the possi·
bility of civil war. Id. After exhorting Madison to write to the President and the public, he
noted Madison's special official position and concluded: "Adieu my dear Sir remember you
are answerable to your country for every neglect or omission on this important occasion."
Id. at 35.
323. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 242, at 88-89. The
treaty was "the boldest act [Hanillton, Jay, and others] ever ventured on to undermine the
constitution." Id. at 88. For further discussion of Jefferson's urgent plea, see supra note 284
and accompanying text.
324. For additional letters requesting Madison's views, see, e.g., Letter from James
Madison to an Unidentified Correspondent (Aug. 23, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 236, at 56, 57 (noting that the correspondent had sought "any ideas, in relation to the
Treaty that may occur to my reflections"); Letter from John Minor, Jr., and Others to James
Madison (Aug. 25, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 59, 59-60 (petition to
Madison from his constituents declaring the treaty unconstitutional and urging Madison to
"use your most strenuous exertions in Congress, to oppose the said treaty in every point
where it infringes the constitution"); Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Madison (Aug.
30, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 60, 60-62 (noting his own view that the
treaty gives "to the foederal Constitution an operation not originally designed by its
Authors" and advising Madison that Tazewell "should be pleased to know your Sentiments"
upon "Mr. Jay's famous Treaty"); Letter from George Nicholas to James Madison (Nov. 6,
1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 118, 118-19 (asserting that the treaty has
"violated the constitution in it's most essential parts"); Letter from Robert R. Livingston to
James Madison (Nov. 16, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 125, 125-26 (re
affirming his constitutional objections and informing Madison that Livingston was the
author of the Cato series).
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develop a comprehensive critique of the treaty and delicately warned
his allies "to avoid laying too much stress on minute or doubtful objec
tions, which may give an occasion to the other party to divert the pub
lic attention from the palpable and decisive ones, and to involve the
question in uncertainty, if not to claim an apparent victory."325
On only one occasion did Madison lend his hand, albeit anony
mously, to an assertion of the central Republican constitutional claim
- that the treaty power did not extend to subjects within Congress's
legislative authority. The circumstances under which he did so, how
ever, simply underscore his essential reticence on this point - and

In response to these letters, Madison unequivocally condemned the treaty - making
more or less detailed substantive critiques of its provisions - but he uniformly declined to
pick up the constitutional bait. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Robert R.
Livingston {Aug. 10, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 46, 46-48 (condemn
ing the treaty in the strongest terms; specifying its defects; agreeing with Livingston's as
sessment of Jay, who cannot be screened "from the most illiberal suspicions without refer
ring his conduct to the blindest partiality to the British Nation & Govt. and to the most
vindictive sensations towards the French Republic" and who belongs to "a British party, sys
tematically aiming at an exclusive connection with the British Govemt. & ready to sacrifice
to that object as well the dearest interests of our Commerce, as the most sacred dictates of
national honor"; and reviewing the political events which demonstrate popular revulsion
toward the treaty; but never mentioning any question about its constitutionality); Letter
from James Madison to an Unidentified Correspondent, supra, at 56-58 (similar and speci
fying Madison's objections to the treaty on the merits in greater depth); Letter from James
Madison to Henry Tazewell {Sept. 25, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 93,
93-94 (sympathizing with Tazewell's views against the treaty, which "cannot appear to you in
a worse light than it does to me," but failing to mention any constitutional objections); see
also Madison in the Fourth Congress, Editorial Note, supra note 236, at 141-42 (noting that
"the assumption that JM would write for the newspapers in opposition to the treaty was a
widespread one, particularly after Alexander Hamilton had opened his vigorous press cam
paign," but that "JM declined all invitations and suggestions that he involve himself in the
newspaper wars raging over the treaty throughout the summer and fall of 1795").
For the intense interest of Jefferson and Madison in the public debate the treaty had en
gendered, see, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison {Aug. 3, 1795), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 42; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
{Aug. 6, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 45; Letter from Joseph Jones to
James Madison (Aug. 19, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 52; Letter from
John Beckley to James Madison (Sept. 10, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at
85; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 18, 1795), in 16 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 236, at 104; Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Oct. 29, 1795),
in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 113; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Nov. 26, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 135 (quoting letter
from Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr., to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 22, 1795)); Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 13, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at
163; Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 20, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 236, at 168; and Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 4, 1796),
in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 285.

325. Letter from James Madison to an Unidentified Correspondent, supra note 324, at
57. This letter was apparently unfinished and never sent. See Letter from James Madison to
an Unidentified Correspondent, Editorial Note, in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at
55, 55-56. Madison nevertheless got the message through to his friends. See Letter from
Joseph Jones to James Madison (Oct. 29, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at
113, 113 (proposing for Madison's advice that the Virginia Legislature take up the treaty and
condemn "the exceptionable parts of it I mean such as are clear and solid objections that a
proper tone may be given similar meetings").
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even more so on the other more questionable claims made by Cato,
Decius, Dallas, and others. In September 1795, working intently be
hind the scenes to support the opposition, Madison undertook to write
a lengthy analysis of the treaty and its defects. The idea was to draft
the body of a document that would form a petition to the Virginia
General Assembly encouraging the Assembly to proclaim its opposi
tion to the treaty. Madison and others hoped that some sort of resolu
tion of support from the Assembly would encourage the House to as
sert a constitutional authority over treaties and, exercising that
authority, to refuse to implement the Jay Treaty at the next legislative
session.326 Consistent with his approach throughout, Madison stuck
strictly to the merits of the treaty.327
In early October, Madison and his new wife visited Jefferson in
Monticello.328 There is little doubt that Jefferson and Madison dis
cussed both the treaty and Madison's draft petition extensively. The
result was a revised petition which now included a short paragraph
conclusorily asserting a broad version of the Republican position on
the House's role in treaty-making.329 It is quite likely that this para
graph was added at the insistence of Jefferson, who underlined this
portion of the petition in his copy of a widely-circulated collection of

326. For background on Madison's drafting of the petition, see Draft of Petition to
General Assembly, supra note 260, at 62-69. For further discussion of Republican efforts to
use the Virginia legislature as a forum for encouraging House resistance to implementing the
treaty, see supra notes 261-262 and accompanying text.
327. See James Madison, Draft of Petition to the General Assembly of the Common
wealth of Virginia (Sept. 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 69 (making
elaborate criticisms of the treaty on the merits but not suggesting any constitutional infirmi
ties).
328. In the same letter that Jefferson plead with Madison to reply to Camillus, he re
quested Madison to visit Monticello with Mrs. Madison. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison, supra note 242, at 88-89 (noting that "I expect the execution of your
promise to bring mrs. Madison to see us").
329. See James Madison, Petition to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Virginia (Oct. 12, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 95. The revised petition
now asserted: "The President and Senate by ratifying this Treaty, usurp the powers of
regulating commerce, of making rules with respect to aliens, of establishing tribunals of jus
tice, and of defining piracy." Id. at 102. It then added coyly (in a Madisonian touch} that
"[a] formal demonstration of every part of this complex proposition is not requisite." Id.
The petition was widely printed in the newspapers. See Madison, supra note 327, at 67-68. It
should be noted that the reference to aliens in the petition referred not to Article 9 but to
Article 2, which gave British subjects living in areas around the posts, which the British had
agreed to abandon, a right to claim American citizenship or retain their British nationality
and in either case to continue to hold their property. See The Jay Treaty, supra note 316, at
245, 246. This provision too had given rise to constitutional objections, both as invading
Congress's power over naturalization and the territories of the United States and as stipu
lating a non-uniform rule of naturalization. See supra notes 278, 288, 308-309. In contrast to
Article 9, Article 2 did not raise states' rights concerns apparently because the posts were
understood to be subject to Congress's power to govern the territories.
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public documents on the Jay Treaty.330 The addition was probably po
litically astute and certainly helped to prompt an extensive debate
over the constitutionality of the treaty in the Virginia General Assem
bly.331 Madison, however, carefully preserved his anonymity and even
tried in later years to obscure his role in drafting the petition.332 Thus,
he avoided accountability for asserting a position which he was un
willing to defend.333
The negative inference arising from Madison's activities during the
heated months in the summer and fall of 1795 is further supported,
moreover, by the insights that can be gleaned from a careful reading of
his speeches in the subsequent House debate. The most crucial point,
of course, was his failure, along with his Republican colleagues more
generally, to raise any constitutional objections to the treaty. Not
withstanding the profusion of constitutional objections fiercely pressed
in the previous summer and fall, Madison, like the others, chose to
stand on a single claim: that the House had discretion in deciding
whether to carry into effect treaty stipulations touching upon subjects
\vithin Congress's legislative authority.334 Perhaps the most revealing
330. For the views of historians, see Madison, supra note 327, at 66-67, and JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, PoLmCS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 357, 420 n.46 (1996).
331. For discussion of the debate, in which John Marshall featured prominently, see su

pra note 261.
332 See Madison, supra note 327, at 62-63. "That JM had ever composed such a peti
tion, either wholly or in part, was probably unknown to most of his contemporaries, and JM
himself, later in life, seems to have arranged his papers in ways that have misled or confused
editors and scholars ever since." Id. at 62.
333. Madison had difficulty enough with the position which he ultimately did take in the
House debate - that the House had discretion to refuse implementation of treaty stipula
tions on subjects within its legislative authority. See supra notes 243, 249, 263-264 and ac
companying text. His main speech was widely criticized for the somewhat equivocal way he
went about defending that view, and he was accused of inconsistency and of disregarding
what the Framers had agreed upon in Philadelphia. See Madison in the Fourth Congress,
Editorial Note, supra note 236, at 145 (noting that the speech provoked "scorn and ridicule
from his political opponents" and that "Fisher Ames (Massachusetts) dismissed the speech
as 'cobweb,' while Theodore Sedgwick found it 'perfectly unaccountable to his mind' that a
man of JM's reputation and ability should declare himself to be so uncertain about where
the Framers of the Constitution had placed the treaty-making powers"); RAKOVE, supra
note 330, at 357-64 (describing the widespread skepticism that Madison's speech provoked).
In a letter to Jefferson, Madison had admitted the "real obscurity in the constitutional part
of the question, & a diversity of sincere opinions about it" Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 13, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 163, 163-64.
And in the speech, he conceded that the question was not "perfectly free from difficulties."
James Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of Representatives (Mar. 10, 1796), re
printed in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 255, 262 [hereinafter Madison, Jay's
Treaty Speech (Mar. 10, 1796)]. Historians have remained skeptical about Madison's bona
fides in this respect. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 330, at 357-64.
334. For Madison's speeches on the floor of the House during the Jay Treaty debate, see
James Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1796), re
printed in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 254; Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Mar.
10, 1796), supra note 333, at 255-63; James Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of
Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 290; James
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point for present purposes, however, was Madison's approach to
Article 9. Throughout the entire controversy, Madison had been in
constant communication with Senator Tazewell, and they spoke exten
sively about Article 9 even as Madison was preparing his final speech
criticizing the treaty on the merits.335 Indeed, after their conversation,
Tazewell prepared an elaborate memorandum on the Article for
Madison's use.336 Despite this prompting, however, in the course of his
lengthy and detailed analysis of the treaty, Madison simply passed
over Article 9. In this context, with the whole anti-treaty effort on the
line, his failure even to mention the Article strongly suggests that he
did not believe that there was a plausible constitutional objection to be
made.337

Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 15, 1796), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 313. I rely on the versions in the Madison Papers
rather than in the Annals of Congress because I assume the former to be more accurate. For
the cites to the Annals, see 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 437-38, 487-95, 771-81, 976-87 (1796).
335. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Madison (June 26, 1795), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 29; Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Madison
(June 29, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 32; Letter from Henry Tazewell
to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1795), supra note 324, at 60; Letter from James Madison to
Henry Tazewell (Sept. 25, 1795), supra note 324, at 93-94. When the new session of
Congress began in December, they were both in Philadelphia and no doubt continued their
interchanges in person. Tazewell's memorandum, which he gave to Madison immediately
preceding Madison's final speech on the merits of the treaty, notes their conversation of the
previous day on the subject of Article 9. See Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Madison,
(Apr. 15, 1796), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 311.
336. See Letter from Henry Tazewell to James Madison (Apr. 15, 1796), supra note 335,
at 311, 311-13.
337. Madison did address Article 2 in his remarks and vaguely referred to the constitu
tional dispute which the Article had raised by permitting British subjects to hold real prop
erty in the area of the posts. For discussion of Article 2, see supra notes 278, 287, 308, 329.
Madison observed that this permission was "a very extraordinary feature in this part of the
treaty," and he claimed that
no example of such a stipulation was to be found in any treaty that ever was made, either
where territory was ceded or where it was acknowledged by one nation to another. Al
though it was common and right in such cases to make regulation in favor of the property of
the inhabitants, yet he believed that in every case that had ever happened, the owners of
landed property were universally required to swear allegiance to the new sovereign, or to
dispose of their landed property within a reasonable time.
Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Apr. 15, 1796), supra note 334, at 317. These observations
bore on Article 2's granting to British subjects in the area of the posts the right to continue
to hold their real property and the option to retain both their residences and their British
citizenship, or to obtain United States citizenship. Obviously, Madison could not have be
lieved that no treaty had ever permitted aliens to hold real property. See supra notes 77-93,
116, 287, 301 and accompanying text. He was referring to the special problem presented by
Article 2 - where one nation acknowledges that certain territory belongs to another nation,
thus raising the problem of what to do with subjects of the first who reside in and own real
property in the ceded territory. "He would not," he said, "enquire how far this might be
authorized by constitutional principles." Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Apr. 15, 1796), su
pra note 334, at 317. After all that had already occurred, however, not to inquire was obvi
ously to concede the constitutional point.
It is perhaps arguable that Madison intended his remarks to apply both to Article 2 and
to Article 9. Perhaps, he considered Article 9 to be an after-the-fact concession of the right
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Some brief remarks found in another of his speeches further sup
port this view. Madison actually devoted two lengthy speeches to de
fending the House's role in deliberating on whether to carry treaty
stipulations into effect.338 A principal argument in favor of the Feder
alist position was the Supremacy Clause, which declares treaties to be
the supreme law of the land. Federalists claimed that this eliminated
any role for the House.339 In a nifty move, Madison sought to deflect
this hefty objection by pointing to the rest of the Clause, which pro
vides that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not
withstanding."340 "The term supreme," he then noticed, "evidently
meant a supremacy over the State Constitutions and laws, and not
over the Constitution & laws of the U. States."341 Having made this
nice observation, he then further noted that, strictly speaking, the lan
guage applied to "the Judicial authority & the existing laws, alone of
the States." It was a nice question, then, what would happen in case a
treaty required affirmative legislation by the states.342

of British subjects to hold real property in territories "acknowledged" or "ceded" by the
king in the Treaty of Peace. Such an interpretation, however, would be quite strained.
Among other things, Article 9 only applied to British subjects then holding real property in
the United States, and thirteen years had already passed since the Treaty of Peace had been
concluded. Moreover, the problem of British-owned property in the United States had been
dealt with in the Treaty of Peace itself in Article VI, which had prohibited any further
confiscations of British landed estates. For discussion, see supra notes 116, 2'ir7, 301 and
infra notes 377-421, 437-439 and accompanying text. In any case, if Madison was referring to
Article 9, he simply chose to forgo making, beyond vague allusion, any comment on
Tazewell's constitutional objection.
Surely, if he thought that the provision was
unconstitutional, he would have said so.
338. See Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Mar. 10, 1796), supra note 333, at 255; Madison,
Jay's Treaty Speech (Apr. 6, 1796), supra note 334, at 290.
339. See, e.g., Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI, supra note 289, at 6; Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796), supra note 253, at 89. The
Federalists generally did recognize that Congress would sometimes have to pass legislation
to implement a treaty - most importantly, when the treaty called for the appropriation of
money. The Constitution itself provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. In
the Federalist view, however, even here, the House would have no choice but to carry out
obediently the treaty stipulations. See Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII, supra note 289,
at 20-21.
340. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
341. Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Mar. 10, 1796), supra note 333, at 256.
342.

See id.

Madison said:

The injunction [of the Supremacy Oause] was not extended to the Legislative authority of
the States or to laws requisite to be passed by the States, for giving effect to Treaties; and it
might be a problem worthy of the consideration, though not needing the decision of the
Committee, in what manner the requisite provisions were to be obtained from the States.
Id. at 256.
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It is far from clear what Madison had in mind in cryptically refer
ring to the possible necessity of affirmative state legislation.343 Con
ceivably, he was noticing the potential parallel raised by his argument
between the legislative powers of Congress and those of the state leg
islatures. As Cato had claimed, did the Republican position that con
gressional legislation was necessary for treaties on subjects within
Congress's legislative authority imply that the same would be the case
for the state legislatures when treaties trenched on state legislative
subjects? If this is in fact what he had in mind, Madison later pro
ceeded to answer his own query. The problem was chimerical because
the Constitution did not require treaties to obtain the sanction of the
state legislatures. Those who opposed requiring the House's approval
had objected to the Republican position, he noted, on the ground that
the treaty power would be frustrated "if Treaties were to depend in
any degree on the [Federal] Legislature."344 This was untrue, he
claimed, because the President, House, and Senate form "but one
Government" and the "will of the nation" is always expressed through
certain checks, in the case of treaties as well as laws. However, this
objection "would have weight," he conceded, "if the voluntary coop
eration of the different States was to be obtained."345 Thus, even trea
ties trenching on subjects within state legislative competence would
not require state legislation to carry them into effect. The validity of
treaties could not be made to "depend in any degree" upon obtaining
the approval of an ever-expanding number of state legislatures, as ex
perience under the Confederation had amply demonstrated. Madison
thus seems quietly to have conceded the untenability of the states'
rights position.346
343. Some of Madison's colleagues, too, seemed to have difficulty comprehending "the
problematical mystery" to which he was referring. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 681 (1796) (re
marks of Rep. Gilbert). Representative Gilbert "could not possibly conceive how the State
Legislature, by acting, by legislating, one way or the other, could constitutionally affect the
operations of a Treaty." Id. Perhaps, prefiguring New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 {1997), Madison was thinking of cases in
which treaty stipulations obligated state governmental officials to undertake affirmative ob
ligations - for example, directing state executive authorities to provide specified services
for aliens or for consular officials. Perhaps, he had the French Consular Convention of 1788
in mind. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text. I consider a broader reading in
the text above.
344. Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Mar. 10, 1796), supra note 333, at 262.

345. Id. For Madison's unequivocal remarks during the Philadelphia and Virginia Rati
fying Conventions on the severe dangers posed by state refusals to comply \vith treaties, see

supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text; infra note 796 and accompanying text.
346. To be sure, Madison's brief, and rather opaque, remarks do not permit any definite
inferences to be drawn. I claim only that my reading is the most compelling in light of the
context. In a subsequent speech, Madison made clear that he did not believe that the treaty
power was necessarily limited to those subjects over which Congress had been given legisla
tive power, the basic claim of the states' rights view. Thus, in explaining the Virginia Rati
fying Convention's proposed amendment to the Constitution to require that treaties ceding
territory require a three-fourths vote in both houses, Madison explained that the Virginia
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In light of this history, it is ironic that the irrepressible Jefferson
would soon seize an opportunity to memorialize some of the seem
ingly abandoned constitutional claims urged by Republican polemi
cists during the initial outrage following publication of the treaty. The
crushing Republican defeat in the great treaty fight was followed by
their rout in the elections of 1796. As Adams's Vice President and
presiding officer of the Senate, Jefferson perhaps had less to do than
could satisfy his prodigious energies and talents, and he soon under
took the yeoman's task of compiling a manual of parliamentary prac
tice for the Senate. Although the treaty controversy was finally be
ginning to fade into the background, he could not restrain himself
from needling the Federalists one more time on the treaty question,
inserting some ultra vires commentary on the scope of the treaty
power.
With considerable understatement, he began by conceding: "To
what subjects this power extends, has not been defined in detail by the
Constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves."347 He then
proceeded to offer his own (highly restrictive) view. First, treaties can
only be used, he claimed, on "objects which are usually regulated by
treaty," and, even then, only when those objects "cannot be otherwise
regulated."348 Second, he reinvoked the more extreme Republican
view about the relationship between the treaty power and congres-

Convention "might not consider the territorial rights and other objects for which they re
quired the concurrence of three fourths of the members of both houses, as coming within
any of the enumerated powers of Congress." Madison, Jay's Treaty Speech (Apr. 6, 1796),
supra note 334, at 297. For Madison's similar affirmation of the constitutionality of the
Louisiana Purchase notwithstanding Jefferson's doubts, see infra note 360 and accompany
ing text.

In any case, although Madison did not explicitly draw out the point, the nationalist view
was implicit in his reading of the Supremacy Clause - because otherwise the inclusion of
the term "treaties" would have been pointless. Under Madison's approach, treaties on sub
jects falling within Congress's legislative powers required congressional implementation to
become effective as domestic law. Thus, the reference in the Supremacy Qause to "treaties"
could not have been meant to apply to treaties of this kind; they were supreme over state
laws only because Congress had implemented them through passage of a "law." Yet, if trea
ties on subjects within the exclusive legislative competence of the states required implemen
tation by the state legislatures, then clearly the Supremacy Clause had no application to
them. Treaties of this kind were emphatically not supreme over state law, but dependent
upon it. What, then, was left for the Supremacy Clause to do? That the states' rights view
would render the Supremacy Clause's reference to "treaties" otiose and misleading was
surely reason enough to condemn it. All the more so, since rendering it meaningless was
radically inconsistent with the importance that the Founders had placed on that Clause and
the history that gave rise to it. See supra notes 95-98, 121-122, 127-142, 171-174, 180 and ac
companying text; infra note 796 and accompanying text. Madison would surely have re
treated in the face of such an implication.
347. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice § 52,
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335, 442 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) .

in 1 THE WRITINGS

348. Id. This was actually Jefferson's second point. His first was undoubtedly correct 
that a treaty "must concern the foreign nation party to the contract, or it would be a mere
nullity." Id.
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sional authority: treaties, he claimed, cannot cover "those subjects of
legislation in which [the Constitution] gave a participation to the
House of Representatives." In language reminiscent of his earlier ex
pressions of hostility to the treaty power, he then rather flippantly ex
plained: "This last exception is denied by some, on the ground that it
would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The
less the better, say others."349 Finally, he turned to the problem of
states' rights: the Constitution, he asserted, "must have meant to ex
cept out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the Presi
dent and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is in
terdicted from doing in any way."350
It is understandable that states' rights advocates have focused on
this latter statement as the strongest support for their view in the early
history. Of course, that does not make Jefferson's claim "consistent
with the prevailing views of the time" - or " 'the consensus of the
Founding Fathers' " - as Professor Bradley claims.351 States' rights
advocates have relied on this comment without any appreciation of
the highly charged political context out of which it arose or the idio
syncratic character of Jefferson's view of the treaty power. In light of
the course of the debate in 1795-96, Jefferson's claim appears more as
a stubborn refusal to accept the outcome of the extended public dis
cussion than as a fair-minded expression of a generally accepted view
point. It may have been precisely claims like these that Madison had
in mind when, in the course of reviewing Jefferson's career, he ob
served that "[a]llowances . . . ought to be made for a habit in Mr.
Jefferson as in others of great genius of expressing in strong and round
terms, impressions of the moment."352
349. Id. Jefferson here was apparently rejecting the moderate version of the Republican
claim - that the House claimed no agency in making treaties but that it had discretion in
deciding whether to execute treaty stipulations on subjects within its legislative powers. See
supra notes 243, 249, 263-264, 272-274, 278, 305, 318-320 and accompanying text. Jefferson
seemed to be suggesting the more radical view that treaties on such matters are subject to
the prior "ratification of the Representatives." Jefferson, supra note 347, at 442.
350. Jefferson, supra note 347, at 442.
351. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 416; id. at 416 n.148 (quoting George A. Finch, The
Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United States Within Constitutional Limits,
48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 61 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
352 Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (May 1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 478, 479 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (explaining the necessity in under
standing Jefferson's remarks of recalling "the aspects of things at different epochs of the
Government, particularly as presented at its outset, in the unrepublican formalities intro
duced and attempted, not by President Washington but by the vitiated political taste of oth
ers taking the lead on the occasion; and again in the proceedings which marked the Vice
Presidency of Mr. Jefferson"). Joseph Eilis's remarks about Jefferson's constitutional posi
tion during the Jay Treaty controversy itself apply as fully to Jefferson's codification of those
views in the Manual:
Jefferson's more extreme position reflected his more cavalier attitude toward constitutional
questions in general. Unlike Madison, who had a deep appreciation for the Constitution as
an artful arrangement of juxtaposed principles and powers with abiding influence over fu-
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Be that as it may, Jefferson himself would soon come to see the
difficulties which his restrictive view of the treaty power would pose
for the fundamental interests of the nation - when in his first term as
President, he unexpectedly stumbled into a bargain that would forever
change the course of the nation's history but which would also require
a revision of his earlier views.353 Coincidentally, it was the willingness
of his Minister to France, the redoubtable Robert Livingston, to jetti
son his instructions and negotiate an agreement with Bonaparte for
the sale of the whole of the Louisiana territory that provoked the con
stitutional difficulty.354 Livingston was fully aware of - and, given his
Cato essays, no doubt shared - Jefferson's doubts about the constitu
tional authority of the treaty power to acquire new territory. Nowhere
in the Constitution had the national government been expressly dele
gated a power to acquire territory, and if the treaty power could not
extend beyond those objects that the Constitution had placed in the
hands of the federal government - which was the essential logic of
the position taken by Jefferson and Livingston during the Jay Treaty
debate - then the treaty power could not legitimately be utilized to
acquire Louisiana. Despite this difficulty, however, Livingston, with
Monroe's help, seized "the fugitive occurrence" and concluded the
agreement.355
There were a number of constitutional difficulties with the
Louisiana Treaty, and the many complexities are too great to permit
explication here.356 Suffice it to say that the two main questions were
ture generations, Jefferson tended to view it as a merely convenient agreement about politi
cal institutions that ought not to bind future generations or prevent the seminal source of all
political power - popular opinion - from dictating government policy. His casual remarks
in the spring of 1796 during the height of the debate over the Jay Treaty were uncharacteris
tic only in the sense that Jefferson customarily left constitutional questions in Madison's ca
pable hands. But precisely because he did not feel the obligation to filter his opinions
through Madison, his statements more accurately reflected his greater willingness to bend
constitutional arguments to serve what he saw as a higher purpose . . • . Upsetting delicate
constitutional balances or setting dangerous precedents did not trouble him in such mo
ments.

ELLIS, supra note 318, at 162.
353. For extended treatments of the Louisiana Purchase and the constitutional issues it
raised, see BROWN, supra note 29, at 1-83; 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PREsIDENT:
FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 270-332 {1970); and DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHf OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 215-16, 244-51 (1994).
354. For Livingston's role in negotiating the treaty, see 4 MALONE,
285-89, 298-99, 304-10, and KETCHAM, supra note 158, at 419-20.

supra note 353,

at

355. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.C. Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 244 n.l (Paul L. Ford ed., New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1897). Jefferson appointed Monroe to aid Livingston and make clear the importance
the administration placed upon the Mississippi River question. See 4 MALONE, supra note
353, at 269-70, 285-89, 298-301, 303-10. Unsurprisingly, the appointment of Monroe created
serious tensions between Livingston and Monroe and competition for recognition and credit.
See 4 id. at 289-91, 298-301, 304.
356. For extended discussion of the constitutional issues, see BROWN, supra note 29, at
1-83; and 4 MALONE, supra note 353, at 311-32.

1190

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1075

whether the treaty power extended to acquiring new territory and
whether it was constitutional to incorporate new territory into the
union by treaty or otherwise.357 The states' rights view had a potential
bearing on both, but it was the first that raised the problem most
clearly. As Jefferson explained in a letter to his skeptical friend and
close ally Wilson Cary Nicholas:

H [the treaty power] is [boundless], then we have no Constitution. If it

has bounds they can be no others than the definitions of the powers
which that instrument gives. It specifies & delineates the operations
permitted to the federal government, and gives all the powers necessary
to carry these into execution. Whatever of these enumerated objects is
proper for a law, Congress may make the law; whatever is proper to be
executed by way of a treaty, the President & Senate may enter into the
treaty; whatever is to be done by a judicial sentence, the judges may pass
the sentence.358

357. The power to acquire territory by treaty proved the easier to resolve and was en
tirely put to rest by the Supreme Court in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511, 541 (1828) (Marshall, CJ.) (noting that the "Constitution confers absolutely on the gov
ernment of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that
government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty").
The problem of incorporating new territory into the United States proved much more com
plex. Beginning with the Louisiana Purchase and running through the Missouri Compro
mise, the annexation of Texas, the Dred Scott decision, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857) (declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional), and finally the
Insular Cases, see, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (resolving the constitutional
questions raised by the acquisition of Puerto Rico), the issue was endlessly controversial and
raised profound questions about the character of the Union.
358. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 355, at 247 n.1, 247-248 n.1. In his letter to
Jefferson, Nicholas, then a Senator from Virginia, explicitly rejected the position that the
Republicans had taken during the Jay Treaty controversy and crune very close to endorsing
explicitly the nationalist view of the treaty power. See Letter from Wilson C. Nicholas to
Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 3, 1803), quoted in BROWN, supra note 29, at 26-27 (noting his
awareness "that this is to us delicate ground, and perhaps my opinions may clash with the
opinions given by our friends during the discussion of the British treaty"). This perspective
was also evident in his remarks in the Senate:
[Tjhe Legislative power is limited in a manner that it was neither intended, nor was it practi
cable to limit the treaty-making power. The power of legislation was only meant to be given
for certain and particular purposes; all other Legislative powers were reserved to the States,
whereas the whole treaty-making power of the nation was vested in the President, to be ex
ercised with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . [I]t must not be inferred from this, that
we believe the treaty-making power is unlimited. The Constitution imposes particular and
general limitations upon the powers of the Government of the United States. No depart
ment of the Government can do any of the things that are prohibited by the Constitution.
Nor would they be justifiable in not doing what is positively enjoined upon them to do. I do
not believe therefore that the President and Senate would cede a State or any part of a State,
because our common defence was one of the great purposes for which the Government was
formed, and because the Constitution guaranties to every State in the Union a Republican
form of government, and engages to protect each of them against invasion. . . . Upon every
other subject proper for a national compact, not inconsistent with our Constitution, and un
der the limitations by me stated, a treaty may be negotiated and absolutely concluded by the
treaty-making power, so as to bind the nation.

8 ANNALS OF CONG. 69-70 (1803) (remarks of Sen. Nicholas). It may well have been the
force with which Nicholson expressed these points that provoked Jefferson to reassert his
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This is perhaps the fullest early expression of the states' rights view,
clearly recognizing that the ultimate issue is whether the treaty power
is a delegated power in its own right or simply another mode of exer
cising powers otherwise granted to the federal government. The
Louisiana problem was simple: since the Constitution nowhere gave
Congress the power to acquire territory, it was, under that view, not
permissible to acquire Louisiana by treaty. That power resided either
in the states or in the people, but, in any case, not in the President and
Senate.359
Understandably, given his earlier views, Jefferson was deeply
troubled by this problem and sought the advice of his Cabinet. Most
famously, Gallatin, his Secretary of the Treasury and former Republi
can leader during the Jay Treaty debate, sought to dispel Jefferson's
constitutional doubts, giving, with Madison's concurrence, an admira
ble restatement of the nationalist view. "[T]he existence of the United
States as a nation," Gallatin first asserted, "presupposes the power
enjoyed by every nation of extending their territory by treaties, and
the general power given to the President and Senate of making trea
ties designates the organ through which the acquisition may be
made."360 He then directly addressed the states' rights objection:

The only possible objection must be derived from the [Tenth]
Amendment, which declares that powers not delegated to the United
earlier view, even though Jefferson had apparently conceded the point in response to
Gallatin. For Gallatin's view and Jefferson's response, see infra notes 360-362 and accom
panying text. For a later use of Jefferson's letter to Nicholas to support the states' rights
view, in connection with the question of whether to annex Texas, see infra note 530.
359. There is, of course, an important difference between the issue raised by a treaty
acquiring territory and that raised by a treaty granting aliens the right to own real property.
Whereas the latter directly interfered with the legislative authority of the states, the former
did not. No one claimed that the states had reserved to themselves the right to acquire terri
tory by treaty or otherwise. But cf. Letter from Levi Lincoln, Attorney General, to Thomas
Jefferson (Jan. 10, 1803), quoted in BROWN, supra note 29, at 18 (proposing that one way out
of the constitutional difficulties Jefferson perceived would be to extend the boundaries of
the State of Georgia and of the Mississippi Territory to include territory ceded by France,
rather than to acquire territory for the United States, an idea that was immediately rejected
as implausible). Thus, even though the power to acquire territory had not been given to the
federal government, it was also "prohibited to the states." Under the Tenth Amendment,
that meant that it must be "reserved to the people." Under the logic of the Tenth Amend
ment argument for the states' rights view, however, the two cases amount to the same thing:
the treaty power is not a delegated power within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, and
thus extends only to those subjects that are otherwise granted to the federal government.
Some subjects beyond federal authority are reserved to the states (e.g., power over real
property), while others are reserved to the people. Either way, the point is the same: the
treaty power does not extend to them.
360. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1803), in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 111 (Henry Adams ed., 1879). According to Ralph
Ketcham, Madison agreed with Gallatin on the constitutional question. He "never really
doubted the power of the United States to add to its territory by treaty, but in deference to
Jefferson, after he and Gallatin had expressed their views in January 1803, he was generally
silent or vague." KETCHAM, supra note 158, at 421-42; see also 4 MALONE, supra note 353,
at 313-14.
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States, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to
the people. As the States are expressly prohibited from making treaties, it

is evident that, if the power of acquiring territory by treaty is not consid
ered within the meaning of the Amendment as delegated to the United
States, it must be reserved to the people. If that be the true construction of
the Constitution, it substantially amounts to this: that the United States
are precluded from, and renounce altogether, the enlargement of terri
tory . . . .361

Jefferson was at least initially convinced and wrote to Gallatin, "You
are right, in my opinion as to Mr. L's proposition; there is no constitu
tional difficulty as to the acquisition of territory . . . . "362 Although at
times Jefferson seemed subsequently to revert to his earlier view,363 his
closest interpreters have generally concluded that he ultimately ac
cepted Gallatin's position that territory could be acquired by treaty
and focused his concerns on the more difficult problem of incorporat
ing territory into the union.364 In any case, as he expressed to
Nicholson in the same letter reasserting the states' rights position: "li,
however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I acquiesce with
satisfaction; confiding, that the good sense of our country will correct
the evil of construction when it shall produce ill effects."365 In fact, he
apparently stood alone among his Cabinet and Republican allies.366 In

361. Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 360, at 114 (emphasis
added).
362. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gallatin (Jan. 1803),
1HOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 355, at 241 n.1, 241 n.1.

in 8

THE WRTI1NGS OF

363. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Aug. 9, 1803), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF 1HOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 355, at 261, 262-63 (stating that the Constitu
tion "has not given [the federal government] a power of holding foreign territory, & still less
of incorporating it into the Union"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.C. Breckenridge
(Aug. 18, 1803), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF1HOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 355, at 244 n.1.
364. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 29, at 20-29 (arguing that Jefferson conceded this
point); 4 MALONE, supra note 353, at 313-14 (same); MAYER, supra note 353, at 248 (same);
see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251-55 (1901) (Brown, J.) (recounting the constitu
tional controversy over the Louisiana Purchase and discussing Jefferson's views); id. at 32330 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). DUillas Malone explains Jefferson's
sometimes inconsistent remarks in letters as designed to anticipate the objections of his old
friends and allies and to smooth their way to acceptance of the treaty. See 4 MALONE, supra
note 353, at 313-14. He also points out that the proposed constitutional amendments that
Jefferson drafted as possible solutions to the constitutional dilemma he perceived only dealt
with the incorporation issue and sinlply accepted the acquisition of Louisiana as a fait ac
compli. See id. at 314-18; see also BROWN, supra note 29, at 20-29; MAYER, supra note 353,
at 248.
365. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803),
358, at 248 n.1.

supra note

366. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 28-29; 4 MALONE, supra note 353, at 313-18; MAYER,
supra note 353, at 249. Jefferson's willingness to overlook his constitutional doubts has ever
after been a matter of controversy and recrimination. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 29-33; 4
MALONE, supra note 353, at 319. John Quincy Adams, for one, remained highly critical of
what he perceived as Jefferson's hypocritical stand. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 30-31.
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the end, waiving any remaining constitutional scruples, he ratified and
implemented the Louisiana Purchase, the outstanding achievement of
his administration.

d. The Supreme Court Affirms the Nationalist View. It is hardly
unusual to find John Marshall at the center of an early constitutional
controversy. Uniquely, however, he was involved here as a political
activist, attorney, and litigant, rather than as Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Remarkably, it was the combination of
the 1783 Treaty of Peace, the Jay Treaty, and Marshall's extensive
land speculations in the Northern Neck of Virginia that produced the
first Supreme Court decision after Ware v. Hylton affirming the na
tionalist view of the treaty power. In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee,361 the Court explicitly upheld Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, over
ruling the contrary Virginia Court of Appeals decision of Judge
Roane, the ardent Jeffersonian jurist and Marshall's great states'
rights antagonist.368 Equally remarkable, it was this very decision that
formed the prequel to the celebrated confrontation, between the
United States Supreme Court, and Judge Roane and the Virginia
Court of Appeals, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.369
During 1795 to 1796, Marshall, cooperating closely with Hamilton
and King, was one of the leading advocates for the Jay Treaty in
Virginia.370 Indeed, quickly recognizing the effectiveness of his advo
cacy, the Federalist leadership rewarded him with an appointment to
an important diplomatic post to France, thus launching his career in

The treaty also gave rise to an extended debate in the House and Senate. Ironically, the
Republicans and Federalists now found themselves arguing points that they had attacked
only a few years before and struggling mightily to avoid outright inconsistency. For an ex
tended discussion of the debates, see id. at 36-74. In the Insular Cases, Justice Brown was
unwilling to consider the arguments of individual legislators because they were "so often
influenced by personal or political considerations, or by the assumed necessities of the situa
tion, that they can hardly be considered even as the deliberate views of the persons who
make them, much less as dictating the construction to be put upon the Constitution by the
courts." Downes, 182 U.S. at 254.

367. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
368. See Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.)
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).

218 (1810), rev'd,

Fairfax's

369. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), rev'g 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).
370. See, e.g.,

Letter from Charles Lee to John Marshall (Apr. 17, 1796), in 3
MARsHALL PAPERS, supra note 125, at 19; Letter from John Marshall to Rufus King (Apr.
25, 1796), in 3 MARsHALL PAPERS, supra note 125, at 22; Letter from John Marshall to
Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 25, 1796), in 3 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 125, at 23. For
accounts of Marshall's efforts in defending the Jay Treaty, see, for example, 2 ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 122-62 (1916); KURTZ, supra note 235, at 2225, 50-51, 57; Farnham, supra note 235, at 84. For correspondence of Jefferson and Madison
on Marshall's role, see Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Nov. 22, 1795), in 16
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 132; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(with enclosure) (Nov. 26, 1795), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 236, at 134.
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national politics.371 Throughout the controversy, Marshall was repeat
edly called upon to defend the treaty's constitutionality, including,
most notably, in a three-hour oration he delivered in the Virginia
General Assembly where the treaty was under sustained Republican
attack. Unfortunately, only the most scanty accounts of his speeches
have been preserved.372 For reasons that will appear shortly, however,
it is safe to assume that he defended Article 9 against the aggressive
states' rights attacks that had been raised, including, or perhaps espe
cially, in Virginia.373
Marshall's personal involvement with the problem of alien land
ownership began in the mid-1780s, when he undertook legal represen
tation of D enny Martin Fairfax.374 The latter's uncle, Thomas, Sixth
Lord Fairfax, had very extensive landholdings (that is, in the millions
of acres) in the Northern Neck of Virginia under royal grants. Lord
Fairfax nevertheless remained a citizen of Virginia after the Declara
tion of Independence and until his death in 1781. Not so his sole heir,
Denny Fairfax, who was and remained a British subject and thus an
alien.375 In light of the common law disability of aliens to hold real
371. See, e.g., 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 198-99; KURTZ, supra note 235, at 235;
Mission to France, Editorial Note, in 3 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 125, at 73. Marshall
was appointed special envoy to France in connection with the so-called XYZ affair that
threatened war with France. Earlier, Washington had offered to appoint him Attorney
General and then for other diplomatic posts, but he had declined. See 2 BEVERIDGE, supra
note 370, at 122-23, 144-46, 200-02. Marshall probably declined out of concern over his fi
nancial position, which was tied up in the Fairfax estate dispute. See id. at 202-13. When he
did finally accept the post in the XYZ affair, it was apparently out of a desperate desire to
help his brother in London make the necessary financial arrangements for purchasing the
Fairfax lands. See id. at 211; Mission to France, supra, at 80.
372. The only first-hand accounts I have seen of his speech are in contemporaneous let
ters. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison, supra note 370, at 132-34; Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 370, at 134-37. For discussions of his
speech and other citations, see, e.g., 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 133-40; KURTZ, supra
note 235, at 22-25; and Farnham, supra note 235, at 84.
373. Marshall's biographer, Albert Beveridge, seems to have thought so.
See 2
BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 128-29 (noting the constitutional attacks on Article 9 of the
Jay Treaty "touched Marshall closely"). For further discussion, see infra notes 374-387, 402
and accompanying text.
374. There are many accounts of the complex history of the Fairfax estate dispute, but
the most accurate and complete are in the Marshall Papers. See, e.g., Marshall and the
Fairfax Litigation: From the Compromise of 1796 to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Editorial
Note, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 108 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995); Fairfax
Lands, Editorial Note, in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARsHALL 140 (Charles T. Cullen &
Herbert A. Johnson eds., 1977); Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, in 5 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARsHALL 228 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1987) [hereinafter 5 MARsHALL PAPERS]. Mar
shall first began to represent Denny Fairfax in 1786 in connection with the Hite v. Fairfax
litigation involving title questions under the colonial-era grants. See Fairfax Lands, supra, at
140-43. For other accounts, see, e.g., 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 203-11; 4
BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 146-57.
375. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 140-41; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, su
pra note 374, at 228-29. The lands comprised 5.2 million acres. See Fairfax Lands, supra
note 374, at 141. The lands were divided into three categories: lands that Lord Fairfax had
granted during his lifetime; lands that were ungranted, sometimes referred to as "waste and
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property, there ensued an epic three-decade-long legal struggle be
tween the Virginia legislature, and Denny Fairfax and John Marshall,
over ownership of the Fairfax lands - a struggle that would occupy
Marshall for much of the rest of his life.376 In the end, Marshall pre
vailed not only in his legal contentions but in securing for himself and
his family considerable landed wealth.
At the core of the conflict was the Treaty of Peace of 1783. Recall
that Article VI provided: "[T]here shall be no future Confiscations
made
."m Although this provision clearly applied to confiscations
made against enemy aliens as a result of the war, Marshall staked his
reputation and family fortune on the claim that it also protected
British subjects from the application of state common law rules pro
hibiting ordinary aliens from holding real property. It thus operated
much like Article XI of the French Treaty of 1778, albeit in a some
what more limited fashion. Under this construction of Article VI,
Denny Fairfax held good title to the Fairfax lands because he had
taken title under Lord Fairfax's will in 1781, and the State of Virginia
had not confiscated his lands by the time the Treaty of Peace had
come into force in 1783.378 As we have already seen, this claim directly
.

.

.

unappropriated" lands; and lands that Lord Fairfax had granted to himself or his family, the
so-called manor lands. One issue was whether Lord Fairfax held only a proprietary, or sei
gniorial, right to the lands, not a fee simple, and thus whether his interests had terminated
with independence. See Fairfax v. Hunter, Case Agreed, in 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra
note 374, at 240, 246 n.16. A similar question had arisen in the debates over the Jay Treaty
in connection with Lord Granville's interests in North Carolina lands. See supra note 311
and accompanying text. For a fascinating history of the dispute over Lord Granville's estate,
which was much discussed during the debate over the Jay Treaty, see Henry G. Connor, The
Granville Estate and North Carolina, 62 U. PA. L. REV. 671 (1914). See
also supra notes 311·
314 and accompanying text.
376. See Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation, supra note 374, at 108-19 (describing
Marshall's involvement in extensive litigation concerning the Fairfax lands throughout most
of the rest of his life); Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 140-49; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial
Note, supra note 374, at 228-34. "How important [the Fairfax dispute] was to him cannot be
fully understood without a close study of the numerous cases in the state courts of Virginia
in which he and his brother, as purchasers of the Fairfax estate, were parties - litigatio� that
continually engaged them throughout much of their remaining lives." Id. at 233-34.
377. Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. 6, supra note 99, at 155.
378. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 141-42, 144-45; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial
Note, supra note 374, at 229-33. These claims were discussed in great detail in the various
court decisions discussed infra at notes 380, 383, 387-400, 416-421 and accompanying text.
The first issue was the scope of Article VI of the Treaty of Peace. Did it override the ordi
nary laws of the states regarding the capacity of aliens to own real property, or was it limited
to prohibiting confiscations of property on the ground that the owner was, or had been, an
enemy alien? The second issue was a complicated common law question about the proper
procedure for taking property by way of confiscation, forfeiture, or escheat. The ordinary
procedure required that an office of inquest be initiated and the putative owner be given a
chance to contest the taking. It was agreed by all that such a procedure was not absolutely
necessary, but what was in dispute was whether acts of the Virginia legislature in 1782 and
1785 effectively took the Northern Neck properties without an office. If the 1782 act did so,
then the Treaty of Peace, even broadly construed, would have had no effect on the Fairfax
estate, since it already would have been confiscated by the time the treaty became effective.
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raised the question of whether the treaty power - under both the
Confederation and the Constitution - could override a state legisla
ture on a matter of internal state policy.379
Unsurprisingly, the State of Virginia violently objected both to
Marshall's construction of the Treaty of Peace and to the claim that
the Fairfax lands had not been confiscated prior to the treaty's effec
tive date.380 Beginning as early as 1782, the legislature had passed a
series of acts dealing with the Northern Neck properties, and starting
in 1786, both sides initiated a large number of complex litigations in
the Virginia state courts seeking alternatively to challenge or uphold
the Fairfax title.381 In the meantime, with his estate under increasingly
intense attack, Denny Fairfax began in the early 1790s to consider
selling off his lands to avoid their ultimate escheat to the state.
Marshall jumped at the opportunity thus presented. Organizing a
collective effort among his close relatives and friends to purchase
some of the best portions of the estate, he and his brother, James
Marshall, negotiated a complex purchase agreement with Fairfax in
1793.382 They thereafter instituted further litigations, including in the
federal circuit court, seeking once again to affirm the Fairfax title, and
hence their own, under the Treaty of Peace of 1783.383
379. See supra notes 77-94, 110-111, 116-136 and accompanying text; infra notes 387-400,
416-421 and accompanying text.
380. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 141-42, 144-45; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial
Note, supra note 374, at 229-33. After the federal circuit court issued a ruling in favor of
Fairfax, the Vrrginia legislature nearly adopted a resolution declaring that the federal courts
had no jurisdiction over grants of real property by the state to its citizens and denying the
binding effect of any judgment they might render. See Petition for Postponement (Jan. 22,
1796), in 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 374, at 252, 253 n.1; infra note 408 and accompa
nying text. For discussion of the intense political controversy surrounding the case and the
later decision in Martin, see, e.g., 4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 370, at 145-67; 2 WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLmCS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 785-817 (1953); and 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 151-53 (rev. ed. 1935).
381. The various acts are described in detail in the various court opinions discussed infra
notes 387-400 and accompanying text. There were a remarkable number of separate actions
pending simultaneously in different courts. Some of the actions were brought by Fairfax in
an effort to block the granting of the waste lands; one was an ejectment action brought
against Fairfax by David Hunter, who claimed title to some of the waste lands under patents
granted by the state; and still others were escheat actions brought by the state against the
Fairfax lands, ultimately including the manor lands. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at
143-47; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, supra note 374, at 229-33. Later Marshall insti
tuted a number of actions in his own name and a federal court action on behalf of Fairfax.
See infra note 383.
382 See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 143; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note,
note 374, at 228-31. The Marshall syndicate purchased the manor lands.

supra

383. Marshall was convinced that the federal courts would be more sympathetic to his
treaty claim. Moreover, he had to shape the litigation with great care in order to ensure that
he would ultimately be able to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court notwith
standing the Eleventh Amendment, which was then pending in the Virginia legislature and
which had caused the Virginia Court of Appeals to delay action on the various pending ap
peals. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 144-47; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, supra
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These various litigations - as well as Marshall's ultimately suc
cessful efforts to arrange a legislative compromise in the General As
sembly - came to a head during the period of 1794 to 1796, just as the
storm caused by the Jay Treaty was underway. A number of the
Fairfax estate cases were then pending in the Virginia Court of Ap
peals, and Marshall, having prevailed in the federal circuit court, was
busily preparing for a long-planned and much-anticipated showdown
in the United States Supreme Court. Before any definitive rulings
were rendered in either court, however, a compromise agreement was
reached in the General Assembly in December 1796, whereby title to
the portions of the estate purchased by Marshall and his associates
were confirmed and the remainder of the estate was transferred to the
State of Virginia.384
In light of this background, there can be no question about
Marshall's view of Article 9 of the Jay Treaty. Surely, he welcomed
the provision, which, by confirming the title of British subjects then
holding lands in the United States, served to strengthen his legal posi
tion and give the Virginia legislature a substantial added inducement
to settle the longstanding Fairfax dispute.385 More important, the con
stitutionality of Article 9 rested on similar, though even stronger,
grounds as the constitutionality of Article VI of the Treaty of Peace,
which, of course, was the principal basis for Marshall's legal position.
With Marshall actively defending the constitutionality of the Jay
Treaty just as the long-lasting Fairfax estate dispute reached its climax
in the United States Supreme Court, the Virginia Court of Appeals,
and the Virginia General Assembly, it seems certain that Marshall
would have publicly affirmed the constitutionality of Article 9 in the
course of the then feverish debates.386

note 374, at 231-32. As part of this strategy, Marshall instituted the federal ejectment action
against Hunter in 1795, and it was promptly heard by Judges James Wilson and Cyrus
Griffin. They agreed with Marshall and confirmed title in Fairfax. See id. at 231-33. Hunter
then appealed to the Supreme Court. Marshall expected the Court to hear argument in the
case at the same time as it heard argument in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), in
which he represented the Virginia debtors against the British creditors. See supra note 125
and accompanying text. He intended to argue that Article IV of the Treaty of Peace did not
revive the debt against the local debtors but that Article VI did protect the Fairfax estate.
After Hunter successfully postponed argument in the case, the legislative compromise of
1796 intervened, and, to Marshall's great disappointment, Hunter dismissed the appeal. See
Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 145-46; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, supra note 374, at
233.
384. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374, at 145-48; Fairfax v. Hunter, Editorial Note, su
pra note 374, at 233.
385. Marshall had advised Fairfax to seek to have the British negotiators put a provision
in the Jay Treaty which would have explicitly protected the Fairfax estate. However, his ad
vice arrived after the treaty had already been concluded. See Fairfax Lands, supra note 374,
at 144-45. The inclusion of Article 9 in the treaty nevertheless greatly strengthened his nego
tiating position. See id. at 149.
386. For a discussion of Marshall's views in another context, see infra note 484.
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In any case, although the legislative compromise effectively ended
the ongoing litigations over the Fairfax estate for a time,387 some years
later one of the cases was revived in the Virginia Court of Appeals. In
Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee,388 a sharply divided Virginia Court of Ap
peals revisited the issues that had only recently been embroiled in
fierce controversy, and the court rejected Fairfax's claim to a small
portion of the lands that Marshall, for technical reasons, had claimed
were not subject to the legislative compromise.389 Of particular inter
est is Judge Spencer Roane's opinion rejecting Marshall's interpreta
tion of Article VI.390 Roane, famously, was a passionate defender of
states' rights and leader of the Virginia Republicans, and he took the
opportunity to press for a states' rights approach to the treaty power.
The difficulties he faced in doing so, and his equivocations in express
ing the states' rights view, however, dramatically underscore the
weakness of that view even among those most prone to support it. His
opinion also supplies the context without which it is impossible to ap
preciate the full significance of the Supreme Court's later opinion up
holding Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.

3'01. In fact, the respite was quite brief, and the intensity of the litigation soon resumed
in full force. See Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation, supra note 374, at 110-13; Articles of
Agreement (Sept. 11, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 93 (Charles F. Hobson
ed., 1990) [hereinafter 6 MARSHALL PAPERS]; Marshall v. Hunter and Pendleton, Deposition
(Aug. 28, 1802), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra, at 122; Marshall v. Janney, Amended Bill
and Answer in Chancery (Nov. 29, 1803), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra, at 202; Martin v.
Weekly, Bill and Answer in Chancery, U.S. Circuit Court, Virginia (Dec. 1806), in 6
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra, at 473; Letter from John Marshall to James M. Marshall (July 9,
1822), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 239 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998) [hereinafter
9 MARsHALLPAPERS].
388. 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1810).
389. See Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation, supra note 374, at 112-16 (explaining how
the land at issue actually fell within the manor lands, even though earlier the Marshalls had
mistakenly stipulated, when it was not a point of significance, that it was waste land).
Hunter had left the appeal dormant in the Court of Appeals for over a decade. See Hunter,
15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1810). Only two Judges participated in the case, Judges Roane and
Fleming. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 223 (opinion of Roane, J.); id. at 232 (opinion of
Fleming, J.). Although they agreed on the judgment, they disagreed sharply on the ration
ale. Judge St. George Tucker did not participate because his son had married Hunter's
daughter. See Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation, supra note 374, at 113; Fairfax v. Hunter,
Editorial Note, supra note 374, at 230-31; Fairfax v. Hunter, Case Agreed, Notes, supra note
375, at 248-49. Tucker had been the judge in the court below and had ruled in favor of
Fairfax on the ground that the state had never in fact legally taken the estate. See id. at 40209. For further discussion of the views of Judge Tucker, see infra notes 393, 432-439 and ac
companying text. Marshall claimed that the property was really manor lands, and therefore
belonged to Fairfax under the legislative compromise. It was on this point alone that Judge
Fleming agreed that Fairfax should lose. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 237-38.
390. Judge Roane incorporated into his opinion an elaborate unpublished opinion he
had written in a previous case, Reed v. Reed. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 226. The Reed
opinion was published as an appendix to his Hunter opinion. See id. at 611-27; see also 3 AM.
L.J. 22 (1810) (reprinting Roane's opinion in Reed v. Reed). Roane had written that opinion
in part in anticipation of the Fairfax dispute. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 226, app. at 616.
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According to Judge Roane, Article VI protected British subjects
only against legislative confiscations made on the ground that a land
holder was an enemy alien but not against forfeitures and escheats
made under the ordinary common law principle prohibiting even
friendly aliens from holding real property.391 Roane gave a number of
interpretive reasons why he believed his was the better understanding
of Article VI. The crux of his argument, however, was based on a
states' rights understanding of the old Congress's powers under the
Confederation. Implicitly invoking Article VI and the proviso to Arti
cle IX of the Confederation, he claimed that it was beyond Congress's
powers to enter into treaty stipulations which "invade a right of the
several states, entirely of an internal and municipal nature":392
[T]he right of escheat and forfeiture now in question could on no con
struction appertain to congress; it strictly "appertained to the internal
polity of the several states," and was, emphatically, beyond the power of
congress. Congress had . . . no power to invade the ordinary rights of the
several states, and to invest with the privileges of citizens of Virginia,
those whom the policy of her laws had thrown into the class of aliens.393

Having made this strong assertion of a states' rights limitation on
the treaty power, however, Judge Roane faced a serious complication.
As he was forced to acknowledge, the old Congress had on several oc
casions - most importantly in the French Treaty of 1778 - concluded
treaties with provisions precisely of the kind which he now contended
were "emphatically" beyond its authority.394 To this, he had two ap391. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 226, app. at 619-25.
392. Id. at 620.
393. Id. In support of this view, Roane relied almost entirely on the self-denying state
ments made by the American commissioners during the delicate negotiations in Paris lead
ing to the Treaty of Peace. See id. at 619-20. (The internal quotation in the quotation above
is taken from diplomatic documents prepared by the commissioners). For a full discussion
of the negotiations and these statements, see supra notes 99-142 and accompanying text.
Given the internal inconsistencies in the positions assumed by the commissioners - and
their strategic character - it is not surprising that Roane's reliance on them led him to in
consistencies and confusions of his own. He simply ignored, or misconstrued, the subse
quent events that demonstrated the unreliability of the quotations on which he relied. See
supra notes 99-142, 148-156 and accompanying text. Despite his heavy reliance on Jefferson,
see Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 226, app. at 626-27, he also ignored the many statements by
Jefferson during the Confederation taking the contrary view. See supra notes 96-98, 148-156
and accompanying text.
Roane also argued that the 1782 act had effectively taken the property even without an
inquest of office and thus that even if Article VI would otherwise have protected the Fairfax
estate, the estate was already in the state's hands by the time the treaty became effective.
See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 228-32. Judge Fleming disagreed on both points. Although
a states' rights proponent himself, he accepted Marshall's argument that Article VI super
seded the ordinary forfeiture and escheat laws applicable to aliens and showed no interest in
Judge Roane's states' rights rhetoric. See id. at 235-36. Moreover, he believed that without
an inquest of office, the state had never effectively taken the estate. See id. at 233-35. In
these respects, he concurred in Judge Tucker's opinion in the court below. See supra note
389.
394. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 226, app. at 620, 621, 625.
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parently inconsistent responses. First, he claimed that notwithstand
ing the peremptory character of these provisions, they were in reality
merely recommendations or requests to the several states to amend
their laws in conformity with the treaty. This was the case, he claimed,
"in several of our foreign treaties which expressly waive the disabili
ties of alienage, in favour of the subjects of certain friendly powers."395
As we have seen, however, such a claim was utterly implausible in
light of the history surrounding those treaties, and Judge Roane, per
haps for this reason, did not press the point.396 Indeed, he even
seemed to acknowledge that such a treaty, no matter how distasteful,
would have to be obeyed: "Such a treaty would not be natural nor
reasonable; but if such a one exists, it must probably have its effect.
Whether there be any such treaty rights in the present instance, we
shall presently inquire. "3'f7
His second argument was perhaps more plausible, but essentially
conceded the states' rights view. Prefiguring contemporary clear
statement rules, Roane argued that the previous treaties which had
waived the disabilities of alienage used language that was express and
unequivocal. Article VI of the Treaty of Peace, in contrast, was gen
eral and vague and thus ought not to be construed as invading the
sphere otherwise reserved to the states:

If in several of our treaties of amity and commerce with friendly
European powers, the several states are called on, by the most particular

and express stipulations, to waive their laws of alienage, in favour of the
subjects of such powers, does it readily follow that in a treaty of peace
with an enemy nation, an expression entirely congenial with the charac
ter of such treaty, and which can be otherwise abundantly satisfied, shall
have this most important effect? Nay, even, if in the treaty of amity and
commerce, formed by us with the same power, (Great Britain,) in 1794
[the Jay Treaty], some partial privileges on this subject could only be ob
tained for British subjects, and those conferred by the most explicit and
unequivocal terms; if even these privileges, notwithstanding the lapse of
eleven years since the date of the treaty of peace, created a general fer
ment in our country, arising from the recollection of ancient injuries;
shall we construe the general words of the treaty before us, to have an
equal or more extensive effect?398

395. Id. at 620.
396. See supra notes 77-98, 247-258, 265-288, 303-315 and accompanying text.
397. Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 616.
398. Id. at 621. In another passage, Judge Roane reasoned:

[I]n all those of our treaties in which it was intended to yield up the laws of alienage in fa
vour of the subjects of highly friendly and favoured nations, nay, even in the instrument of
confederation itself, in relation to the citizens of the other states of the union, (see art. 4) ex
press, explicit, and appropriate terms are used to effect such surrender: whereas this is an at
tempt, under general and ambiguous expressions, (to admit the most,) to infer a surrender of
those laws, and to create or enlarge interests in favour of the subjects of a nation, then cer
tainly standing at the head of those the least favoured by America, and which has not been
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Thus, in the final analysis, even Judge Roane was unwilling, or un
able, to mount a defense of the states' rights view of the treaty power
under the Confederation, retreating instead to a federalism-based rule
of construction. In this light, his remarks on Article 9 of the Jay
Treaty are all the more striking. Although he (incorrectly) viewed the
Jay Treaty as inapplicable to the case (because the case was pending
before the treaty was ratified),399 he did at several points refer to it in
support of his general position. Clearly, Judge Roane was not enam
ored of the Treaty; indeed, his Jeffersonian hostility is barely sub
merged beneath the surface of his judicial rhetoric. However, in an
effort to show why Article 9 did not further undermine the states'
rights rationale for narrowly construing Article VI of the Treaty of
Peace, he distinguished between the scope of the treaty power under
the Confederation and the scope of such power under the Constitu
tion:

[W]hile that treaty has guarantied, in a remarkable manner, the property
in lands then actually holden in either country[, this] proves nothing in
relation to the treaty of 1783, both because the present general govern
ment of the United States has powers, perhaps, competent to that pur
pose, and because the treaty of 1794 has used strong words to effect it; in
both which important respects, the treaty of 1783 is widely different.400

In other words, the treaty power under the Constitution (divested,
presumably, of the constraints of Article VI and the proviso to Article
IX of the Confederation) was stronger than the treaty power under
the Confederation and thus permitted the inclusion of a provision
which, on states' rights grounds, might not have been valid in the
Treaty of Peace. Or, as Madison had put it in the Federalist Papers,
the treaty power under the Constitution had been "disembarrassed by
the plan of the convention, of an exception under which treaties might
be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States."401 Furtherable to obtain from us up to this day, even by the famous treaty of 1794, the boon in ques
tion, in the extent now contended for!

Id. at 625.
399.

See id. at 611.

400.

Id. at 625.

401. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, NO. 42 (James Madison), at 264. Although the
context strongly suggests otherwise, it is possible to interpret Judge Roane as claiming not
that the treaty power was broader under the Constitution but that Congress's legislative
powers included the power to accord aliens the right to own real property in the states. It
seems particularly doubtful that this is what Judge Roane had in mind, however, because,
among other things, making such a claim would have been far more unorthodox for a
Jeffersonian strict constructionist than simply accepting the nationalist view of the treaty
power - especially after the experience with the Alien Act of 1798. See, e.g., JOHN C.
MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDffiON ACTS 163-65, 189-93 (1951);
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETIERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDIDON LAWS AND
AMERICAN ClVIL LIBERTIES 63-79 (1956). See also Madison's famous report justifying the
Virginia Resolutions of 1799, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 307, 317-24 (David B. Matten, J.C.A. Stagg, Susan Holbrook Perdue,
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more, the states' rights constraint, even in Roane's view, could be
overcome by a clear and unequivocal provision.
After thirty years of litigation, the stage was finally set for the
Supreme Court to resolve the Fairfax estate dispute. By this time, of
course, Marshall was Chief Justice; obviously, though, he did not sit in
the case. In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court reversed. To
Marshall's frustration, however, Story decided to place the decision
not on the Treaty of Peace, as Marshall had always believed proper,
but on Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.402 Story noted that although the
point "has been very elaborately argued at the bar," it was
unnecessary to consider Article VI of the Treaty of Peace because the
Fairfax estate was protected in any case by Article 9 of the Jay Treaty,
"which being the supreme law of the land, confirmed the title to
[Fairfax], his heirs and assigns, and protected him from any forfeiture
by reason of alienage."403
Perhaps because even Judge Roane had conceded the validity of
Article 9, perhaps because the lawyers were unwilling at this late stage
to hazard their credibility by raising a states' rights challenge, perhaps
because the Court considered the states' rights view wholly implausi
ble and generally abandoned, most likely for all of these reasons neither Justice Story nor Justice Johnson, the two Justices who
authored opinions, felt compelled even to address the claim which had
been so passionately asserted during the "general ferment" aroused by
Article 9 of the Jay Treaty,404 the traces of which could still be found in
Judge Roane's opinion. Without making any reference to the states'
rights arguments of Roane, both construed the treaty as overriding
state laws on the disabilities of aliens, satisfied that a simple citation to
the Supremacy Clause fully resolved the issue.405 The only difference

Jeanne K. Preuss eds., 1991). No doubt this explains why Roane's Republican allies and
their antebellum strict constructionist successors routinely denied that Congress had any
such power. See supra notes 249, 256, 265-266, 271-281 and accompanying text; infra notes
503-504, 527-529, 532-533, 538-540, 558-561, 563-564 and accompanying text.
402. Years later, Marshall wrote to his brother: "The case of Hunter & Fairfax is very
absurdly put on the treaty of 94." Letter from John Marshall to James M. Marshall, supra
note 387, at 240. By resting the decision on Article 9 rather than Article VI, the Court gave
Marshall an immediate victory but left title uncertain in the many other pending litigations,
to which the Jay Treaty might not be applied. Marshall had hoped to put the question of
title under Article VI to rest. See Marshall and the Fairfax Litigation, supra note 374, at 116.
403. Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1813). Story also
agreed with Judge Fleming in the Virginia Court of Appeals that without an inquest of office
the state had never taken the Fairfax estate. See id. at 622-27.
404.

Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 226 app. at 621.

405. For the relevant portion of Story's opinion, see Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 627; for the relevant portion of Johnson's dissenting opinion, see id. at
629. In this respect, they followed the example of Judge Fleming in the Virginia Court of
Appeals, who had likewise ignored Judge Roane's states' rights rhetoric. See Hunter, 15 Va.
(1 Munf.) at 235-36. Unlike Story, Johnson in his dissent did reach the Article VI issue and
concurred in Roane's view that it did not apply to ordinary laws of forfeiture and escheat.
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between Story's and Johnson's opinions was on the question of
whether Virginia had in fact taken the property before the conclusion
of the Jay Treaty, with Story answering in the negative and Johnson in
the affirmative.406
The lack of any dissent on the states' rights question is all the more
striking because Brockholst Livingston was now sitting on the Court.
Recall that Livingston had authored the Decius series, which had been
among the leading Republican essays against the Jay Treaty in the
heated summer of 1795. Despite his confident charge in 1795 that Ar
ticle 9 "infringes the rights of the different States,"407 Livingston was
now content to join quietly Story in upholding that provision without
even a word devoted to defending, or explaining, his earlier point of
view.
It is well known, of course, that Virginia did not take kindly to the
Court's decision. In 1795, when an appeal was first taken in the
Fairfax litigation to the Supreme Court, the legislature had nearly
adopted a resolution "most unequivocally den[ying] the authority of
the federal courts to decide cases affecting titles to lands under the
grants of this commonwealth to the citizens thereof."408 When the
Virginia Court of Appeals received the Supreme Court's mandate in
1813, it followed the legislative precedent and denied that the
Supreme Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction in the case.409
Thus ensued the final chapter of the Fairfax litigation and the decision
in the great case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.410
In the years following the decision in Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee,
the Court repeatedly made clear that states' rights subject matter limi
tations could not be asserted against the treaty power, upholding vir-

See Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 628-29. Even here, however,
Johnson's opinion is revealing, because in reaching that result, he carefully avoided any ref
erence to Roane's states' rights rhetoric and instead relied purely on ordinary interpretive
considerations. See id. For Justice Johnson's strong affirmation of the nationalist view of
the treaty power, see infra notes 451-489.

406. See Fairfax Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622-27 (Story, J.)
(holding that the property was never taken); id. at 629-31 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the state did take the property).
407. AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 244 (reprinting the Decius essays); see
supra notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
408. Fairfax v. Hunter, Petition for Postponement, supra note 380, at 253 n.1 (quoting
resolution (internal quotation marks omitted)). It does not appear that the resolution was
rejected because of any hesitancy on this subject
409. See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 16 (1814). Of course, its reason was dif
ferent. The Court of Appeals famously asserted that the Supreme Court could not exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the state courts, even in cases raising federal
questions.
410. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). After Fairfax died during the long pendency of the
appeal, Martin, his heir, was substituted as the defendant, and consequently the case bears
his name.
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tually all of the provisions in earlier treaties granting aliens the right to
hold real property. In 1817, in Chirac v. Chirac,411 the Court in an
opinion by Marshall unanimously upheld both Article XI of the
French Treaty of 1778 and the corresponding provision in the Conven
tion of 1800 with France which superseded the earlier agreement. As
to the former, Marshall, like Story in Hunter, declined to decide the
constitutionality of Article XI under the terms of the Confederation
because the property at issue had been purchased after the adoption
of the Constitution; whatever controversy there might have been
about the scope of the treaty power under the Confederation, upon
adoption of the Constitution "this treaty had become the supreme law
of the land."412 As to the latter, he broadly construed the somewhat
narrower provision in the Convention of 1800 to override Maryland's
law requiring French citizens holding real property to become citizens
or sell their property to citizens within ten years of acquiring the prop
erty. The French Treaty, he held, permitted them to sell their prop
erty at any time during their lives.413 During the following term,
moreover, the Court, in Craig v. Radford,414 reaffirmed the validity of
Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.415
In 1819, with Marshall again not sitting, the Court completed the
unfinished business left over from the Hunter decision. Writing for
the Court in Orr v. Hodgson,416 Justice Story this time explicitly up
held Marshall's construction of Article VI of the Treaty of Peace as
well as again affirming Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.417 Rejecting Judge
Roane's view, Story found that

[w]hen the 6th article of the treaty declared, "that no future confiscation
should be made," it could not mean to confine the operation of the lan
guage to confiscations jure belli. . . . [I]t must have meant to protect
[British subjects] from all future losses of property, which but for the war
would have remained inviolable.418
He then referred to the Hunter case and noted that this "subject has
been heretofore before us, and although no opinion was then pro
nounced, it was most deliberately considered."419 This ruling, moreo-

411. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 {1817).
412 Chirac, 15 U.S. {2 Wheat.) at 271.
413. See id. at 274-78.
414. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 594 {1818).
415. See Craig, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 599-600.
416. 17 U.S. {4 Wheat.) 453 {1819).
417. See Orr, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 462-65.
418. Id. at 462-63 (quoting Article VI of the Treaty of Peace).
419. Id. at 463. Professing insufficient time because of "other imperious duties," Story
explained that the Court was unable at that time "to go at large into the reasoning upon
which our present opinion is founded." Id. Story did, however, provide persuasive argu
ments in favor of the Court's construction. See id. at 962-63.
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ver, also effectively resolved the question left open in Chirac
not
only Article VI, but also all of the treaties concluded under the Con
federation, which included provisions dealing with alien landholding,
were constitutional, even under the more restrictive provisions of the
Articles of Confederation.420 As far as the Court was concerned, they
were ipso facto constitutional under the broader terms of the
Constitution.421
-

420. Subsequently, in Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489, 496 (1824), the Court
again upheld Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, and in Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181,
189 (1825), it again upheld Article XI of the French Treaty of 1778.
Professor Bradley wishes to deflect the force of this whole line of decisions by pointing
out that the treaties at issue "did not purport to regulate the relationship between states and
their own citizens . . . . They regulated only the treatment of aliens." Bradley, supra note 2,
at 420. Thus, he concludes, these treaties were "quite naturally viewed as regulating this
country's inter-national relations." Id. To be sure, these treaties were quite naturally viewed
as important to our international relations - just as today human rights treaties are. Profes
sor Bradley's observation simply fails to explain why those decisions are not authoritative
support for the nationalist view. Indeed, his point seems designed precisely to justify that
view. Even under his construction, the Court was permitting treaties to override areas of
exclusive state legislative authority when the treaty was important to our inter-national rela
tions. That is precisely the nationalist view.
421. Proponents of the states' rights view have often relied upon an opinion written by
Attorney General Wirt in 1819. Professor Bradley is no exception. See Bradley, supra note
2, at 416. Within a week of having received an inquiry from the Secretary of State, Wirt con
cluded in a three-sentence opinion, first, that the treaty with Sweden of 1782 did not extend
the right to inherit real property to Swedish subjects and, second, that it could not constitu
tionally have done so because that subject was within the exclusive competence of the states.
See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 275 (1819). One is certainly tempted to attribute Wirt's view to a too
hasty judgment without adequate consideration and research. Perhaps, as a Jeffersonian
Virginian, he had Jefferson's states' rights dictum in mind. See supra note 350 and accompa
nying text. If so, however, he was not well informed. As we have already seen, during the
Confederation, Jefferson had not only attempted to negotiate treaties extending privileges in
real property to aliens, he had also explicitly endorsed their validity under the Articles and
their binding status on the states notwithstanding their refusal to pass implementing legisla
tion - indeed, in the face of conflicting state legislation. See supra notes 94-98, 148-154 and
accompanying text. Presumably, moreover, Wirt was unaware of the circumstances that led
to the conclusion of the treaty and of French legal usages which left no doubt that the treaty
extended to real property. See supra notes 89-93, 285-288 and accompanying text. Even
more important, Wirt simply failed to mention that the Supreme Court had unequivocally
affirmed the constitutionality of this type of provision on several recent occasions - not
only in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, but in Chirac, Craig, and Orr, the last of which
was decided that same year. If he meant to reject the Court's opinions wholesale, would he
not have felt obliged at least to mention that fact? In any case, Wirt himself would shortly
thereafter switch to the nationalist view. Following in Gallatin's footsteps, he would defend
the Louisiana Purchase to a skeptical John Quincy Adams, citing the treaty power as the
source of constitutional authority for the acquisition of territory. See 5 JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS, MEMOIRS 401 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874-77). Moreover, in a later Attorney
General opinion in 1824, discussed infra note 490 and accompanying text, he again seemed
to affirm the nationalist view - this time after far more consideration and on a subject of
enormous controversy. Ironically, later courts rejected Wirt's construction of the treaty and
applied it to real property. See Erickson v. Carlson, 145 N.W. 352 (1914); Adams v.
Akerlund, 168 ID. 632 (1897). Over a century later, the Supreme Court explicitly disap
proved both Wirt's interpretation of the treaty and his constitutional claim. See Todok v.
Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 452-54 (1930) (noting that Wirt's "view of the treaty
making power of the United States is not tenable"). Proponents of the states' rights view
seem to be ignorant of this history. For discussion, see infra note 664.
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e. The Views of Early Commentators. In concluding this survey of
the views of the first generation of Americans on the treaty power, it is
worth considering briefly the views of the leading early commentators
on the Constitution - Joseph Story, William Rawle, and St. George
Tucker, among others. Although none of these writers addressed the
question head on, they all expressed a clear and unmistakable under
standing of the breadth and scope of the treaty power that leaves little
doubt as to where they stood. This inference becomes all the more
powerful, moreover, when it is recognized that all were fully familiar
with - some, indeed, participated in - the great struggle over the Jay
Treaty. They were thus fully aware of the implications of the views
they expressed.
Story's position, of course, is already clear from his opinion in
Hunter and the other Supreme Court cases upholding precisely those
provisions of earlier treaties that were claimed to violate the rights of
the states, under both the Confederation and the Constitution. His
Commentaries422 only serve further to confirm this understanding.
Thus, he begins by attacking the states' rights subject matter limita
tions in Article IX of the Confederation: "These limitations were
found very inconvenient in practice; and indeed, in conjunction with
other defects, contributed to the prostration, and utter imbecility of
the confederation."423 In contrast, the power to make treaties
is by the constitution general; and of course it embraces all sorts of trea
ties, for peace or war; for commerce or territory; for alliance or succours;
for indemnity for injuries or payment of debts; for the recognition and
enforcement of principles of public law; and for any other purposes,
which the policy or interests of independent sovereigns may dictate in
their intercourse with each other.424

This breadth was necessary, moreover, because the treaty power "is
indispensable to the due exercise of national sovereignty. . . It is diffi
cult to circumscribe the power within any definite limits, applicable to
all times and exigencies, without impairing its efficacy, or defeating its
purposes. The constitution has, therefore, made it general and un
qualified. "425
Obviously, Story's ringing affirmation of the broad scope of the
treaty power, accompanied by his denunciation of states' rights limita.

422. See STORY, supra note 19.
423. Id. § 1501, at 355.

The states' rights limitations he was referring to were those im
posed by the proviso to Article IX of the Confederation. For discussion, see supra notes 7589, 147-153, 187-189 and accompanying text.

424. Id. § 1502, at 355.
425. Id. § 1503, at 356. Given this unavoidable necessity, it was crucial, Story affirmed,
that the Constitution ensure that the power be delegated to those "best qualified for the
purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good." Id. § 1503, at 357. For this
reason, the Constitution wisely choose the President and Senate, in which, as to the latter,
"all the states are equally represented." Id. § 1507, at 360.
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tions under the Confederation, strongly confirms the nationalist view.
This conclusion becomes even more powerful when the exceptions
which he did recognize are taken into account. Thus, even "though
the power is thus general and unrestricted,"426 it is not, Story ex
plained, entirely unlimited. No delegated power can be construed "to
authorize a destruction of other powers given in the same instru
ment . . . and cannot supersede, or interfere with any other of its fun
damental provisions."427 Therefore, a "treaty to change the organiza
tion of the government, or annihilate its sovereignty, to overturn its
republican form, or to deprive it of its constitutional powers, would be
void; because it would destroy, what it was designed merely to fulfil,
the will of the people."428 It is hardly inconspicuous that states' rights
subject matter limitations did not appear among the exceptions he
thus noted.429 The conclusion would appear inescapable.430
If anything, Rawle's affirmation of the broad scope of the treaty
power is even stronger than Story's:
The most general terms are used in the constitution. The powers of con
gress in respect to making laws we shall find are laid under several re
strictions. There are none in respect to treaties. . . . [The President and
Senate] are by the treaty making power, invested with the high and sole
control over all those subjects which properly arise from intercourse with
foreign nations. . . . To define them in the constitution would have been
impossible, and therefore a general term could alone be made use of . . .
[A treaty] is a compact entered into with a foreign power, and it extends
to all those matters which are generally the subjects of compact between
independent nations . . . . To make treaties is an essential of a nation.
One which disabled itself from the power of making, and the capacity of
observing and enforcing them when made, would exclude itself from the
international equality which its own interests require it to preserve . . . .
In modem times and among civilized nations, we have no instances of
such absurdity. . . . Under the articles of confederation it was given with
some restrictions, owing to the nature of that imperfect compact, to con-

426. Id. § 1502, at 355.
427. Id. § 1502, at 355-56.
428. Id. § 1502, at 356.
429. Story noted that whether there may be other exceptions, "necessarily growing out
of the structure of the government, will remain to be considered, whenever the exigency
shall arise." Id. § 1502, at 356. Obviously, as Story was exquisitely aware, the states' rights
issue had already arisen (and been dispatched with by himself) and thus could not possibly
have been what he had in mind.
430. Professor Bradley argues that Story supported the states' rights view, relying on
Story's reference to the "fundamental laws" and his general view that the Constitution is an
instrument of limited and enumerated powers. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 416-17. In light
of the above, this is a remarkable claim.
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gress . . . . In our present constitution no limitations were held necessary.
The only question was where to deposit it.431
Finally, St. George Tucker's views are perhaps the most revealing.
Not only was he a leading jurist; a prominent Republican and states'
rights proponent; and a judge in the Virginia District Court, the
Virginia Court of Appeals, and the Federal Circuit Court; he was also
an active opponent of the Jay Treaty and a lower court judge in the
Fairfax estate litigation.432 Indeed, it was his ruling in the lower court
in favor of Fairfax's title in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee that
the Virginia Court of Appeals overturned and that was then reinstated
by the Supreme Court.433 He was thus peculiarly knowledgeable about
the whole question as well as disposed to view the states' rights posi
tion sympathetically. It is especially significant, then, that he too re
jected it in favor of a broad construction of the treaty power.

431. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 57-58 (1825). Rawle nevertheless affirmed that treaties are subject to the Consti
tution "from which alone the power proceeds." The only example of an unconstitutional
treaty that he cited was "an engagement to cede a part of the territory of the United States."
Id. at 66. He did spend a good deal of effort criticizing the position of the House during the
Jay Treaty debate that it had discretion to refuse to carry treaty stipulations into effect. See
id. at 60-67. "The representation held out by our constitution to foreign powers, was that the
president with the advice and consent of the senate, could bind the nation in all legitimate
compacts: but if pre-existent acts, contrary to the treaty, could only be removed by congress,
this representation would be fallacious." Id. at 60-61. Professor Bradley cites Rawle for the
proposition that the treaty power is limited. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 416.
William Duer's discussion of the treaty power in relevant part was largely taken from
Rawle and, to a lesser extent, from Story. See WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, COURSE OF
LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 227-35
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1856). With nuances, he concurs in their views. Chan
cellor Kent, the great federalist jurist, was the least explicit on the scope of the treaty power,
but he too is probably best read as affirming the nationalist view. See 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *284-87. Citing the special procedural limitations on
the treaty power in Holland arising from its federal structure, he observed that in the end
they led to a breach of the Constitution: "The history of Holland shows the danger and folly
of placing too much limitation on the exercise of the treaty-making power
So feeble are
mere limitations upon paper - mere parchment barriers, when standing in opposition to the
strong force of public exigency." 1 id. at *285. As to the scope of the treaty power under the
Constitution, he merely cited Story. See 1 id. at *287 n.a. Consistent with his active advo
cacy of the Jay Treaty, however, he had harsh words for the House's claim to discretion in
implementing treaties. The House Jay Treaty resolution "cannot be mentioned at this day,
without equal regret and astonishment . . . ." 1 id. at *286.
. . . •

Professor Bradley appears to cite both Rawle and Duer in support of the states' rights
view. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 416-17. What possible basis there might be for this con
struction of their writings escapes me.
432. Clyde N. Wilson, Foreword to ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH SELECTED WRITINGS (1999).
433. See Hunter v. Fairfax, Apr. 22, 1794, in St. George Tucker, Notes on Cases in the
General Court, District Court, and Court of Appeals in Virginia, 1786-1811, Tucker
Coleman Papers, ViW, rev'd Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1810), rev'd
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). For discussion of
Tucker's ruling in the lower court, see supra notes 389, 393 and accompanying text.
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Tucker's extensive commentaries on the Constitution, published in
1803 when the treaty power controversies were still smoldering, leave
no doubt about his view.434 After referring to international law for the
definition of treaties, he observed:

[T]he most usual [treaties] relate to, or in their operation may affect, the
sovereignty of the state; the unity of its parts, it's territory, or other prop
erty; it's commerce with foreign nations, and vice versa; the mutual
privileges and immunities of the citizens, or subjects of the contracting
powers, or the mutual aid of the contracting nations, in case of any at
tack, or hostility, from any other quarter. . . . In our constitution, there is
no restriction as to the subjects of treaties, unless perhaps the guarantee
of a republican form of government, and of protection from invasion,
contained in the fourth article, may be construed to impose such a re
striction, in behalf of the several states, against the dismemberment of
the federal republic.435
This affirmation is all the more striking, moreover, because Tucker
was otherwise highly critical of the treaty power. Adopting the cri
tiques that Republicans had articulated during the Jay Treaty debate,
he argued at length in favor of amending the treaty power, and he
likewise strongly supported the House's position during the Jay Treaty
debate.436 Even more significantly, he undertook an extended analysis
of Article VI of the Treaty of Peace and Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.
While broadly construing both, he at the same time explicitly upheld
their constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause: "By the adoption
of the constitution of the United States [the Treaty of Peace] became a
part of the supreme law of the land, and as such paramount to the acts
of the state legislature."437 Nor did this constitutional view come with
out cost to his political preferences. In the initial storm after the Jay
Treaty was published in 1795, he too had written a lengthy essay at
tacking the treaty.438 While arguing that the treaty was unconstitu-

434. See TuCKER, supra note 52. Tucker's version of Blackstone's Commentaries filled
five volumes and included extensive appendices giving his own commentaries on the
Constitution and laws of the United States and Virginia.
435. 1 TuCKER, supra note 52, at 332-33.
436. See id. at 334-38 (criticizing the interaction between the treaty and impeachment
powers and declaring them "the most defective and unsound, of any part of the fabric"); id.
at 338-39 (criticizing the "extraordinary" exclusion of the House from the treaty-making
process); id. at 339-40 (arguing in favor of the House resolution asserting the House's discre
tion in implementing treaty stipulations on subjects within congressional powers).
437. 3 TuCKER, supra note 52, at 61; see also id. at 62-65 (construing Article VI of the
Treaty of Peace and Article 9 of the Jay Treaty). Much of Judge Roane's lengthy opinion in
Hunter is an effort to address the elaborate and learned arguments that Tucker made in his
opinion in the lower court and in his commentaries. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 616. No
doubt Roane was particularly frustrated by having to defend his views against a fellow Re
publican and noted jurist See id.
438. See ST. GEORGE TuCKER, REMARKS ON THE TREATY OF AMITY, NAVIGATION,
COMMERCE, CONCLUDED BETWEEN LORD GRENVILLE AND MR. JAY, ON THE PART

AND
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tional in a variety of respects, when he came to Article 9, he declined
to endorse the constitutional claims of Cato, Decius, Dallas, and oth
ers, restricting himself instead to a lengthy and harsh critique of the
Article on policy grounds.439
2.

Treaty Power, Slavery, and Antebellum States' Rights Dogmas

As with many other momentous constitutional questions, the scope
of the treaty power quickly became caught up in the great antebellum
debates over strict versus broad constructionism, states' rights versus
nationalism, slavery versus freedom. Indeed, after the Missouri Com
promise in 1819, the entanglement of the treaty power with the slavery
question became the first flashpoint in the brewing struggle between
North and South, providing the opening act in the famous Nullifica
tion drama of the late 1820s and early 1830s. For Southern strict con
structionists, it was nothing short of a sacred postulate that the whole
question of slavery was beyond the delegated powers of Congress.
Could a treaty nevertheless affect a slave state's regulations of its slave
population? Was there a fatal loophole in the Constitution through
which the whole economic, social, and political structure of Southern
society could thus be brought to its knees? In the developing South
ern states' rights jurisprudence, there was only one possible answer.
That affirming the states' rights view meant disregarding the
precedents of the Marshall court, and even the many treaties that were
necessarily premised on the nationalist view, was not too great a bar
rier. There was nothing special in this context about challenging the
great existing nationalist precedents or even the practical construction
given to the Constitution during the first generation. They were under
attack whenever their possible, or even their imagined, implications

OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, REsPECTIVELY
pseudonym "Columbus").

(1796) (written under the

439. See id. at 13-14 (attacking the constitutionality of the appointment of commission
ers to decide on violations of Article IV of the Treaty of Peace regarding impediments to the
collection of debts as in violation of Article Ill and the requirement of a jury trial); id. at 1517 (broadly construing and sharply attacking Article 9 as subverting "the wholesome maxims
of the common law," as allowing a dangerous British influence, as lacking in reciprocity, and
as threatening an ultimate return to British rule, but not mentioning any doubt as to its con
stitutionality); id. (arguing that the commercial stipulations in the treaty violate the rights of
the House). In his concluding riposte, he again severely attacked Article 9 and then ob
served that the treaty
is subversive of the constitution of the United States; because it establishes a tribunal incom
patible with the constitution, and assigns to it jurisdiction in cases expressly vested by the
constitution in the judicial courts of the Untied States; and because the decisions of this tri
bunal are paramount to the judgments of the constitutional courts; and because it tends to
wrest from the whole body of congress its constitutional powers, and to transfer the same to a
part of that body only; or to subject the measures of one of the component parts of congress
to the absolute controul of the other two.

Id.
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could pose a threat to slavery. Thus, Charles Warren, with perhaps
only slight exaggeration, could rightly observe about the great Com
merce Clause controversies beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden: "the
long-continued controversy as to whether Congress had exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over commerce was not a conflict between
theories of government, or between Nationalism and State-Rights, or
between differing legal construction of the Constitution, but was sim
ply the naked issue of State or Federal control of slavery."440 All the
more so in the case of the treaty power.
The full significance of the potential constitutional problem be
came evident almost immediately. In the wake of the Denmark Vesey
conspiracy in Charleston in 1822, South Carolina slave society found
itself in a panic. The successful Haitian slave revolts of the turn of the
century in "St. Domingo" were an ever-present source of worry, and
Vesey was a free black man who had hailed from the West Indies.
The problem, South Carolinians inferred, was that free blacks from
the North and from abroad were stirring up the slave population with
abolitionist ideas. It was essential to the safety of South Carolina essential, that is, to preventing a repetition of the wholesale slaughter
of slave owners and their families that had occurred in Haiti - that
any further contact between free blacks and slaves be entirely cut
off.441
In order to alleviate this "threat," South Carolina promulgated
draconian new laws against free blacks. Among these was the so
called Negro Seamen Act of December 1822.442 It provided that when
a ship employing free blacks called at a South Carolina port, whether
coming from an American or a foreign port, the free blacks were to be
arrested immediately and kept in jail until the ship was ready to de
part. At that point, the captain of the ship was obligated to carry the
jailed free blacks back to the ship and pay the expenses of their deten-

440. 1 CHARLEs WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 627-28
(1935).
441. For accounts of the Vesey affair and the reaction in South Carolina, see, e.g.,
WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO C!vIL WAR, THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY
IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836, at 53-61, 108-12 (1965); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 128-32 (1977).
Vesey, a free black, allegedly had planned an elaborate slave insurrection in Charleston, in
tending to slaughter slave owners and then escape to Haiti. The "plot" was foiled before the
uprising began1
442 See Act of Dec. 21, 1822, ch. 3, § 3, 1822-23 S.C. Acts & Resolutions 11, 12. The
Seamen Act was frequently amended, alternately tightening and loosening its provisions.
Similar laws were passed in other Southern states. For citations, see Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1874 nn.26061. I refer to these laws collectively as the "Negro Seamen Acts" or "Seamen Acts."
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tion. If the captain failed to do so, the free black mariners were to be
"taken as absolute slaves, and sold."443
It is hardly surprising that the measure was greeted with a storm of
protest. The Northern states, whose black mariners were hauled off
their ships and placed into Charleston jails, were vociferous in their
condemnation of the statute on constitutional grounds.444 In the dec
ade following its adoption, however, the sharpest controversy was not
with the North, but with the British, who claimed that the treatment
thus accorded their free black mariners violated the Commercial Con
vention of 1815.445 For Southern states' rights advocates, the issue was
thus drawn: since the Negro Seamen Act was, broadly speaking, a
regulation of slavery (or at least was, in their view, essential to pre
serving the slave system), it was ipso facto beyond congressional
authority; it must, therefore, be beyond the treaty power of the Presi
dent and Senate as well.
Given the delicate - or, rather, explosive - character of federal
state relations, no solution to this festering conflict was in the offing.
As a result, the matter was left in a state of uneasy, and portentous,
stalemate; relations with the British were seriously strained.446 Not
that the federal government was slow in asserting the supremacy of
443. See Negro Seamen Act § 3, 1822-23 S.C. Acts & Resolutions at 12. A captain fail
ing to carry the free blacks back to ship and pay their upkeep was also guilty of a criminal
offense. The best accounts of the Negro Seamen Act controversy are in FREEHLING, supra
note 441, at 108-16; WIECEK, supra note 441, at 132-40; Philip M. Hamer, British Consuls
and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860, 1 J. S. HIST. 138 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, British
Consuls]; and Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts,
1822-1848, 1 J. S. HIST. 3 (1935) [hereinafter Hamer, Negro Seamen Acts]. There is an ex
cellent Ph.D. dissertation on the subject. See Alan F. January, The First Nullification: The
Negro Seamen Acts Controversy in South Carolina, 1822-1860 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation (on file with author)).
444. The Northern states claimed that the Act violated the Constitution in two respects.
First, it interfered with Congress's power over commerce. Second, it violated the privileges
and immunities of their free black citizens. See, e.g., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FREE
COLORED SEAMEN - MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 27-80, at 2-7
(1843) (3d Sess.) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 27-80] (arguing the unconstitutionality of the
Seamen Act).

445. See Convention to Regulate Commerce, July 3, 1815, U.S.-Gr. Brit., in 2 TREATIES,
supra note 74, at 595. The first article provided:
There shall be between the Territories of the United States of America and all the Territo
ries of His Britannick Majesty in Europe a reciprocal liberty of Commerce. The Inhabitants
of the two Countries shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and car
goes to all such places Ports and Rivers in the Territories aforesaid to which other Foreign
ers are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of
the said Territories respectively, also to hire and occupy Houses and warehouses for the
purposes of their commerce, and generally the Merchants and Traders of each Nation re
spectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their Commerce but
subject always to the Laws and Statutes of the two countries respectively.

Id. at 595-96.
446. Hamer is particularly effective in bringing out the strains and consequences for
United States-British relations. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 443, passim; Hamer,
Negro Seamen Acts, supra note 443, passim.
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federal authority and the treaty. Despite intense diplomatic protests,
active federal efforts, and a highly publicized federal circuit court deci
sion condemning the statute, South Carolina doggedly persisted in its
policy, unflinchingly claiming justification in "the law of self
preservation." Later, it was joined by other Southern states which en
acted similar laws, and challenges were met by increasingly hysterical
rhetoric and secessionist threats.447 Flatly disregarding the mounting
protests, South Carolina thus successfully "nullified" federal authority
in this area even as it retreated in the face of threatened federal mili
tary intervention in the "Nullification" controversy over the federal
tariff.448 In the end, there proved no way to reach a definitive settle
ment of the conflict other than to await the outcome of the Civil War.
It is difficult to overestimate the impact of the Seamen Act contro
versy on the treaty power debate during the antebellum period and
beyond. If single incidents sometimes profoundly shape the character
of constitutional debates for decades to come, the Seamen Acts are an
exemplary case in point. The positions staked out in the initial battles
echoed in public debates throughout the pre-Civil War period, not
only over the Acts themselves but over a myriad of treaty power ques
tions. Though the constitutional issue remained sharply contested
throughout, the position staked out by states' rights activists ultimately
found its way into dicta in the opinions of some of the most states'
rights-oriented Justices of the Taney Court. Indeed, the ambiguous
figure of Roger Taney - with his strategy of appeasement and con
cession - assumed a pivotal position on the states' rights side, both in
his opinions as President Jackson's Attorney General and later as
Chief Justice. Of the relatively few authorities supporting the states'
rights view in American history, these dicta undoubtedly had the most
lasting impact, surviving the immediate crisis which provoked them
and necessitating a further effort after the end of the Civil War to re
turn to the status quo ex ante of the first generation. Although the
treaty power issue, of course, had wider significance than its implica
tions for the slavery debate, just below the surface of the states' rights

447. See, e.g., FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 113-15; WIECEK, supra note 441, at 132-40;
Hamer, Negro Seamen Acts, supra note 443, passim; January, supra note 443, at Ch. 4, 5, 6, 7.

448. See FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 115 (describing the close relationship between
the Negro Seamen Act controversy and Nullification); Donald G. Morgan, Justice William
Johnson on the Treaty-Making Power, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 200 (1953). According
to Freehling,
In 1823 South Carolinians relied on the reserved rights of the states to nullify a federal treaty
which they judged interfered with internal safety. In 1832 South Carolinians used the same
reserved rights to nullify a federal law which they judged unconstitutional. The Negro Sea
men Controversy, in short, served low country gentlemen as a powerful lesson on the neces
sity for adopting strict-construction principles if the federal government was to be prevented
from touching the slavery issue.
FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 115.
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arguments uniformly lay the Negro Seamen Acts and the unavoidable
and overriding question of slavery.
South Carolina's passage of the Negro Seamen Act prompted im
mediate diplomatic protests from the British government. Initially,
though, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams seemed to be success
ful in quelling the problem by convincing the South Carolinians to let
the statute sleep.449 Soon, however, leading members of the South
Carolina slaveholding gentry formed the South Carolina Association
for the express purpose of ensuring strict enforcement of the Black
Codes. The Association was to become a permanent fixture of South
Carolina society and an important source of radical pro-slavery, states'
rights activism throughout the antebellum period.450 One of its first
and most important projects was to reverse the lax enforcement of the
Seamen Act, and its first victim was Henry Elkison, a British seamen
from Jamaica who was seized when his ship docked in Charleston.451
This time, however, the British not only protested, but also sought a
writ of habeas corpus on Elkison's behalf in the federal circuit court in
Charleston. Fortuitously, Supreme Court Justice William Johnson, a
Jefferson appointee and South Carolina native, was riding circuit and
available to hear the case.452
It was immediately evident that the case would be hotly contested
and have wide significance. Instead of defending itself, the state per
mitted two lawyers for the South Carolina Association, Benjamin
Hunt and Isaac Holmes, to handle the matter.453 Elkison argued that
the statute was unconstitutional on two grounds: that it interfered
with Congress's exclusive right to regulate foreign commerce, and that
it was in violation of Article I of the 1815 Convention, which guaran
teed a reciprocal liberty of commerce to citizens of each nation.454 In
response, Hunt and Holmes, in an argument bristling with secessionist
undertones, sought to develop a states' rights jurisprudence capable of
shielding slavery from federal challenge.455 As they formulated it, the

449. See, e.g., Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) {No. 4,366);
H.R. REP. No. 27-80, supra note 444, at 10-11 (reprinting diplomatic notes between Secre
tary of State Adams and British Minister Canning); Hamer, Negro Seamen Acts, supra note
443, at 3-4.
450. See FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 113; WIECEK, supra note 441, at 133; January,
supra note 443, at 153-58.
451.

See FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 113; January, supra note 443, at 156-58.

452

See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 493-94.

453.

See id. at 494; January, supra note 443, at 159.

454.

See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 493-96; supra note 445.

455. For a description of the arguments of Hunt and Holmes, see, for example, Morgan,

supra note 448, at 191-92 & n.11, 202; January, supra note 443, at 159-61; see also Elkison, 8
Fed. Cas. at 494. Hunt's argument was published as a pamphlet and widely circulated. See
THE ARGUMENT OF BENJ. FANEUIL HUNT, IN THE CASE OF THE ARREST OF THE PERSON
CLAIMING TO BEA BRITISH SEAMAN, UNDER THE 3D SECTION OF THE STATE ACT OF DEC.
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question was not whether the federal commerce and treaty powers
logically extended to the regulation of seamen aboard foreign ships
trading in American ports. Rather, the starting point was the law of
nations and the inherent and inalienable right of a sovereign state to
protect its vital interests. South Carolina, they claimed, was at the
time of the federal compact a sovereign state and, as such, necessarily
retained a paramount right to enact laws to protect against the spread
of moral contagion among its slave population. The Negro Seamen
Act was simply a police regulation founded in the law of self
preservation and was therefore exclusively within the state's authority.
Only the state could judge its necessity.456 In any case, moreover, the
law did not violate the Convention of 1815, but if it did, "it would not
be obligatory upon the State, inasmuch as the treaty making power
can make no stipulation which shall impair the rights, which by the
constitution are reserved 'to the States respectively, or to the peo
ple.' "457 Rather, the treaty power "is but a mode for exercising those
powers, which are expressly delegated by the States, or which are nec
essary to the perfect exercise of those powers."458
Justice Johnson would have none of it. As far as he was con
cerned, the unconstitutionality of the Act was so clear that "it will not
bear argument."459 The Act "leads to a dissolution of the Union, and
implies a direct attack upon the sovereignty of the United States.''460
The arguments of Hunt and Holmes, moreover, would render the
Union, like the old Confederation, "a mere rope of sand," with federal
laws subject to a discretionary authority in the states as to how far they
would be observed.461 Justice Johnson was particularly shocked by
Holmes's concluding argument, in which he had declared "that, if a
dissolution of the Union must be the alternative, he was ready to meet
it."462 On the other hand, Justice Johnson was entirely in agreement
with Elkison's constitutional claims. Congress's power over foreign
commerce was by its nature necessarily exclusive, and the Act ac
cordingly unconstitutionally ventured beyond the area of state

1822, IN RELATION TO NEGROES, &C. BEFORE THE HON. JUDGE JOHNSON, CIRCUIT
JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR 6TH CIRCUIT {1823) [hereinafter ARGUMENT].

456.

See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 494; January, supra note 443, at 159-61.

457. Morgan, supra note 448, at 192 n.11 (quoting ARGUMENT, supra note 455 (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. X)).
458. Morgan, supra note 448, at 202 (quoting ARGUMENT, supra note 455, at 16).
459. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 494.
460.

Id.

461. Id. at 496. Is this not, he asked, "asserting the right in each state to throw off the
federal constitution at its will and pleasure? If it can be done as to any particular article it
may be done as to all." Id.
462

Id. at 494.
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authority into the realm assigned to Congress.463 "But," he then
added, "the case does not rest here." Because the Act violated the
commercial convention with the British, " [i]n order to sustain this law,
the state must also possess a power paramount to the treaty-making
power of the United States, expressly declared to be a part of the su
preme legislative power of the land."464 Thus invoking the nationalist
conception of the treaty power, he held that the Act was unconstitu
tional for this reason as well.465
Johnson's opinion, delivered to a packed courtroom, unleashed a
raging torrent of attack. Press coverage was national, but the fevered
pitch reached in South Carolina was unmatched anywhere else.466
Immediately, a barrage of letters began to appear in the South
Carolina newspapers harshly attacking both Justice Johnson and the
opinion.467 The most important - a series of thirteen essays - were
co-authored by Isaac Holmes and Robert Turnbull under the signa-

463. See id. at 495. The question of whether the commerce power is exclusive or con
current, of course, was one of the great constitutional issues of the day. If it was indeed ex
clusive, its exclusivity only heightened the importance of determining what fell within the
powers of Congress and what was reserved to the states.
464.

Id.

465. See id. To be sure, there was an ambiguity in Johnson's opinion. He never explic
itly stated that the treaty would be valid irrespective of whether the subject matter fell within
Congress's power over foreign commerce. In context, however, the treaty power argument
appears as an independent and separate grounds for the invalidity of South Carolina's law,
not dependent on the scope of Congress's commerce authority. Johnson's later writings
make this point undeniable. See infra notes 478-489 and accompanying text. For his role in
the Fairfax estate litigation, see supra notes 405-406 and accompanying text.
Ironically, after declaring the law invalid on the merits, Johnson went on to hold that he
had no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against state officials. See Elkison v.
Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496-97 C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). He did consider the possi
bility that he could enter another now archaic writ but expressed doubt on that score as well.
See id. at 497. Hence, much like Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), he was subject to attack for having issued a lengthy opinion on the merits in a case in
which he was ultimately forced to acknowledge he had no jurisdiction.

466. See Morgan, supra note 448, at 193; January, supra note 443, at 166-79. Niles' Reg
ister and the National Intelligencer both published Justice Johnson's opinion. See Important
Judicial Decision, National Intelligencer, Sept. 10, 1823; Judge Johnson on the S Carolina
Law, NILES' WEEKLY REGIS1ER, Sept. 6, 1823, at 12. Niles' declared that "his decision was
such as every one must have expected that it would be: to wit, that the law is unconstitu
tional," Free People ofColor, NILES' WEEKLY REGIS1ER, Aug. 23, 1823, at 392, and that its
unconstitutionality is "so clear . . . that it cannot be doubted for a moment by any impartial
mind," Judge Johnson on the S Carolina Law, supra. John Quincy Adams reported that at a
dinner in Boston, when the subject of Johnson's decision arose, Robert Hayne, the Senator
from South Carolina, "discovered so much excitement and temper that it became painful,
and necessary to change the topic." 6 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS 176 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1874-77) [hereinafter 6 MEMOIRS]; see also Letter from John Marshall to
Joseph Story (Sept. 26, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 387, at 338 (describing
the excitement generated by the opinion).
467. See Morgan, supra note 448, at 193-96; January, supra note 443, at 166-77. Three of
the four Charleston newspapers printed a constant stream of letters attacking the opinion.
There were more than a dozen letter writers. See January, supra note 443, at 176-77.
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ture Caroliniensis.468 Holmes had been one of the lawyers in the case;
Turnbull was a budding lawyer and polemicist who would shortly play
an incendiary role in inciting the Nullification movement. Both were
officers in the South Carolina Association.469 The purpose of their es
says was to undermine Johnson's credibility, develop a jurisprudence
suitable for the task of protecting slaverJ, and, contra Justice Johnson,
establish the constitutionality of the South Carolina law. Central to
their project was establishing the principle that treaties could not
touch on subjects that were beyond Congress's delegated authorities.
The Caroliniensis essays are a fascinating study in early antebellum
jurisprudence. Caroliniensis proved far more sophisticated in building
a theory of state sovereignty than in making more traditional
constitutional arguments about the scope of the treaty power. The
authors seemed to think that it was sufficient, in order to establish the
states' rights view, simply to point out that treaties are subject to the
Constitution and that thus, for example, a commercial treaty that gave
preference to the ports of one state over those of another in violation
of Article I, Section 9 would be unconstitutional.47° From this,
Caroliniensis then claimed:
These are cases in which treaties would be void, as infringing express ar
ticles or provisions in the constitution. But there might be stipulations in
treaties which would be void, as interfering with the numerous undefined
powers reserved to the states, such as a stipulation that a foreigner
should carry on his trade free from all state taxes, or that he should be
exempt from military or patrol duty, or that the estate of an intestate
should be distributed according to the laws of the nation to which he be
longed, and different from the law of the state in which he died . . . A
treaty then at last, as to its validity, is no more than an act of congress.
Its validity depends upon its constitutionality. It must not interfere . . .
with the powers . . . reserved to the states respectively. If it does, such a
.

468. See Morgan, supra note 448, at 193-94; January, supra note 443, at 167-68. The
Caroliniensis essays were printed in the Charleston Mercury. These letters with three addi
tional letters, under the signature "Philo-Caroliniensis," and a fourth by "A Southerner"
were published in pamphlet form. Even before they appeared, Johnson had arranged for the
publication of his opinion as a pamphlet.
469. Morgan, supra note 448, at 193-94; January, supra note 443, at 167. On Turnbull's
career as a leader in the Nullification crisis and as the firebrand author of the pamphlet that
sparked the movement, see FREEHLING, supra note 441, at 126-28 (noting that the "man
most responsible for creating the new militancy was Robert J. Turnbull, a lowcountry
planter and pamphleteer, whose series of essays, The Crisis, made him a hero of the nullifica
tion campaign").
470. See Caroliniensis No. 7, Charleston Mercury, Aug. 28, 1823. A treaty establishing a
defensive alliance would also be void because "it would give the President and Senate a
power to place the United States in a state of war, which power by the constitution is ex
pressly and exclusively vested in Congress." Id. Likewise, a treaty giving foreign subjects
after a period of residence all the immunities of citizens would be void because "Congress
alone can naturalize foreigners." Id.
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treaty . . . is ipso facto void, and the states are no more bound by it than
they can be bound by an act of the British Parliament.471
Caroliniensis then shifted to higher ground: The President and Sen
ate, in exercising the treaty power, are "to be regarded in no other
light, than as delegates from the several states, to negotiate with Great
Britain, a treaty of commerce, for their benefit . . . with an obligation
on the part of the states, to ratify any convention, to be made in virtue
of their powers."472 As with any other agent, however, the President
and Senate had no power to deprive their principal "of an essential
right."473 Indeed, since self-preservation is the first law of nature,

a State never can surrender a right, the exercise of which is indispensable
to its safety. It is a right inherent in every sovereign state; and it matters
not whether a State be in league or confederacy with others . . . . To
deny this right to South Carolina . . . is to take from her that first, that
unalienable attribute, which is the foundation of all sovereignty.474
Moreover, it was absurd to claim that South Carolina, when it agreed
to join the Union, could possibly have intended to relinquish "a point
of such magnitude . . . as the regulation of a black population found
within her limits."475

471. Id. Even more incomprehensible, in Caroliniensis's view, imagine a treaty which
obligated the state to allow the importation of slaves which it wished to exclude:
Are we to be told that the treaty is the supreme law of the land, and that the treaty making
power, being rightfully exercised, in permitting an unlimited liberty of commerce must be
paramount? The idea is preposterous, that the sovereign state of South Carolina
should
be precluded from [prohibiting such importation] again at any time when she shall conceive
that the further increase of a black population, ready so large, shall endanger her domestic
quiet.
. • •

Caroliniensis No. 8, Charleston Mercury, Aug. 29, 1823.
Caroliniensis recognized that his interpretation of the treaty power might sometimes
cause collision or even war with a foreign state. Too bad, he declared:
Let the General Government extricate itself from a dilemma occasioned by its own oversight
or folly in the best way it can, and let the State whose acknowledged right has been improp·
erly surrendered, and upon which its peace and existence depend, continue to exercise it, as
if nothing had happened. Let her in every such case adhere to the rights reserved to her by
the constitution of the United States. Let her cling to them as the Ark of her salvation.
Id.
472

Caroliniensis No. 9, Charleston Mercury, Sept. 3, 1823.

473.

Id.

474. Id. Here, Caroliniensis was developing a theory of state sovereignty that would
become a staple of Southern states' rights jurisprudence.
475. Caroliniensis No. 10, Charleston Mercury, Sept. 6, 1823. Treating all questions re
lating to slavery as necessarily exclusively within the realm of state authority was also a basic
premise of Southern antebellum jurisprudential thinking.

The other most important of Johnson's critics, Zeno, wrote six essays in the Charleston
Courier. These were slightly less acrid in tone but made essentially the same points, includ
ing on the treaty power. See Morgan, supra note 448, at 195, 207; January, supra note 443, at
173-74.
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An outraged Justice Johnson, unwilling to let the storm pass, in
stead threw himself into the heart of the tempest. With indefatigable
energy, he sought to take on the entire battery of his critics.476 The
most important of his essays, signed Philonimus, were the nine that re
sponded to Caroliniensis, in which, sensing the vulnerability of his an
tagonist's argument, he focused most heavily on the treaty power
question.477 His first move was to observe that the undoubtedly cor
rect premise that treaties are subject to the Constitution did not move
Caroliniensis "one inch . . . towards proving" that treaties may extend
no farther than the legislative powers of Congress. "Does he adduce,"
he asked, "an argument proper to sustain this doctrine?"478 Treaties,
Philonimus then observed, are different from laws. "The one is the act
of its own will, the other may be the act of another: may be imposed
on it by the bayonets of a victor.
. A treaty is an affair of negociation
and compromise, of mutual concession and sacrifice."479 Furthermore,
the text and structure of the Constitution rendered the matter entirely
clear:
.

.

The legislative power of Congress is expressly limited to a few prominent
objects. The Treaty-making power, in its nature admitted of no such
specific definition; for it was subject to contingencies which we could not
hope to control. The legislative power of the States was wholly retained,
with the exception of the few subjects which they gave up to the general
government. The Treaty-making power of the States was wholly relin
quished, and vested in the general government. It exists therefore in the
latter in the same extent that it existed in the former, restricted only, by
the limitations prescribed in, or incident to the provisions of the constitu
tion.480

476. See Morgan, supra note 448, at 195-96; January, supra note 443, at 176-77. Elras
perated, Johnson eventually gave up the effort to answer all of his critics.
477. On attributing the Philonimus essays to Johnson, see Morgan,
196-97 n.32. They were likewise published in the Mercury.
478.

Philonimus No. 6, Charleston Mercury, Sept. 11, 1823.

479.

Id.

supra

note 448, at

480. Id. His co=ents in these respects closely echoed both Hamilton's and Calhoun's
analyses. See supra notes 42, 49, 291-294 and accompanying text As to the applicable con
stitutional limits, he then observed:
There are powers which the United States Government cannot exercise at all; from which
they are precluded by express words; such is that which imposes uniformity in commercial
regulations; there are those which they cannot exercise because expressly delegated to the
States, such is that of officering their militia; there are powers which they cannot exercise be
cause restrained by conflicting stipulations such is that which guarantees the States a repub
lican form of government. And there are powers which the President and Senate in their
Treaty-making capacity cannot exercise because exclusively delegated to co-ordinate
branches of the government, such is that of declaring war.

Id.
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The reasons for this latitude of power, moreover, were obvious:
[W]hat have the States lost by the cession of this power? It never could
have been exercised free of foreign control, and the necessity of acting as
one people in their controversies with foreign powers was the great end
for which they united themselves together. Mutual concessions became
unavoidable. . . . What an absurdity would there not be in entailing on
ourselves interminable war, from a groundless or unreasonable fear of
jeopardizing the State rights! When the ship is in danger some ones
goods must go over board to save the rest. . . . What a folly to vest in the
President and Senate the Treaty-making power, yet bind them hand and
foot in the exercise of it!481
But Philonimus left the best for last. If the treaty power was limited to the subjects of congressional legislation, then
we have been strangely inattentive to our rights for half a century past.
For upon a cursory examination of treaties, I find no less than thirty-six
instances in which the rights of the States have been invaded. Thirty-six
instances, in which treaties have acted upon subjects within the acknowl
edged reservation of the States.482
He then proceeded to offer a partial, though extensive, survey of the
precedents, climaxing in Articles IV, V, and VI of the Treaty of Peace
and Article 9 of the Jay Treaty:
Who is ignorant that both the provisional and definitive articles of peace,
which terminated the revolutionary war, expressly stipulated [for the
payment of the debts, the recognition of certain interests in land, and for
the cessation of further confiscations and prosecutions?] And who is ig
norant that all these stipulations have been pleaded in bar and sustained
in all our courts? Yet, what are they but laws imposed upon the States
under the treaty making power? Imposed upon the exercise of power
over subjects unquestionably reserved? If more modern instances are
required, who has not heard of the case of Hunter and Fairfax? And of
the treaty stipulation on which it arose.483
Philonimus thus claimed to have established that the nationalist view
"is sanctioned by contemporaneous exposition, immemorial usage,

481. Id. Limits on the scope of the treaties, he then remarked, must be found in a dif
ferent manner. "Those limits are, as they ought to be, adapted to the exercise of diplomatic

functions." Id.
482

Philonimus No. 7, Charleston Mercury, Sep't 13, 1823.

483. Id. Philonimus also cited Article XI of the French Treaty of 1778, which pennitted
French subjects to own real property; a number of provisions in the French Consular Con
vention of 1788; Article 14 of the Jay Treaty, which was virtually identical to Article I of the
Commercial Convention of 1815, the provision in dispute; articles from the Prussian Treaties
of 1785 and 1799, concerning the rights of aliens to inherit real property and affording them
exemption from taxation; two provisions from the treaty with Spain of 1795 concerning the
same and giving Spanish subjects an unlimited right to sue in courts of the two nations; and,
finally, a provision on freedom of commerce in a treaty with Tunis of 1799. See id.
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and the unrepining acquiescence of the States from the earliest period
of our Union."484
The controversy over the Seamen Act had a profound impact on
Johnson.485 Only seven months after rendering his decision in Elkison,
and with the Seamen Act controversy clearly foremost in his mind,
Johnson penned his famous separate opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.486
Outdoing even Marshall, he argued that the commerce power was ex
clusive and thus that any regulations which foreign nations are "sub
jected to in the ports of the Union" belong to the federal govem
ment.487 Although there was no treaty issue, he also took the
opportunity subtly to let his views be known. Thus, he gratuitously
484. Id. As to Caroliniensis's argument that the President and Senate were merely
agents of the states and that treaties required the ratification of the states, he had nothing
but contempt. It was simply disguised "revolutionary" doctrine:
But suppose we meet him on his own ground and admit the necessity of this ratification; how
is it to be obtained? What the evidence of it? Is there any mode provided by the
Constitution to obtain it? Any legal evidence of its having been executed? I know of
none . . . . What time is to furnish the inference "of ratification?" How many States are to
concur? Is each one to set at nought all the rest by its refusal? Or at liberty to withdraw its
assent at any unlimited period? I will not offend against decorum. I will borrow the very
language of Caroliniensis: "it is monstrous, it is preposterous."

Id.
Marshall followed the controversy closely from Virginia, reading both Johnson's Elkison
opinion and the ensuing debates. See Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story, supra note
466, at 338-39. Although aware that the "subject is one of much feeling in the south," he
"could scarcely have supposed that [the opinion] would have excited so much irritation as it
seems to have produced." Id. at 338. "The decision has been considered as another act of
judicial usurpation; but the sentiment has been avowed that if this be the constitution, it is
better to break that instrument than submit to the principle. Reference has been made to
the Massacres of St Domingo . . . ." Id. For Marshall, the controversy was just another indi
cation that "the exaltees are about to roast the judicial department." Id. Johnson had "hung
himself on a democratic snag in a hedge composed entirely of thorny state rights in South
Carolina." Id. Marshall himself, moreover, had only recently faced a case involving a simi
lar Virginia statute "in which I might have considered its constitutionality had I chosen to do
so." Id. Less intrepid than Johnson - "as I am not fond of butting against a wall in sport"
- "I escaped on the construction of the act." Id.
The case to which Marshall referred, Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va.
1820), also involved free blacks employed upon a ship calling at a port in Vrrginia. Marshall
struggled hard to construe the pertinent federal and state forfeiture and penal laws narrowly
to avoid their application to these free black mariners. Although he thereby avoided any
delicate constitutional issues, he nevertheless tipped his hand by making frequent reference
to potentially conflicting treaty obligations and to Congress's paramount authority over
navigation. See id. at 245-46.
485. Johnson quickly sent off letters to Secretary of State Adams and to Jefferson, en
closing copies of his opinion. See 6 MEMOffiS, supra note 466, at 175; William Johnson to
Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 11, 1823, in Letters from Judge William Johnson to Thomas
Jefferson, S.C. HIST. MAG. 1 (1900); H.R. REP. 27-80, supra note 444, at 14-15 (reprinting
correspondence with Adams).
486. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
487. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 227-29. For discussion of the relationship between
the Seamen Act controversy and Gibbons, particularly Justice Johnson's opinion, see, for
example, DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILUAM JOHNSON, THE FmsT DISSENTER 20206 (1954); 1 WARREN, supra note 440, at 623-25; and WIECEK, supra note 441, at 135-36.
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observed that if a treaty were involved, the matter would require a dif
ferent analysis, because the treaty power was a separate grant of
authority not subsidiary to the commerce power: "I speak not here of
the treaty making power, for that is not exercised under the grant [i.e.,
the commerce power] now under consideration. I confine my observa
tion to laws properly so called."488 After analyzing the scope of
Congress's legislative authority, he then added: "The treaty making
power undoubtedly goes further."489
Rational discussion, however, was hardly the currency of the day in
South Carolina on any subject relating to slavery, and the state was ut
terly unwilling to defer to Johnson's opinion or to the vigorous efforts
of Secretary of State Adams to have the law repealed. Adams and
Monroe concurred in Johnson's view that the law was unconstitutional
and actively sought ways of solving the crisis in relations with the
British. Eventually, they decided to obtain a definitive resolution of
the issue in the Supreme Court. At Monroe's suggestion, moreover,
Adams submitted the case to Attorney General William Wirt for an
official opinion, with Wirt quickly concurring in Johnson's views.490
When the planned test case unexpectedly became moot, Monroe and
Adams settled upon a new strategy: Adams drafted a letter to Gover
nor Wilson of South Carolina, enclosing copies of the latest British
diplomatic protests and of Wirt's opinion and expressing the hope of
the President "that the inconvenience complained of will be remedied
by the legislature of the state of South Carolina itself. "491
488. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 228. In a veiled reference to the Seamen Act, he
noted that "[w]hatever regulations foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of
the Union, the general government would be held responsible for them; and all other regula
tions, but those which Congress had imposed, would be regarded by foreign nations as tres
passes and violations of national faith and comity." Id. at 228-29.
489.

Id. at 230.

490. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 441, at 136-37; 6 MEMOIRS, supra note 466, at 279,
295, 297, 307, 376; Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 8-10. For Attorney General
Wirt's opinion, see 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 659 (1824). Wirt concurred on both points. As to the
treaty power, he observed that by "the national constitution, the power of making treaties
with foreign nations is given to the general government; and the same constitution declares
that all the treaties so made shall constitute a part of the law of the land." Id. at 661. Wirt's
opinion is ambiguous in the same respect as Johnson's opinion in Elkison. See supra note
465. For the same reasons - especially given the high publicity battle over the opinion in
the newspapers - it seems safe to assume that his treaty power argument was meant to be
separate and independent from his commerce power argument. For Wirt's shifting positions
on the treaty power issue, compare supra note 421 (describing Wirt's views at various times).
491. Letter from John Quincy Adams to the Governor of South Carolina (July 6, 1824),

reprinted in 27 NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Dec. 25, 1824, at 263; January, supra note 443, at
210; see also WIECEK, supra note 441, at 137; Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at
10. Johnson gave Adams little grounds for optimism, writing to give him an update on leg
islative efforts to strengthen the Act and the practical difficulties of bringing a case to the
Supreme Court. See H.R. REP. No. 27-80, supra note 444, at 14 (reprinting letter from
Judge Johnson to Adams). He complained bitterly that:
although obliged to look on and see the Constitution of the United States trampled on by a
set of men who, I sincerely believe, are as much influenced by the pleasure of bringing its
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Unfortunately, the President soon got his answer, and with it, the
inauguration of a fateful transformation in the relationship between
the federal government and South Carolina that would ultimately lead
to war. In submitting the correspondence to the legislature, the Gov
ernor announced that
[t]he crisis seems to have arrived . . . . The president of the United
States, and his law adviser, so far from resisting the efforts of a foreign
ministry, appear to be disposed, by an argument drawn from the over
whelming powers of the general government, to make us the passive in
struments of a policy, at war, not only with our interests, but destructive
also of our national existence.492

He then concluded with a call to arms: if the federal government
would not listen to reason, "there would be more glory in forming a
rampart with our bodies on the confines of our territory, than to be
the victims of a successful rebellion, or the slaves of a great consoli
dated government."493
Release of Adams's correspondence created still another uproar in
South Carolina. After extensive debate on the constitutionality of the
Act, the state senate adopted a resolution which officially declared the
new states' rights jurisprudence:
That it is as much the duty of the state to guard against insubordination
or insurrection among our colored population, or to control and regulate

any cause which might excite or produce it, as to guard against any other
evil, political or physical, which might assail us. This duty is paramount
to all laws, all treaties, all constitutions. It arises from the supreme and
permanent law of nature, the law of self-preservation; and will never, by
this state, be renounced, compromised, controlled or participated with
any power whatever.494

functionaries into contempt, by exposing their impotence, as by any other consideration
whatever, I feel it my duty to call the attention of the President to the subject, as one which
may not be unworthy of an official remonstrance to the Executive of the State.

Id.
492. Message of Governor John L. Wilson of South Carolina, in STATE DOCUMENTS ON
FEDERAL RELATIONS 205 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1970) (hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS].
493. Id. at 206. For discussion of the reaction of the Governor and the state legislature,
see WIECEK, supra note 441, at 138; January, supra note 443, at 201, 209-16; and Hamer,
Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 11, 12.
494. Resolutions of the Senate of South Carolina, Dec. 1824, in STATE DOCUMENTS, su
pra note 492, at 206. The House adopted a somewhat milder resolution, see Resolutions of
House of Representatives of South Carolina, Dec. 1824, in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note
492, at 207. Because the two houses never agreed on a substitute, the resolution died, and
South Carolina simply failed to respond to Adams's letter. For discussion, see January, su
pra note 443, at 211-16, and WIECEK, supra note 441, at 138.
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Unsurprisingly, national reaction to South Carolina's defiance was
critical,495 but there the matter stood, with little immediate hope of
reconciliation.
The Seamen Act remained an irritation in relations with the
British and even spread to other Southern states, but it was not until
late 1830 that the next major controversy erupted. Andrew Jackson
was in the White House, and Edward Livingston, the youthful fire
brand of the Jay Treaty controversy, was now serving as Secretary of
State. Although still protesting loudly, the British had substantially
weakened their position by themselves throwing doubt upon whether
they believed that the Seamen Acts actually violated the 1815 Conven
tion. 496 Jackson turned to Attorney General John Berrien for a second
opinion.
Berrien, a Georgian, was a passionate supporter of the Seamen
Acts and was fully inculcated in the by-then well-established strict
constructionist school. Unsurprisingly, he explicitly rejected Wirt's
1824 opinion and the premises on which the previous two administra
tions had acted in the matter.497 According to Berrien, the Seamen

495. See January, supra note 443, at 216-18. Niles' Register printed the whole contro
versy, see 27 NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Dec. 18, 1824, at 242; NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER,
Dec. 25, 1824, at 261-64, 292-93, and took the occasion to affirm the nationalist view, see 27
NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER, Dec. 18, 1824, at 242. See also Letter from Robert Y. Hayne to
Charles C. Pinckney (Dec. 21, 1824), quoted in THEODORE D. JERVEY, ROBERT Y. HAYNE
AND HIS TIMES 181-82 (1909) (noting, as Senator from South Carolina, that the actions of
the legislature "are certainly not very acceptable here (Washington, D.C.]"). After assuming
the presidency, Adams was asked by a South Carolina Senator to make some conciliatory
remarks to calm the disquiet over the slavery question in the South. Still smarting from his
confrontation with the state, Adams replied that:
the Legislature of South Carolina itself had put it out of my power to say anything soothing
to the South on that subject - by persisting in a law which a Judge of the Supreme Court of
the United States, himself a native and inhabitant of South Carolina, had declared to be in
direct violation of the Constitution of the United States; which the Attorney General of the
United States had declared to infringe the rights of foreign nations, against which the British
Government had repeatedly remonstrated, and upon which we had promised them that the
cause of complaint should be removed - a proviso which the obstinate adherence of the
Government of South Carolina to their law had disenabled us from fulfilling. . . • In this state
of things, for me to say anything gratifying to the feelings of the South Carolinians on this
subject would be to abandon the ground taken by the Administration of Mr. Monroe, and
disable us from taking hereafter measures concerning the law, which we may be compelled
to take.

7 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS 57 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874-77).
496. See Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 12-15. The British Foreign Of
fice obtained a legal opinion that upheld the Act under the treaty on the ground that the ref
erence to "the laws and statutes of the two countries" in Article I exempted the Act from
attack. Id. at 13. This seriously embarrassed the British in pressing the question diplomati
cally, although they nevertheless persisted.

497. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 426
braced the Act:

(1831). In the course of his opinion, Berrien openly em
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Acts were perfectly consistent with the treaty and with the laws of the
United States.498 Even if they were not, however, it was not the state
laws that would have to bend but the treaties and laws of the United
States. Berrien hardly discussed the treaty issue, simply assuming, like
Caroliniensis, that if Congress's commerce powers did not extend to
the subject, that a treaty could not.499 He was more explicit about why
the Acts should not be condemned on Commerce Clause grounds.
Rejecting the Supreme Court's decisions in both Gibbons and
McCulloch v. Maryland,500 he substituted in place of Marshall's doc
trine the now-standard states' rights view worked out by Calhoun and
others: in the event a conflict arose between federal and state law
from the exercise of one of Congress's delegated powers and of the
state's police powers, federal law was only supreme if it was indispen
sable to the exercise of a delegated authority.501 Otherwise, it could
not be considered "necessary and proper" and, hence, was an uncon
stitutional invasion of state prerogatives.502
Livingston apparently disagreed, at least on the treaty question.
Berrien had rendered his opinion on March 25, 1831. In a complete
turnabout from his Jay Treaty days,503 and notwithstanding Berrien's
contrary opinion, Livingston, on June 13, explicitly endorsed the na
tionalist conception of the treaty power. Directing the American
Minister to Russia to negotiate yet another treaty granting subjects of
each nation the right to own real property in the territory of the other,
Livingston observed:

By the Federal Constitution the several States retained all the attributes
of sovereignty which were not granted to the general government. The

It would be . . . revolting to withhold from [the Southern States] the power of protecting
themselves as they may, against the introduction among their colored people of that moral
contagion, compared with which physical pestilence, in the utmost imaginable extent of its
horrors, would be light and trifling.

Id. at 437.
498. See id. at 441-442. As to the treaty, he too relied upon the language saving the laws
and statutes of the two countries. See id. at 439.
499. See id. at 436 (arguing that it makes no difference if "such regulations be made by
law or by treaties"). Professor Bradley, unsurprisingly, relies on Berrien's opinion as
authority for the states' rights view. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 416.
500. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 {1819).
501. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. at 435-36 (rejecting Gibbons explicitly and McCulloch implic
itly but unmistakably).
502. See id. at 435-46. For a particularly clear exposition of this approach in a famous
speech by Calhoun, see John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Bill to Prohibit Deputy-Postmaters,
in 2 WORKS OF CALHOUN, supra note 19, at 509-33.
503. See supra notes 253, 268-277, 309 and accompanying text Recall that Livingston
helped his brother Robert write the Cato essays and took a leading role in the House debate.
Note also the similarity between the provision which Livingston affirms in the quotation
above with Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, which likewise dealt with alien ownership of real
property.
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right of regulating successions in relation to the subject in question is not
among those conceded rights; consequently it was reserved to, and is still
vested in, the several States. But by the same Constitution it is provided
that treaties made under the authority of the general government shall
be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of a
State to the contrary notwithstanding.s04

Notwithstanding Berrien's opinion, Livingston continued to assure the
British that the federal government would seek the repeal of the of
fending statute.sos
When shortly thereafter Berrien resigned,
Livingston, in August, decided to obtain yet another opinion from
Berrien's successor, perhaps hoping for a more congenial result. The
new Attorney General was none other than Roger Taney.
In response, Taney did indeed write an elaborate opinion in which
he upheld the constitutionality of the Seamen Act, explicitly endorsing
the states' rights view of the treaty power.s06 Because the opinion was
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 738, at 177
and undertaking diplomatic duties in
Europe, Livingston continued to press for treaties affording aliens rights in regard to real
property - indeed, under the direction of President Jackson and his then Secretary of State
Louis McLane. See Ralston Hayden, The States' Rights Doctrine and the Treaty·Making
Power, 22 AM. HIST. REv. 566, 571-572 (1917).

504. 5 JOHN BASSEIT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
(1906). Even after resigning as Secretary of State

505. See Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 15.
506. See Letter from Roger Taney, Attorney-General, to Edward Livingston, Secretary
of State (May 28, 1832), in Carl B. Swisher Papers, MSS (Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Letter from Taney to Livingston]; see also Letter from Roger Taney, Attorney-General, to
Edward Livingston, Secretary of State (June 9, 1832), Dept. of State, Misc. Doc. (supple
menting the May 28, 1832 opinion).
I think this right is reserved to the states & cannot be abrogated by the U. States either by
legislation or by treaty. . . . The constitution it is true has declared that a Treaty shall be the
supreme Jaw. But in order to make it so the stipulations must be within the Treaty making
power. A Treaty would be void . . . if it came in conflict with rights reserved to the states.
Letter from Taney to Livingston, supra, at 4-5. Taney's version of the states' rights view may
differ in certain respects from its modern successor. Although Taney is difficult to pin down,
it is not entirely clear that, like contemporary states' rights proponents, he would strictly
limit the treaty power to those subjects falling within Congress's legislative authority. At
times, he seems instead to postulate the existence of a category of subjects - e.g., those re
lating to slavery - which are absolutely "reserved" to the states from any exercise of federal
power, whether it be under Congress's legislative authorities or the treaty power. This ap
proach is consistent with antebellum states' rights jurisprudential thinking, but it leaves open
the possibility that some exercises of the treaty power might be permissible notwithstanding
that they go beyond Congress's legislative authorities. See infra note 519 (discussing Taney's
opinion in Holmes v. Jennison, which may be consistent with this interpretation of his views).
See also supra note 36. Whether the treaty power could ever touch on a subject beyond
Congress's authority would depend upon how the category of subjects absolutely reserved to
the states was defined - a central difficulty with strict constructionist theory. At times,
Taney seems to suggest that the law of self-preservation may provide the key. See infra
notes 519-520 and accompanying text (discussing Taney's opinion in the Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. 283, 464 (1849) (Taney, CJ., dissenting), in which he relies on the law of self
preservation). I do not mean to offer any particular interpretation of Taney's views, only to
signal the complexities.
Livingston requested Taney's opinion in August 1831, but Taney delayed responding for
almost a year. Apparently, the delay was due in part to the Nat Turner uprising in Virginia,
which made the whole subject even more politically sensitive than before. Further diplo-
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never published - probably because Livingston, and perhaps Jackson,
disagreed - it fell into obscurity. It was only discovered by Taney's
biographer, Carl Swisher, in the early 1930s and, despite its consider
able historical significance, thereafter largely fell back into obscu
rity.507 In the opinion, Taney makes a variety of claims of historical
note. Among them are an argument prefiguring the view on the citi
zenship of free blacks that he would later adopt in Dred Scott and a
remarkable denigration of the precedential weight of Supreme Court
opinions, sounding strikingly like Lincoln's later justification for disre
garding Dred Scott.508 For present purposes, however, it is Taney's
discussion of the treaty power which is of the greatest significance.
That discussion has a bearing on the present discussion in three
crucial respects. First, although Taney explicitly adopted the states'
rights view, he believed that it was his "duty to apprise" Livingston
that the Supreme Court was "likely" to disagree:

While I express my own decided opinion that the power to guard them
selves on this point is reserved to the states and cannot therefore by con
tested by the Treaty making power, conferred on the General govern
ment, I am not insensible of the conflicting opinions entertained on the
true construction of the constitution of the U. States, upon questions
which arise on the relative powers of the states & of the Federal governmatic protests, however, necessitated a response. In the meantime, while holding the Sea
men Act question in abeyance, Taney did cleverly take the opportunity to hint at where he
stood on the issue in an earlier opinion upholding the right of a state to free a slave brought
into its port from abroad. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 475, 476 {1831) (noting that it is "unneces
sary now to inquire whether the United States could, by treaty, control the several States in
the exercise of this power. I think they could not").
507. This development is partially the fault of Swisher. Although Swisher clearly recog
nized the historic importance of the document, and described it in some detail in his 1935
biography of Taney, see CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 152 n.35 {1935), his cita
tion was mistaken. He indicated that the document was in the "Attorney-General MSS" at
the Library of Congress. Id. In response to my inquiries, a librarian at the Library of
Congress informed me that not only was there no such file at the Library, but no such file
existed in 1935 according to the old indexes. Ironically, after concerted effort, the librarian
was able to find a copy of the document in the Carl Brent Swisher Papers. Where the origi
nal is filed remains a mystery. The few citations to the document in historical works that I
have found repeat Swisher's error, and I presume, therefore, that they were relying on his
account rather than on the document itself.
508. See Letter from Taney to Livingston, supra note 506, at 6-9, 16-18. As to the latter,
Taney said:

I

am not prepared to admit that a construction given to the constitution by the Supreme
Court in deciding in any one or more cases fixes of itself irrevokably & permanently its con
struction in that particular & binds the states & the Legislative & executive branches of the
General government, forever afterwards to conform to it & adopt it in every other case as
the true reading of the instrument . . . I advert to [this issue] because it being my duty to state
what I suppose may possibly be the decision of the Supreme Court on the law of S. Carolina
it became necessary to explain why I do not advise the Executive to adopt in advance the
construction which I think may be given by the court.

Id. at 16-18. In other words, although it is likely that the Court would declare the Seamen
Act unconstitutional, the executive ought to persist in upholding the law at least until the
Court rules.
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ment. And I am aware that the Supreme Court of the U. States have
maintained doctrines on this subject to which I cannot yield my assent.
And differing as I do most respectfully from that high tribunal . . . I am
aware that the opinion I have expressed may not be sanctioned by that
Court. - Indeed judging from the past I think it highly probable that the
Court will declare the law of S. Carolina null & void if contrary to the
stipulations in the Treaty whenever the question comes before it.509
Thus, Taney himself, the single most important source of the states'
rights view, confirmed what should already be more than obvious: the
Supreme Court had already clearly endorsed the nationalist view. It
was the states' rights view, then, that required a revision of settled
constitutional doctrine.510
Second, Taney's rationale for adopting the states' rights view is
vintage antebellum strict constructionism and reveals clearly the un
derlying premises of his position.
For Taney, the question was
whether South Carolina had surrendered to the federal government
"the right to prohibit the introduction of free people of colour within
her limits."511 To answer that question, there was no need to inquire
into the text or structure of the Constitution or the history of its inter
pretation, no need to examine the nature of the treaty - or, for that
matter, the commerce - power or consider the historical background
of the Supremacy Clause in the experience of the Confederation. The
sacred premise of Southern jurisprudence would suffice:

In what article can the slave holding states who assisted in forming the
constitution - and who afterwards adopted it be supposed to have con
templated the relinquishment of this power? The words ought to be
clear & express or the implication necessary & unavoidable which should
lead us to such a conclusion. For we have every reason to believe that if
the proposition had been distinctly made to them, they would as soon
have surrendered their own lives as parted from a power absolutely nec
essary for their own safety. . . . It is impossible to imagine they could

509. Id. at 15-16.
510. For the record, I note that, strictly speaking, it is possible that the disagreement
with the Supreme Court which Taney had in mind was not over the nationalist versus the
states' rights views of the treaty power but only over the scope of Congress's legislative
authorities, e.g., the commerce power. Under this reading, Taney was (implicitly) claiming
that the Supreme Court would declare the treaty void not because the Court would affirm
the nationalist view but because it would likely hold that the subject of the treaty fell within
Congress's powers over foreign commerce. If this is what Taney had in mind, however, his
language was exceedingly indirect and misleading. The passage explicitly addresses the
scope of the treaty power and nowhere mentions the commerce power. Moreover, through
out the opinion Taney treats the treaty power as a separate power delegated to the federal
government. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (noting that for a treaty to be valid it "must be within the
Treaty making power"); id. at 10 (denying that the states intended to limit their power over
all persons of African decent "by the grant of the Treaty making power or any other general
power to the Federal government"); id. at 24 (same). In my view, therefore, the far more
persuasive reading is as stated in the text.
511. Id. at 5.
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have so intended. . . . The slave holding states could not have surren
dered this power, without bringing upon themselves inevitably the evils
of insurrection & rebellion among their slaves . . . . How can the states be
supposed to have intended to surrender or limit their right of Legislation
over this description of people by the general Terms in which they have
been granted the power to regulate commerce and to make Treaties?512

Now is not the time for an inquiry into constitutional methodology. It
should be obvious, however, that Taney's interpretive method is in
consistent not only with the great precedents of the Marshall Court
but also with long-settled modes of interpretation recognized today.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Taney's opinion demon
strates how his endorsement of the states' rights view, and his much
cited dicta as Chief Justice, arose directly and immediately out of the
crisis over the Negro Seamen Act and, thus, how the development of
the states' rights view during this period was intimately intertwined
with the whole question of slavery. As Carl Swisher put it, "Taney
was attempting to mold legal doctrines, quite as much as to follow
them." In the face of the Southern states' intense sensitivity on the
slavery question, Taney "selected and interpreted historical facts and
constitutional doctrines" to uphold their claims. "He was acting as a
realist, though he had to conceal his realism behind the verbiage of
law."513 Surely, the entanglement between Taney's views and the im
peratives of the sectional conflict over slavery says something impor
tant about the constitutional question and the status that ought to be
accorded dicta from this period.
The connection between the Seamen Act and Taney's states' rights
position are equally, though more subtly, evident in his (dissenting)
opinion in the Passenger Cases514
the opinion most often cited in fa
vor of the states' rights view.515
At issue was the right of
Massachusetts and New York, notwithstanding the commerce power,
to impose head taxes on passengers arriving from foreign ports. In the
immediate background, however, was the Seamen Act controversy. If
the federal government could deny states the power to impose head
taxes for purposes of protecting their citizens against vagrants and
paupers, could they not also deny them the power to arrest free black
mariners arriving in their ports? Sensitive to such an implication,
Taney framed the issue as
-

whether, under the Constitution of the United States, the federal gov
ernment has the power to compel the several States to receive, and suffer

512

Id. at 6-9.

513. SWISHER, supra note 507, at 157.
514. 48 U.S. 283, 464 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). The Court was sharply divided,
and numerous opinions were written.
515. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 414 & n.167.
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to remain in association with its citizens, every person or class of persons
whom it may be the policy or pleasure of the United States to admit. 516
For if it does not, "then any treaty or law of Congress invading this
right . . . would be an usurpation of power which this court could nei
ther recognize or enforce."517 Taney's answer was unequivocal: citing
the law of self-preservation,518 he declared that the power was neces
sarily reserved exclusively to the states.

If however, the treaty or act of Congress above referred to had at

tempted to compel the State to receive them . . . the question would not
be on any conflicting regulations of commerce, but upon one far more
important to the States, that is, the power of deciding who should or
should not be permitted to reside among its citizens. . . . I cannot, believe
that it was ever intended to vest in Congress, by the general words in re
lation to the regulation of commerce, this overwhelming power over the
States. For if the treaty stipulation before referred to can receive the
construction given to it in the argument, and has that commanding power
claimed for it over the States, then the emancipated slaves of the West
Indies have at this hour the absolute right to reside, hire houses, and traf
fic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State law to
the contrary; inevitably producing the most serious discontent, and ulti
mately leading to the most painful consequences.519

516. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 465.
517.

Id. at 466.

518.

See id. at 470.

519. Id. at 473-74; see also id. at 467 (referring implicitly to tile Seamen Act). The Sea
men Act controversy was hovering behind a number of earlier Taney Court decisions as
well. See, e.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 56869 (1840) (Taney, CJ.); New York v. Milo, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); see also WIECEK, supra note
441, at 136 (noting how slavery was in the background of many of the Taney Court's deci
sions); 1 WARREN, supra note 440, at 621-28 (same); In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216-217
(C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (Field, J.) (arguing tllat "we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that much of
what was formerly said upon the power of the state in tltis respect, grew out of the necessity
which tile soutllem states, in which tile institution of slavery existed, felt of excluding free
negroes from tlleir limits. . . . But at this day no such power would be asserted . . . [a]nd tile
most serious consequences affecting tile relations of tile nation witll other countries might,
and undoubtedly would, follow from any attempt at its exercise"). In Holmes, Taney ex
pressed a surprisingly expansive conception of tile treaty power - as "designed to include
all tllose subjects, which in tile ordinary intercourse of nations had usually been made sub
jects of negotiation and treaty." 39 U.S. at 569. He added coyly: "which are consistent with
tile nature of our institutions, and the distribution ofpower between the general and state gov
ernments." Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 614, 615, 618-20 (Baldwin, J.) (seeming im
plicitly to assert tile states' rights view). In tile License Cases, it was Justice Daniels, tile
Court's most ardent states' rights jurist, who gratuitously brought up the treaty power:
Every power delegated to the federal government must be expounded in coincidence with a
perfect right in the States to all tllat they have not delegated, in coincidence, too, with the
possession of every power and right necessary for their existence and preservation; for it is
impossible to believe that these ever were, in intention or in fact, ceded to the general gov
ernment. Laws of the United States, in order to be binding, must be within the legitimate
powers vested by the constitution. Treaties, to be valid, must be made within the scope of
the same powers; for there can be no "authority of the United States," save what is derived
mediately or intmediately, and regularly and legitimately, from the constitution. A treaty, no
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In the following years, the Seamen Act issue continued to simmer
and, on frequent occasion, to boil over. With time, the focus of con
troversy shifted to the dispute over the treatment of Northern mari
ners, although diplomatic controversy continued as well. The issue
was repeatedly debated in Congress, provoking heated rhetoric but no
forward movement.520 Typical were Senator Archer's inflammatory
remarks: citing the law of self-preservation, he declared that "[i]f you
had a hundred provisions in the constitution of the United States in
express terms prohibitory of such legislation," the Southern states
would not abide. "No matter what might be the provisions of the con
stitution. . . . [w]e will endeavor to avoid such a form of plague as vis-

more than an ordinary statute, can arbitrarily cede away any one right of a State or of any
citizen of a State.

46 U.S. at 613; see Bradley, supra note 2, at 420-21.
Professor Bradley relies heavily on an earlier decision, Mayor, Alderman and Inhabitants
U.S. 662, 736-37 (1836). See Bradley, supra note 2, at
419. The case does contain some sweeping, though ambiguous, dicta. Professor Bradley,
however, misinterprets it as addressed to the Missouri v. Holland issue. On the contrary, the
relevant portion of the complicated opinion in New Orleans deals with the so-called "equal
footing" doctrine, under which all states entering the Union are to be considered as on an
equal footing with the original thirteen members. The Court held that once Louisiana was
admitted as a state, the United States could no longer exercise legislative jurisdiction over
property located in the state - in that case in the city of New Orleans. In dicta, it noted that
a treaty purporting to expand the jurisdiction of the national government in this respect
would likewise be unconstitutional. See id. It would be unconstitutional, however, not be
cause of a reserved powers subject matter limitation on the treaty power but because the
equal footing doctrine constituted an affirmative prohibition. That this was the contempo
raneous understanding of the decision, moreover, is demonstrated by the failure of any of
the Justices in later cases to cite the decision in support of their dicta on the scope of the
treaty power. Professor Bradley, though not the first, is one of the few who have understood
it as affirming the reserved powers argument

of New Orleans v. United States, 35

Some have cited Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. 1, 7 (1856), as supporting the states' rights
view. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 419. The relevant dicta in Prevost, however, only denied
the power of a treaty to override vested property rights. Cf Frederickson v. Louisiana, 64
U.S. 445, 448 (1859) (disposing of a case involving a tax on the personal property of an alien
on the ground that the treaty did not apply, but noting that it was argued that the treaty
power "is incompetent to regulate testamentary dispositions or laws of inheritance of for
eigners, in reference to property within the States" and that the "question is one of great
magnitude").
520. For continued diplomatic wrangling, see, e.g., Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra
note 443, at 17-27. For congressional debates, see January, supra note 443, at 284-95. Per
haps the most significant event in Congress was the preparation in 1843 of an elaborate re
port by the House Committee on Commerce in response to memorials from Massachusetts
citizens complaining about the treatment of their free black mariners under the Acts. See
H.R. REP. No. 27-80, supra note 444. The majority declared the Acts unconstitutional as
infringing the privileges and immunities of free black citizens (thus raising the Dred Scott
issue), the commerce power, and numerous treaties of the United States. See id. at 3, 6. The
report reprinted much of the diplomatic correspondence with the British, Judge Johnson's
opinion in Elkison, and Attorney General Wirt's opinion. See id. at 7-36. Representative
Rayner of North Carolina dissented and reprinted Attorney General Berrien's opinion. See
id. at 37-58. On the treaty question, he said that he agreed "with most" of Berrien's views.
Id. at 48. Nothing came of the report but further stalemate.
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ited St. Domingo."521 Therefore, he urged, the Northern states should
let the subject pass.522
The resistance of the South, if anything, only stiffened as time
passed. In response to further British protests, Secretary of State
Buchanan told the British Minister that dissolution of the Union
would be the result of any effort to enforce federal authority. Later,
Webster, as Secretary of State, advised the British Minister that he
believed the law was unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court
would so hold if presented with the question. So did the United States
District Attorney in Charleston, but he also claimed that "[i]n the
present temper of the people here, the unconstitutionality of the law
would not stagger them at all. They would continue to enforce it, even
after the Supreme Court had declared it void."523
When
Massachusetts sent an agent to South Carolina to bring a court action
challenging the constitutionality of the law, he was chased out of the
state by a mob even before the legislature adopted a resolution
directing the Governor to expel him as a "seditious" person
"dangerous to their peace."524 Thereafter, the legislature adopted a
law imposing stiff criminal penalties on any person who, either on his
521. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 379-80 (1845).
522 See id. at 380; see also id. at 381 (remarks of Sen. Archer) (providing further expla
nation of his remarks). Ironically, Isaac Holmes, the lawyer for the South Carolina Associa
tion in Elkison, and John Quincy Adams were now both in the House, and John Berrien was
a Senator from Georgia. All of them were active participants in the debates, and calling
upon the knowledge they had obtained in their previous positions, they simply continued the
rancourous arguments of the past. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1842)
(colloquy between Reps. Adams and Holmes); CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66
(1843) (colloquy between Reps. Adams and Holmes); CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess.
378, 383 (1845) (remarks of Sen. Berrien); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849)
(remarks of Rep. Holmes); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1627 (1850) (remarks of Sen.
Berrien). When Adams requested that the House obtain from the President all papers rela
tive to the diplomatic controversy as well as Justice Johnson's opinion, Holmes fired back:
the gentlemen from Massachusetts was throwing a firebrand into the House which was to
cause a conflagration that might endanger the Republic and not only so, but he was calling
upon this Union to come in conflict with the States, to trample upon those rights which the
States deemed most essential, and which they would not yield even if the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Adams] should, like Samson, throw his giant strength round the pillars
of the Constitution, and crush the whole Republic.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 {1842).
523. Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 443, at 157 (quoting diplomatic note); see also
id. at 155, 157; Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 25. The British accordingly
abandoned the idea of appealing to the Supreme Court. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra
note 443, at 159.
524. See Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 22-23. For Massachusetts's com
plaints about this incident, which then became part of the mounting grievances of North
against South, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1625-26 (1850) (remarks of Sen.
Davis) (recounting the incident). After failing to find a South Carolina attorney willing to
bring a challenge, Massachusetts had sent a respected emissary, Samuel Hoar, to South
Carolina to make the necessary arrangements for a suit. It also sent an agent to Louisiana
for the same purpose. He too was chased out of town under threat of violence. See
WIECEK, supra note 441, at 140; Hamer, Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443, at 23.
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own or on behalf of a foreign power, should seek "to disturb,
counteract, or hinder the operation" of the Seamen Act. It also
suspended the writ of habeas corpus for any free black imprisoned
under the Seamen Act.525
Notwithstanding all the controversy, however, treaty practice more
generally during the pre-Civil War period continued to reflect the na
tionalist conception of the treaty power. Beginning with the second
Monroe administration, the treaty power experienced a second flow
ering, and many of the treaties concluded contained provisions
trenching upon areas widely viewed at the time as within the reserved
powers of the states.526 For the most part, these sailed through the
Senate, although toward the latter part of the period, the Senate,
sometimes with the administration's support, apparently got cold
feet.527 Just as sharp debates rankled in Congress over the Seamen

525. Hamer,
legislation).

Negro Seamen Act, supra note 443,

at 23-24 (quoting the South Carolina

526. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 62, at 134-42; NICHOLAS PENDLETON MITCHELL,
STATE INTERESTS IN AMERICAN TREATIES (1936) (providing a comprehensive analysis of
U.S. treaty practice and its relationship to the interests of the states); Davis, supra note 95, at
1224-26. Corwin nicely summarized the practice:
During this entire period, as earlier, treaties continued to assure for consuls their regular
immunities from local jurisdiction, their immunity, when not citizens of the United States,
from taxation except upon real estate and personal investments, their exemption from the
duty of rendering testimony in court in person, the inviolability of their archives from any
sort of judicial process whatsoever; further their right to assume jurisdiction over disputes
arising between masters and sailors of vessels of their respective countries when such dis
putes did not involve the peace of the port; again their right to apply to the local authorities
for assistance in securing the arrest and detention of deserters; and finally, frequently their
right to intervene in the case of death of citizens or subjects of their respective countries, to
make inventory of the property of the deceased and to take other steps looking to the safe
transmission thereof to the rightful heirs. Treaties of the same period also assured aliens
rights of sojourn, travel, residence, and trade, subject to the ordinary laws and on an equality
with citizens . . . guaranteed them freedom of religion and rights of burial, and covenanted
freedom of access to the courts of justice on an exact equality with citizens. They also as
sured aliens the most unqualified rights of acquiring, passing, willing, inheriting, and dispos
ing of personal property, on an equality with citizens, and in the case of their inheriting real
estate, where the local Jaws made alienage a bar to their succeeding, a reasonable term to
dispose of such real estate to whom they chose; and in four instances the earlier type of
treaty provision was recurred to and aliens were guaranteed the right of succession to real
estate as well as personal estate, on an equality with citizens. It was also a period when a
great number of extradition treaties were negotiated, covering progressively an ever wider
range of offenses. . . . The Treaty of 1837 with Greece made what was potentially at least a
most serous inroad upon he State quarantines, stipulating that any vessel arriving at a port of
the United States from Greece, which was provided with certain documents, should not be,
save in certain exceptional cases, subjected to other quarantine than such as might be neces
sary for the visit of the health officer of the port. Again, [a treaty with Peru of 1851 pro
vided]:
The said citizens (of the two contracting power respectively) shall not be liable to impris
onment without formal commitment under a warrant signed by a legal authority . . • and
they shall in all cases be brought before a magistrate, or other legal authority, for exami
nation, within twenty-four hours after arrest . . • •

CORWIN, supra note 62, at 134-36.
527. This history is rendered in Hayden, supra note 504, at 567-77, 580-82 (1917) . Both
President Fillmore and Secretary of State Marcy expressed the view that treaty provisions
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Acts, the Senate would occasionally refuse to approve or would mod
ify provisions permitting aliens to own or inherit real property in the
states. Most likely, friction in Congress over the Seamen Act brought
the whole problem to mind, and some Senators suddenly recognized
the implications of approving treaties of this kind.528 Far more often,
however, the Senate would simply approve similar or even identical
provisions and others which were equally vulnerable on states' rights
grounds.529 In areas less sensitive than slavery, the imperatives of for
eign policy consciously or unconsciously overcame any concerns about
interfering with state prerogatives.530

dealing with alien ownership of real property were within the reserved power of the states
and thus beyond the treaty power. See id. at 575 (describing Fillmore's view); id. at 577 (de
scribing Marcy's views). Neither Fillmore nor Marcy mentioned the several Supreme Court
decisions affirming the constitutionality of treaties with stipulations of this kind - nor the
large number of contrary precedents in past practice. It is noteworthy that later that year,
Marcy also asserted the radical Republican view during the Jay Treaty debate that the treaty
power does not extend to subjects within congressional competence and therefore, that,
notwithstanding the many earlier precedents including in the Jay Treaty, a treaty stipulation
concerning piracy would be unconstitutional. See 5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 736, at 169.
Moreover, Attorney General Cushing made a point of denying the validity of Marcy's con
stitutional claims. See infra notes 532-533 and accompanying text.
528. See Hayden, supra note 504, at 567-77, 580-82. Hayden describes the Senate's re
markably inconsistent practice with regard to stipulations permitting aliens to hold or inherit
real property in the states. See id. In his view, the Senate's rejection or modification of pro
visions of this kind on a few occasions demonstrates its acceptance of the states' rights view.
See id. at 569-71. He discounts the significance of its approval on far more occasions of
similar and sometimes even stronger provisions. See id. Hayden is no doubt correct that
states' rights feelings lay behind the Senate's actions in at least some of the cases he de
scribes. He is certainly wrong in implying, to the extent that he does, that the Senate was of
one mind on the question. On the contrary, the very practice he cites demonstrates the divi
sions on the question, and the frequent approval of such stipulations suggests the continuing
dominance in practice of the nationalist conception. Hayden also misses entirely the rela
tionship between the Seamen Act controversy and the Senate's action on these treaties. It is
more than likely that it was the sectional feeling generated by the continuing and acrid con
gressional debates - and a fleeting sense of urgency about retaining consistency - that ex
plain the Senate's actions in the few cases when it resisted stipulations of this kind. The
Court's decision in Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. 490, 493-94 {1850) (holding, what had long been
assumed, that the question of whether an alien could take real property by descent or devise
was within the exclusive power of the states), might conceivably have added some fuel to the
fire. Professor Bradley, of course, cites the few controversies over treaties on alien property
rights as evidence in support of the dominance of the states' rights view. See Bradley, supra
note 2, at 421.
529. See Hayden, supra note 504, at 567-69 (describing the forty-four treaties with
stipulations concerning alien land ownership entered into between 1778 and 1860). There
were several different types of treaties. Some gave aliens the same rights as citizens. Others
required them, in states prohibiting aliens from owning or inheriting real property, to sell the
property within a specified period of time, or a reasonable time, or within the time period
specified by local law. See id.
530. See supra note 526 and accompanying text. From time to time, strict construction
ists seized the opportunity to memorialize the states' rights view. Thus, in a 1845 report rec
ommending against the annexation of Texas, Senator Archer of Virginia argued:

the treaty-making power can never have capacity of exertion unless in the cases in which its
aid is invoked by some one of the expressed powers, to carry out the purpose, which, being
of exterior relation, the powers of domestic sphere of operation would be unable for that

March 2000]

Treaty-Making and the Nation

1235

Nor was Southern opinion on the issue monolithic. Perhaps most
significant, notwithstanding his pivotal role in developing the strict
constructionist jurisprudence and his undoubted sympathy for the
Seamen Act, Calhoun seems to have accepted the nationalist view of
the treaty power.531 Also significant, in 1857, Attorney General Caleb
Cushing of Massachusetts rendered an elaborate and well-reasoned
opinion affirming the nationalist view. According to Cushing:

The power, which the Constitution bestows on the President, with advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, is not only general in terms
and without any express limitation, but it is accompanied with absolute
prohibition of exercise of treaty-power by the States. That is, in the mat
ter of foreign negotiation, the States have conferred the whole of their
power, in other words, all the treaty-powers of sovereignty, on the
United States. Thus, in the present case, if the power of negotiation be
not in the United States, then it exists nowhere, and one great field of in
ternational relations, of negotiation, and of ordinary public and private
interest, is closed up, as well against the United States as each and every
one of the States. That is not a supposition to be accepted, unless it be
forced upon us by considerations of overpowering cogency. Nay, it in
volves political impossibility. For, if one of the proper functions of sov
ereignty be thus utterly lost to us, then the people of the United States
are but incompletely sovereign, - not sovereign, - nor in coequality of
right with other admitted sovereignties of Europe and America.532
reason to reach, without the aid of this power of exterior operation. The treaty-making
power, under this construction, can never by any other than subsidiary - is never a power
independent in its vocation, however, it is so in its name and structure.
S. REP. No. 79, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1845). Archer relied on Jefferson's letter to
Nicholas in connection with the Louisiana Purchase for authority. See id.; supra note 358
and accompanying text. Compare Senator Archer's impassioned - and nearly secessionist
- remarks that same year in connection with a debate over the Seamen Act, which are
quoted in the text above. See supra notes 521-522 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing Calhoun's view as ex
pressed in the Disquisition and in a famous speech in the House); see also 5 MOORE, supra
note 504, § 735, at 164 (quoting Calhoun, then Secretary of State, asserting that "[t]he treaty
making power has, indeed, been regarded to be so comprehensive as to embrace, with few
exceptions, all questions that can possible arise between us and other nations, and which can
only be adjusted by their mutual consent, whether the subject-matter be comprised among
the delegated or the reserved powers"); Hayden, supra note 504, at 574 (quoting Callioun, in
connection with a treaty stipulation permitting aliens to acquire and dispose of real property
to which the Senate had refused its consent, as asserting that the "President would have had
no hesitation in ratifying the Convention as it stood"). It is indeed striking that Callioun
continued to affirm this view even in the midst of the Seamen Act controversy. Indeed, it is
so surprising that I cannot refrain from expressing a doubt as to whether he might have ex
pressed a contrary view at some other point. Hugh S. Legare was another South Carolinian
Secretary of State who likely endorsed the nationalist view. See January, supra note 443, at
214-15 (discussing Legare's unpublished speech during an 1824 debate in the South Carolina
legislature over the constitutionality of the Seamen Act, entitled Elkison's Case, but leaving
ambiguous exactly what constitutional grounds Legare endorsed).
532. 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 411 (1858). Secretary of State Marcy had asked Cushing for yet
another opinion on the constitutionality of stipulations permitting aliens to inllerit real prop
erty. In support of his opinion, Cushing also cited, inter alia, early practice under the
Confederation, Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, the French Convention of 1800 ("as the most ex-
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Cushing's opinion is particularly noteworthy, not only for the persua
siveness of argument, but because later, when the states' rights dog
mas of the antebellum period were being discarded, it would be widely
cited, among others, by the Supreme Court.533
Finally, the conclusion of the Seamen Act story provides a cau
tionary tale about the direction in which the states' rights view of the
treaty power inevitably leads. The British finally grew frustrated with
the federal government's acknowledged impotence in the face of the
Act and turned instead to negotiating with the Southern states di
rectly.534 When it became known that the British Consul in Charleston
had delivered formal diplomatic notes to the Governor of South
Carolina, just as the state teetered on the verge of secession, an imme
diate nationwide furor was unleashed.535 But what were the British

pressive of all precedents, it having passed through the hands, and received the approbation,
of John Adams, John Marshall, Oliver Ellsworth, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison,"
id. at 414), Calhoun, and the Supreme Court's decisions in Ware v. Hylton and Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee (which was "the direct constitutional question in its fullest condi
tions"). See id. at 415.
533. See infra notes 559, 564 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that sup
port for the states' rights view was strictly limited to the Southern states. The states' rights
dogmas of the day had wider influence, as did the dicta on this question in the opinions of
Justice Taney and others. The conflicting views on the question were well expressed by a
series of California Supreme Court decisions in the period immediately following the state's
admission to the Union, when its loyalty to North or South was as yet undecided. In People
v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232, 246-48 (1850), the Court, citing Taney's dicta in the Passenger Cases
and Daniel's dicta in the License Cases, added dicta of its own endorsing the states' rights
view. Five years later, in People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 382-85 (1855), involving alien property
ownership, the Court reversed direction and, in a reasonably able opinion, affirmed the na
tionalist conception. See also id. at 385-87 (Bryan, J., concurring). The next year, in
Siemssen v. Bofer, 6 Cal. 250, 252-53 (1856), also in an alien property case, it again reaf
firmed the states' rights view. Chief Justice Murray was concerned that otherwise by
a treaty with England, her free black citizens may be introduced into South Carolina and
other slave States of the Union. . . . Nay, more; by a treaty of amity and friendship with the
Emperor Soulouque, of Hayti, every slave in the Southern States may be emancipated, and
turned loose upon their present masters.
at 253. Perhaps revealing a concern closer to his own heart - and prophetic of future
controversies - he also worried that the "Asiatic, and the convicts of the penal colonies of
the South Pacific, may be introduced into California." Id. This decision, too, was not to last.
A short time later, the Court once again reversed direction, overruling Siemssen. See Forbes
v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 242, 283 (1859) (reviving Gerke). For an elaborate opinion affirming a
broadly nationalist view of the treaty power, see Comet v. Winton's, 10 Tenn. 143, 150, 16166 (1826) (Haywood, J., concurring).

Id.

534. See Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 443 (describing the extended efforts of
British diplomats to obtain repeal or modification of the Negro Seamen Acts in the various
Southern states, after the long-repeated failures of the federal government to redress British
claims).
535. See id. at 146-53. In his first note, the British Consul, on behalf of "Her Brittanie
Majesty's Government," addressed "His Excellency, The Governor and Commander-in
Chief of South Carolina," and concluded by expressing the hope for a strengthening of "the
existing bond of commerce, of friendship, and of mutual good faith [with] a kindred nation."
Id. at 146. Although intended as a confidential exchange of notes, a journalist from the
North obtained copies of the correspondence, and the New York Evening Post published it.
See The British Consul and South Carolina, Evening Post, Jan. 24, 1851. Commentary out-
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supposed to do? As the British Foreign Secretary had warned pro
phetically in response to an earlier profession of impotence in the face
of state resistance:

With the particulars of the internal compact which may exist between
the several States which compose the Union, Foreign Powers have
nothing to do: the relations of Foreign Powers are with the aggregate
Union: . . . of that Union the Federal Govt. is to them the only organ.
Therefore, when a Foreign Power has redress to demand for a wrong
done it by any State of the Union, it is to the Federal Government, and
not to the separate State, that such Powers must look for redress for that
wrong; and such Foreign Power cannot admit the Plea that the Separate
State is an Independent Body over which the Federal Government has
no control.
It is obvious that such a Doctrine, if admitted, would at once go to a
dissolution of the Union, as far as its relations with Foreign Powers are
concerned; and Foreign Powers in such case, instead of accrediting Dip
lomatic Agents to the Federal Government, would send such Agents not
to that Government but to the Government of each Separate State; and
would make their relations of Peace and War with each State depend
upon the result of their separate intercourse with each other, without
reference to the Relations which they might have with the rest.536
South Carolina was no doubt flattered by the British show of respect.
But this was just a delusion. Its resistance to British demands was pos
sible only under the protective wings of the federal government - the
very reason why the treaty power was exclusively entrusted to the na
tional government. As the New York Commercial Advertiser tren
chantly observed, South Carolina "must feel a little awkward, too,
when she reflects that the power to which she looked for commercial
relations when she secedes, is the very first to deny her state-rights,
and demand the abrogation of laws designed to protect her 'peculiar
institution.' "537
side of South Carolina, even in the South, was uniformly hostile, and commentators quickly
connected the incident with South Carolina's threats to secede. See Hamer, British Consuls,
supra note 443, at 150-51 (quoting from the Evening Post, the Morning Courier and New
York Enquirer, the New York Commercial Advertiser, the New Orleans Daily Picayune, the
Richmond Whig, and a paper in Savannah). It presented yet another occasion for the en
dorsement of the nationalist view of the treaty power in the press. See, e.g., Great Britain
and South Carolina, Evening Post, Jan. 24, 1851; A New Phase of an Old Subject, Commer
cial Advertiser, Jan. 25, 1851.

536. Hamer, British Consuls, supra note 443, at 140 n.7 (quoting British Public Record
Office, Foreign Office Papers, Ser. 5, Vol. 358).
537. Governor Means and Consul Mathew Again, Commercial Advertiser, Jan. 27, 1851.
The Richmond Whig was even stronger:

This brings to our mind the sheltered position of [South Carolina], and all the States, so long
as

the present Union continues . . . . [W]ith what party would the war be waged? Not with
Carolina alone, with her overwhelming negro population; but with the great and powerful
Government of the Union. If an English fleet were dispatched to bombard Charleston, or an
English army to invade her cotton fields, the Navy and the Anny of the Union would be sent
for her defense . • • . So important is that Union which she is prepared to overthrow, to the
welfare of S. Carolina! . . . If [Carolina] were now in the position of independence in which
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The Nationalist View Reemerges as the Dominant Position in the
Aftermath ofthe Civil War

It should come as no surprise that the nationalist view, in the af
termath of the Civil War, would again gain quick recognition as the
dominant construction of the treaty power. The states· rights view had
been intimately linked to the slavery question and had found its doc
trinal underpinnings in the states' rights jurisprudence flowing out of
the great sectional struggle between North and South. Inevitably, the
landmark precedents of the Marshall Court would be revived and,
with them, the decisions beginning with Ware v. Hylton and Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, both of which had resolved the treaty ques
tion in favor of the nationalist view. Perhaps even more irresistible
was the consistent stream of practice going back to the Confederation
which demonstrated both that the nationalist view had always pre
vailed in practice and that practical imperatives required that the
treaty-making power not be restrained by rigid limitations.
Both the political branches and the Court were quick to reaffirm
the old precedents. As a result, few sensitive interpreters of the
Court's precedents doubted that the Court would sooner or later
authoritatively resolve the conflict between the Marshall and Taney
Courts' precedents in favor of the nationalist view. Still, the issue re
mained open, and, as has always been the case, there were some who
persisted in maintaining the states' rights view. Sometimes, its adher
ents even obtained high executive office, adding to the confusion.
Notwithstanding occasional - and sometimes embarrassing - incon
sistencies, the executive branch repeatedly made clear that when a
treaty was important to the national interests of the United States, the
executive would not feel bound by any states' rights subject matter
limitations on the scope of the treaty power.
The most important conflicts were over race - through the me
dium of treaties protecting the rights of aliens. It was the West Coast's
unbridled hostility toward Chinese and Japanese residents that pro
voked controversy. Indeed, the critical confrontation - forming the
immediate backdrop for Missouri
was over school desegregation.
A half century before Brown v. Board of Education, the federal gov
ernment received a preview of the reaction which would attend fed
eral intervention - this time pursuant to a treaty - in a state's racial
policies for local schools. Only by bearing in mind the controversy
-

her statesmen desire to place her, what think you, reader, would be the tone and language of
England now? A respectful request to repeal the obnoxious law? . . . Why, if South Carolina
were at this moment free from her federal relations, England would seize upon the Govern

ment, and as she has done in her West Indian colonies, emancipate the blacks, and raise them
above their masters.

Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, Feb. 7, 1851, reprinting From the Richmond Whig.
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over San Francisco's creation of separate but equal schools for "orien
tal" residents can one fully understand Missouri.
The course of the debate over the treaty power question, of course,
was not wholly divorced from other developments in constitutional
law and politics. No doubt the continuing controversy reflected in
part the wider struggles over the relationship between the federal and
state governments during Reconstruction and Post-Reconstruction.
The expanding consensus on the nationalist view in the first part of the
Twentieth Century, moreover, was inevitably connected to the per
ceived imperatives of foreign policy as the United states emerged as a
world power in the wake of the Spanish-American War. Nevertheless,
the issue had a life and integrity of its own, and the same structural
imperatives that had been present from the beginning - and reflected
in a century and a half of actual experience - continued to underwrite
the nationalist view.

a. The Practices of the Executive Branch and the Senate Largely
Conformed to the Nationalist View. It took only a short time for the
nationalist view to receive full confirmation in the executive branch
and the Senate. In 1870, Baden - a Germanic mini-state - proposed
a treaty regulating inheritances of real estate and marriages. This
proposition immediately brought to mind the antebellum Senate's in
creasing resistance to treaties affording aliens rights in real property as
well as the states' rights dicta of some of the Taney Court Justices.538
The reaction of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish is instructive: noting
the "doubts which had been raised 'by extreme constructionists
touching the constitutional power of this government to conclude such
a treaty, doubts in which I do not share,' " he decided in advance of
undertaking further negotiations to obtain the opinion of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.539 In response, the Chairman of the
Committee, Charles Sumner, informed the Secretary that he had been
directed "to say that the Committee after consideration unite with you
in opinion on the propriety of such treaties and recommend their ne
gotiation. "540
Subsequent executive branch statements continued strongly to
confirm this view. Most importantly, in 1898, Attorney General John
538. See supra notes 527-529 and accompanying text (describing the Senate's resistance
in the 1840s and 1850s to stipulations allowing aliens to hold real property); supra notes 516519 and accompanying text (describing dicta in Taney Court opinions supporting the states'
rights view).
539. 5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 738, at 178 (quoting Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr.
Bancroft, Min. to Prussia, No. 193, April 22, 1870, MS. Dep't St. Inst. Prussia, XV. 121); see
also Davis, supra note 95, at 1239 (noting that the State Department referred the matter to
the Foreign Relations Committee "[i]n deference to the doubts suggested from the bench").
540. Letter from Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rel. Co=., to
Hamilton Fish, Sec. of State (Apr. 21, 1870), MS. Dep't St. Misc. Letters; see also 5 MOORE,
supra note 504, § 738, at 178 (describing Sumner's letter).
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Griggs explicitly affirmed the nationalist view in an opinion upholding
the power of the federal government to make a treaty with Great
Britain regulating fisheries in the waters of the United States and
Canada along the international boundary.541 Similar treaties had been
concluded in 1854 and 1871, and thus he argued, fisheries were "rec
ognized as a proper subject for international agreement."542 It was
true that the "regulation of fisheries in navigable waters within the ter
ritorial limits of the several States, in the absence of a Federal treaty,
is a subject of State rather than of Federal jurisdiction."543 However,
the "several States are by the Constitution forbidden to enter into any
such treaty or regulation with any foreign power, and unless the
United States may regulate the subject by treaty it is impossible of
regulation by uniform and reciprocal rules."544 Thus, the Attorney
General advised "that the regulation of the fisheries in these boundary
water is a proper subject of the treaty-making power."545 Subse
quently, as we shall see, in 1906-07, Secretary of State Elihu Root
forcefully expressed the same view in an even more controversial con
text.546
This understanding of the scope of the treaty was put into practice
in a wide range of cases. In light of past controversies, perhaps the
most emblematic were treaties giving aliens unqualified rights to hold
and inherit real property in the states. These were now generally
treated as unproblematic.547 There were, however, many others: con
sular conventions, conventions limiting searches and seizures of aliens
and protecting their religious and burial rights, fisheries conventions,
migratory bird conventions, trademark conventions, sanitary conven
tions, conventions for the suppression of opium and other drugs, and
conventions prohibiting trade in white women for purposes of prosti
tution. All of these raised states' rights dilemmas but were neverthe
less concluded.548 As Nicholas Pendleton Mitchell observed:

541.

See 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 214 (1898).

542

Id. at 216.

543. Id. at 215. Congress's authority extended only to navigation and did not include
the power "to pass laws to regulate or protect fisheries within the territorial jurisdiction of
the States." Id. at 216.
544. Id. at 216-17.
545.

Id.

546.

See infra notes 584-590 and accompanying text.

547. For discussion of these treaty provisions, see, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 62, at 20811, and MITCHELL, supra note 526, at 84-86, 163-65 (1936) (including appendix setting forth
a list of all treaties containing the relevant stipulations). For an expression of doubt about
their constitutionality, see infra note 552.
548. See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 205-16; MITCHELL, supra note 526, at 81-88, 97-115,
120-26 (describing various conventions). Although they all raised states' rights questions, I
do not mean to deny that in some cases they did fall within the scope of Congress's legisla
tive powers, just that this point was in dispute at the time they were concluded. As late as
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If it is possible, as it is, by treaty, to throw open the courts of the states to
aliens, to exempt foreign consuls from the application of state laws, to set
up an international body to decide what use shall be made of boundary
waters which constitute the territorial waters of a state, to regulate the
manner and method of taking fish in the same waters, to overrule state
laws relating to the collection of private debts, to set up restrictions on
intrastate trade in livestock, and to establish limitations regarding the
killing of game within a state, then it seems equally possible, so far as the
Constitution is concerned, to negotiate treaties invading any of the other
fields of state power, so long as the point at issue is one of proved na
tional interest and a proper subject for international discussions.549
Notwithstanding these precedents, on a number of occasions, ex
ecutive branch officials did express the states' rights view.550 In part,
these statements must have reflected genuine doubts held by some
about the question. Almost uniformly, however, the statements were
made to foreign governments in explanation of why the United States
1944, the courts rested on treaties for the source of authority for congressional legislation
prohibiting the cultivating of opium poppies. See Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F. Supp.
810, 812-13 (N.D. Cal. 1944). For later cases, see Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in
Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. Cf. REV. 77, 117 n.212 (collecting citations).
549. MITCHELL, supra note 526, at 152. In fairness, some of the treaties that Mitchell
mentions were made shortly after Missouri. Even in those cases, however, similar treaties
were made before the decision.
550. For discussion, see, for example, HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL STATE 184-88 (1931) (discussing various cases); Kurt H. Nadelmann,

Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of
Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 325-26, 330-31, 334 (1954) (same in relation to private
international conventions); 5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 738, at 178-79. The treaties that
typically prompted expressions of the states' rights view dealt with the rights of consuls to
administer estates, private international law, and labor rights. The states' rights objections
were often mingled with reservations about whether a matter was really a proper subject for
international negotiation and agreement. In some cases, particularly in regard to private
international law conventions, these concerns persisted even after Missouri. See Nadelmann,
supra, at 335-43, 357-62. The hesitance of the United States to enter into private
international law conventions, for example, became the subject of major controversy as it
became increasingly clear that rigid states' rights limitations seriously jeopardized important
U.S. national interests. As the so-called Wigmore Committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws put in it in 1921, "[w]e here start with two assertions:
First, a most important process of the next twenty-five years in the world's affairs will be a
vast activity in world-legislation; Secondly, into this activity the United States of America
will enter as a self-inflicted cripple... HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTER-STATE COMPACTS 297, 321 (1921). The committee made the radical
suggestion that the only solution was to allow the states to make compacts with foreign
states on private law subjects, and it even developed an elaborate program of action along
these lines. See id. at 326-56. However, given the traditional reluctance to permit the states
any role in conducting diplomatic negotiations, nothing came of it. Their report is
nevertheless a powerful reminder of the difficulties into which the states' rights view
inevitably leads. Some years later, the still-continuing diffidence of the United States
prompted a famous debate on the scope of the treaty power at a meeting of the American
Society of International Law. See 1929 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 176-96; infra notes 670,
727-728 and accompanying text (discussing the views expressed by Charles Evans Hughes).
Eventually, of course, these concerns were dropped, and the United States became party to
private international law conventions. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 471-72.
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was unwilling to conclude treaties that our friends and allies were
pressing upon us. The conventions were generally ones which the ex
ecutive viewed as unfavorable to our interests and which, given the
sensitivity of the Senate to the interests of the states, could not in any
case be approved.ssi These self-denying - and self-interested statements were thus highly suspect as genuine expressions of the ex
ecutive's constitutional views. All the more so, then, because they
were irreconcilable with past practice and the positions which the ex
ecutive branch had taken on other occasions - as astute foreign dip
lomats were to point out on several occasions.ssz
551. See, e.g., STOKE, supra note 550, at 185 (discussing, for example, a note to the
Italian minister explaining why the United States would not enter into a treaty "giving the
right of gratuitous defense in civil and criminal proceedings to Italian citizens in America as
it was accorded to aliens in Italy"); Nadelmann, supra note 550, at 325-26, 330-31, 334 {dis
cussing notes and statements at diplomatic conferences explaining why the United States
would not join conventions on private international Jaw). Private international law treaties
provide a good example: the United States, like the British, long resisted joining because the
conventions were based upon civil rather than common law premises. See id. at 326. Even
without claiming constitutional incapacity, the United States regularly invoked federalism
concerns as a basis for declining to participate in various conferences and conventions on
these kinds of treaties. See, e.g., id. at 325-43; 5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 735, at 164-65
{discussing U.S. refusal to negotiate a treaty with the British to prevent the imposition of
discriminatory taxes on foreign fire insurance companies because such an effort would
"probably be futile on account of the indisposition of the people to permit any encroach
ment upon the exercise of powers of the local legislation"). The Senate actively policed the
executive branch to ensure that state interests would be fully respected. See MITCHELL, su
pra note 526, at 155; STOKE, supra note 550, at 190-98.
552. Thus, for example, despite the Supreme Court decisions to the contrary, as late as
1886, Secretary of State Bayard dissented from the view that the treaty power extended to
stipulations affording aliens the right to hold real property in the states: "A treaty is, it is
true, the supreme law of the land, but it is nevertheless only a law imposed by the Federal
government, and subject to all the limitations of other laws imposed by the same authority."
5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 738, at 178-79. Nevertheless, a year later, he negotiated a treaty
with Peru which contained precisely such a provision. See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 210-11
{describing Article 11 of the Treaty of 1887 with Peru). Even Secretary of State Fish, whose
strong affirmation of the nationalist view in 1870 was quoted in the text above, see supra
notes 538-540 and accompanying text, could not restrain himself from invoking states' rights
when it suited his immediate diplomatic purposes. Thus, even though he reaffirmed the
nationalist view in 1874, see 5 MOORE, supra note 504, § 738, at 178 (noting that estates are
administered in accordance with state law "in the absence of any treaty regulations on the
subject"), in 1876, in a note never published in the United States, he deflected Peru's request
for U.S. participation in a conference on private international law, inter alia, by asserting
that "the several states have reserved powers which it is not competent for this government
to trench upon either by Act of Congress or by Treaty with a foreign power." Nadelmann,
supra note 550, at 326 {quoting NATIONAL ARClllVES, RECORD GROUP 59: GENERAL
RECORDS OF TIIB DEPARTMENT OF STATE {Communications to Foreign Sovereigns and
States, vol. 4, 1865-77). Fish thus set the pattern for how U.S. diplomats would handle the
growing movement in Latin America and on the Continent for treaties harmonizing private
law. See Nadelmann, supra note 550, at 326-43. For challenges to the U.S. claims of
constitutional incapacity by skeptical foreign diplomats, see, for example, id. at 330
{discussing an Argentine diplomat's cogent challenge, observing that the states' rights view
would place the "country under a capitis deminutio, with a constitutional capacity to treat
inferior to that of all other countries of the world") and id. at 336-37 {describing a Cuban
diplomat's argument that "an investigation of the treaties entered into by the United States
showed a number of these subjects dealt with in such treaties signed by the Executive and
ratified by the Senate").
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b. The Supreme Court's Early Reaffirmation of the Marshall Court
Decisions. Like the executive branch, the Supreme Court too was
quick to signal its support for the nationalist view. In 1870, Congress
had passed its first effort at regulating trademarks. In 1879, in the
Trade-mark Cases,553 the Court struck down the Act. The law could
not be justified, the Court found, as a measure "to promote the Prog
ress of Science and useful Arts";554 nor was it limited to the use of
marks in interstate or foreign commerce. Even if it were, moreover,
the Court expressed skepticism about whether trademarks in principle
fell under the power to regulate commerce.555 Notably, there was no
treaty question presented in the case. The federal government had,
however, concluded a treaty with Belgium in 1868 containing a stipula
tion according subjects of each nation mutual trademark protection,
and similar treaties had followed.556 Without prompting, the Court
was quick to dispel any implication that its ruling undermined the con
stitutional validity of the treaties: "In what we have here said we wish
to be understood as leaving untouched the whole question of the
treaty-making power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to
pass any laws necessary to carry treaties into effect. "557
It seems likely that the Court already had Hauenstein v. Lynham558
in mind in offering these qualifying remarks. A short time after ren
dering the Trade-mark Cases, it issued its decision in Hauenstein,
thereby practically resolving the issue in favor of the nationalist view.
Once again it was a treaty provision according aliens rights in real
property that was at issue. Citing Ware v. Hylton, Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, Chirac v. Chirac, the other Marshall Court cases
553. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
554. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
555.

See Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-99.

556.

See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 205-06.

557. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99. Even before the Trade-mark Cases, the Court in
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, etc., 93 U.S. 188, 197-98 (1876), had af
firmed a broad conception of the scope of the treaty power and the validity of treaties ac
cording aliens the right to inherit real property:
[The treaty power] is, beyond doubt, ample to cover all the usual subjects of diplomacy. One
of them relates to the disability of the citizens or subjects of either contracting nation to take,
by descent or devise, real property situate in the territory of the other. If a treaty to which
the United States is a party removed such disability, and secured to them the right so to take
and hold such property, as if they were natives of this country, it might contravene the stat
utes of a State; but, in that event, the courts would disregard them, and give to the alien the
full protection conferred by its provisions. If this result can be thus obtained, surely the
Federal government may, in the exercise of its acknowledged power to treat with Indians,
make the provision in question, coming, as it fairly does, within the clause relating to the
regulation of commerce.

Id. In other words, if the treaty power extends to subjects falling into areas of exclusive state
legislative competence, like descents of real property, then it surely extends to subjects fal
ling within the scope of congressional authority.
558. 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
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arising in this line, the California Supreme Court's decision in People
v. Gerke, Calhoun, and Attorney General Cushing's 1857 opinion,559
the Court upheld the treaty as within the scope of the treaty power:

By the British treaty of 1794, "all impediment of alienage was absolutely
levelled with the ground despite the laws of the States. It is the direct
constitutional question in its fullest conditions. Yet the Supreme Court
held that the stipulation was within the constitutional powers of the Un
ion." Mr. Calhoun, after laying down certain exceptions and qualifica
tions which do not affect this case, says: "Within these limits all ques
tions which may arise between us and other powers, be the subject
matter what it may, fall within the treaty-making power and may be ad
justed by it."560
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, "[i]f the national government has
not the power to do what is done by such treaties, it cannot be done at
all, for the States are expressly forbidden to 'enter into any treaty, alli
ance, or confederation. ' "561
Hauenstein thus affirmed all of the essential grounds for the na
tionalist view. The only question is why, forty years before Missouri, it
was not understood as an authoritative post-Civil War reaffirmation of
the Marshall Court precedents. The answer is that it surely would
have been so understood were it not for a caveat the Court added at
the end of its opinion. Noting that counsel had not argued that the
treaty was beyond the scope of the treaty power, the Court decided to
"forbear to pursue the topic further.''

We have no doubt that this treaty is within the treaty-making power con
ferred by the Constitution. . . . There are doubtless limitations of this
power as there are of all others arising under [the Constitution]; but this
is not the proper occasion to consider the subject. It is not the habit of
this court, in dealing with constitutional questions, to go beyond the lim
its of what is required by the exigencies of the case in hand.562
With the door thus barely left open, the Court thereafter repeat
edly hinted that it endorsed the nationalist view, but never squarely
decided the issue. The most important case was the 1889 decision in
Geofroy v. Riggs, yet another case involving a treaty affording aliens
rights in real property.563 Justice Field famously attempted a compre
hensive definition of the scope of the treaty power. With citations to

559.

See Hauenstein, 100 U.S. at 488-90.

560. 100 U.S. at 489-90.
561. 100 U.S. at 490 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
562 Id. Notwithstanding the Court's explicit reasoning, Professor Bradley reads
Hauenstein as being limited to the proposition "evident from the constitutional text" that
"treaties are supreme over state law," Bradley, supra note 2, at 418, and as establishing that
" '(t]here are doubtless limitations of this power,' " id. at 419 n.161 (quoting Hauenstein, 100
U.S. at 490).
563. 133 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1889).
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Ware, Chirac, Hauenstein, People v. Gerke, and Attorney General
Cushing's 1857 opinion, he once again reaffirmed the broad scope of
the treaty power:
That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects
of negotiation between our government and the governments of other
nations, is clear. It is also clear that [the rights of the subjects of one na
tion to own and devise real property in the territory of the other] are fit
ting subjects for such negotiation . . . . The treaty power, as expressed in
the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government it
self and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession

of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent [citation
omitted]. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.564

Some years later, in Keller v. United States,565 the Court struck down a
congressional statute which made it a federal crime to harbor an alien
in a house of prostitution within three years after the alien's entrance
into the country.
The Court held that the subject was beyond
Congress's legislative authority and hence within the powers reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment. In the course of its opinion,
however, it noted:
The question is, therefore, whether there is any authority conferred upon
Congress by which this particular portion of the statute can be sustained.
By § 2 of Art. II of the Constitution, power is given to the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, but

564. Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 266-67. Field was drawing in part from Calhoun and some of
the other early authorities discussed previously. See supra notes 26, 28, 39, 41-42, 131-134,
291-292, 424-431, 435, 480-481, 557, 560 and accompanying text; infra notes 624, 720-721,
724-739, 747-748 and accompanying text. Despite the breadth of his language, states' rights
advocates have sometimes attempted to find support in his reference to restraints "arising
from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States" See, e.g., Bradley, supra
note 2, at 419 n.167. In light of Field's approving citations to authorities upholding the na
tionalist view and of the passage as a whole, however, it should be clear enough that this
amounts to wishful thinking rather than an effort to give a faithful interpretation to his re
marks. It is noteworthy that Field's claim that the territory of a state cannot be ceded with
out the consent of a state masks a longstanding controversy over the question, beginning
with the efforts under the Confederation to cede navigation of the Mississippi. For a discus
sion, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 16, at 193, 465-66, and supra notes 26, 159-166,
196-207, 210-211, 216, 431, 435 and accompanying text. In Jn re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891),
Justice Field, again writing for the Court, said: "The treaty-making power vested in our gov
ernment extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments." Id. at 463.
565. 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
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there is no suggestion in the record or in the briefs of a treaty with the
King of Hungary under which this legislation can be supported.566

In light of these decisions, the opinion in Missouri could hardly
have come as a surprise to anyone carefully following the precedents.
These previous decisions also provide at least part of the explanation
for why Justice Holmes was able to gamer seven votes while provok
ing no written dissent.
c.
The First Great Controversy: Anti-Chinese Legislation in the
West Coast. As we have seen, the Treaty of Peace and the Jay Treaty

were the focal points for controversy in the first generation, and the
Negro Seamen Acts were the same for the antebellum period. For the
post-Civil War period, it was the virulent racism against Asian immi
grants on the West Coast that gave rise to a national controversy over
the scope of the treaty power. The first wave came during the 1870s
and 1880s when California and Oregon adopted discriminatory laws
designed to drive Chinese immigrants out of the country. The obsta
cle was the so-called Burlingame Treaty of 1868 with China.567 Under
this treaty, Chinese subjects had the right of permanent residence in
the United States. Article 6 provided that "Chinese subjects visiting
or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same privileges, im
munities, and exemptions, in respect to travel or residence, as may

566. Keller, 213 U.S. at 147. Even before Keller, the Court in Wildenhus's Case, 120
U.S. 1 (1886), which involved a treaty granting consular jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed in the United States, had no trouble affirming the extent of the treaty power:
The treaty is part of the supreme law of the United States, and has the same force and effect
in New Jersey that it is entitled to elsewhere. If it gives the consul of Belgium exclusive ju
risdiction over the offense which it is alleged has been committed within the territory of New
Jersey, we see no reason why he may not enforce his rights under the treaty . . . .

Id.

at 17; see also Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514-16 (1896) (assuming, without de
ciding, that even in the absence of congressional power over wild game on lands owned by
the federal government in a state, the treaty power could reach the subject); id. at 516, 519
(Brown, J., dissenting) (same); New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 562
(1916) (implicitly raising the treaty power as a possible source of power where the subject at
issue was beyond Congress's legislative authorities). For discussion of Becker, see Lofgren,
supra note 548, at 89 & n.70.
There were some cases from which states' rights proponents could draw, if not comfort,
at least some consolation. On a couple of occasions, the Court construed treaties narrowly
so as to avoid overriding state law on matters generally regulated by the states. See, e.g.,
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329-34 (1912) (narrowly construing treaty providing for
right of consul to intervene in probate proceedings, but "assuming • . . that it is within the
power of the National Government to provide by treaty for the administration of property of
foreigners dying within the jurisdiction of the States, and to commit such administration to
the consular officers of the Nations to which the deceased owed allegiance"); Compagnie
Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393-95
(1902) (narrowly construing treaty with Greece concerning quarantines of ships).

567. See 6 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at
680 (1971).
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there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored na
tion."568
Given the agitated state of public feeling, California and Oregon
were not impressed. California tried a number of expedients for nulli
fying the treaty, including attempts to exclude Chinese immigrants
from entering the state under the pretext that they were "lewd or
abandoned women. "569 It also included, inter alia, a constitutional
provision making it a criminal offense for any corporation organized
under California law to employ any Chinese resident in any capacity
whatsoever, an ordinance requiring jailors to cut the hair of all prison
ers to a uniform length and thus to clip the traditional Chinese
"queue" notwithstanding its religious significance, and an ordinance
making it impossible as a practical matter for the Chinese to operate
laundries.
Oregon followed suit, adopting a law prohibiting the
Chinese from working on any public works project.
All of these laws and ordinances quickly came before the lower
federal courts. In each instance, the challenge was based on the treaty,
and in each instance, despite the fact that the laws and ordinances
dealt with matters of a peculiarly local character, the lower courts
steadfastly struck them down as in conflict with the treaty. In the first
case, In re Ah Fong, Justice Field, on circuit, nullified California's ef
fort to exclude "lewd" Chinese women.570 Justice Field, himself a
strong supporter of states' rights, struggled with Chief Justice Taney's
dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases: "[W]e cannot shut our eyes
to the fact that much which was formerly said upon the power of the
state in this respect, grew out of the necessity which the southern
states, in which the institution of slavery existed, felt of excluding free
negroes from their limits."571 On a combination of dormant commerce
power and treaty grounds, he struck down the California statute.572
By 1880, with Taney's approach to the commerce power relegated
to history's dustbin,573 and with Hauenstein on the books, the courts

568. Id. at 683. The treaty was later modified to permit the exclusion of Chinese labor
ers in some cases. See In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 217 n.3 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874). Ultimately,
Congress decided to defy the treaty altogether and prohibit the immigration of Chinese la
borers. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States {The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
{1889). The Court upheld the congressional action. See id. For discussion of the political
context and the court decisions, see CORWIN, supra note 62, at 174-82.
569.

In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 215 (quoting § 2952 of the California Political Code).

570.

See id.

571. Id. at 216. He included an appendix in which he considered the Passenger Cases at
greater length. See id. at 218-20.
572. See id. at 216-18. Justice Field also ruled that the statute violated the Equal Protec
tion Oause. See id. at 218.
573. In Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 {1875), the Supreme Court struck down on
dormant co=erce clause grounds the same provision of California law which Field had
struck down in In re Ah Fong.
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were more secure in their doctrine. In In re Tiburcio Parrott,514 the
two judges assigned to the case each undertook elaborate analyses of
the treaty issue. In re Tiburcio Parrott involved California's prohibi
tion on the employment of Chinese residents by California corpora
tions. Judge Hoffman declared that "even if the reserved power of the
state over corporations were as extensive as is claimed, its exercise in
the manner attempted in this case would be invalid, because in conflict
with the treaty."575 He then continued:
Would it be believed possible, if the fact did not so sternly confront us,
that such legislation as this could be directed against a race whose right
freely to emigrate to this country, and reside here with all "the privileges,

immunities, and exemptions of the most favored nation," has been rec
ognized and guaranteed by a solemn treaty of the United States, which

not only engages the honor of the national government, but is by the very
terms of the constitution the supreme law of the land? . . . The declara
tion that "the Chinese must go, peaceably or forcibly," is an insolent con
tempt of national obligations and an audacious defiance of national
authority . . . no matter whether it assumes the guise of an exercise of the
police power, or of the power to regulate corporations, or of any other
power reserved by the state.576

Judge Sawyer was even more emphatic. Quoting extensively from
Ware v. Hylton and Hauenstein,571 he reasoned:
Among all civilized nations, in modem times at least, the treaty-making
power has been accustomed to determine the terms and conditions upon

which the subjects of the parties to the treaty shall reside in the respec
tive countries, and the treaty-making power is conferred by the constitu
tion in unlimited terms . . . If the treaty-making power is authorized to
.

determine what foreigners shall be permitted to come into and reside
within the country, and who shall be excluded, it must have the power
generally to determine and prescribe upon what terms and conditions

such as are admitted shall be permitted to remain. If it has authority to
stipulate that aliens residing in a state may acquire and hold property . . .
against the provisions of the laws of the state, otherwise valid - and so
the authorities already cited hold - then it certainly must be competent
for the treaty-making power to stipulate that aliens residing in a state in

574. 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
575.

In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. at 494.

576. Id. at 495-96, 499. Judge Hoffman noted that the California law "is in open and
seemingly contemptuous violation of the provisions of the treaty . . . . It is in fact but one,
and the latest, of a series of enactments designed to accomplish the same end." Id. at 497.
577. See id. at 499, 501-03 (Sawyer, J., concurring). He also cited the prohibition on
state treaties, the various Marshall Court decisions in the Chirac v. Chirac line, People v.
Gerke, and Calhoun. See id. at 503.
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pursuance of the treaty may labor in order that they may live and acquire
property that may be so held . . . .578
Equally emphatic was Judge Deady's opinion in Baker v.
Portland.579 Striking down Oregon's law prohibiting the employment
of Chinese people on public works projects, a subject which could
hardly trench more deeply on state prerogatives, he reasoned:

This treaty, until it is abrogated or modified by the political department
of the government, is the supreme law of the land . . . . [S]o far as this
court and the case before it is concerned, the treaty furnishes the law,
and with that treaty no state or municipal corporation thereof can inter
fere. Admit the wedge of state interference ever so little, and there is
nothing to prevent its being driven home and destroying the treaty and
overriding the treaty-making power altogether.580

d. San Francisco's Separate but Equal Schools for Japanese Resi
dent Schoolchildren Collide with the Treaty Power. Anti-Chinese leg
islation was only the prelude to yet another and, for present purposes,
even more consequential treaty power controversy. In the early 1900s,
anti-Japanese sentiment had been steadily rising in California. In
October 1906, the San Francisco School Board responded to the pres
sure by exercising its Plessy-condoned right to establish "separate but
equal" schools for "Oriental" schoolchildren, including the children of
Japanese residents.581 The reaction was explosive. The Japanese gov
ernment immediately complained that the action violated the guaran
tees of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894,582 and, in a
deeply offended Japan, bitter denunciations were widespread. Harsh
words in turn provoked rumors of impending war, and hostile feelings
578. Id. at 507-08; see also In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (striking down
licensing ordinance for Chinese laundries); Ho Ah Kow v . Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1879) (striking down the so-called "Queue" ordinance).
579. 2 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D. Or. 1879).
580. Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 473-74. In one federal court decision from (not surprisingly)
South Carolina - entirely unrelated to the Chinese issue - the court conclusorily affirmed
the states' rights view in dicta. See Cantini v. Tillman, 54 F. 969, 976 (C.C.D. S.C. 1893).
After finding the relied-upon treaty inapplicable, the district judge added that the exercise of
the reserved police powers of the states "cannot be affected by any treaty stipulations." Id.
581. The most complete treatment of the controversy is THOMAS A. BAILEY,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CRISIS 28-192 (1934). For other
discussions, see, for example, CORWIN, supra note 62, at 216-33; DEVLIN, supra note 62, §§
145-61, at 142-90; and TUCKER, supra note 62, at 380-419. The School Board resolution is
quoted in BAILEY, supra, at 29.
582

See 9 BEVANS, supra note 567, at 387. Article I provided that the

citizens or subjects of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to en
ter, travel, or reside in any part of the territories of the other Contracting Party. . . . In what
ever relates to rights of residence and travel . ..the citizens or subjects of each contracting
party shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same privileges, liberties, and rights ...
[as] native citizens or subjects, or citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

Id. at 387-88. For the Japanese diplomatic protest, claiming violation of Article I, see
BAILEY, supra note 581, at 63-64 (quoting from diplomatic note dated October 25, 1906).
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on both sides threatened to harden positions and sour relations. Al
though the rumors were exaggerated, the incident was undoubtedly
one of the earliest links in the chain of events leading to Pearl
Harbor.583
The Roosevelt administration struggled mightily to preserve good
relations with the Japanese, which Roosevelt had spent years foster
ing.584 Accepting the Japanese interpretation of the treaty, the admini
stration made intensive efforts to convince the San Franciscans to re
peal the resolution and readmit the schoolchildren to the white
schools.585 When those efforts failed, it instituted litigation in federal
court seeking a judicial ruling affirming the Japanese construction of
the treaty and ordering San Francisco to comply.586 From the outset, it
was clear that the controversy raised the treaty power question in a
particularly stark form: did the treaty power extend so far that a
treaty could override local educational policy - indeed, override a lo
cal decision to segregate primary education on the basis of race?
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Root left no one in doubt about their

583.

See BAILEY, supra note 581, at 46-84.

584. Roosevelt had been careful to protect Japanese interests when he had intervened in
the Russo-Japanese War, and was an ardent admirer of Japanese culture. See id. at 89-92.
He was deeply troubled by the Board's action and in general by the racial hostility being di
rected at Japanese residents in California. See id. at 80-83 (quoting, inter alia, Roosevelt's
letter to his son: "I am being horribly bothered about the Japanese business. The infernal
fools in California, and especially in San Francisco, insult the Japanese recklessly and in the
event of war it will be the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences."). Fearing
that a military conflict in the Far East could not be ruled out, he began making preparations
for fortifying the navy. See id. at 81-82, 119-20. His vigorous efforts to rescind the School
Board resolution and to protect Japanese residents did win him the confidence of the
Japanese and smooth over the difficulties. See id. at 85-96.
585. From the outset, the administration made clear that it would support the Japanese
interpretation of the treaty, see id. at 59-60, and it maintained that position throughout. The
administration was less sure that the courts would uphold the Japanese view. The treaty
language was far from clear. Secretary of State Elihu Root was convinced that the rights of
residence protected by the treaty included the right to attend public school, but less certain
that provision of a separate (if equal) school violated the treaty. In his view, though, it cer
tainly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty. See id. at 189-90. Other members of
the administration were more pessimistic on the treaty interpretation questions. See id. at
189. Among other efforts, Roosevelt sent his Secretary of Commerce Victor Metcalf to San
Francisco to conduct a full investigation of the dispute. See id. at 60-61, 85-89, 114-17. His
report was printed as a Senate Document. See S. Doc. No. 147, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907).
Metcalf quickly determined that it was hopeless to reason with the San Francisco authorities.
See BAILEY, supra note 581, at 88-89.
586. See BAILEY, supra note 581, at 123; Elihu Root, The Real Questions Under tlte
Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 273, 276
(1907). A state court action was also brought by the parent of one of the Japanese children
affected by the Board's resolution. See DEVLIN, supra note 62, § 159, at 189. Devlin was the
United States Attorney in San Francisco responsible, under the direct supervision of the At
torney General, for conducting the federal suit against the School Board. See BAILEY, supra
note 581, at 126-27.
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views.587 Indeed, Roosevelt threatened to uphold the treaty forcibly if
necessary.588
Fortunately from the diplomatic point of view, the Court never
answered the question. In an extraordinary political move, Roosevelt
and Root invited the entire School Board along with the Mayor to
Washington for consultations about the impact of San Francisco's
action on relations with Japan - and, most important from San
Francisco's perspective, on Roosevelt's ability to obtain an agreement
from Japan to limit the emigration of Japanese laborers to California.
In the end, the San Francisco authorities backed down and rescinded
their resolution, obviating the need for a judicial showdown.589 The
resolution, however, did not arrive soon enough to avoid another
heated national debate over the treaty power.
Secretary Root himself took the lead in defending the nationalist
view. Shortly after the crisis passed, he delivered a much-noted
speech before the American Society of International Law in which he
laid out the argument for the nationalist position:
It has been widely asserted or assumed that this treaty provision and its
enforcement involved some question of state's rights. There was and is
no question of state's rights involved, unless it be the question which was
settled by the adoption of the constitution. . . . Legislative power is dis
tributed: upon some subjects the national legislature has authority; upon
other subjects the state legislature has authority. Judicial power is dis
tributed: in some cases the federal courts have jurisdiction, in other cases
the state courts have jurisdiction. Executive power is distributed: in
some fields the national executive is to act; in other fields the state execu
tive is to act. The treaty-making power is not distributed; it is all vested
in the national government; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the
states. In international affairs there are no states; there is but one na
tion . . . 590
.

587. For Root's public statement of the executive position, see Root, supra note 586, at
277-83.
588. See BAILEY, supra note 581, at 89-90, 100-01, 140. Roosevelt made the threat
highly public by including it in a message to Congress that harshly attacked the San
Francisco authorities. See id. at 89-90. Under pressure, he retreated somewhat, saying that
he would not use troops to return the Japanese schoolchildren to the public schools, only to
protect their safety. See id. at 101. The damage, however, had already been done. Senator
Rayner, a leading critic of Roosevelt's handling of the crisis, ridiculed this threat on the floor
of the Senate: "[I]t is quite a serious matter . . . for the President to contemplate the bom
barding of the city at this time, and to declare war against the boards of county school trus
tees of California." 41 CONG. REC. 281 (1906) (remarks of Sen. Rayner).
589.

See BAILEY, supra note 581, at 127-49, 168-86.

590. Root, supra note 586, at 273-86. Root was also President of the American Society
of International Law. In the course of his address, he discussed many of the precedents
which have previously been discussed. See id. Devlin's 864-page volume, published in 1908,
was largely dedicated to establishing the basis for the nationalist view. See DEVLIN, supra
note 62.
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California found its advocates as well.591 The Southern states, the
traditional seat of states' rights sentiment, were highly sympathetic,
immediately perceiving the danger which Roosevelt and Root's doc
trine posed to their own institutions.592
As Senator Rayner of
Maryland explained:

If [the President] can take possession of the public schools of California
and compel the State to admit to them Japanese students contrary to the
laws of California, he could with equal propriety send us an amendment
to the Santo Domingo treaty and demand the admission of the negro
children of Santo Domingo into the white schools of South Carolina or of
any other State
593
. . . .

In the midst of the controversy, Rayner introduced a resolution de
claring that the federal government "has no right to enter into any
treaty with any foreign government relating in any manner to any of
the public school systems of any of the States of the Union" and fur
ther declaring that "it is the duty of the President . . . to notify the
Government of Japan and notify any foreign government with whom
the question may arise that the public educational institutions of the
States are not within the jurisdiction of the United States."594 He then
defended the states' rights position in a lengthy speech on the Senate
floor.595
·

591. San Francisco officials adopted the states' rights position, arguing that the treaty
could not trench on local school policy, which was a right reserved to the states. See
BAILEY, supra note 581, at 76, 143-44 (noting the assertion by San Francisco's mayor that "if
any part of the treaty conflicted with the local school law that part of the treaty was null and
void"). Intriguingly, Metcalf reported that he had met with the justices of the California Su
preme Court and that they had assured him that if the treaty did protect Japanese rights,
they would rule unanimously that the Board's action was invalid. See BAILEY, supra note
581, at 188. Such a ruling would have been consistent with the California Supreme Court's
earlier, though mixed, decisions on the treaty power issue. For discussion of those decisions,
see supra note 533.
592. As Bailey describes it,
After Secretary Root came forward with the contention that a city could not segregate chi!·
dren of a foreign power if such action conflicted with established treaty rights, the Southern
ers recognized dangerous implications in this doctrine. Particularly vigorous were the objec
tions of Southern congressmen in discussing this matter, some of whom professed to see in
the position of Root and Roosevelt a movement to break down the whole system of separate
schools for Negroes in the South. H the federal government could win the day in this case, it
might, after negotiating the proper treaty with Great Britain or France, force the black sub
jects of these powers into the white public schools of the South.

BAILEY, supra note 581, at 71-72; see, e.g., 41 CONG. REC. 297 (remarks of Sen. Rayner,
Maryland); id. at 1235, 3223 (remarks of Rep. Garrett, Tennessee); id. at 3218, 3222-23 (re
marks of Rep. Williams, Mississippi) (declaring that "I stand with the State of California
in opposition to mixed schools. I stand with Californians in favor of the proposition that we
want a homogeneous and assimilable population of white people in this Republic"); id. at
3217 (remarks of Rep. Burnett, Alabama).
• • .

593. 41
594.

CONG. REC. 297.

Id.

595. See 41 CONG. REC. 298-304. His speech was widely seen as the most elaborate de
fense of the states' rights view yet attempted. From a contemporary perspective, it seems to
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Senator Rayner's resolution ultimately went nowhere, and the con
troversy in Congress quickly died after implementation of the amica
ble settlement. Having caught the attention of the nation, however,
the episode proved to be of wider significance. Over the next decade,
it provoked the writing of four major scholarly books and countless
articles, all dedicated to the constitutional issue.596 These works were
important in two respects. First, by collecting relevant historical mate
rials and developing the arguments on both sides, they ensured that
when the Supreme Court undertook a final resolution of the question,
it would have the most complete possible basis for rendering its judg
ment. Among the authors were many of the leading scholars of the
day. With considerable care, they had considered the question, mar
shaled historical support, and astutely articulated the opposing argu
ments. Second, the outburst of scholarly attention plainly revealed
that the great weight of informed opinion endorsed the nationalist
view. Leading authorities like Edward Corwin, Westel Willoughby,
John Bassett Moore, Quincy Wright, Charles Henry Butler, Edwin
Borchard, and George Sutherland all unequivocally affirmed the nabe a rather poorly conceived argument. See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 222-25 (analyzing the
speech and observing that the "plain fact of the matter is that Senator Rayner's argument is
not a well considered performance"). Tellingly, a few years after the School Board contro
versy, the Czar applied the same discriminatory policy to American Jews seeking to trade in
Russia that he applied to Russian Jews. In response, the United States complained that this
treatment constituted a violation of our treaty with Russia under a provision which, though
weaker, was similar to the provision upon which the Japanese had relied. When Russia
would not relent, Senator Rayner was among the staunchest advocates for abrogating the
treaty as obsolete. See id. at 231.
596. The best book by far was Corwin's National Supremacy, which was entirely dedi
cated to the issue. CORWIN, supra note 62. Devlin published his treatise in 1908. See
DEVLIN, supra note 62. A book by Charles Burr, also largely dedicated to the issue, won the
prestigious Henry M. Phillips Prize of the American Philosophical Society. See CHARI.Es H.
BURR, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE METHODS OF !TS
ENFORCEMENT AS AFFECTING THE POLICE POWERS OF THE STATES (1912). On the states'
rights side, Henry St. George Tucker published a lengthy treatise. See TUCKER, supra note
62. Even before the School Board controversy, Charles Henry Butler had published his
great two-volume treatise on the treaty power, which was also largely dedicated to estab
lishing the nationalist view. See BUTLER, supra note 62. Butler was inspired by his work in
1898 at the State Department on whether the treaty power extended to fisheries within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states and by Attorney General Griggs's 1898 opinion upholding
that power and endorsing the nationalist view. See 1 BUTLER, supra note 62, at i-ii; 1929
PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 180. For discussion of Griggs's opinion, see supra notes 541-546
and accompanying text. For a sampling of articles published in the wake of the School
Board controversy, see, for example, Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of
the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution, 1 AM. JUR. lNT'L L. 636 (1907) (upholding
the nationalist view); Charles C. Hyde, The Segregation of Japanese Students by the School
Authorities of San Francisco, 19 THE GREEN BAG 38 (1907) (same); Arthur K. Kuhn, The
Treaty-Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 172
(1907) (same); and William D. Lewis, Can the United States by Treaty Confer on Japanese
Residents in California the Right to Attend the Public Schools?, 15 AM. L. REG. 73 (1907)
(same). The best article endorsing the states' rights view was William E. Mikell, The Extent
of the Treaty-Making Power ofthe President and Senate of the United States (pt. 2), 57 U. PA.
L. REV. 528 (1909). See also Shackelford Miller, The Treaty Making Power, 41 AM. L. REV.
427 (1907).
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tionalist view, while only Henry St. George Tucker and other scholars
of little note supported the states' rights view.597
With all of the political commotion and academic speculation,
there seemed little doubt that the Supreme Court would soon finally
resolve the question. The probable quickly became the actual. In
deed, it was Elihu Root, now Senator from New York and fresh from
his battles with San Francisco, who prompted the decisive events.

597. Professor Bradley characterizes the authorities as evenly matched, see Bradley, su·
pra note 2, at 421, but, to put it mildly, that is highly misleading. For Convin's view, see
CORWIN, supra note 62. For Butler's view, see 1 BUTLER, supra note 62. Willoughby em·
phatically endorsed the nationalist view, see 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 21, §§ 212-15, at
495-503. He specifically considered the Taney Court-era dicta supporting the states' rights
view and contrasted them with the many precedents upholding the nationalist view. Finding
them irreconcilable, he presciently declared:
The author is convinced that the obiter doctrine that the reserved rights of the States may
never by infringed upon by the treaty-making power will sooner or later be frankly repudi
ated by the Supreme Court. In its place will be definitely stated the doctrine that in all that
properly relates to matters of international rights and obligations, whether these rights and
obligations rest upon the general principles of international law or have been conventionally
created by specific treaties, the United States possesses all the powers of a constitutionally
centralized sovereign State; and, therefore, that when the necessity from the international
standpoint arises the treaty power may be exercised, even though thereby the rights ordinar
ily reserved to the States are invaded.

Id. §

215, at 503. Professor Bradley claims John Bassett Moore for the states' rights view,
helping to balance the ledger sheet. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 421 (citing 5 MOORE, su·
pra note 504, § 736, at 166). That is an error. He relies on Moore's brief description of the
Supreme Court's decision in Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. 1 (1856), discussed supra note 519.
Moore's discussion is somewhat misleading (as a description of Prevost). Moore, however, is
an equal opportunity employer in his description of authorities and does not purport to be
giving his own views. Indeed, he also quotes from a large number of authorities in favor of
the nationalist view. See 5 MOORE, supra note 504, §§ 734-36, 738, at 158-59, 161-62, 164,
166, 175-79. In any case, Moore was a State Department official under Secretary of State
Root at the time he wrote the famous treatise on which Professor Bradley relies. Moreover,
Moore later wrote a review of the books by Convin, Burr, and St. George Tucker, in which
he strongly criticized Tucker's book and endorsed the nationalist view. See J.B. Moore, Re
views, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 320, 320-24 (1917) (noting, as to advocates of the states' rights view,
that "in proportion as they would curtail, thwart, and hamper the operation of the ample
clause of the Constitution in this country, in the same measure must citizens of the United
States be put at a disadvantage in foreign countries, reciprocity being essential to successful
negotiation"). For Quincy Wright's views, see WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 50, at 88-93, and
Quincy Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 252-60 (1919). For
the views of Edwin Borchard, the great constitutional conservative, see Edwin Borchard,
Comment, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE LJ. 445, 44749 (1919). For Sutherland's views, see GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
AND WORLD AFFAIRS 155-57 (1919). We have already discussed Root's view. See supra
notes 586-593 and accompanying text. Samuel Crandall, the author of another leading text
on the treaty power, also endorsed the nationalist view. See CRANDALL, supra note 64, at
106-11. For other authorities, see supra note 596. In the two decades preceding Missouri,
the only prominent scholar of whom I am aware that endorsed the states' rights view was St.
George Tucker. See TUCKER, supra note 52. Among post-Civil War commentators in the
nineteenth century, Pomeroy strongly supported the nationalist view, see JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO TIIE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TIIE UNITED STATES §§
674-79, at 556-70 (1880), while Cooley endorsed the states' rights view, see THOMAS M.
COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (1880).
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e. Of Migratory Bird Statutes and Migratory Bird Treaties. Con
gressional efforts to regulate migratory birds date to as early as 1904.
The birds were of significant economic value in their own right, and
they also played a critical role in protecting agriculture by reducing the
insect population. Tragedy of the commons imperatives, however,
had made it impossible for states to place adequate restrictions on
hunting. As a result, the birds were in danger of becoming extinct.598
The difficulty lay in the Court's decisions that had made it fairly plain
that wild game was beyond the regulatory powers of Congress and
hence was "reserved" to the states.599 Constitutional objections thus
repeatedly stymied efforts to pass a bill.600 Indeed, proponents were
themselves so unsure of the constitutionality of the proposed legisla
tion that they introduced a constitutional amendment to validate it. 601
However, in spite of their doubts - and the certainty of the oppo
nents - Congress proceeded to adopt the Migratory Bird Act of
1913.602
Despite the legislative victory, proponents correctly anticipated le
gal problems ahead. Their solution was striking: following the vote in
the Senate, they immediately offered a resolution calling for negotia
tion of a migratory bird treaty with Canada.603 The idea was appar
ently Root's, who offered the resolution and reportedly remarked: "I
think, sir, that that may furnish a pathway along which we can proceed
to some practical relief in regard to the very urgent and pressing
evil . . ."604 The treaty power, he claimed, might create "a situation . . . in which the Government of the United States will have constitutional authority to deal with this subject."605 One need hardly
guess why the idea sprang to his mind. In the next session, the Senate
.

598. There are two excellent accounts of the background to the migratory bird legisla
tion insofar as it is pertinent to Missouri. See Julian P. Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power,
11 N.C. L. REV. 428, 442 (1926); Lofgren, supra note 548, at 78.
599. The leading case was Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896), in which the
Court had decided that wild game within the territory of a state was held by the state in trust
for its citizens. The Court had elaborated this doctrine in a line of cases. For discussion, see
Lofgren, supra note 548, at 79, 83-91 (elaborating on the legal issues).
600. See Boyd, supra note 598, at 442; Lofgren, supra note 548, at 78-80.
601. See 47 CONG. REC. 2564 (1911).
602. See Boyd, supra note 598, at 442; Lofgren, supra note 548, at 80. One supporter
candidly acknowledged that "I do not know whether [the bill] is constitutional but I do know
that it is eternally right and in the end right will prevail." 49 CONG. REC. 4332 (1913) (re
marks of Rep. Moss); see also H.R. REP. No. 680, at 2, 4-5 (1912) (making similar acknowl
edgment).
603. See 49 CONG. REC. 1494 (1913); see also Boyd, supra note 598, at 442; Lofgren, su
pra note 548, at 81.
604. Root's remark was omitted from the permanent edition of the Congressional Rec
ord but was reported by Senator Robinson in a later debate. See 51 CONG. REC. 8349 (1914)
(quoting Root); see also Boyd, supra note 598, at 442-43; Lofgren, supra note 548, at 81.
605. 51 CONG. REC. 8349 (1913).

1256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1075

went along, adopting a similar resolution, and the Wilson administra
tion readily obliged, concluding a migratory bird treaty with Canada in
1916.606
Naturally enough, Root's strategy did provoke some hostile com
ment in Congress, as well it might.607 If ever the federal government
could be charged with bad faith in making a treaty, this had to be the
case. Nevertheless, the Senate approved the treaty after a thirty
minute debate, and thereafter Congress adopted implementing legisla
tion.608 The legislation passed by a voice vote in the Senate and, after
some constitutional sparring, by a vote of 236 to 49 in the House.609
The constitutional question was thus sharply drawn.
As it turned out, proponents had been wise in planning an alterna
tive constitutional basis for the legislation.
Relying on well
established Supreme Court precedents, two lower federal courts
quickly struck down the 1913 Act as a violation of the Tenth Amend
ment.610 Although the government appealed to the Supreme Court, it
was evidently highly dubious about its prospects for success. Hence, it
delayed the argument, and ultimately dismissed the appeal once the
treaty and implementing legislation of 1918 were in place.611 Its strat
egy paid off quickly. In contrast to their reception to the 1913 Act, the
four lower federal courts to hear challenges to the 1918 legislation
were unanimous in upholding it as a valid exercise of the treaty
power.612 Indeed, the same district judge who had found the 1913 Act
clearly unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment now affirmed
the 1918 legislation as unproblematic.613 Citing the precedents we

606. For the adoption of the resolution, see 50 CONG. REC. 2339-40 {1913). The treaty
was actually negotiated with Great Britain, which was still responsible for Canada's external
affairs. See Convention with Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 39 Stat.
1702 (1916); see also Boyd, supra note 598, at 443; Lofgren, supra note 548, at 81.
607. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 598, at 443-44 (providing citations to the debate);
Lofgren, supra note 548, at 81-82 (same). Root, among others, was a defender. The leading
Senate isolationists, Borah and Reed, were among those who attacked the constitutionality
of the treaty and its implementing legislation.
608. See Boyd, supra note 598, at 443-44; Lofgren, supra note 548, at 81·82. The legisla
tion was dubbed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918. See 40 Stat. 755 (1918).
609. See 55 CONG. REC. 5548 (1918) (passing bill in the Senate); id. at 7461-62 (same, in
the House); see also Lofgren, supra note 548, at 82.
610. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v.
Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (per J. Treiber). Two state courts also struck down the
statute. See State v. Sawyer, 113 Me. 458 (1915); State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan. 786 (1915).
For extended analysis of the decision by Judge Treiber in Shauver, see Lofgren, supra note
548, at 82-85.
611. See Lofgren, supra note 548, at 85-91.
612 See United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257 (1919); United States v. Samples, 258 F.
479 (1919), affd sub nom., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); United States v.
Selkirk, 258 F. 775 (1919); United States v. Rockefeller, 260 F. 346 (1919).
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have discussed, all four of the district judges expressly upheld the na
tionalist view.
III. THE MEANING OF MISSOURI

Unraveling the Mysteries ofJustice Holmes's Opinion

A.

Putting aside the controversy over the merits, Justice Holmes's
opinion in Missouri has given rise to much interpretive debate. In
part, the fault lies with Holmes. He famously sacrificed clarity for
compression, explication for rhetorical flourish. As a result, even
careful readers of the opinion have seriously misunderstood his argu
ment.614 The onus, however, is not entirely on Holmes. These mis
takes have stemmed in part from a failure to understand the issue in
historical context. As a result, many interpreters have failed to discern
that Holmes was elegantly, albeit cryptically, restating the arguments
which had already been worked out by others.
The opinion itself reveals that Holmes did in fact have a deep ap
preciation of the historical roots of the controversy, and the little evi
dence we have about the writing of the opinion confirms this conclu
sion. As he wrote to Harold Laski shortly after completing the
opinion, "I have a case that interested me very much and on which I
worked fiercely."615 Holmes almost certainly consulted the recently
published works of Edward Corwin and St. George Tucker, to say
nothing of the other books and commentaries of leading authorities
that the San Francisco School Board affair had inspired.616 Indeed, al
though unacknowledged, the most important source of Holmes's
opinion was quite likely Corwin's brilliant 1913 book National Su
premacy. Because the structure of Holmes's argument so closely

613. Compare United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (per J. Trieber)
(striking down the 1913 Act on Tenth Amendment grounds), with United States v.
Thompson, 258 F. 257 (1919) (affirming the 1918 legislation as a valid exercise of the treaty
power and endorsing the nationalist view). Judge Trieber's opinion was the most elabo
rately researched and reasoned, and showed the impact of the previous decade's scholarly
efforts.
614. For discussion of Holmes's sometimes cryptic style, and engaging commentary on
the subject by Frankfurter and Brandeis, see Lofgren, supra note 548, at 113-14 (noting, inter
alia, Brandeis's comment that "Holmes did not 'sufficiently consider the need of others to
understand' ).
"

615. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 254 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). For identifica
tion of Missouri as the case to which Holmes referred, see, e.g., id. at 254 n.2, and 9
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
JUDICIARY AND REsPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 480 n.180 (1984).
616. Although the Court was doubtless aware of the issue, the briefs specifically brought
the Japanese schoolchildren controversy to its attention. See Brief for Appellant, Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 417 (1920), at 59.
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tracks Corwin's distinctive analysis, familiarity with Corwin's book
goes a long distance toward unraveling the mysteries of the opinion.
Notwithstanding the confusion, there are several points which have
not provoked interpretive controversy. First, Holmes clearly held that
if a treaty is valid, then there can be no doubt about Congress's power
to pass legislation to implement the treaty under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Thus, the only question presented was the scope of the
treaty power.617 Second, Holmes accepted the traditional requirement
that a treaty must deal with a subject proper for negotiation and
agreement or, as Holmes put it, that the treaty power extends to sub
jects in which there is a "national interest."618 Third, like his forebears,
he agreed that treaties, like all other governmental acts, are subject to
the prohibitions contained in the Constitution.619 Finally, he clearly
upheld the nationalist view, rejecting the claim that treaties are limited
to those subjects which would otherwise fall within the scope of
Congress's legislative authority. The only question in dispute is what
Holmes said in order to justify this last, and most crucial, conclusion.
To undo the widespread misconceptions, we will need to reexamine
the text with care.
As Holmes begins by noting, the State of Missouri premised its ar
gument against the treaty on the Tenth Amendment.620 Many of the
interpretive difficulties surrounding Missouri have stemmed from a
simple failure to appreciate that this is the sole claim which Holmes
sets out to answer. Holmes's first point is straightforward: the literal
terms of the Tenth Amendment provide no support for Missouri's
claim because the treaty power is expressly delegated to the national
government and thus not "reserved" to the states.621 Missouri's real
claim, therefore, was "that what an act of Congress could not do un
aided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty can-

617. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (noting that "[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no
dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government").
618. See id. at 433-35. At several points Holmes referred to the treaty as serving an im
portant national purpose. Indeed, at one point he clainted that "a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude is involved." Id. at 435.
619. See id. at 433 (noting that the treaty "does not contravene any prohibitory words to
be found in the Constitution"). This point is of importance because Holmes was later, par
ticularly during the Bricker Amendment controversy, misconstrued as having ruled that
treaties are not subject to constitutional restraints of any kind. See infra notes 676, 688 and
accompanying text
620. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 431 (noting that the "ground of the bill is that the statute is
an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amend
ment").
621. See id. at 432 (noting that "[t]o answer this question it is not enough to refer to the
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Ar
ticle II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly").
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not do."622 The lower courts had held that the 1913 Act was beyond
Congress's powers. It therefore followed, in Missouri's view, that the
treaty and implementing legislation were equally unconstitutional.623
The unadorned question, in other words, was the validity of the states'
rights view of the treaty power.624
Holmes immediately gives his answer: the scope of the legislative
powers granted to Congress "cannot," he says, "be accepted as a test
of the treaty power."625 Holmes thus explicitly endorses the nationalist
view, and he dedicates the rest of the opinion to justifying this conclu
sion. The first argument he gives is familiar and rests on the text.
Pointing to the provisions pertaining to treaties, he notes that the
"language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties [is] gen
eral."626 Under the Supremacy Clause, "Acts of Congress are the su
preme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under
the authority of the United States." It "is open to question," he then
opines, "whether the authority of the United States means more than

622

Id.

623.

See id.

624. Some have supposed that Holmes was attempting to provide a general account of
the limits applicable to treaties. See, e.g., White, supra note 3, at 69-72 (interpreting Holmes
as promising to define qualifications on the treaty power but failing to live up to the promise
- and drawing possible implications from Holmes's failure in this regard). Holmes is ex
plicit throughout, however, that he is only "considering the validity of the test proposed" by
Missouri. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. The whole opinion is devoted to that question. To the
extent Holmes addresses other limitations, it is not to break new ground, but only to explain
why there is no question about whether the treaty in issue passes the traditional tests. Thus,
the treaty furthers "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude . . . [that] can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power." Id. at 435. There
is no question, then, that it is a proper subject for negotiation, meeting the traditional re
quirement. Furthermore, it "does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution." Id. at 433. In light of these conclusions, there was no need to consider fur
ther clarification of the applicable limits. The Tenth Amendment limit raised by Missouri
was the only question to be addressed.
Professor White claims that Holmes's conclusion that migratory birds were a subject of
national concern "seems particularly counterintuitive" and virtually strips the requirement
of any substance. "The risks to migratory birds," he suggests,
were a function of their tendency to fly into a particular area in great numbers and the pre
dictable reactions of citizens in that area . . . . Protection of migratory birds was simply a
function of the existence or nonexistence of laws forbidding their killing. The United States
could have achieved that protection without any help from Canada.
White, supra note 3, at 71 n.246. This claim seems fundamentally to misunderstand the pur
pose of treaties - indeed, even of legislation. The point is that because of tragedy of the
commons imperatives, both countries had strong reasons to enter into mutually binding
stipulations to restrain themselves. That way each could be sure that the other would not
take advantage of the first's restrictive legislation. That much seems beyond debate.
Holmes quite rightly treats the question of whether there was a national interest in the treaty
as a non-issue requiring no more than conclusory mention.
625. 252 U.S. at 433.
626.

Id. at 432.
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the formal acts prescribed to make the convention."627 Taken out of
context, this language might be read to suggest that there are no con
stitutional limits on treaties, but that was not Holmes's point. The
next sentence dispels any doubts: "We do not mean to imply that
there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must
28
be ascertained in a different way."6
Admittedly, Holmes's language in this passage is elliptical, but his
point can be reconstructed without too much difficulty. The Suprem
acy Clause, he is arguing, ties the validity of acts of Congress, but not
the validity of treaties, back to the legislative powers of Congress.
Acts of Congress must be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution,
meaning within the scope of the powers delegated in Article I. Those
powers were carefully defined and limited to avoid conflicts over the
boundaries between federal and state power. In contrast, treaties
have a much wider scope: the Constitution only specifies that they be
made under the authority of the United States. This does not mean
they are entirely unrestricted in subject matter. The "different way"
their limits were to be "ascertained" entails only that the scope of
Congress's authority is not the touchstone; rather, as he then made
clear, the question was whether the treaty dealt with a matter of na
tional interest. If it did, then the fact that it went beyond the scope of
Congress's powers was irrelevant: "It is obvious that there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an
act could."629 Thus, it was not the scope of Congress's powers that de
termined the extent of the treaty power - the "test" proposed by
Missouri - but the natural scope of the treaty power considered as an
independent power in its own right.630

627.

Id. at 433.

628. Id. Then, a bit later, he notes that the treaty "does not contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in the Constitution." Id. Nevertheless, Holmes's remark gave rise to
much debate, during the Bricker Amendment controversy, about whether treaties are sub
ject to constitutional restraints. See Lofgren, supra note 548, at 119 (discussing and collect
ing citations); supra note 619 and accompanying text; infra notes 676, 688. In my view, those
who expressed concern were primarily politically motivated.

629. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
630. It seems evident that Holmes was short-handing the long-familiar argument made
most famously by Calhoun. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Calhoun emphasized
the contrast between unqualified grant of the treaty power and the carefully defined and
limited nature of Congress's legislative powers, which were specifically enumerated by sub
ject matter to mark out their limits and thereby to preserve the powers to the states. See su
pra note 42 and accompanying text. Calhoun's argument had been cited routinely in
authorities affirming the nationalist view. For examples, see, e.g., supra notes 532, 559, 564
and accompanying text. It was quoted in the lower court decisions upholding the treaty as
well. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257, 260 (1919). In this respect, Holmes
did not achieve his apparent aim: to state Calhoun's argument not only more economically
but more effectively as well.
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Holmes's next reason for rejecting the states' rights view is equally
familiar. He simply invokes the standard point that the treaty power
must be interpreted in light of the fact that the Constitution prohibits
the states from making treaties. "[I]t is not lightly to be assumed,"
Holmes observes,

that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong to
and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found
[citing Andrews v. Andrews]. What was said in that case with regard to
the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the na
tion in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act.631
Although some have read the passage otherwise, Holmes was not en
dorsing the idea of inherent federal foreign affairs powers free from
constitutional limitations;632 nor was he licensing bad faith recourse to
treaties in order to achieve domestic ends.633 On the contrary, Holmes
631. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (citing Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)). In
Andrews, the question was whether under the Full Faith and Credit Oause a state could ref

use to give effect to a divorce rendered in another state to citizens of the first on grounds
that the first did not itself recognize. The Court pointed out that no state could effectively
regulate marriage if its citizens could temporarily leave the state and obtain a divorce that
would have been illegal in their home state. The regulation of marriage, however, was a
power that must belong to every civilized government. Since it was beyond the powers dele
gated to Congress, it could only exist in the states. Hence, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
should not be construed in a manner that would undermine the power over marriage admit
tedly belonging to the states. See Andrews, 188 U.S. at 33. This reasoning was just the in
verse of Holmes's. The treaty power had been prohibited to the states. It belonged to the
national government, and it ought therefore to be interpreted to avoid leaving the nation as
a whole and as individual parts without the power to make treaties on all subjects appropri
ate for negotiation and agreement. The power to make treaties on all appropriate subjects
was a power belonging to every civilized government.
632. Professor White claims that Holmes was at least toying with the notion of inherent
foreign affairs powers and that he abandoned the traditional enumerated/reserved powers
framework that had been accepted until then. Under this view, Holmes's argument was that
the treaty power, being inherent in sovereignty, can override the sphere of reserved powers
traditionally off limits to Congress. See White, supra note 3, at 63-72. White acknowledges
that the opinion is ambiguous and that Holmes purported to be acting within the traditional
enumerated/reserved powers framework. He seems to doubt that Holmes lived up to this
promise and to believe that the idea of inherent powers free from constitutional limits forms
the real basis for the decision. See id. at 72. I note that Professor White speaks with some
authority about Holmes. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL Hou.ms:
LAW AND TIIE INNER SELF (1993). Even many of Missouri's friends have understood
Holmes this way. See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 1302-05; Neuman, The Nationalization of
Civil Liberties, supra note 3, at 1645-46.
633. Under this view, Holmes intended to give the federal government a green light to
regulate domestic affairs by finding cooperative foreign partners willing to sign off on faux
treaties and thereby to avoid the restrictions of the Tenth Amendment. See White, supra
note 3, at 71 (noting that what Holmes was saying was "that when the national government
wanted to achieve some goal, and believed that the states would resist it, the national gov
ernment could achieve that goal if it could induce a foreign power to agree to a joint articu
lation of that goal in a treaty"); Lofgren, supra note 548, at 98 (suggesting as a possible
reading that because certain powers "had to exist somewhere in American government, a
treaty followed by a statute could serve to clothe the national government with needed ple
nary power that the Constitution otherwise failed to grant"). According to Professor
Lofgren, the opinion affirms the propriety of using the treaty power not for international
purposes but to fill in gaps in Congress's limited domestic powers when necessary to achieve
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was simply making one of the core arguments in favor of the national
ist view which, as we have seen, its advocates had uniformly advanced
from the beginning. Because the states are expressly prohibited from
making treaties - and are thus "incompetent to act" - imposing
states' rights subject matter limitations on the scope of the power
would leave the nation - both the national government and the states
- without any power to make treaties on a range of important sub
jects otherwise appropriate for negotiation and agreement.
The
power to make such treaties is the power which " 'must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government.' " The Court there
fore ought not to impose implied limitations on the treaty power
which would undermine this sound maxim.634
Holmes's next argument is far more complex and elusive - and
thus even more likely to be misunderstood. Still considering only "the
validity of the test proposed," Holmes, in the opinion's most famous
passage, observed:

[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a cen
tury and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hunimportant domestic purposes. See id. In his view, Holmes is saying that if the states cannot
escape from the race-to-the-bottom logic, then the federal government can have recourse to
pseudo-treaties to make up for its lack of domestic powers. I do not deny that the Migratory
Bird Treaty could plausibly have been seen in this light. See supra notes 603-609 and ac
companying text. In my view, however, nothing in the opinion suggests that such bad faith
practices are permissible under the treaty power. In this respect, Missouri just reflects the
traditional - and continuing -judicial reluctance to second-guess the motives of the politi
cal branches, particularly in the field of foreign affairs. The Court was un\villing even to
consider the possibility that the treaty was entered into in bad faith.
634. Indeed, the Court itself had made this very point in Hauenstein, see supra note 561
and accompanying text, as had the lower courts in upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty, see
e.g., United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257, 259, 263, 268 (1919) (observing that the states
"are expressly prohibited from entering into treaties, alliances, or confederations with other
nations. If, therefore, the national government is also prohibited from exercising the treaty
power, affecting matters which for internal purposes belong exclusively to the states, how
can a citizen be protected in matters of that nature when they arise in foreign countries?").
The point had also been made on countless occasions in the past. For examples, see supra
notes 532, 543-545, 590 and accompanying text. The government, moreover, had emphati
cally pressed the point in its argument. See Missouri v. Holland, 1920 Lexis 1520, at 16, 17,
19, 22 (observing that it "is inconceivable that, since the States were to be denied the treaty
making power, the framers of the Constitution intended that the treaty-making power con
ferred upon the new Government should be less than that possessed by any other independ
ent government and less than that possessed by the State conferring it. The very general
language used in conferring the power negatives such an intention"). As already explained,
moreover, Holmes's citation to Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903) strongly con
firms this reading. See supra note 631. For further discussion of this point, see supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text; infra notes 709-711, 804-806 and accompanying text.
,
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dred years ago. . . . The only question is whether [the treaty] is forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in decid
ing what that Amendment has reserved.635
What prompted Holmes, thrice-wounded Civil War veteran, thus
to invoke the bloodletting of the Civil War and "our whole experi
ence? " Many have read this passage as a paean to an evolving concep
tion of the Constitution, justifying an expansion of federal powers be
yond those originally intended by the Founders. This construction,
however, misses Holmes's point. The passage neither addresses the
question of expanding federal powers nor the capacity of the
Constitution to evolve, at least in the sense we use that concept today.
Indeed, as we shall see momentarily, Holmes himself explicitly places
the decision on originalist grounds.636 The passage, therefore, de-

635. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34.
636. Professors White and Lofgren both read Holmes as endorsing an evolving concep
tion of the Constitution and, in particular, the notion that the national interest is not static.
Just because migratory birds might not have been considered a matter of national impor
tance in 1789 does not mean that, in light of our whole experience, they cannot be so consid
ered today. See Lofgren, supra note 548, at 99; White, supra note 3, at 68-69. Indeed, White
ridicules the passage by claiming that it
reduce[s] itself to the argument that even though the framers might not have explicitly said
that the protection of migratory birds was a matter requiring national action, the "whole ex
perience" of the United States since the founding of the Constitution, including "much sweat
and blood" to prove that the United States was now "a nation" rather than merely "an or
ganism," demonstrated a national interest in the protection of migratory birds.

Id. at 69.

He then adds that "[i]f that reading seems to parody Holmes's argument, it illus
trates the dangers in making literary inspiration a source of judicial language." Id. at 69.
Perhaps. A safer maxim might be to assume that an interpretation that renders a celebrated
passage in an important text ridiculous must itself be mistaken.

In any case, the passage is surely rich enough to bear interpretation as an endorsement
of the idea of an evolving Constitution. There is perhaps, there is no more eloquent expres
sion of that view. Nevertheless, for reasons that will appear, I strongly doubt that that is
what Holmes had principally in mind. Given its powerfully suggestive quality, it is not sur
prising that the passage has been used for many purposes, bearing little relation to the
meaning intended in its original context. For discussion of some of its subsequent uses in
important cases, see Lofgren, supra note 548, at 115-18.
It is no doubt true that Holmes rejected a static conception of the national interest that
would have limited the treaty power to subjects deemed appropriate for negotiation at the
time of the Founders. See supra notes 624, 629-630 and accompanying text. That latter
position, however, was hardly controversial. Indeed, it was endorsed by the Founders
themselves, see supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text; infra note 730 and
accompanying text, and Holmes assumes it throughout without ever addressing the point.
The difficulty with the White/Lofgren reading is that the quoted passage has nothing to do
with the question of how to interpret the scope of the national interest. Rather, as Holmes
explicitly stated, he was still addressing the meaning of the Tenth Amendment and
Missouri's argument - "test" - that it should be read to limit the treaty power to those
subjects falling within the scope of Congress's legislative powers. According to the position
Missouri was asserting, the scope of the national interest was wholly irrelevant; no matter
how important the subject - no matter how appropriate for negotiation and agreement and
no matter how broadly the notion of the national interest may expand - if it was beyond
Congress's legislative powers, as the lower courts had held, the treaty power was precluded
from dealing with the matter. Thus, it was not the scope of the national interest, but rather
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mands a more careful reading. It is in the unraveling of the mysteries
in the profoundly resonant phrases of the passage that the key to the
opinion lies.
Part of the difficulty may arise from the fact that Holmes in this
passage is (probably self-consciously) adopting sub silentio the central
thesis that Corwin had developed in National Supremacy, and it is dif
ficult to appreciate Holmes's meaning without a familiarity with
Corwin's analysis. As Holmes pointed out at the outset, the literal
terms of the Tenth Amendment could not support the states' rights
view - because it only "reserves" to the states those powers not dele
gated to the United States. Rather, the states' rights view rested upon
something entirely different and more radical: the idea that implicit in
the Tenth Amendment - Holmes's "invisible radiation" from its gen
eral terms - were affirmative subject matter restraints that existed
prior to and as absolute limitations on the scope of the delegated fed
eral powers. As Corwin had argued, this idea was one of the funda
mental points of contention between the strict and broad construc
tionists during the antebellum struggle. Strict constructionism had
roots in Jeffersonian constitutionalism and the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions, rested at its core on an idea of the Union as a compact
among sovereign states rather than a national polity, and, in the end,
provided the constitutional justification for secession. In practice, it
meant that slavery - and anything that could affect it - was "re
served" and therefore that no federal power could be exercised in a
manner that would invade this affirmatively guaranteed sphere of
state autonomy. As we have seen, the treaty power was no excep
tion.637 The Taney Court dicta supporting the states' rights view was
thus just the inevitable working out of the whole strict constructionist
jurisprudential project in relation to the treaty power.638
Understood in this light, Holmes was situating Missouri's Tenth
Amendment claim within the framework of the struggle between the
strict and broad constructionists over the fundamental question of na
tional supremacy. However doubtful strict constructionism was as an

the validity of Missouri's Tenth Amendment claim that was at issue. Equally decisive,
Holmes makes clear just a few sentences later that he is not resting his ruling on "the later
developments of constitutional law." Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. It is fully supported by
decisions going back to the eighteenth century. See id. at 434-35. An evolving Constitution
thus does not enter into the case. Holmes's references to history have a different, but no less
important, purpose.

637. For discussion of the antebellum strict constructionist perspective and its applica
tion to the treaty power, see supra notes 455-458, 470-475, 494, 506, 511-512, 514-519 and
accompanying text.
638. See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 23-58, 99-165. Corwin's book is a tour de force in its
sweeping overview of the broad movements of American constitutional thought. Written
when he was still a relatively young scholar, it left no doubt that he would be recognized as
among the most important constitutional scholars of the twentieth century.
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interpretation of original understandings,639 it was not the sort of
movement that could be defeated simply by reference to the Found
ers' intent or to John Marshall's decisions - by what was said "a hun
dred years ago." The jurisprudential conflict between the two con
tending schools was the expression in constitutional law of profound
underlying sectional cleavages over the character of national identity,
cleavages that could not be resolved through constitutional exegesis.640
Even the "most gifted" of the Constitution's "begetters" could not
have foreseen completely - nor, Holmes might have added, have con
trolled - whether the organism they called into being would develop
into a nation. Only the unfolding of history could provide an answer,
and for us, tragically, the forging of a national identity could be ac
complished only on the field of battle - the "much sweat and blood"
that it "cost their successors . . . to prove that [the Founders] created a
nation." Strict constructionism was, and as things developed could
only have been, defeated by the clash of arms. Missouri's conception
of the Tenth Amendment, having descended directly from the strict
constructionist school, had to be viewed "in the light of our whole ex
perience." What that amendment "has reserved" depended upon
"what this country has become."
When this remarkable passage is correctly understood, the mean
ing of the next two paragraphs immediately becomes clear. They sim
ply aim to demonstrate how Missouri's Tenth Amendment claim is in
consistent with the fundamental principle of national supremacy
announced in McCulloch v. Maryland: the principle that notwith
standing any state constitutions or laws to the contrary, all exercises of
federal authority within the scope of the delegated powers are su
preme, that there are no subjects which are, a priori, affirmatively re
served to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, Holmes notes
that Missouri "founds its claim of exclusive authority upon an asser
tion of title to migratory birds."641 Because the treaty power is dele
gated, however, "it does not follow that [the state's] authority is exclu
sive of paramount powers."642 The state's claim is simply that the
treaty deals with creatures that are "within the state borders, that it
must be carried out by officers of the United States within the same
territory, and that but for the treaty the State would be free to regu
late this subject itself."643 These facts, however, do not distinguish the
case from any other valid exercise of federal authority: "As most of

639. Corwin spent considerable effort to demonstrate that the strict constructionist
viewpoint was clearly inconsistent with the original understandings. See id. at 23-58, 99-121.
640. For illuminating discussion, see PAUL w. KAHN, LEGmMACY AND HISTORY 38-45
{1992).
641. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
642 Id.
643. Id.
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the laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as
many of them deal with matters which in the silence of such laws the
State might regulate, such general grounds are not enough to support
Missouri's claim."644 The states' rights view, in other words, was based
on erroneous, strict constructionist conceptions of the Tenth Amend
ment and the principle of national supremacy: "No doubt the great
body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State,
but a treaty," like all other exercises of federal authority within the
scope of a delegated power, "may override its power."645
It was unnecessary, moreover, "to invoke the later developments
of constitutional law for this proposition."646 Indeed, specifically in re
gard to the treaty power,

it was recognized as early as Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454, with regard
to statutes of limitation, and even earlier, as to confiscation, in Ware v.
Hylton, 3 Dall. 199. It was assumed by Chief Justice Marshall with re
gard to the escheat of land to the State in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat 259,
275. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258. Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340. So as to a limited jurisdiction
of foreign consuls within a State. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1. See Ross
v. Mcintyre, 140 U.S. 453. Further illustration seems unnecessary.647
Original understandings, then, were more than adequate to support
the nationalist view, once the detritus of the strict constructionist con
ception of the Tenth Amendment had been washed away.
It is evident, then, that Holmes did indeed work "fiercely" on the
case. True, his brief opinion showed scant concern for citing authori
ties or precedents and working out the details of the arguments.
Those precedents and arguments could be found in Hauenstein, in the
decisions of the courts below, and in the countless authoritative dis
cussions of the issue in the past. Nor was the question particularly
problematic, given the very widespread endorsement of the nationalist
view among leading authorities. Befitting his genius, Holmes instead
went to the root of the matter and offered a penetrating vision of how
the question fit into the framework of our constitutional structure and
history. It is for this reason that Missouri ought rightly to be cele
brated as among the greatest of the Court's decisions.
B.

The Court and Human Rights Treaties

A final note to dispel any doubts about whether the Court was
aware of the full implications of its decision. Professor Bradley has

644. Id.
645. Id.

646. Id.
647. Id. at 434-35.
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emphasized that the development of human rights treaties arose sub
sequent to Missouri; hence, the Court could not have contemplated
that treaties affecting the ways in which nations treat their own citi
zens, as opposed to aliens, might be made the subject of treaties.648
This suggestion is, among other things, historically untenable.
Perhaps the most discussed "human rights" treaties at the time of
Missouri dealt with labor rights. The first labor treaties were con
cluded among European nations right after the turn of the century.649
Most important, however, was Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles,
which established the International Labor Organization ("ILO") and
charged it with drafting conventions dealing comprehensively with the
rights of workers and working conditions.650 Missouri itself was de
cided at the same time the Treaty of Versailles was being debated in
the Senate and across the country. Indeed, even before the Senate
had acted upon the Treaty, President Wilson had improvidently in
vited the ILO to hold its opening session in Washington, D.C., in
1919.651 Under the eyes of the capitol, the first ILO conference
adopted draft conventions on the eight-hour work day, maternity pro
tection, night work for women and children, unemployment, and child
labor.652 Nor had the implications of the nationalist view of the treaty
power gone unappreciated even before Missouri. There was already
much speculation over the question of whether the treaty power
would permit the United States to conclude labor conventions.653 In
648. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 460 (noting that since Missouri "we have seen the
rise of international human rights law, which regulates the relations between nations and
their citizens"). Ironically, in making this claim, Professor Bradley seems not to have no
ticed that Missouri itself dealt with a treaty placing linritations on a state's treatment of its
own citizens, not aliens. Indeed, that is a distinctive feature of most, if not all, environmental
treaties, of which the Migratory Bird Treaty appears to have been the first It is also a dis
tinctive feature of arms control treaties, conventions for the suppression of narcotics, treaties
dealing with atomic energy, and many others. Human rights treaties may be politically sensi
tive, but they are not unique in the respect which Professor Bradley emphasizes.
649. For discussion, see, e.g., Boyd, supra note 598, at 440-50.
650. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. 13, § 1. Among other things, the ILO was to
propose conventions dealing with the length of the working day, the prevention of unem
ployment, the provision of adequate wages, the protection of workers against sickness and
injury, the protection of women and children, the provision for old age and disability, and
the protection of workers exercising the right to organize unions. See id.
651. President Wilson submitted the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. It famously provoked
a major national debate. For discussion, see generally DEENA FRANK FLEMING, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1918-1920 (1932), and David Golove,
From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Transformation ofthe War Powers, 10
W. COLO. L. REV. 1491, 1493-94 (1999). For discussion of the ILO invitation incident, see
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 841-42. The agenda for the first meeting in Washing
ton was included as an annex to Chapter 4 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. See
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 650, pt 13, § 1, ch. 4, annex.
652 See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 598, at 451-52 & n.114; ILO
11, 2000) <http://www.ilo.org/public/englisb/about/history.htm>.

History (last ·modified Jan.

653. As early as 1907, a scholar raised the issue in the debate over the San Francisco
School Board ordinance excluding Japanese schoolchildren from the public schools. See
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1919, the American Association for Labor Legislation declared that
"these international evils know no frontiers" and resolved that "in in
ternational agreements there be incorporated minimum protective la
bor guarantees."654 Even the briefs in Missouri, citing the Treaty of
Versailles, cautioned the Court that a ruling in favor of the treaty
would permit the federal government to take over areas of traditional
state authority, including the regulation of child labor. Citing Article
23 of the Treaty of Versailles, which explicitly pledged states to secure
labor rights, the State of Kansas warned:

H the United States becomes a party to this treaty, it is thereby invested
with constitutional authority to control the employment of labor in local
industries, within each of the sovereign states, to determine the condi
tions of labor, to prescribe a minimum wage, to regulate hours of labor,
to prohibit child labor, and to determine the innumerable questions of a
similar character which have always been supposed to be a matter of
state regulation.655

Anderson, supra note 596, at 664. For discussions of the issue during the period immediately
preceding Missouri, see, e.g., J.P. Chamberlain, The Power of the United States Under the
Constitution to Enter into Labor Treaties, 9 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 330 (1919); Thomas I.
Parkinson, Constitutionality of Treaty Provisions Affecting Labor, 9 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV.
21 (1919); and The League ofNations Covenenant, 8 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 359-512 (1919).
In 1919, Edwin Borchard, a constitutional conservative, see Ackerman & Golove, supra note
19, at 806 & n.17, 872-73, wrote in the Yale Law Journal:

It is within the power of the federal government by treaty to remove from state control any
matter which may become the subject of negotiation with a foreign government. With the

continued drawing together of the world by increased facilities for travel and communica
tion, the subjects of common interest which require international regulation will continue to
grow in extent and variety. Uniformity of legislation by withdrawal from state legislative
control of such subjects as marriage and divorce, labor legislation, the ownership and inheri
tance of property, and all matters affecting aliens would be possible by the exertion of the
necessary federal treaty power.

Borchard, supra note 597, at 449 (emphasis added). Borchard spoke with special authority.
He had been Librarian of the Supreme Court at the time of the migratory bird litigation im
mediately preceding Missouri, and Chief Justice White had commissioned him to make an
exhaustive study of the law in order to find a constitutional basis for the legislation. He had
been privy as well to discussions with the Chief Justice about the use of a treaty as a means
of avoiding the problem of Congress's limited domestic authority. The extraordinary story is
recounted in Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE LJ.
616, 632-33 (1945). See also 9 BICKEL, supra note 615, at 477-78.
654. Boyd, supra note 598, at 453 (quoting 9 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 329 (1919)).
655. Brief for the State of Kansas, Amicus Curiae, at 43, 28-29, Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 417 (1920). Kansas was particularly farsighted in imagining the future expansion of
treaties, making clear that, if accepted, the government's position would permit treaties on
"marriage and divorce," "the organization of corporations and their affairs," and a range of
other matters of local import. Id. at 28-29. By treaty, moreover, "[c]hild labor laws could
thus be made uniform throughout the states and uniform rules laid dovm covering the condi
tions of labor, including wages in stores, factories and mines." Id. Article 23 of the Treaty of
Versailles, which Kansas quoted, provided that the members of the League of Nations "will
endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and
children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and in
dustrial relations extend." Id. at 42-43 (quoting Treaty of Versailles).
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In the wake of the decision, speculation became widespread.656
There can thus be no doubt that the Court was fully aware that
Missouri would remove the most potent constitutional obstacle
blocking the path to human rights treaties.657 The near unanimity with
which it accepted this possibility is all the more impressive in light of
its controversial five-to-four decision less than two years before in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.658 In Hammer, the Court had reached out ag
gressively to strike down a congressional statute forbidding the sale in
interstate commerce of products manufactured with the use of child
labor. The uproar that greeted that decision is well known. What is
perhaps less well known is the Court's evident willingness to offer the
federal government a means to achieve the same end through interna
tional negotiation and agreement. Surely, when the Court permitted
the federal government to use a treaty to avoid the effect of lower
court decisions striking down migratory bird legislation as beyond the
scope of congressional authority, it was aware that the same logic ap
plied fully to Hammer.659
IV. FROM MISSOURI TO THE PRESENT

Although Missouri finally settled the ancient controversy over the
nationalist and states' rights views as a matter of constitutional law, it
could not resolve the political tensions underlying the controversy.
Indeed, by bringing the subject more clearly into public view, the
decision may well have inflamed, rather than soothed, conflict. As a
consequence, a striking conjunction of developments ensued. On the
one hand, the Court repeatedly reaffirmed Missouri in the following
decades, giving no hint that it intended to retreat from the full
implications of its decision. On the other hand, the presence of a
vigilant Senate prevented the executive from attempting to exploit the
656. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 598, at 449-55; Jay Lloyd Jackson, The Tenth Amend
ment Versus the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United States (pt. 2), 14
VA. L. REV. 441, 446-56 (1928); Lofgren, supra note 548, at 117 n.216 (collecting citations);
Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and the Constitution 1919-1920, 35 POL. SCI. Q.
411, 417 (1920).
657. I do not mean to suggest that the Court foresaw the explosion in human rights trea
ties that followed World War II. Rather, my point is only that the Court was perfectly aware
that treaties might extend protections to the rights of U.S. citizens and might do so even in
areas beyond Congress's legislative powers.
658. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
659. Notwithstanding the scholarly discussion and obvious implications of Missouri, U.S.
diplomats continued to assert constitutional uncertainty about whether the United States
could conclude labor conventions. See, e.g., STOKE, supra note 550, at 61-62. As in other
instances, behind the diplomatic position lay less a concern about what the Supreme Court
would rule than a near certainty about the light in which the Senate would view such a
treaty. For other examples, see supra notes 547-552 and accompanying text. For discussion
of a similar position asserted about treaties limiting armaments manufacturing, see HENKIN,
supra note 16, at 191-92.
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Missouri doctrine to the fullest. As a result, it was cautious in striking
out into new areas which might provoke controversy. Indeed, even
after Missouri, it continued on occasion to parry international pressure
by claiming constitutional incompetence. With time, however, such
claims sounded more obviously disingenuous, as the meaning of
Missouri became more widely understood and the executive's
inconsistencies more blatant. Ultimately, constitutional excuses were
abandoned in favor of more forthrightly political explanations for the
unwillingness of the executive and Senate to impose particular treaties
upon the states. In the meantime, however, race once again provoked
full-blown political controversy over the Missouri question. This time,
with Missouri on the books, states' rights advocates attempted a direct
assault through constitutional amendment. Their failure only served
to consolidate Missouri's holding even further.
A.

The Supreme Court Reaffirms Missouri

The Court's two most notable opinions in the decade following

Missouri were Asakura v. City of Seatt[e6fJO and Santovincenzo v.
Egan.661 At issue in Asakura was a Seattle municipal ordinance regu
lating pawnbrokers, which restricted applicants to citizens of the
United States. It would be hard to imagine a subject more local in
character, and the city urged the Court to revisit Missouri; the city ar
gued that Missouri was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and
rendered the treaty power "a convenient substitute for legislation in
fields over which Congress has no jurisdiction. As this Court knows, a
treaty is usually drafted secretly by the State Department or commis
sioners . . . in conference with some foreign representative."662 The
Court refused the bait. Instead, Justice Butler, speaking for a unani
mous Court, made clear that Missouri would be taken for all it was
worth:

The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any ex
press provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend "so
far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids," it does extend to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other na
tions. . . . The treaty was made to strengthen friendly relations between
the two nations . . . . Treaties for the protection of citizens of one country
residing in the territory of another are numerous, and make for good un
derstanding between nations. The treaty is binding within the State of
Washington . . . . It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It operates

660. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
661. 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
662

Asakura, 265 U.S. at 338 (Charles T. Donworth, Counsel for Defendant).
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of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be
applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.663
In other words, the only question was whether the treaty was of a
common type and whether it strengthened "friendly relations" and
promoted "good understanding." If so, then no matter how local the
subjects with which it dealt, it fell within the scope of the treaty power
and superseded inconsistent state laws.664
Santovincenzo presented a similar case. The treaty at issue had a
novel provision concerning intestate distribution of the estates of de
cedents of Italian nationality. Under New York law, in the absence of
known heirs, the estate escheated to the state. Under the treaty, how
ever, the Italian Consul was entitled to receive the assets for distribu
tion in accordance with Italian law. Thus, rather than just removing
the disability of alienage, the treaty substituted the law of a foreign na
tion regarding inheritance for the law of a state.665 The Court was
once again unanimous in upholding the treaty, with Chief Justice
Hughes delivering the opinion. Reminding his audience that treaties
of this kind have reciprocal benefits, Hughes observed:

There can be no question as to the power of the Government of the
United States to make the Treaty . . . . The treaty-making power is broad
enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign rela
tions, and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens
of the United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such
countries within the United States, and the disposition of property of all-

663. Id. at 341 (citations and footnote omitted).
664. Even before Asakura, the Court had assumed the validity of the same treaty at is
sue in that case in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222-23 (1923). In Terrace, Justice
Butler, writing for the Court, held that Washington's Alien Land Law, which prohibited
Japanese residents from leasing agricultural land, was not in violation of the treaty - or, for
that matter, of the Equal Protection Oause. See id. at 221-22. The Court expressed no
doubts, however, about whether the treaty would override the local law if the latter were in
conflict with the treaty. See id. After Asakura, the Court decided two other cases in which
Missouri was reaffirmed. In Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929), the Court unani
mously upheld a treaty provision overriding a discriminatory state inheritance tax on aliens
to avoid violation of a treaty with Denmark. The Court did not pause even to consider the
validity of the treaty. See id. (noting that because "the treaty-making power is independent
of and superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so
construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation
and when so ascertained must prevail over inconsistent state enactments"). Finally, in
Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 453-54 (1930), the Court went out of its way to
affirm that the treaty of 1783 with Sweden, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text,
gave aliens the right to hold and inherit real estate, and to disapprove of Attorney General
Wirt's 1819 states' rights opinion giving the contrary view of the treaty and stating his dictum
that the treaty power did not extend to the rights of aliens to inherit real property in the
states. For discussion ofWirt's view, see supra note 421 and accompanying text.

665. The Italian Consular Treaty contained a most favored nation clause. The Italian
Consul relied on an article in an 1856 treaty with Persia. See Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 3536.
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ens dying within the territory of the respective parties, is within the scope
of that power, and any conflicting law of the State must yield.666
B.

The Executive and the Senate

As dramatic as Missouri's holding was as a matter of constitutional
law, it had relatively little immediate impact on the conduct of the ex
ecutive branch. In retrospect, this should not be surprising. The
Framers had created a system designed to ensure rigorous scrutiny of
treaties that threatened to undermine state interests, and the system
had been, and continued to be, highly effective in achieving this aim.
In conducting negotiations, the President always had to bear in mind
the watchful eye of the Senate. As a result, the same practical limita
tions that had constrained the executive before 1920 continued to con
strain it thereafter.
The executive's treaty practice during this period was thus of a
dual character. The President and Senate continued to make a variety
of treaties that interfered with traditional areas of exclusive state leg
islative competence and even expanded into important new areas.667
At the same time, especially in the decade following Missouri, U.S.
diplomats occasionally invoked constitutional incapacities when ex
plaining to other nations their reasons for declining to join in certain
treaty regimes - most importantly, conventions concerning private
international law, labor rights, and armaments production. 668 Such
statements were no doubt made with the political realities of the
Senate closely in mind, and the statements were so often inconsistent
with and contradicted by subsequent practice that they came to be
widely viewed with suspicion
"as merely an excuse for not doing
something which the United States does not wish, as a matter of pol
icy, to do."669 As Missouri came to be more widely understood, the
-

666. Id. at 40. For subsequent cases, see discussion infra notes 692-695 and accompa
nying text.
667. For examples, see HENKIN, supra note 16, at 191-92, 463-64, 474-75 (describing
various conventions); MITCHELL, supra note 526, at 68-95, 97-115, 121-28 (same); and
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REV. 345,
364-68 (1952) (same). The Senate, however, often imposed restrictive reservations to pro
tect state interests. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 16, at 192, 464-65.
668. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 191-92, 463-64 (describing examples); Pitman B.
Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L.
456, 456-61 (1934) (same); supra note 659.
669. Potter, supra note 668, at 461-62. Professor Potter, who taught in Geneva, wished
to assume that the statements were in good faith, but could offer no reason for so conclud
ing. For inconsistencies, see HENKIN, supra note 16, at 464 (describing how in early 1930s
the United States dropped the federalism reservations it had asserted in the late 1920s to
armaments conventions), and Nadelmann, supra note 550, at 341 (describing 1942 Senate
approval of a private international law convention on powers of attorney, despite earlier
pleas of constitutional incapacity). Potter discusses the inconsistent statements of United
States diplomats concerning federal authority over conventions dealing with the rights of
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statements themselves became more equivocal, seemingly asserting
political rather than constitutional imperatives.670
The same tendency was marked in the occasional efforts of the
United States to include "federal-state" clauses in treaties and of the
Senate to impose federalism-based reservations. Federal-state clauses
permit federal states to limit their binding obligations under a treaty to
carrying out those portions of the treaty which deal with matters
within the usual legislative competence of the federal government. As
to matters ordinarily within the jurisdiction of local governments, the
federal government is only obliged to bring the relevant treaty provi
sions to their attention with a recommendation that the provisions be
carried out. Senate federalism reservations attempt to achieve the
same result when the President has been unsuccessful in the difficult
task of convincing other nations to accept a federal-state clause.671 At
times, the executive or the Senate claimed to be acting under constitu
tional necessity, but in time they adopted equivocal language which
implicitly acknowledged the political character of the federalism re
straints.672

C.

The Bricker Amendment

The relatively high degree of quietude that Missouri had achieved
shattered in the early 1950s. Once again, race was the principle
aliens. See Potter, supra note 668, at 458-61. Indeed, it is nothing short of incredible that
U.S. diplomats would claim constitutional incapacity to make treaties of that nature in light
not only of Missouri but of the large number of treaties of that kind that had been made in
the past. For a remarkable effort by one diplomat to harmonize the contradictory, see
Potter, supra note 668, at 460-610 (quoting League of Nations Document C.lOM.8.1934.IV,
at 6).
670. The U.S. delegation's explanation for why it could not vote on a code of private
international law in 1928 was a typical use of weasel words:
The Delegation of the United States of America regrets very much that it is unable at the
present time to approve the Code of Dr. Bustamante, as in view of the Constitution of the
United States of America, the relations among the States [sic] members of the Union and
the powers and functions of the Federal Government, it finds it very difficult to do so.

Nadelmann, supra note 550, at 337 & n.68 (quoting THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF
AMERICAN STATES 1889-1928 371 (Scott ed. 1931)). For other examples, see id. at 336, 34243. It was a dispute over this statement that led to debate in 1928 and 1929 at the meeting of
the American Society of International Law, at the latter of which Charles Evans Hughes
made a famous statement about the requirement that treaties deal with matters of "interna
tional concern." See 1928 PROC. AM. Soc. lNT'L L. 60-62; 1929 PROC. AM. Soc. lNT'L L.
176, 194-96. For further discussion, see supra notes 550-552 and accompanying text; infra
notes 727-728 and accompanying text.
671. As to federal-state clauses and the increasing resistance to their inclusion in multi
lateral treaties, see REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 302 reporter's note 4; HENKIN,
supra note 16, at 192 & 464 n.68. As to federalism reservations, see id. at 181 & 453 n.31.
672 See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 192 & n.*, 464 n.68 (describing the shift from reser
vations limiting U.S. obligations, to those matters "within the jurisdiction" of the federal
government, to those matters over which they "exercise" jurisdiction or which are "appro
priate" for federal action).
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provocation. After adoption of the United Nations Charter, courts
tentatively began to toy with the possibility that the Charter's broad
expressions in favor of human rights might constitute self-executing
treaty obligations mandating higher levels of protection to civil liber
ties than the Supreme Court had required under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One lower state court had even struck down
California's anti-Japanese alien land laws as inconsistent with the
Charter.673 The implications struck terror into the hearts of conserva
tive Republicans and racist Southern Democrats, who immediately
perceived the danger posed to racial segregation. When the Truman
administration pushed through the aspirational Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and then began negotiations for a binding interna
tional human rights covenant, the threat became too much to bear. A
constitutional amendment was necessary to prevent the United States
from concluding such a treaty.674 It was Missouri, moreover, that stood
at the center of the problem: if the United States ratified the pro
posed covenant, then under Missouri Congress would have the power
to implement it by adopting a national anti-lynching law or even a law
prohibiting racial segregation altogether.675
Thus began Senator John Bricker's (shameful) seven-year effort to
limit the treaty power through constitutional amendment. 676 Once
673. In Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647, 650 {1948) {Black, joined by Douglas,
JJ., and Murphy joined by Rutledge, JJ., concurring), four Justices said that California's anti
Japanese alien land law violated the Charter. In Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 {1950), an
intermediate california Court of Appeal held that the human rights provisions of the Char
ter are self-executing and overrode another section of California's alien land law. The
california Supreme Court reversed that ruling, finding that the Charter provisions were not
self-executing. See Fujii v. State of california, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
674. The whole embarrassing episode is recounted admirably in DUANE TANNANBAUM,

THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY, A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S PoLmCAL
LEADERSHIP 1-48 {1988). See also Lofgren, supra note 548, at 118-20. There were of course
other considerations that helped prompt the Bricker Amendment movement. Among other
things, the movement reflected an isolationist backlash against the United Nations, pent-up
resentment against Franklin Roosevelt, antipathy for the "executive agreements" reached in
Yalta and Potsdam, and an intense hostility to any foreign influence over domestic practices
and institutions. See TANNANBAUM, supra, at 1-48. Proponents, moreover, claimed that the
human rights covenants threatened the constitutional liberties of American citizens. This
was a convoluted claim, which at root meant the liberty to discriminate. See id.
675. See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 12-15. At the time, it was thought that
Congress would not have that authority in the absence of a treaty. That later proved incor
rect. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 192-93. Missouri would only come into play, of course,
if the international human rights covenant was not self-executing. That too was a point
which the amendment proposals sought to accomplish.
676. There were a number of different versions of the so-called "Bricker Amendment,"
some proposed by Bricker, others by the American Bar Association, and still others by dif
ferent Senators. They are conveniently reproduced in TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at
221-27. One common feature of all of the amendment proposals was to clarify that treaties
are subject to the Constitution. See id. Of course, that point was never in doubt, but Bricker
proponents made a great deal of the claim that Justice Holmes, in Missouri, had raised the
possibility that treaties would not even be subject to the Bill of Rights. See TANNANBAUM,
supra note 674, at 36-41; George A. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of
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again, the Missouri question was propelled into national prominence
and became the subject of widespread national debate in Congress,
the press, and law journals.677 At one point in 1954, the proposed
amendment came within one vote of passage in the Senate,678 and the
whole experience left a deep impriu.t on the nation - particularly with
respect to human rights treaties.679 However, rather than undermining
Missouri, as Professor Bradley seems to imply, the Bricker Amend
ment controversy actually revealed far greater consensus on the na
tionalist view than may at first have appeared, and the controversy ul
timately enhanced its constitutional grounding.
Surprisingly, Bricker himself initially opposed overruling Missouri
because his experience in the Senate led him to believe that the treaty
power would necessarily sometimes have to touch on matters other
wise within state legislative competence.680 In early versions of his
amendment, he therefore refused to include the famous "which"
clause that was designed to overturn Missouri. It was only under in
tense pressure from virtual fanatics in the American Bar Association
that he ultimately agreed to its inclusion.681 It was that provision,
the United States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM J. lNT'L L. 57, 66-67 (1954). Opposi
tion on this point was limited to pointing out that it was entirely unnecessary. See Finch, su
pra, at 67; John B. Whitton & J. Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment - Fallacies and Dan
gers, 48 AM. J. INT'LL. 23, 31-33 (1954).
.

677. For citations, see Lofgren, supra note 548, at 118-20. Al!, Lofgren explains, Missouri
was " 'the bete noire of the [Amendment's] proponents.' " Id. at 119 (quoting Zechariah
Chaffee, Stop Being Terrified of Treaties: Stop Being Scared ofthe Constitution, 38 A.B.A. J.
731, 732 (1952)).
678. See 100 CONG. REC. 2374-75 (1954). For discussion, see TANNANBAUM, supra
note 674, at 180-81. The vote was not as close as at first appears. See id. at 188-89. The vote
was on Senator George's substitute, which had virtually abandoned the effort to amend the
Treaty Clause and had focused instead on executive agreements. See id. at 146-47; infra
notes 686-689 and accompanying text.
679. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM J. lNT'LL. 341, 348-50 (1995).
.

680. See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 42 (noting that although Bricker "was usu
ally a vocal critic of any attempts to expand the power of the federal government, Bricker's
years in the Senate had convinced him that there were some topics that came 'within the le
gitimate scope of, treaties, notwithstanding the fact that the States maybe deprived of some
of their jurisdiction' " (quoting Letter from Bricker to Eberhard Deutsch (Nov. 5, 1951)).
681. See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 91-92 (describing how Bricker caved into
political pressure from the ABA to accept the "which" clause). The "which" clause pro
vided: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.'' Id. This provision had two as
pects. First, it made all treaties non-self-executing, and second, it overruled Missouri. This
version of the amendment was adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, with a positive
reco=endation to the Senate. See id. There was a third section which gave Congress the
power to regulate all executive agreements. See id. Initially, Bricker had sought to draft the
amendment to prohibit the entry into human rights treaties (treaties "respecting the rights of
citizens of the United States" or vesting "in any international organization or in any foreign
power any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested by this Constitution in the
Congress, the President, and in the courts"), to make treaties non-self-executing, and to limit
the President's powers to make executive agreements. See id. at 221-22.
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moreover, which provoked the unbending hostility of President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Dulles, and the administration as
a whole.682 Eisenhower pledged to "fight to the bitter end against the
'which clause', if need be by going into every State in the Union."683
Overruling Missouri, the President observed, would force the "Ad
ministration to represent 49 governments in its dealings with foreign
powers, whereas he was convinced that in foreign affairs there could
be only one United States."684 It would take the United States "back
to the days 'when American Ambassadors were subject to ridicule
abroad because [they] represented thirteen states, not one central
government,' " and hence Eisenhower "would 'fight up and down
[the] country . . . call names' . . . [and] denounce the amendment as a
'stupid, blind violation of the Constitution by stupid, blind isolation
ists.' "685
Eisenhower and Dulles quickly convinced much of the Senate that
Missouri could not be overturned without seriously endangering the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the interests of American citizens
abroad. As a result, support in the Senate evaporated, and Bricker
was forced to abandon the "which" clause even before it had reached
the floor of the Senate.686 In the climactic battle, none of the three
contending versions of the amendment would have had any effect on
Missouri.ffil The one version that actually came within a vote of pas
sage, moreover, dealt only with executive agreements, leaving the
treaty power wholly untouched.688 In later years, Bricker still persisted
in (unsuccessfully) pushing for an amendment, but he was never again
682 See, e.g., id. at 89-90 (noting Dulles's testimony that the administration was even
more opposed to the ABA's "which" clause than to the Bricker Amendment itself); id. at 95,
98-102, 136-46 (describing the administration's intense hostility to overruling Missouri). The
administration engaged in intensive efforts to block the "which" clause, which are recounted
by Tannanbaum. See id.
683. Memorandum by the Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Minnich) (Jan. 11,
1954), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIIE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, at 1832 (William z.
Slany et al. eds., 1983).
684. Id. at 1832. For the Secretary of State's view that the "which" clause "would at
once have a seriously damaging effect on what we are trying to do," see Memorandum from
John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower (Jan. 20, 1954), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
TIIE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, supra note 683, at 1835-37.
685. TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 138. For Dulles's view, see id. at 89-90, 98, 10001, 108.
686. See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 139-43, 148, 153.
687. See id. at 157-81. Even without the "which" clause, Bricker's proposal could not
muster a majority vote in the Senate. See id. at 167-68.
688. See id. at 169-81. This was Senator George's substitute proposal, which was the
mildest of the various versions. As with all of the proposed versions, it did have a provision
reaffirming that treaties and executive agreements conflicting with the Constitution would
have no force or effect. See id. at 225. That point was uncontroversial. Its other provision
made executive agreements, but not treaties, non-self-executing. See id. George's version
lost by a vote of 60 to 31. See 100 CONG. REC. 274-75 (1954).

March 2000]

Treaty-Making and the Nation

1277

able to mount an effective challenge to Missouri.689 As a result, the is
sue once again retreated to the background.
Rather than providing grounds for doubt about the nationalist
view, then, the Bricker Amendment controversy demonstrated how
fully that view had been accepted as an essential strut in the foreign
affairs apparatus of the federal government.690 Having been decisively
defeated in the realm of constitutional politics, there would seem to be
little basis for revisiting the question today through judicial construc
tion. Two other important considerations, moreover, undergird this
conclusion. First, despite the intensity of its support among certain
groups, the Bricker Amendment(s) never achieved any significant
measure of popular support, thus undermining any claim that
Bricker's movement was an expression of popular sentiment that
should be given due respect.691 Second, even as Bricker continued his
efforts into the late 1950s, the Supreme Court decided Reid v.
Covert.6n Justice Black, speaking for a plurality of four, deliberately
reached out to calm some of the fears that Bricker advocates had
flamed. They had claimed that Missouri meant that treaties were free
from constitutional limitations of any kind, including those protecting
individual rights. Justice Black put that question to rest by striking
down a treaty provision as inconsistent with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.693 At the same time, however, he once again explicitly
reaffirmed Missouri:

There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not incon
sistent with any specific provision of the Constitution. The Court was
concerned with the Tenth Amendment which reserves to the States or
the people all power not delegated to the National Government. To the
extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the people and

689.

See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 192-215.

690. Professor Bradley suggests that the Bricker Amendment was defeated, inter alia,
because of the Supreme Court's recognition of expansive congressional powers to regulate
human rights. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 427. The implication seems to be that Bricker
proponents recognized the futility of their efforts and just gave up. There is no evidence of
which I am aware that would support this claim. On the contrary, Professor Henkin later
wrote a lengthy article to point out how the Bricker proponents had failed to recognize this
defect in their strategy. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 192-93; Henkin, supra note 36, at 90306. In any case, the amendment was defeated because of President Eisenhower's deter
mined resistance and the administration's arguments that overruling Missouri would seri
ously damage U.S. foreign policy interests and undermine the country's ability to protect the
rights of U.S. citizens abroad.
See supra notes 682-689 and accompanying text.
Eisenhower's political concession that he would not submit the then-proposed human rights
conventions to the Senate also played a significant role. See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674,
at 89, 199.
691.

See TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 128-32.

692. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
693. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 17-18. For a discussion of how Justice Black reached out to
answer the claims of Bricker and company, see TANNANBAUM, supra note 674, at 213.
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the States have delegated their power to the National Government and
the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.694
The Court thus put the nation on notice that Missouri was good law
and that if a different rule was to prevail, it would have to be the result
of constitutional amendment. The Court has never retreated from
that position; nor has the Senate shown any tendency to be less vigi
lant in protecting state interests.695
V.

THE CONTEMPORARY DEBAIB

Most proponents of the states' rights view, including Professor
Bradley, have claimed that Missouri and the nationalist view are with
out support in the constitutional history of the United States.696 It
ought to be clear by now that this claim is entirely unwarranted. In
deed, in light of the materials we have reviewed, it is the states' rights
view that must stretch for historical validation. Although Professor
694. 354 U.S. at 18.
695. As recently as 1999, the Court reaffirmed the validity of Missouri. See Minnesota
v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204-05 (1999). Although the majority
suggested that a treaty which was "irreconcilable with a state's sovereignty" over its natural
resources and deprived it of " 'an essential attribute of its governmental existence' " might
be invalid, see 526 U.S. at 204, the Court affirmed a treaty with the Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewas that granted the tribe hunting and fishing privileges on state lands. Citing
Missouri, it noted that regulatory authority over natural resources within a state's borders "is
shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its
enumerated constitutional powers, such as treaty making." Id. Notwithstanding the serious
federalism issues raised by the treaty, the dissents apparently fully concurred in this aspect of
the majority's opinion. See id. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 221-26 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).

As to the Senate, it has, for example, continued to insist in the few cases in which it has
approved human rights treaties that state interests be fully safeguarded. See HENKIN, supra
note 16, at 464-65 (describing Senate's attachment of federalism reservations); Bradley, s11pra note 2, at 428 (same). The Senate's reservation to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides
(t]hat the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal
Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the mat
ters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that
state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government
shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authori
ties of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of
the Covenant.
138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992). For an argument that the Senate's persistent refusal to ratify
human rights treaties, and its insistence on federalism based reservations in the few cases in
which it has consented to such treaties, constitutes an informal overruling of Missouri, see
Spiro, supra note 3, at 572-78. Although there are no doubt some senators who still cling to
the states' rights view, in my view, the practice on which Professor Spiro relies largely re
flects the continuing effectiveness of the special procedural safeguards that the Framers cre
ated for treaty-making - the two-thirds rule for Senate advice and consent. For discussion,
see supra notes 56, 167-170, 178, 425 and accompanying text; infra notes 748-756, 772 and
accompanying text.
696. For multiple citations to portions of Professor Bradley's article making this claim,
see supra note 61.
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Bradley devotes considerable attention to the historical questions, he
mostly cites authorities supporting the states' rights view (without ex
plaining their historical context), quickly deflects a few contrary
precedents, and largely ignores the rest. This approach is particularly
inadequate in light of Professor Bradley's professed aim simply to be
working out the logic of recent Supreme Court federalism opinions.697
If those opinions reveal anything about the current Court's jurispru
dence, it is the extent to which the Court, in undertaking constitutional
adjudication, takes history seriously.
I turn now to the doctrinal and policy-based arguments that have
been launched against Missouri. Because Professor Bradley is the lat
est, and one of the more thorough, advocates of Missouri's dissolution,
I focus most closely on his contentions. I also consider his somewhat
surprising hybrid proposal for reconciling the conflicting concerns
which the question poses - permitting the federal government to
make treaties on any subject but declining to accord treaties on sub
jects beyond Congress's legislative authority the status of law of the
land. In my view, his arguments are no more persuasive than his his
torical claims, and his proposal is entirely without support in the
Constitution.
A.

Professor Bradley's Arguments Against the Nationalist View
and for Overturning Missouri
1.

Tenth Amendment Redux

Advocates of the states' rights view have uniformly relied upon the
Tenth Amendment. Professor Bradley is no exception. Although the
Tenth Amendment explicitly "reserves" to the states only those pow
ers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution," Professor
Bradley nevertheless contends that it requires that the treaty power be
limited by the "reserved powers of the states." The argument that the
treaty power is "delegated" and, hence, that its scope is not limited by
the Tenth Amendment has, he claims, only "superficial appeal." The
flaw in the argument is "that it fails to provide any reason for giving
special Tenth Amendment immunity to the treaty power."698 All fed
eral powers have been delegated to the national government, but they
are not, he says, immune from the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, citing
Hammer v. Dagenhart,699 he contends that the Tenth Amendment
"operates as a substantive restraint. "700 This is confirmed, he claims,
697.

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 394.

698. Bradley, supra note 2, at 434.
699. 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). He also cites Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907).
700. Bradley, supra note 2, at 435.
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v.

United States and

This sweeping argument is nothing short of a tour de force that, if
accepted, would radically transform accepted constitutional jurispru
dence. The main difficulty flows from Professor Bradley's failure to
distinguish between two entirely different kinds of Tenth Amendment
restraints. In its literal sense, the Tenth Amendment, of course, does
deal with the subject matter of federal power and is a reminder that
the federal government cannot exercise authority over any subject that
is beyond the powers delegated to it. It is hardly news that the powers
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment are defined negatively
- as that set of subjects which are not delegated to the United States.
As a result, it is simply incoherent to suggest that there is a set of pow
ers "reserved" to the states that can be determined without reference
to, and as an a priori limitation upon, the subject matter scope of any
individual delegated power. We cannot say what powers are "re
served" to the states until after we determine the full scope of the
powers delegated to the federal government, including not only those
enumerated in Article I, but the treaty power as well. According to
the nationalist view, then, as a subject matter limitation on the dele
gated powers, the Tenth Amendment applies in precisely the same
fashion to the treaty power as it applies to all of the other delegated
powers - that is, not at all.702 Rather, the Tenth Amendment aims at
701. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (holding that the federal govern
ment may not co=andeer state executive officials to carry out federal programs); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (holding that the federal government
cannot co=andeer state legislative processes by requiring states to adopt legislation).
702 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155-59; United States v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 100, 124 (1961) (citing Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946), which reaffirmed the
long-settled principle "that the Tenth Amendment 'does not operate as a limitation upon the
powers, express or implied, delegated to the national government' " (quoting Fernandez v.
Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945))). For further discussion, see infra note 706 and accompa
nying text. Thus, for example, we cannot determine what subjects are reserved to the states
from exercise of the powers to coin money, to define offenses against the law of nations, and
to declare war by reference to the scope of the co=erce power. That the co=erce power
may not reach a certain subject does not mean that the subject cannot be reached under, for
example, the war power. That depends entirely on the scope of the war power. See Woods
v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506-07 (1870). According
to the nationalist view, the same analysis applies to the treaty power.
Indeed, in the instance where such a claim could be most persuasively maintained - the
power to tax and spend for the general welfare - even the conservative states' rights Court
of 1935 resolved the longstanding controversy over the issue in favor of the view that the
power was not limited to taxing and spending in support of the other delegated powers. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1935) (holding "that the power of Congress to
autllorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by tile direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution"). The Court has subsequently made
clear tllat, subject to other unrelated requirements, tile only question is whether the measure
is designed to further tile general welfare. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 171-73
(affirming this view as expressed in Dole); Soutll Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987)
(affirming tile view but, in conditional spending cases, adding a germaneness requirement,
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exercises of nondelegated authority. Were the President and Senate
to make a treaty on a subject inappropriate for negotiation and
agreement, and thus beyond the scope of the treaty power, the treaty
would be invalid under the Tenth Amendment.703
The second kind of restraint imposed by the Tenth Amendment or rather the penumbra of the Tenth Amendment - is indeed an af
firmative restraint on the delegated powers, but a restraint of an en
tirely different order. In combination with other provisions and gen
eral structural considerations, the Court has found that the Tenth
Amendment provides the states with certain special immunities from
federal regulation - such as the prohibition on Congress to "com
mandeer" state legislative or executive processes or subject states to
suit in federal or state court. These more nebulous "Tenth Amend
ment" dignitary limitations arise from, or are closely related to, prin
ciples of sovereign immunity, and they apply to exercises of authority
that are admittedly within the subject matter scope of congressional
powers.704 As I have already indicated, nothing in Missouri or the na-

among others). Professor Bradley seeks to blunt the force of the analogy by pointing out
that spending measures do not create preemptive federal law. See Bradley, supra note 2, at
436-37 n.269. However, as is widely recognized, the Court's expansive approach to the tax
ing and spending power enables Congress as a practical matter to avoid federalism restric
tions to a very great extent. In the taxing and spending context, moreover, there are no ob
vious countervailing considerations other than the text in favor of permitting Congress to
override state authority through such an expedient. See, e.g., Lynn A. Balcer, Conditional
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry
Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. er. REV. 85. In
contrast, as we have seen, in the treaty context, there are a host of compelling reasons to
permit the federal government the necessary flexibility in conducting negotiations with for
eign nations, including that the states are themselves precluded.
703. For discussion, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. Professor Bradley reads
the Tenth Amendment as if it said that the powers not delegated to "Congress" are reserved
to the states rather than the powers not delegated to the "United States." U.S. CONST.
amend. X Congress, however, is not the sole repository of delegated federal powers.
704. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (resting on the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments for ruling that pursuant to its Article I powers, Congress cannot subject a state
to private suits for damages in state court); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (same as to federal courts); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (rul
ing that pursuant to its delegated legislative powers Congress cannot commandeer state ex
ecutive officials into executing a federal program); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at
171-73 (same as to state legislative processes). There was no question in any of these cases
- nor any doubt - but that Congress's legislative powers extended to the subject matter
regulated. The only question was whether the particular fashion in which Congress chose to
regulate was justified, or whether by the manner in which the regulation applied to the states
as states, it unconstitutionally trenched upon their sovereign immunity or dignitary interests.
See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) ("Appellants in no way
challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of authority granted Congress under the
commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, is that when Congress seeks to regulate
directly the activities of States as public employers, it transgresses an affirmative limitation
on the exercise of its power a1cin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained
in the Constitution. Congressional enactments which may be fully within the grant of legis
lative authority contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be invalid because
found to offend against the right to trial by jury . . . or the Due Process Clause . . . . Appel
lants' essential contention is that the 1974 Amendments . . . while undoubtedly within the
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tionalist view compels the conclusion that these limitations do not ap
ply to exercises of the treaty power.705 But that is an entirely different
subject. The only question at issue - and to which Professor Bradley
devotes his entire argument - is whether the Tenth Amendment im
poses a special subject matter limitation on the treaty power: to wit,
that it may be exercised only on subjects falling within the scope of the
legislative powers delegated to Congress.
Indeed, had Professor Bradley not so boldly asserted that the
Tenth Amendment is a substantive or affirmative restraint upon the
subject matter scope of the delegated powers, it would have seemed
unnecessary even to address the point. Although claims of this kind
had strong resonance during the height of strict constructionism and
the struggle over slavery, they have long since been abandoned.706 It is

scope of the Commerce Oause, encounter a similar constitutional barrier."), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

705. For the antebellum strict constructionist view, see supra notes 455458, 470-475,
494, 506, 510-512, 514-519. See supra notes 27, 30-35 and accompanying text. It is an open
question whether some or all of these rights apply in full to exercises of the treaty power.
706. I suspect that few would doubt that Professor Bradley's view is inconsistent with
the great opinions of the Marshall Court in, inter alia, McCulloch and Gibbons. Convin
thought that the whole question of the nationalist versus the states' rights view of the treaty
power was resolved, from a logical point of view, by the post-Civil War decisions in Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875), and Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259
(1875), both of which rejected the approach of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases
and other decisions. See CORWIN, supra note 62, at 183-86. Both cases affirmed that exer
cises of delegated federal powers were not limited by the states' police powers and thus nec
essarily superseded inconsistent state law "no matter under what class of powers [state law]
may fall, or how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the States." Henderson, 92
U.S. at 272. Indeed, this is the very point which Holmes adopted from Corwin in his opinion
in Missouri. See supra notes 637-640 and accompanying text. Despite Professor Bradley's
suggestion to the contrary, moreover, the Court's discussion of the nature of Tenth Amend
ment limitations in New York v. United States did nothing to undermine this longstanding
view. Justice O'Connor reaffirmed once again that as a subject matter limitation, "the Tenth
Amendment 'states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.' " New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (noting that Justice Story expressed the same view in
the Commentaries and quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). The Tenth
Amendment, she noted, does restrain the power of Congress, "but this limit is not derived
from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a
tautology." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156-57. Rather, insofar as the principle
of state sovereignty (loosely derived from the Tenth Amendment) precludes Congress from
commandeering the state legislatures, then the exercise of such a power "is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." Id. at 156. As a result,
it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of ascer
taining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the
States under the Tenth Amendment.

Id. at 159. That, however, does not support the quite different claim that the Tenth
Amendment is an affirmative subject matter restraint on the exercise of the delegated powers.
See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671-72 (2000). Surprisingly, Professor Bradley does not
rely on the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a
congressional statute prohibiting the possession of a gun within one thousand feet of a
school as beyond the commerce power). Lopez and the even more recent decision in United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act
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telling that Professor Bradley relies upon Hammer v. Dagenhart for
support.707 He declines to tell us, however, just how we should go
about determining the content of those "substantive" powers that are
affirmatively "reserved" to the states. Apparently, they are just those
subjects that are beyond the scope of Congress's delegated powers.
Thus, even in his view, the Tenth Amendment does not operate as an
affirmative subject matter restraint on Congress's delegated powers.
Yet, for reasons not explained, it does with regard to the treaty power.
The treaty power, then, does not claim a "special immunity" from
subject matter limitations to which the other delegated powers are
subject, but Professor Bradley wishes to subject it to a special Tenth
Amendment limitation that does not apply to the others.708
as beyond Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), provide at least some arguable, albeit unpersuasive, support for his view. In
both, the Court adopted a narrow construction of the scope of the commerce power, inter
alia, to avoid rendering it limitless and thereby permitting Congress to oust the states from
areas in which they have traditionally regulated. The Court has not done so, however, by
imposing limitations that are not derived from the object and purpose of the power. Rather,
the Court has simply reformulated the long accepted effects test, sharply limiting its applica
tion to the regulation of activities that are not themselves "commercial" in character. See,
e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61, 566-67; Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749-54. Whatever one may
think of these decisions, the Court has acted to restrict the commerce power to matters more
closely allied with what the Court believes is its core purpose - affording Congress legisla
tive authority over commerce among the states. Morrison is similar in tying its restrictive
construction of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to what the Court understands the object
and purpose of § 5 to be. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (holding that the Violence Against
Women Act was beyond Congress's § 5 powers because it afforded a remedy against private
individuals rather than against state actors).
707. Even in Hammer, the Court did not claim that the Tenth Amendment was an af
firmative restraint on the scope of the commerce power. Although Congress had literally
prohibited the movement of goods (those produced by child labor) in interstate commerce,
the majority thought that the commerce power should not be given a literal reading which
would allow Congress to prohibit the sale of goods, in themselves harmless, for the purpose
of achieving certain regulatory aims regarding matters internal to the states. See Hammer v,
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-77 (1918). This was certainly a narrow construction of the
scope of Congress's power, but one which the Court claimed was derived from the nature
and object of the grant. In any case, Hammer has hardly found favor even in the Supreme
Court's most recent decisions. Kansas v. Colorado provides even less support for Professor
Bradley's view. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907).
708. Professor Bradley also observes that statutes and treaties are of equal status under
the Constitution, such that in the event of conflict, the later in time prevails. See Bradley,
supra note 2, at 457 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 600-02 (1889)). From this, he thinks that it follows that treaties and laws
should both be equally subject to the "reserved powers" of the states. It should be clear,
however, that the mere fact that treaties and laws are treated similarly for one purpose does
not entail that they should be treated similarly for all other purposes. Be that as it may, Pro
fessor Bradley again errs in thinking that treaties and laws are being treated according to
some different Tenth Amendment standard. On the contrary, the standard is the same. In
sofar as the subject matter of a law falls within the scope of one of the legislative powers
granted to Congress, it does not violate any subject matter limitation arising from the Tenth
Amendment. Likewise, insofar as a treaty deals with a subject falling within the scope of the
treaty power, it too does not violate any Tenth Amendment subject matter limitation.
Moreover, the scope of Congress's legislative powers and the scope of the treaty power are
determined in accordance with the same principle: the scope of all delegated powers is de
rived from the nature and object of the power.
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Professor Bradley, however, also makes a more novel Tenth
Amendment objection. He understands the nationalist view as argu
ing that Tenth Amendment subject matter limitations that apply to
other delegated powers are inapplicable to the treaty power because
the latter is not only a delegated power but also a power exclusively
delegated to the national government. "This argument," he claims, "is
a non-sequitur."700 On the contrary, the non-sequitur is to claim that
the Tenth Amendment applies as a subject matter limitation on the
other delegated powers. Professor Bradley simply misunderstands the
argument. To be sure, that the treaty power is exclusive is of consid
erable significance. Its significance, however, is not that it exempts the
treaty power from Tenth Amendment limitations that apply to other
powers. In that respect, it is utterly irrelevant whether the treaty
power is an exclusive or a concurrent power.710 Rather, its exclusivity
provides compelling (though hardly the only) structural grounds for
construing the treaty power as an independent "delegated" power,
rather than as a secondary mode for exercising the legislative powers
delegated to Congress. Otherwise, a whole class of potentially benefi
cial agreements, appropriate for international negotiation and agree
ment, would be beyond not only the power of the national govern-

Professor Bradley also worries that the nationalist view entails that there are some treaty
stipulations which Congress does not have the power to override as a matter of domestic
law. As to treaty stipulations falling within Congress's legislative authority, it is well settled
that Congress has the power to pass laws which are inconsistent with those treaty obligations
and thereby supersede them as a matter of domestic - but never international - law. See,
e.g., HENKIN, supra note 16, at 211-12. However, according to Professor Bradley, when a
treaty deals with a subject beyond Congress's legislative authority, Congress will be pre
cluded from exercising this authority. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 457. So what? Perhaps
there are a small number of cases when Congress cannot place the United States in violation
of its treaty obligations by passing inconsistent legislation. The United States always retains
the option to terminate the treaty, whether in accordance with the requirements of the treaty
or not. How that is done is itself a vexed question. See Golove, supra note 16, at 1848 n.180.
In any event, there are two possible cases: self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. As
to the latter, there is little difficulty. Given that Congress has the power under the Necessary
and Proper Oause to pass legislation implementing such a treaty, see supra notes 20, 57 and
accompanying text; infra notes 800-801 and accompanying text, it undoubtedly has the
power to repeal any such legislation. As to self-executing treaties, the problem is slightly
more difficult, but hardly beyond solution. Were the issue ever to arise - which is highly
doubtful - Congress could probably rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass the
inconsistent statute, so long as the statute was limited to removing the effect of the treaty
and did not purport to legislate another rule for the states. For discussion, see HENKIN, su
pra note 16, at 487, and Anderson, supra note 596, at 663. This potential technical difficulty
hardly amounts to a reason for overruling Missouri.
709. Bradley, supra note 2, at 436.
710. Indeed, the exclusivity of a federal power may in some cases provide grounds for
giving it a narrow construction. For example, were the Commerce power exclusive, as was
often claimed in the early period, it might well have been necessary to give it a narrow con
struction in order to avoid ousting the states from broad swaths of regulatory authority, par
ticularly given Congress's apparent inability to cover the field on its own. This difficulty
preoccupied the Court in its early commerce power decisions. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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ment but also that of the constituent governments of which it is com
posed. As the Court in Missouri observed, "it is not lightly to be as
sumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must
belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' " is
somehow denied both to the nation acting collectively and to the indi
vidual states acting separately.711 Especially in the face of strong lan
guage suggesting that the treaty power is a delegated power, its exclu
sivity argues strongly against imposing implied limitations that would
render the nation less than fully capable of making the entire range of
beneficial international agreements.
Professor Bradley compounds his error by extrapolating from the
"logic" of the exclusivity argument, which he wrongly attributes to the
nationalist view, conflicts with separation of powers and thus demon
strating the argument's problematic implications. "One could argue,"
he contends, "that, like federalism restrictions, separation of powers
restrictions do not apply to powers exclusively delegated to a branch
of the federal government."712 What he means by this argument is less
than clear. One thing is clear, however: the argument is based on at
least two fundamental mistakes about the contentions of those favor
ing the nationalist view. First, as just noted, nationalist view propo
nents do not argue that the treaty power, because it is exclusively
granted to the federal government, is therefore free from federalism
limitations that would apply to concurrent powers. Second, as I have
also previously pointed out, they do not contend that the treaty power
is categorically exempt from either affirmative federalism limitations,
such as the principle of state sovereign immunity, or from the general
Tenth Amendment declaration that exercises of nondelegated author
ity are unconstitutional.713 The only question is how to construe the
scope and extent of the treaty power as an independent delegated
power. Thus, his argument, whatever it might mean, is irrelevant.714

711. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14, 33 {1903)). For further discussion and qualifications, see supra notes 51-53, 532,
543-545, 561, 590 and accompanying text; infra notes 804-806 and accompanying text.
712. Bradley, supra note 2, at 437.
713.

See supra notes 24-35, 703 and accompanying text.

714. Professor Bradley invokes the controversial decision in United States v. Curtiss
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 {1936), to support his argument. See Bradley, supra note
2, at 437-39. He seems to wish to tar Missouri and the nationalist view with the justified
doubts about Justice Sutherland's expansive dicta. Ironically, the one aspect of the case that
seems to have any relevance to Professor Bradley's argument is the only part that has re
ceived widespread acceptance - the Court's holding that the non-delegation doctrine ap
plies less rigorously to foreign than to domestic affairs. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
What has been {rightly) criticized is Sutherland's dicta that the foreign affairs powers are not
enumerated but inherent and that the President, as the sole organ of the nation, has the
lion's share of the foreign affairs powers. As best I can make out Professor Bradley's argu
ment, it is something like this: from the President's vaguely defined exclusive authority over
foreign affairs, Sutherland found grounds for weakening the usual separation of powers
principle that would apply to delegations of legislative authority. Professor Bradley seems to
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It may nevertheless be worthwhile to clarify the relationship be
tween the treaty power, on the one hand, and federalism and separa
tion of powers limitations, on the other. The relationship is precisely
parallel. The treaty power empowers the President and Senate, inci
dent to making agreements with foreign states, to promulgate laws.
As a result, whenever a treaty makes stipulations on subjects falling
within the scope of Congress's legislative authorities, the treaty over
rides the general separation of powers principle that legislative
authority is vested in Congress. This is just a function of the overlap
ping grant of power and does not suggest that the treaty power is any
more immune to separation of powers principles than any other
power.715 Likewise, whenever a treaty makes a stipulation on a subject
falling within the exclusive legislative competence of the states, the
"federalism" subject matter restrictions which would apply to acts of
Congress are not applicable, but this by no means suggests that trea
ties are exempt from federalism principles. The parallel, moreover,
works in the other direction as well. Thus, a treaty purporting to
authorize the President rather than Congress hereafter to make laws
regulating interstate and foreign commerce would violate the separa
tion of powers. Even though a treaty can regulate particular matters
falling within those subjects, it may not change the internal distribu
tion of power between Congress and the President.716 Likewise, a
treaty purporting to grant Congress hereafter legislative authority
over, say, real property in the states, would fall afoul of federalism.
Although a treaty can regulate particular aspects of real property rela
tions in the states, it cannot transfer legislative authority over those
subjects from the states to Congress. Beyond these cases, treaties are
as subject to federalism as they are to the separation of powers.717
interpret the opinion to mean that the holding of an exclusive power exempts the President
from all other separation of powers principles that would ordinarily apply to the exercise of
constitutional authorities. I suppose this would mean that, in the exercise of his exclusive
foreign affairs powers, the President could unilaterally regulate foreign commerce, make
war, define offenses against the law of nations, and conduct executive adjudications without
reference to the Article III courts. Even Justice Sutherland would, I assume, be shocked to
learn that this is where the "logic" of his opinion led!
715. See supra notes 20-23, 57, 708 and accompanying text; text following note 26.
There are, of course, complications, - for example, for self-executing and non-self
executing treaties. As to the latter, the treaty does not override the usual principle that leg
islative power is vested in Congress. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 203-04; supra notes 20,
57, 708 and accompanying text; infra note 799 and accompanying text.
716.

See supra notes 22-23, 53, 292 and accompanying text.

717. Thus, for example, "constitutional limitations on delegation of legislative power
apply as well to delegation by treaty." HENKIN, supra note 16, at 195. Professor Bradley
seems to think that this is just a bad faith concession nationalists make to avoid revealing the
true implications of their views. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 439. On the contrary, this
principle follows directly from the fact that treaties are alternative modes of promulgating
laws and, hence, ought presumptively to be subject to the same restrictions on delegations to
which the identical laws would be subject. This principle follows directly from the logic of
the nationalist view; it is not a concession to mitigate its implications. Professor Bradley re-
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The Treaty Power and the Enumerated Powers Doctrine

Professor Bradley also argues that permitting the treaty power to
extend to subjects beyond Congress's legislative powers somehow
renders the treaty power limitless and thus undermines the enumer
ated powers doctrine.718 This argument, too, is unpersuasive. It does
not follow from the fact that treaties may include matters that could
not otherwise be regulated by Congress that the treaty power is limit
less. Conversely, even supposing that the enumerated powers doctrine
entails that every power delegated to the national government must
have legally definable limits, that does not mean that just any limits
will do. One principal difficulty with the states' rights position is that
it fails to justify limiting the treaty power in the particular way it advo
cates. The scope of a delegated power can only be determined by ref
erence to its object.719 Hence the traditional view, endorsed virtually
uniformly from the beginning of our history: the treaty power extends
to all proper subjects of negotiation and agreement between states.720
To put the point more precisely - and here I offer my own interpreta
tion - the object of the treaty power is to enable the federal govern
ment to protect and advance the national interests by obtaining bind
ing promises from other states regarding their conduct. To be within
the scope of the treaty power, therefore, the purpose of a treaty must
be to advance those interests - that is, our foreign policy interests.
This does not mean that treaties may not incidentally regulate domes
tic matters. That is often the price paid for obtaining equivalent con
cessions from the other side, and the Supremacy Clause specifically
recognizes the necessity for permitting such concessions by making the
obligations we undertake in treaties the supreme law of the land.
Nevertheless, the purpose of a treaty cannot be to adopt domestic
standards just because the President and Senate believe them to be
laudable. A treaty is unconstitutional if it does not serve a foreign

peatedly claims that the nationalist view rejects all federalism limitations on the treaty power
and that it renders uncertain whether separation of powers principles apply. See Bradley,
supra note 2, at 391, 393. These claims are simply false. See supra notes 20-35, 53, 292 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, as previously noted, given the different contexts to which
treaties and laws apply, federalism and separation of powers principles may sometimes apply
differently to treaties. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.

718. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 393-94.
719. See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1870)

(noting that it can
not "be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers conferred
by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which
those powers were granted"); supra note 209 and accompanying text

720. See supra notes 26, 28, 39, 41-42, 49, 61, 131-134, 256-257, 291-292, 424-431, 435,
480-481, 557, 560, 564, 624 and accompanying text; infra notes 724-739, 747-748 and accom
panying text.
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policy interest or if it is concluded not to affect the conduct of other
nations but to regulate our own.721
Professor Bradley is not satisfied, however, that these limits actu
ally apply to the treaty power. He notes that there are two different
types of potential subject matter limitations on the treaty power. The
first is general "subject matter" limitations - stated variously as the
requirement that a treaty deal only with subjects appropriate for in
ternational negotiation and agreement, with matters of international
concern, or with matters that relate to our foreign relations. The sec
ond is federalism, or "reserved power," limitations - such as the re
quirement, which he advocates, that treaties may not touch on subjects
that are beyond the legislative competence of Congress. There is sig
nificant historical support, he claims, for one or the other of these limi
tations. Yet, both have been rejected. As a result, the treaty power is
now unlimited as against the states in violation of the basic principles
of federalism and the enumerated powers doctrine. The solution, he
urges, is to adopt "reserved power" limitations.722
There are several difficulties with this formulation of the argu
ment. Most important, Professor Bradley here engages in sleight of
hand: it is of course true that there is significant historical support for
one or the other of these limitations, but that is because virtually every
authority, including the Supreme Court, has on countless occasions
from the earliest days recognized general subject matter limitations on
treaties. Professor Bradley, however, is not arguing for general sub
ject matter limitations. Those he willingly abandons.723 He is arguing
for "reserved power" limitations, for which, as I have tried to show,
there is at best only weak historical support. He wishes to transfer the
overwhelming historical support for one kind of limitation - a limita
tion which has strong roots in text and structure as well - to another
limitation which lacks all of these. That simply will not work. A con
stitutional limitation must be justified in its own right; it is not suffi
cient to point out that another well-established limitation has eroded
over time. Constitutional limitations are not fungible.
This is especially so given that Professor Bradley rather heatedly
claims that general subject matter limitations were rejected "by com
mentators only recently" - in bad faith too boot.724 According to Pro
fessor Bradley, this rejection was part of "a rather disturbing phe-

721. See supra notes 41, 49 and accompanying text; infra notes 728-730, 747-748 and ac
companying text. On the breadth of the "national interest," which may include not only
economic or strategic but moral interests as well, see supra note 41. On the need for some
treaties that impose binding obligations only on ourselves, see supra note 49.
722. This argument appears at numerous points in his argument.
note 2, at 393-94, 417, 429-33, 450-55.
723.

See id. at 450-55.

724.

Id. at 451.

See

Bradley,

supra
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nomenon in the development of American foreign affairs law," in
which Professor Henkin has used his position as Chief Reporter for
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law to incorporate ques
tionable positions into the final document.725 Why such deference,
then, to recent commentators? If Professor Bradley is correct - if the
only thing standing in the way of reviving subject matter limitations is
the self-serving dictum of Professor Henkin - then why discard sub
ject matter limitations, so often affirmed by the Court, in favor of "re
served powers" limitations? Why do so when "reserved powers" limi
tations were explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court eighty years ago
in a nearly unanimous decision by a Court well known for its sensitiv
ity to states' rights, and when that decision has deep roots in history,
text, and the structure of the Constitution? To whom is deference
due?
The irony runs deeper. In my view, Professor Bradley, in fact,
misinterprets the positions of both Professor Henkin and the Restate
ment (Third). Contrary to Professor Bradley's claim, Professor
Henkin and the Restatement (Third)
and commentators more gen
erally - have not rejected subject matter limitations.726 What has
been widely rejected is a particular interpretation of the subject matter
limitation that hails back to extemporaneous comments made by
Charles Evans Hughes in 1929, which were later used during the
Bricker Amendment campaign and beyond in an effort to establish
the unconstitutionality of human rights treaties. Reformulating the
traditional notion that treaties must deal with subjects appropriate for
negotiation and agreement or which relate to our foreign relations,
Hughes stated that treaties must deal with matters of "international
concern."727 Some later sought to interpret this requirement as estab
lishing a fixed category of subjects which are a priori matters of con-

725.

Id. at 432.

726. I suspect that the vast majority of commentators on foreign affairs and the
Constitution believe that there are subject matter limitations on the scope of the treaty
power. Certainly, none of those that Professor Bradley cites rejects such limitations. See,
e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (2d ed. 1995);
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 843-44; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role ofthe United
States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 61 CID.-KENT
L. REV. 515, 530 (1991). Professor Bradley acknowledges that Professor Tribe supports
subject matter limitations. See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1261 n.133. Nor did Professor Tribe
have in mind anything more than requiring that treaties have a bona fide foreign policy pur
pose. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to David Golove (Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with
author) ("[I] did not say that the U.S. could not enter a treaty with Canada committing both
nations to providing their citizens with health care systems. Rather, I stated that the Presi
dent and Senate may not use a 'treaty' with Canada to make an end-run around the House
of Representatives in setting up a U.S.-only health care system. In my view, my illustration
does not even remotely call into doubt the permissibility of human rights treaties."). For the
views of Professor Henkin and the Restatement (Third), see supra note 41; infra note 728
and accompanying text.
727. 1929 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'LL. 194.

1290

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1075

cem only to ourselves and over which no officious intermeddling for
eigners have any legitimate interest. What Professor Henkin criti
cized, and what the Restatement (Third) rejected, was simply this un
justifiable interpretation of the subject matter limitation. 728
The irony runs deeper still. After calling Professor Henkin's integ
rity into question for supposedly rejecting subject matter limitations,
Professor Bradley then proceeds to announce his own endorsement of
that very position. Indeed, he (erroneously in my view) cites Professor
Henkin approvingly as authority in support of that view!729 As noted,
however, it is not recent commentators who have rejected subject mat-

728. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 302 cmt.c (acknowledging that trea
ties are limited to subjects "suggested by [U.S.] national interests in relations with other na
tions"); id. § 302 reporter's note 2 (characterizing Hughes's position approvingly as that "an
international agreement of the United States must be a bona fide agreement with another
state, serving a foreign policy interest or purpose or the United States," and stating that a
"treaty . . . must be a bona fide international act with one or more other nations, not a uni
lateral act dressed as an agreement"). Professor Henkin has observed that a treaty must be
a bona fide agreement, between states . . . by hypothesis, a bona fide treaty deals with a for
eign nation about matters "which pertain to our external relations", that are of mutual "in
ternational concern". But Hughes was interpreted to mean that some matters are not ap
propriate subjects for agreement with another country because they are our ovm affair and
not the legitimate "concern" of any other country. I know no basis for reading into the Con
stitution such a limitation on the subject matter of treaties. . • . If there are reasons in foreign
policy why the United States seeks an agreement with a foreign country, it does not matter
that the subject is otherwise "internal" . . . . As other policies and laws of the United States
become of interest to other countries, they are equally subject to modification by treaty if
the United States has foreign policy reasons for negotiating about them.

HENKIN, supra note 16, at 197. To be sure, in a brief essay thirty years ago, Professor
Henkin made some provocative remarks that could be misconstrued. See Louis Henkin,
"International Concern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 AM J. INT'L L. 272,
278 (1969). His purpose was to challenge what he (correctly in my view) believed were mis
interpretations of Hughes's remarks, not to deny that there were any subject matter limita
tions on treaties. Thus, Henkin concluded that treaties must "be used to further transna
tional foreign relations purposes of the United States, as the United States conceives them."
Id. at 278. Absent bad faith, however, it may be impossible to conclude that a treaty does
not serve transnational purposes of the United States. Why else would the President and
Senate make a treaty?
.

Hughes made his comments during a meeting of the American Society of International
Law in 1929. See 1929 PROC. AM Soc. INT'L L. at 194-96. For discussion of the surround
ing history, see Henkin, supra, at 274-77. Although the tone of Hughes's remarks does sug
gest concern over the rights of the states, his remarks do not, in my view, readily lend them
selves to the construction they later received. Thus, for example, Hughes concludes by
asserting that the treaty power "is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating
to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their internal
concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making power." 1929 PROC. AM Soc.
INT'L L. at 196. His concern appeared to be that the treaty power might be used to deal with
wholly internal matters in which other nations did not take a substantial interest. See id. at
195 (noting that the treaty power would extend to matters "which perhaps under former
conditions had been entirely local," but which "had become so related to international mat
ters that an international regulation could not appropriately succeed without embracing the
local affairs as well"). I cannot undertake here a full exegesis of Hughes's views. What is
important for present purposes is that Hughes too affirmed Missouri. See id. at 194.
.

.

729. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 454 & n.360 (citing Louis Henkin, The Constitution,
Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1025 (1968)).
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ter limitations; it is Professor Bradley. His reasons for doing so are
not difficult to discern: he is simply not satisfied with the traditional
subject matter limitations that the Constitution imposes. What drives
Professor Bradley is his own preference for more deeply cutting limi
tations that can be actively enforced by courts.
Professor Bradley's preferences are evident from the reasons
which he gives for rejecting subject matter limitations. The plausible
tests which he can imagine are too weak and apparently would not ex
clude enough treaties for his purposes.730 Most important, they fail be
cause they are unlikely to be strictly enforced by courts. Courts, he
quite rightly observes, cannot be expected to second-guess the politi
cal branches on the question of whether a treaty deals with a matter
that is sufficiently international in nature. Indeed, citing Professor
Henkin, he argues that the dynamic nature of world conditions and in
ternational relations makes line-drawing in this area especially diffi
cult.731 Hence, on the unexamined assumption that it is essential that
courts be available to enforce limits on the subject matter of treaties,
something else is needed.732
To be sure, the traditional subject matter limitations on treaties are
very general, and with globalization, the matters appropriate for trea
ties have expanded and will continue to do so. This development par
allels the expansion in congressional powers brought about by the in-

730. See id. at 451-55. He also considers some wholly implausible limitations that are
clearly too strong. Thus, limiting treaties to those which were typical in 1789, he agrees, is
out of the question. Such a limitation would, he concedes, be ridiculous on policy grounds
and can find no support in history or in the intent of the Founders. See id. at 451. On the
other hand, limiting treaties to those which are "truly 'international' in nature" - whatever
that could mean - is too weak. Arguably, any treaty could meet this test - evidently a bad
thing. See id. at 451-52. See also supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text. A necessity
test seems to fail on both counts; it could either prove to be too strong or too weak depend
ing on how it is interpreted. See id. at 453. Unfortunately, Professor Bradley does not con
sider what I believe is the most plausible test: a treaty is valid if its purpose is to advance the
interests of the United States in its relations with other nations. See supra notes 41, 49, 721,
728 and accompanying text; infra notes 747-748 and accompanying text. No doubt, however,
it would also be too weak from his perspective.
731. See id. at 453-54, (citing Henkin, supra note 36, at 1025). The power to regulate
commerce, Bradley notes, at least has reference to the movement of goods or the exchange
of money. In contrast, the power to make treaties has reference only to the fact of agree
ment. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 453-54. However, that is the whole point. The purpose
of the treaty power is to enable the United States to advance its interests in the conduct of
foreign states by making contracts with them. There are no other subject matter limitations
because of the nature and object of the power.
732. Professor Bradley discusses at some length a recent Second Circuit decision, United
States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998). See Bradley, supra note 2, at 454-56.
The court upheld a statute enacted in implementation of the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages. It had no difficulty finding that the Convention dealt with a
matter of concern among nations. See Wang Kun Lue, 134 F3d at 83. Professor Bradley
never says why the decision is a matter for concern. Should the court have declared the
treaty unconstitutional? How about the implementing statute?
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tegration of the national and now the international economies.733 Still,
the scope of the treaty power is not unlimited. Treaties have hardly
overtaken the field of domestic regulation at either the national or the
state level, and it is doubtful that they ever will.734 Be that as it may,
the Constitution charges the President and Senate with balancing the
gains to our foreign policy interests against the losses to the interests
of the states and the nation, and to make this protection stronger, it
gives a Senate minority veto power. That balancing must inevitably be
controlled by political standards, and one can understand the whole
history of the treaty-making practice of the President and Senate as a
process of working out just those standards on a treaty-by-treaty,
subject-by-subject basis.735 But as in all matters controlled by political
standards, the lines drawn are provisional and, as has also been the
case throughout U.S. history, subject to revision as conditions change
and new views emerge. From the beginning, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the scope of the treaty power is not susceptible to pre
cise definition and has repeatedly endorsed the notion that treaties
may cover any subject appropriate for negotiation and agreement.736
As to the perceived imperative for judicial review, strikingly in
over two hundred years the Court has never struck down a treaty on
the ground that it exceeds the scope of the treaty power.737 For obvi
ous reasons, courts do not feel free to second-guess the political
branches on whether a treaty furthers our foreign policy interests.
Nor have they been willing to judge the motives of the political
branches. This may perhaps mean that judicial review in this area is
quite limited or even nonexistent. Why that should be a matter for re
gret, rather than celebration, is unclear. As Justice Chase declared in
Ware v. Hylton: "If the court possess a power to declare treaties void,
I shall never exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed."738 In the fol
lowing two hundred years, the Court religiously followed this advice.
733.

See infra notes 779-783 and accompanying text.

734. For example, it is doubtful that a treaty establishing uniform zoning rules for, say,
residential set-backs would be a proper subject for negotiation. Nor would a treaty estab
lishing uniform municipal parking regulations. There would appear to be no sense in which
treaties of this sort would advance our foreign policy interests. On the other hand, consider
the controversy in New York City over the treaty-based immunity of United Nations diplo
mats from parking regulations. See, e.g., David Firestone, Grumbling, Giuliani Accepts
Truce in U.N. Parking War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1997, at 1. These relatively trivial cases are
just examples of a more general point. Large swaths of our domestic political, social, cul
tural, and even economic life have never become matters of concern to foreign nations and
are not likely to become so in the foreseeable future.
735. See MITCHELL, supra note 526 (discussing the patterns that emerged from the first
century and half of treaty practice under the Constitution).
736. See supra notes 120, 123-125, 226-234, 331, 367-369, 402-421, 480-481, 557, 564 and
accompanying text.
737.

See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 185.

738. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796).
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Why, then, the sudden impulse to develop a formulation under which
judicial review can blossom and assume control over the nation's for
eign policy?739
At the outset of his article, Professor Bradley announces that he is
not defending the value of federalism. Rather, posing as politically
neutral, he claims only "that if federalism is to be the subject of judi
cial protection - as the current Supreme Court appears to believe there is no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity
from such protection."740 If this is indeed his project, however, then
presumably he ought to have followed the logic of the Supreme
Court's recent opinions. Yet, he virtually ignores the questions raised
by the several recent landmark decisions in which the Court has
sought to create spheres of immunity to protect the states from direct
applications of federal power. To what extent do these apply to the
treaty power?741 More importantly, he ignores the lesson of the other
main branch of federalism decisions - those in which the Court has
sought to define limits on the subject matter scope of federal powers,
most notably the commerce power and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-

739. Contrary to Professor Bradley's suggestion, moreover, the fact that the scope of the
treaty power rests to some degree on subjective judgments of the President and Senate does
not make it unique among the delegated powers. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 452. Con
sider the congressional power to provide for the "general Welfare of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Surely, determining the general welfare is as subjective an en
terprise as deciding upon our foreign policy interests. Nor are courts any more likely to de
clare an appropriation unconstitutional for failing to promote the general welfare than a
treaty unconstitutional for failing to serve the foreign policy interests of the United States.
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). Still less are they likely to interfere
with a congressional decision to declare war, a power that affords Congress a degree of lati
tude in no way inferior to that which the treaty power affords the President and Senate.
Likewise, there is nothing unique about linking the scope of a delegated power to the con
duct of foreign nations. Consider in this regard the congressional power to define and pun
ish "Offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Just as interna
tional practice, with regard to what matters are appropriate for negotiation and agreement,
develops over time in accordance with changing conceptions of the interests of nations, so
too the law of nations develops new offenses over time in accordance with their practices
and judgments. When international law develops a new offense, congressional power corre
spondingly expands. In any case, it is an inescapable fact of the world that we cannot control
how other states define their interests. We may regret this fact, but we cannot wish it away.
Perhaps sometimes - perhaps often, given our preeminent international position - we can
successfully resist demands that impose a high cost on our notions of local, or of national,
autonomy, but we can never know in advance what the costs will be. To impose artificial
limits on the treaty power would be to risk placing the nation in a weakened, and potentially
vulnerable, position.
740. Bradley, supra note 2, at 394.
741. For discussion of the Court's recent decisions in New York, Printz, Alden, and
Seminole Tribe, see supra notes 27, 30-35, 704-705 and accompanying text. Professor
Bradley does briefly discuss Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), and interprets it as hold
ing that the Eleventh Amendment does apply to treaties. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 458.
On the contrary, although Breard certainly suggests that the Court might ultimately come

out that way, it does not purport to be an authoritative resolution of the question. For brief
discussion of Breard and the Eleventh Amendment issue, see supra note 30 and accompa
nying text.
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ment.742 Whatever one might think of the success of the Court's ef
forts in these cases, the Court has looked for limits in the nature and
purpose of the grants of power themselves. If Professor Bradley had
wished to follow the Court in that course, he would certainly have
searched for additional subject matter limits in the nature and object
of the treaty power. No doubt, as he concedes, it would have proved
difficult. In over two hundred years, no one has proposed a workable
limitation other than the obvious: treaties may only deal with matters
of mutual concern between nations.
3.

The Significance of the Special Political Protections Afforded
State Interests in the Treaty-Making Process

Professor Bradley also argues that the special political protections
which the Senate affords the states in the treaty process are irrelevant
to the question of whether "reserved power" limitations ought to be
accepted. He contends that this argument really amounts to nothing
more than the claim that it is unnecessary to overrule Missouri be
cause the Senate is in any case doing a good job of protecting state in
terests. Otherwise, the argument is subject to all of the difficulties that
apply to the political safeguards argument endorsed by the Supreme
Court in the controversial decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro
politan Transit Authority.143 The Founders, he contends, did not mean
to make the Senate the sole safeguard. Moreover, although it is true
that the Senate has protected state interests, this pattern could
change.744

742 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (ruling that the Age Dis
crimination Employment Act is beyond Congress's § 5 powers); Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct.
666 (2000) (upholding the Driver's Protection Privacy Act under the commerce power);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999) (ruling that the Patent Remedy Act is beyond Congress's § 5 powers); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond
Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down statute prohibiting the possession of guns within 1,000 feet of
a school as beyond Congress's commerce power); United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Congress's powers under
the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). For discussion of Morrison
and Lopez, see supra note 706.
743. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), and leaving to the political process the protection of traditional governmental func
tions from federal regulation under the commerce power). For citations to critical appraisals
of Garcia, see Bradley, supra note 2, at 441 n.297 (collecting citations). For present pur
poses, it is unnecessary to take a position on the Garcia controversy. I note that Larry
Kramer has developed a persuasive account of the role of political parties in the constitu
tional structure that may provide a compelling justification for Garcia's reliance on the po
litical process. He also usefully examines the Founders' intent regarding the role of the
Court in upholding federalism limitations. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards ofFederalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 234-52, 268-87 (2000).
744.

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 440-45.
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Once again, however, Professor Bradley misapprehends the nature
of the argument for the nationalist view and the role that the political
safeguards argument plays in this context. In Garcia, the Court ac
knowledged that "the Constitution's federal structure imposes limita
tions on the Commerce Clause."745 It nevertheless left it to the politi
cal process to define and enforce those limitations.746 In contrast, the
argument for the nationalist view is not that the Senate is the exclusive
agent for the protection of the constitutional rights of the states, and
therefore that the courts need not assume their customary role. On
the contrary, whatever federalism limitations there are should of
course be enforced by the Senate, the House, the President, and, if
called upon in a proper case, the courts.747 What the nationalist view
contends, rather, is that the treaty power is not limited by the scope of
the powers delegated to Congress in Article I. The only limits on the
treaty power are those implicit in the requirement that treaties extend
only to proper subjects for negotiation and agreement. Beyond those,
there are no "reserved powers" subject matter limitations and there
fore nothing for the Senate, or the courts for that matter, to enforce.
The relevance of the Senate to the argument is simply to show why the
Founders were comfortable in granting such a broad power to the fed
eral government. In addition to the affirmative reasons that justified
giving the power exclusively to the national government, they created
a unique procedure for ensuring that the interests of the states would
be adequately secured.748
In assigning the treaty power to the Senate, and safeguarding it
with a minority veto, the Founders were only partly concerned about
exercises of the treaty power that would trench on the exclusive legis745.

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.

746.

See id. at 547-55.

747. For reasons which I have already discussed, the courts have been and are likely to
continue to be highly deferential in reviewing whether a treaty falls within the scope of the
treaty power - because they feel incompetent to assess whether a treaty advances U.S. for
eign policy interests, or because they fear the possible consequences should they overturn a
treaty already concluded, and because they are reluctant to second guess the motives of the
political branches in making a treaty. See supra notes 41, 731-732, 737-739 and accompany
ing text. Wholly apart from Garcia, therefore, the courts are unlikely to play a significant
role.
748. Strictly speaking, Garcia is irrelevant to the question of whether the courts should
review treaties to ensure that they remain within the subject matter scope of the treaty
power. Garcia dealt with congressional regulation of the states as states, not with the subject
matter scope of the commerce power. Insofar as there are subject matter limitations on the
commerce power, the Court has continued to enforce them. See, e.g., United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 {1995) {striking down act of Congress prohibiting the possession of guns
within 1,000 feet of a school as beyond the subject matter scope of the commerce power); see
also, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 {1997) {striking down Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as beyond Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). For
discussion, see supra notes 706, 742. As previously noted, however, wholly apart from
Garcia, it is doubtful whether the courts will be willing or able to play a similar role in the
treaty context. See supra notes 41, 731-732, 737-739, 747 and accompanying text.
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lative sphere of the states. Treaties well within Congress's powers
could profoundly threaten state interests. Indeed, the navigation of
the Mississippi River and access to the Newfoundland fisheries seem
to have been their largest concerns, but they also had serious worries
about the dangers posed by peace and commercial treaties. The two
thirds rule was designed as a special political protection for state and
sectional interests because the Founders felt compelled both to cede
the power over treaties and to refrain from limiting it in ways that
might ultimately prove detrimental to the national interest. By en
suring the most rigorous protection consistent with prudence, they be
lieved that they had harmonized the conflicting considerations in the
manner most advantageous to the nation.749
To be sure, as Professor Bradley points out, much has changed
since 1789. The Seventeenth Amendment provided for direct election
of Senators, and the relationship between the President and Senate in
the treaty process did not work out in precisely the fashion that had
been anticipated. There were other changes as well.750 Nevertheless,
if the question is whether the Founders' expectation that the Senate
would safeguard state interests in treaties has proven correct, the an
swer has been from the beginning a resounding "yes," as even Profes
sor Bradley is forced to concede.751 Indeed, the Senate has often been

749.

See supra notes 159-170, 177-178, 183-186, 194-212 and accompanying text.

750. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 442. Professor Bradley points out that the Senate was
expected to play a more prominent role in advising the President regarding treaties. See id.
On the other hand, the abandonment of the executive council model may have intensified
the Senate's tendency to view its function as independent of, and even antagonistic to, the
presidential negotiation function, leaving the foreign policy process in a dysfunctional state
of conflict See EDWARD CORWIN, THE CONSTITIJTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 3236 (1945); Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 869-70. Professor Bradley also points to
the emergence of the executive agreement as an alternative to the treaty and suggests that
this has undemiined the protection which the Senate affords. On why this argument is seri
ously mistaken, see discussion infra notes 784-792 and accompanying text. In any case,
whatever implications it may have for executive agreements, it has none for treaties - which
is the only matter in issue. Professor Bradley further points to a number of deficiencies
which others have identified in the treaty-making process: that as compared to the legisla
tive process, the treaty process is opaque, public participation is diminished, and the Senate
has less freedom to detemiine the shape which the treaty provisions take; that there are
sometimes overriding foreign policy considerations which may make the Senate feel con
strained to accept treaties even with highly objectionable provisions; and that treaties may
contain vague and aspirational language making their implications for the states less predict
able, especially when an international body is charged with their interpretation. See Bradley,
supra note 2, at 442-43. For the most part, these points are not new. They were simply part
of the calculus which the Founders had to consider in 1787-89. In any case, they apply
equally to a wide range of treaties, not just to those with implications for the interests of the
states. If they argue for anything, it is for a reformation of the treaty-making process to
make the executive more accountable. They do not make it any more sensible to place
states' rights restrictions on the subject matter of treaties.
751. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 443-44 (conceding that notwithstanding his objections
to the political process argument, "it must be acknowledged that the Senate often has acted
to protect states' rights in the treaty context, especially with respect to human rights trea
ties"). The Senate has acted vigorously to protect state interests throughout American his-
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so vigorous in upholding the interests of the states, and in promoting
an isolationist foreign policy, that the Founders' decision to create a
minority veto has been quite plausibly condemned as the "fatal de
,,
fect in the Constitution.752 As I have tried to show elsewhere, it led to
a virtual constitutional revolution during the World War II years, pro
voking the development of an alternative form for making interna
tional agreements - the so-called congressional-executive agree
ment.753 It is not clear what conclusions would follow were the
Senate's performance to have proven less protective, but given the
success of the Founders' plan, there is no need to face that question.754
This is not to suggest that the treaty power cannot be abused. For
example, the President and Senate could in theory make a treaty
serving only a relatively weak foreign policy purpose even while
trenching heavily on the interests of some states. All powers, how
ever, are susceptible to abuse. Where the political branches never-

tory. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 191-93, 463-65 (providing examples and discussing the
use of federal-state clauses); STOKE, supra note 550, at 190-98; Wrumrr, supra note 21, § 50,
at 93. In recent times, even when it has reluctantly approved human rights conventions, it
has uniformly attached federalism reservations which severely limit the impact of the con
ventions on the states. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 428-29, 444 (describing the Senate's
practices and providing citations). Professor Kramer attributes the continuing sensitivity of
the political branches to federalism concerns to the workings of the party system. See
Kramer, supra note 743, at 278..frl.
752 See DENNA F. FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT 156
(1945); see also DENNA F. FLEMING, THE TREATY VETO OF THE AMERICAN SENATE
(1930); Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 861-62. For an excellent discussion of the

various ways in which the states have influenced U.S. treaty practice from the beginning, see
MITCHELL, supra note 526, passim. As Secretary of State Hay famously observed a hundred
years ago: "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say
just how or when the final blow will fall - but one thing is certain - it will never leave the
arena alive." 2 THAYER, LIFE OF JOHN HAY 393 (1915) (quoting John Hay).
753. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 861-96 (describing the rise of the
congressional-executive agreement as a reaction to the Senate's consistent resistance to trea
ties).
754. Professor Bradley also suggests that the senatorial safeguards are inadequate be
cause it is Congress and not the Senate that implements treaties. Thus, in adopting imple
menting regulations, Congress operates under normal simple majority legislative procedures,
rather than under the two-thirds requirement. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 444-45 (citing
the possible use of stipulations in human rights treaties to justify domestic implementing
legislation in areas otherwise beyond congressional authority). Obviously, however, the ad
ditional layer of congressional implementation - which applies only to non-self-executing
treaties - simply provides an added protection. The treaty first has to obtain two-thirds
Senate consent and hence is subject to a double security. Perhaps what Professor Bradley
has in mind is that treaty stipulations can be vague, and that Congress in implementing the
treaty may claim wide discretion to regulate in ways that were unanticipated by the Senate
when it gave its consent. How serious a problem this is can only be determined by reference
to practice. To the extent that it is an issue, however, the remedy lies in more strictly apply
ing the requirement that implementing legislation (at least insofar as that legislation is oth
erwise beyond Congress's regulatory powers) be reasonably related to the treaty obligations
it is designed to execute. See United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming the application of the rational basis test to implementing legislation).
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theless act within the scope of their delegated authority, the remedy
for abuse lies ultimately in the people and not the courts:

The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the peo
ple, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war,
the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely, in all representative governments.755
In the case of the treaty power, the Founders created special proce
dural safeguards which provide the people and the states with an
added security that does not apply in the ordinary legislative process.
As a result, there are few, if any, examples of treaties that might right
fully be described as an abuse of the treaty power, and Professor
Bradley does not claim otherwise.756
Although Professor Bradley does not press the point, there is a
related argument that has sometimes been made in favor of the states'
rights view which is worth noting in this context. The claim is that
there is something incoherent in permitting two "branches" of the
federal government - the President and the Senate - to regulate
matters which the three "branches" - the House, the Senate, and the
President - are prohibited from regulating. If the whole legislature
cannot touch upon the matter, then surely, it is said, the President and
Senate are precluded as well.757
Presumably, those who make this argument find an inconsistency
in allowing a greater intrusion on state interests by a process subject to
lesser checks and balances in favor of the states. It is highly doubtful,
however, that the treaty power is in fact a greater intrusion on the in
terests of the states, except in the formal sense that it can in principle
755. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. {9 Wheat.) 1, 197 {1824) (Marshall, CJ.).
756. It is not difficult to hypothesize possible abuses of the treaty power. For a more
ambiguous case, consider the following: Suppose that Congress's legislative powers do not
extend to prohibiting the states from imposing the death penalty. Suppose further that the
President and Senate decide to conclude a treaty prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty as a violation of human rights and that their sole reason for concluding the treaty is
that they wish to further the moral aspiration, not shared by some states, of a world without
executions. Such a treaty would serve a foreign policy purpose - to advance the nation's
moral interests by altering the conduct of foreign nations regarding the death penalty - and
would thus be constitutional. However, it could plausibly be attacked as an abuse of the
treaty power. Did the President and Senate take seriously their role in weighing the moral
benefits of imposing a no-death-penalty rule on foreign nations against the arguably substan
tial federalism costs of imposing a similar rule on dissenting states? In any case, whatever
one might conclude about this scenario, the main point is that it is entirely unrealistic. If
past experience is any guide, without a weighty foreign policy purpose of a more narrowly
self-interested kind, the President and Senate would never make such a treaty. Moreover,
the reason, at least in part, is the safeguard provided by the two-thirds rule.
757. This argument was made by Jefferson in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice. See
Jefferson, supra note 347, at 442 (claiming that the Constitution "must have meant to except
out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the President and Senate cannot do
by treaty what the whole Government is interdicted from doing in any way").
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touch on matters which Congress may not regulate. Surely our na
tional experience suggests that congressional legislation is the greater
threat. In any case, it is well known that the exclusion of the House
from the treaty process reflects the Founders' judgment that the
House was too numerous a body, whose members had too short a
term of office, to enable it to act with the kind of secrecy, despatch,
and long-term perspective that they felt were necessary for supervising
treaty-making. They therefore assigned the advice and consent power
to the Senate alone (where state interests would be most tenaciously
protected).758 Contrary to the implication of the states' rights view,
however, in doing so they acted to ensure that both state and national
interests would be even more fully protected than in the normal legis
lative process. Not only is there the extraordinary two-thirds super
majority requirement, but also the President is afforded an even
greater check on the Senate than he exercises in the ordinary legisla
tive process. The Senate can neither originate treaties, nor can it force
the President to ratify a treaty even after it has given the treaty its
consent.759 In contrast to the legislative process, then, the President
effectively wields a veto that cannot be overridden. In order to make
a treaty, both the President and two-thirds of the Senate must agree whereas a law requires only a simple majority of both houses, with the
concurrence of the President, or two-thirds of both houses without the
President's assent. It is simply not the case, therefore, that the Consti
tution subjects treaties to lesser protections for state interests than
those applying in the legislative process. In fact, given the dynamics of
the political process, the two-thirds rule has proven to provide far
greater protection than the ordinary procedures for passing laws.
4.

The Maintenance ofNational Unity in Foreign Negotiations and
Human Rights Treaties

Professor Bradley also seeks to challenge a central claim of the na
tionalist view - that a unified bargaining posture is important to as
sure that the United States maximizes its collective influence in inter
national negotiations. He refers to this claim as the "one-voice
argument" and contends that it is overdrawn.760 According to Profes
sor Bradley, although the Supreme Court has often made statements
affirming the one-voice view, in fact the claim has often been over
stated. Moreover, the Court's decision in Barclay's Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board,761 he claims, sharply eroded the doctrine.762
758. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, NO.

64 (John Jay), at 39.

759. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 303;
viding for presidential vetoes and congressional overrides).
760. Bradley, supra note 2, at 445.
761. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).

cf.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (pro
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The view that we are one nation in our relations with foreign na
tions and that the foreign affairs powers are exclusively lodged in the
federal government has been affirmed on so many occasions, and re
peated by the Supreme Court so many times, that citations to establish
the point seem hardly necessary.763 The idea that Barclay's Bank has
somehow overridden all that past history is, to say the least, wildly ex
aggerated, if not outright misleading.764 Barclay's Bank dealt with the
dormant foreign commerce clause and specifically with the role of the
Court in policing the states. At issue was California's worldwide com
bined reporting method for taxing multinational corporations, which
had caused friction with U.S. trading partners. What is significant
from Professor Bradley's perspective is that the Court was unwilling to
strike down the law on its own authority notwithstanding the law's
significant indirect impact on the conduct of foreign relations. What
ever implications this development may have, however, it provides no
support for his argument here. Although the Court declined to use its
implied dormant commerce powers, it positively referred the matter to
Congress for action by the political branches and thus fully vindicated
the supremacy of federal authority over the field.765 In contrast, Pro
fessor Bradley is not arguing for a limitation simply on the Court's
powers, while leaving the political branches free to exercise their ple
nary authority. He seeks instead to impose states' rights limitations on
the political branches - here, the President and Senate - in a core
field of foreign relations and in an area where their power is expressly

762

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 445-48.

763. The view has been virtually uniformly held, including by the most states' rights
oriented jurists - for example, Taney in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 {1840), and
Calhoun in the Disquisition. See also, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711
(1893) (observing that the Untied States is "vested by the Constitution with the entire con
trol of international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain
that control and to make it effective. The only government of this country, which other na
tions recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union • . . . The Constitution of the
United States speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject"); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604, 606 {1889) {observing that the
"United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one
nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can
be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its
entire territory" and that "[f]or local interests the several States of the Union exist; but for
international purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people,
one nation, one power"); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. {12 Wall.) 457, 555 {1870) (Bradley,
J., concurring) {observing that the "United States is not only a government, but it is a na
tional government . . . • It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country,
war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden
to the states governments").
764. For discussion, see Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary: ls International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1848-49 {1998).
765. See Barclay's Bank, 512 U.S. at 321-30. Indeed, the Court relied heavily on its con
struction of Congress's prior actions as demonstrating that Congress had intended to pre
serve the rights of the states to use the worldwide combined reporting method. See id.
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affirmed by the text in the strongest possible language. That is an en
tirely different matter. Ironically, if the states' rights view were
adopted, it would mean not that the United States would speak with
multifarious voices on the affected treaties, but that potentially the
country would speak with no voice at all.766
Notwithstanding his doubts about the one-voice argument, how
ever, Professor Bradley himself concedes its "strong intuitive appeal"
in regard to "traditional" treaties, like peace treaties.767 In his view,
however, this intuitive appeal runs out when it comes to newfangled
treaties "that regulate many subjects formerly considered domestic in
nature, especially in the human rights area." These treaties are not
"truly inter-national." For example, it "is not at all obvious," he
thinks, "that it is necessary or desirable that the country speak through
the Executive with respect to the regulation of religious freedom."768
This argument reveals Professor Bradley's true target. Although
more nuanced than the Brickerites of fifty years ago, he too seeks a
constitutional doctrine that will effectively prevent the United States
as a nation from adhering to human rights treaties, at least insofar as
those treaties protect rights that are not already protected by the
Constitution or otherwise within the scope of federal authority. In
deed, he seems virtually to concede the importance of avoiding feder
alism limitations in other areas of treaty-making, because in those ar
eas "the intuitive appeal" of the one-voice argument is strong enough
to carry the day.
Professor Bradley's appeal to intuition is no more than an appeal
to untutored prejudice. To be sure, the development of human rights
treaties, though not as new as many seem to believe, does represent a
profound transformation in international legal theory and practice.769
766. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 68 U.S.L.W. 4545 (2000), striking down a
Massachusetts state law imposing sanctions on companies doing business with Burma.
Although I cannot analyze the case here, suffice it to say that the Court unanimously and
forcefully reaffirmed the importance of speaking with "one voice" in foreign affairs. It also
narrowly construed Barclay's Bank as premised on Congress's express intent to permit state
regulation irrespective of the potential impact on foreign relations. Crosby seems to indicate
that the Court continues to be committed to broad federal power over foreign affairs
notwithstanding conflicts with state regulatory authority.

Crosby

767. Bradley, supra note 2, at 445-46. Thus, he notes:
Foreign affairs, after all, concern the entire nation. Moreover, effective international bar
gaining may well require that we have a national representative with the power to make
binding commitments. . . . Most of us would agree . . . that the Executive should not be ham
pered by federalism concerns when negotiating a peace treaty.
He even quotes Madison's observation that "if we are to be one nation in any respect, it
clearly ought to be in respect to other nations." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 176, No. 42
(James Madison).

Id.

768. Bradley, supra note 2, at 446.
769. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 196-98. Nor are human rights conventions the only
kind of treaties which limit the way a government can treat its own nationals. See id. at 474-
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It does not, however, represent a change in the respects relevant to the
scope of the treaty power. The United States does not, and may not,
enter into human rights treaties in order to engage in the regulation of
domestic activities. In this respect, human rights treaties are no differ
ent from any other treaties. It bears repeating that treaties are bar
gains between states, and just as in a contract between private indi
viduals, agreement requires mutual concessions. The United States
agrees to do or to forbear from doing certain activities in return for
promises by its treaty partners to do or to forbear from doing the same
or other activities. The purpose from our perspective is not to restrict
our own liberty of action, but to restrict the liberty of our treaty part
ners. Certainly, the concessions that other states demand may require
the United States to change its domestic legislation. However, that is
not peculiar to human rights treaties; nor is it an unanticipated devel
opment arising after the adoption of the Constitution.770
In this crucial respect, then, human rights treaties are the same as
all other treaties, and the reasons why maximizing our national influ
ence is important in negotiating "traditional" treaties apply as well to
these "new" conventions. The United States enters human rights trea
ties in order to secure the promises of other states to abide by basic
human rights standards. Obtaining these promises, and the enforce
ment mechanisms that accompany them, are widely recognized as na
tional interests of the highest magnitude, implicating, inter alia, our
national security and economic interests.771 We do not - and consti-

75 {listing examples, including conventions concerning narcotic drugs, safety at sea, and ar
maments limitations); Henkin, supra note 36, at 911-13 (same); supra note 648.
770. As we have seen, the Founders were painfully aware that treaty stipulations would
require implementation in domestic law. See supra Section II.A and accompanying text.
Indeed, the whole point of the Supremacy Clause was to ensure that treaties requiring the
regulation of domestic activities would, of their own force, become supreme law of the land.
Notwithstanding the extreme sensitivity of some early treaties precisely on states' rights
grounds, the Supreme Court acted vigorously to ensure domestic respect for the obligations
imposed. See supra notes 103, 120, 123-125, 226-234, 311, 367-369, 402-421 and accompany
ing text {describing numerous early Supreme Court decisions, including Ware v. Hylton and
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, that enforced treaty stipulations notwithstanding their
impact on state laws). Indeed, it was the resistance of the states to complying with the
Treaty of Peace and other treaty obligations that was among the principal motivations lead
ing to the Philadelphia Convention and the Supremacy Clause. See supra notes 99-142 and
accompanying text. As we have also seen, even after the adoption of the Constitution, trea
ties frequently imposed obligations of the most sensitive and intrusive kind. See supra Sec
tions II.B and N.C and accompanying text.
771. See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 475-76. The way that other states treat their own
nationals is of crucial importance to us for a variety of compelling reasons: because we be
lieve that states that violate fundamental human rights are more likely to be aggressive ex
ternally and unstable internally and thus to undermine international peace and security, be
cause the humanitarian and economic disasters that frequently accompany regimes that
systematically violate human rights have and will continue to force us to make substantial
financial and even military commitments when conflicts erupt, because such regimes do not
make good trading partners and disrupt the flow of international commerce, because we feel
powerful moral commitments to uphold basic rights for all persons wherever located, and
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tutionally may not - enter into human rights treaties as a means of
achieving domestic policy ends, and so far as I am aware no responsi
ble official of the United States government has ever suggested other
wise. If the President disagrees with domestic law concerning freedom
of religion, as Professor Bradley hypothesizes, he may not attempt to
alter that law by making a treaty. That would be to make an unconsti
tutional end-run around our normal domestic lawmaking institutions.
Indeed, it would be equally illegitimate whether the subject matter of
the treaty lies within the legislative jurisdiction of Congress or within
the legislative jurisdiction of the states.772

5.

Changed Circumstances and Missouri

Finally, Professor Bradley addresses a major practical obstacle to
his view
Missouri is, after all, a well-established precedent of nearly
a hundred years vintage. Given what we have seen, it would be absurd
to claim that it does not have deep roots in constitutional history and
in the text and structure of the Constitution. Why should it be over
ruled now? Professor Bradley's answer: stare decisis carries less
weight in constitutional adjudication, especially "when fundamental
-

because our international standing may be seriously compromised unless we are willing to
make the same commitments that we urge - indeed sometimes coerce - other states to
undertake.

In practice, the United States has often refused to join human rights conventions, and
when it has joined, it has done so at the last moment, after most other states have already
become parties. It might be argued, therefore, that our participation was unnecessary to ob
tain the promises of other states to uphold human rights; they had made those promises even
without our making mutual concessions. Surely, however, the United States is not constitu
tionally compelled to be a free rider. Nor is free riding really "free." By withholding its par
ticipation, the United States forgoes important foreign policy benefits. Among other things,
ratifying a human rights convention, even after other nations have joined, affords the United
States access to the procedural mechanisms created by the treaty to encourage respect for
human rights in other countries, strengthens the convention by making participation more
universal and by lending it the preeminent influence of the United States, encourages other
states to join, and, perhaps most importantly, bolsters the reputation and influence of the
United States by demonstrating its good faith and willingness to compromise and to under
take reciprocal obligations.
772. Professor Bradley cites the Senate's practice of attaching federalism reservations to
human rights treaties as evidence that the one-voice argument is not important in this area.
Since we already recognize states' rights limits as a practical matter, why not constitutional
ize the practice? See Bradley, supra note 2, at 447. On the contrary, what the Senate's prac
tice reveals is that the system is operating in precisely the fashion that the Founders envi
sioned. The Senate carefully weighs the states' interests in autonomy against the gains to
our national interests, and it accords a heavy presumptive weight to the former. The com
pelling point is that the political process adequately protects state interests. Indeed, the
United States has paid a heavy price in its foreign relations because of the solicitude of the
Senate for state interests. At some point, however, the balance may shift. Imperative for
eign policy reasons may demand that we more fully and unconditionally accede to existing or
future international human rights regimes. Overruling Missouri would place the United
States under rigid limitations that might have deleterious consequences for our foreign pol
icy. Yet, Professor Bradley would impose these limits despite his acknowledgment that the
Senate is adequately performing its watchdog task.
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assumptions in the first decision no longer hold true."773 He points to
the rise of human rights agreements, which upsets the Court's assump
tion that treaties would deal with "truly inter-national relations";774 the
growing scope of treaty practice; the emergence of the executive
agreement as perhaps the dominant domestic form of agreement
making; and the expansion in congressional powers generally.775
To the extent that these are "changes" at all, however, they have
little or no bearing on the validity of Missouri. As we have just seen,
human rights treaties are no different from older treaties in any re
spect relevant to the treaty power. All of the considerations that
weigh in favor of the nationalist view apply as strongly to them as to
more "traditional" treaties. Furthermore, as a historical matter, "hu
man rights" treaties - or their functional equivalents - have been
with us from the beginning. One need look no further than the Treaty
of Peace itself for "human rights" provisions prohibiting the states
from taking reprisals against U.S. citizens who had supported the
British during the Revolutionary War.776 As we have also seen and at
great length, from the beginning the whole question of the scope of
the treaty power has been fought out over treaties, usually dealing
with the rights of aliens, that are close cousins of today's human rights
treaties. Indeed, immediately preceding Missouri, the nation was
treated to the spectacle of San Francisco resisting the effect of a treaty
on its right to consign Japanese resident alien schoolchildren to sepa
rate but equal schools! Missouri, moreover, was itself rendered just as
human rights conventions on the rights of labor were, in the most visi
ble manner, in the process of negotiation. As we have also seen, the
Court was fully aware that its decision opened up the possibility that
Hammer v. Dagenhart would be affected by a treaty.m
To be sure, as Professor Bradley contends, international treaty
practice has greatly expanded in the past half century and promises to
expand further in the decades ahead as globalization proceeds. Pro
fessor Bradley expends considerable energy demonstrating that trea
ties today cover a wider range of subjects than was the case in 1789 or
in even 1920. These are examples, he claims, of the ways "in which the
treaty power might be used to overcome federalism restraints on do
mestic Iawmaking:ms This latter claim, however, is false.

773. Bradley, supra note 2, at 459.
774.

Id. at 460.

775.

See id. at 459-61.

776.

See supra notes 116-120, 127-137.

777.

See supra notes 650-658 and accompanying text

778. Bradley, supra note 2, at 402; see also id. at 402-09.
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No knowledgeable person is likely to doubt that globalization has
many important implications for our federal system.779 The problem
with Professor Bradley's argument, however, is that he mistakes the
way in which globalization principally affects the states. As a result of
increasing economic integration, nations have felt compelled to make
treaties on subjects previously regulated only, or mostly, through do
mestic legislation. In the United States, regulatory authority over
many of those subjects has long been exercised by the federal govern
ment. In others - and these are the cases on which Professor Bradley
mainly focuses - regulatory authority admittedly exists in the federal
government, but Congress has traditionally chosen to leave the matter
to the states. The pressure of globalization has changed that practice.
More and more, the federal government is exercising the full scope of
congressional powers to deal with problems that until now were
largely under state control. This development surely raises important
federalism concerns, but they have little relation to Missouri. Nor
would overruling Missouri have any effect upon the problem.780
This is not to deny that some of the new generation of treaties im
plicate Missouri. Principally, however, the treaties that do are human

779. For an excellent discussion of the federalism issues in relation to NAFfA and
GATI, see Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441 (1994). See also Samuel C. Straight, Note, GA TT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective
Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty ofthe Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216 (1995).
780. Thus, for example, Professor Bradley emphasizes the many private international
law conventions that have been proposed, some of which have been ratified by the United
States. These treaties, he claims, involve " 'nothing less than federal arrogation of
traditional state competence in the law governing private, and in particular commercial,
relations.' " Bradley, supra note 2, at 406 (quoting Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 690 (1998)). Although strictly accurate, the point is
misleading. These private law treaties, as Van Alstine explains, deal with contracts, financial
leasing, factoring, bills of exchange and promissory notes, stand-by letters of credit,
international security interests, and receivables financing. See Van Alstine, supra, at 689-99.
Moreover, they apply specifically to international or transnational transactions. See id. at
690 n.14. Although there may have been a question at one time whether Congress's
commerce powers extended to these matters, see supra notes 550-552, 670 and accompanying
text, there is no doubt today, and Professor Bradley does not suggest otherwise. For the
most part, however, Congress has not chosen to regulate in these areas before now.
Certainly, taking over large areas of regulatory authority from the states has important
federalism implications, but they have nothing to do with Missouri. The same applies to
Professor Bradley's discussion of the Hostage Convention. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 404
(citing the Convention as a case in point, while at the same time noting a recent case, United
States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F3d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995), upholding the implementing
statute under Congress's power over aliens and foreign relations). The same applies to the
NAFfA and GATI trade agreements as well. For discussion see infra notes 782-783 and
accompanying text (noting that all of the provisions in these agreements fall under
Congress's commerce power). Although Professor Bradley cites environmental treaties, he
does not deny that for the most part there is no reason to believe that they deal with subjects
outside of Congress's powers. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 408. In the event that the Court
were to strike down one of Congress's environmental statutes, for instance the Endangered
Species Act, the Missouri issue might arise. This hypothetical case, however, seems to
illustrate the decision's merit. Should the United States be precluded from negotiating over
a subject of such intense international interest?
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rights treaties - or, rather, stipulations in human rights treaties that
establish rights not already protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
and arguably not susceptible to protection under Congress's com
merce or other powers.781 I certainly agree that these stipulations are
extremely important, and they are clearly the real focus of Professor
Bradley's concern. In this respect, however, the changes since 1789,
let alone 1920, have been remarkably slight. As we have seen, treaties
have always dealt with rights and have always imposed obligations on
the states which some found extremely uncongenial. Certain stipula
tions in human rights treaties, if accepted, may well find a similar re
ception. This is just the same problem, in a slightly different form,
which has existed from the beginning. Surely, it is not a development
that could justify overruling Missouri on the grounds of changed cir
cumstances.
This fundamental defect in Professor Bradley's argument is even
more patent in his reliance on NAFTA and the WTO as prime evi
dence of new practices that justify overruling Missouri.782 He does not
specify any respect in which either of these landmark trade agree
ments trenches on subjects otherwise within the exclusive legislative
power of the states. This is not surprising. Given the subject matter
with which they deal, no one to my knowledge has doubted that all of
the provisions in the agreements fall within the subject matter scope of
Congress's commerce powers. To be sure, NAFTA and the WTO
raise important federalism concerns, but that is because they regulate
in areas which, though admittedly within congressional authority,
Congress has previously decided to leave to the states.783
Indeed, were there provisions in NAFTA and the WTO going be
yond Congress's powers, the agreements would probably be unconsti
tutional to that extent - which brings us to Professor Bradley's next
claim. He relies on the increasing use of executive agreements in lieu
of treaties. Executive agreements, he notes, are not subject to the spe
cial procedural protections which treaties are, and hence there is even

781. Professor Bradley discusses a number of such treaties and hypothesizes a number
of others. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 401-05. How many of these contain provisions that
would actually be beyond Congress's legislative powers is debatable. In light of the Court's
recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, however, it seems possible that the number of
potentially affected stipulations will grow. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct.
631 {2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2219 {1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 {1997).
782

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 407-08.

783. See Friedman, supra note 779, at 1478. Ironically, in a recent decision upholding
NAFTA from constitutional challenge, an Alabama district court suggested, without finally
deciding, that NAFTA might not even be permissible as a treaty: only Congress could ap
prove it because it dealt so entirely with matters within congressional power over commerce.
See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1255-56, 1317-23 (N.D.
Ala. 1999). That suggestion is obviously incorrect, but it nevertheless nicely reveals the fal
lacy of Professor Bradley's reasoning.
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less justification for "exempting" them from the Tenth Amendment.784
It is unclear why Professor Bradley takes this to be an objection to
Missouri. Missouri held only that treaties may deal with subjects that
are beyond Congress's legislative powers. It said nothing about execu
tive agreements. If there is a valid objection to executive agreements
being afforded the same treatment, that provides a reason for not ex
tending the reasoning of Missouri to executive agreements. It hardly
provides grounds for overruling Missouri.185
Although this simple point dispatches with Professor Bradley's
concern, it is worth noting as well that his basic premise is at best
highly problematic. The vast bulk of executive agreements take the
form of congressional-executive agreements.786 The most outstanding
recent examples are NAFTA and the WTO. That means that they
were approved by Congress by simple majority votes in both houses,
rather than by two-thirds of the Senate.787 The constitutional basis for
the congressional-executive agreement has been the source of substan
tial controversy.788 Under the most plausible textual interpretation,
however, a congressional-executive agreement is valid only if its sub
ject matter falls within one of Congress's legislative powers. Its valid
ity stems from its being necessary and proper to carrying into execu
tion one of Congress's own delegated authorities.789 On this view, the

784.

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 398-99, 444, 460.

785. On this point, see Vasquez, Breard, supra note 3, at 1339 n.75.
786. See Executive Agreements, 14 WHITEMAN DIGEST § 22, at 210; Golove, supra note
16, at 1805 n.44.
787. See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 801-08, 917-25; Golove, supra note
16, at 1793-94, 1798-99.
788. Compare Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, passim (arguing for the constitu
tional validity of the congressional-executive agreement), and Golove, supra note 16, passim
(same), with Tribe, supra note 35, passim (arguing for its unconstitutionality). See also
HENKIN, supra note 16, at 216-17.
789. See Golove, supra note 16, at 1799-1800, 1808-09. The so-called "interchangeabil
ity" doctrine may create some confusion in this respect. According to this doctrine,
Congress can approve any agreement as a congressional-executive agreement that the Sen
ate could approve as a treaty. While as a practical matter that may be true, it is not so in
theory. Interchangeability in practice results from the breadth of Congress's powers over
foreign affairs, which some claim are expansive enough to cover any stipulation which the
United States ever has, or presumably ever will, include in a treaty. See id. at 1800 n.28; su
pra note 36. To the extent that this claim is exaggerated, interchangeability is an overstate
ment.
It is true that the advent of the congressional-executive agreement has federalism impli
cations - it undermines to some degree the Founders' special solicitude for state and sec
tional interests embodied in the two-thirds rule.
That goes to the validity of the
congressional-executive agreement as a form for approving international agreements and
rests on the recognition that international agreements pose threats to state interests irrespec
tive of whether they deal with matters within congressional or state legislative competence.
See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 19, at 808-13; Tribe, supra note 35, at 1241, 1244, 126668. With the possible qualifications mentioned in the next paragraph of the text above,
Congressional-executive agreements, however, do not - and cannot - deal with matters
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only distinction between a treaty and a congressional-executive
agreement is that the Missouri doctrine does not apply to the latter.190
Thus, if NAFTA and the WTO are constitutional, it would only be be
cause each and every provision in the agreements falls within the
scope of Congress's powers.
Having said this much, however, a caveat is in order. It is some
times claimed that the legitimate scope of a congressional-executive
agreement may be extended somewhat by the President's independent
constitutional authorities. Under this view, a congressional-executive
agreement can be supported not only by Congress's legislative powers
but additionally by the President's powers. The President's powers
principally derive from his role as commander-in-chief, his power to
receive ambassadors, and his position as "sole organ" of the nation in
conducting its diplomatic relations. It is theoretically possible, then,
that a congressional-executive agreement may extend somewhat be
yond Congress's legislative powers.791 Even if correct, however, this
refinement is unlikely to pose much of a threat to the exclusive legisla
tive powers of the states. The President's independent powers are
largely confined to matters having little or nothing to do with domestic
law, and Professor Bradley has not pointed to any congressional
executive agreement which he claims trenches on the exclusive legisla
tive powers of the states.
The same applies to his concerns about sole executive agreements
- agreements which the President makes strictly on his independent
authority. The logic that applies to treaties may apply in this context
as well because the sole executive agreement falls within a power
delegated - albeit implicitly - to the President.792 As with the

which are within the exclusive legislative powers of the states.
would not ordinarily arise.
790.

Thus, the

Missouri

issue

See Golove, supra note 16, at 1800 n.28.

791. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 303(2) (asserting that "the President,
with the authorization or approval of Congress, may make an international agreement deal
ing with any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the
Constitution"); id. § 303 reporter's note 7. As noted, the underlying assumption is that the
President may have independent constitutional powers that reach subjects which are beyond
Congress's powers and that Congress can approve an agreement that falls within his powers
even if not within its own. Arguably, such an agreement would simply be a sole executive
agreement supported by congressional implementing legislation, rather than a congressional
executive agreement. For discussion of the sole executive agreement, see infra note 79'2 and
accompanying text.
79'2. The power to make sole executive agreements is incident to the exercise of the
President's substantive authorities - his role as commander-in-chief and sole organ of the
nation in diplomatic affairs and his power to receive ambassadors. See, e.g., REsTATEI\fENT
(THIRD), supra note 19, § 303(4); Golove, supra note 16, at 1897-99 & n.329. Whether the
exercise of these powers can extend to matters within exclusive state legislative competence
is uncertain. The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)
(upholding the Litvinov Assignment), and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (same),
did not explicitly resolve the question. They held that a valid sole executive agreement su
persedes state law under the Supremacy Clause, but did not say whether a sole executive
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congressional-executive agreement, however, the issue is largely theo
retical. Only a very small percentage of international agreements are
concluded in this form, and they typically (with exceptions) deal with
matters having no domestic legal effect. Professor Bradley points to
no sole executive agreements that potentially raise the Missouri ques
tion. If such a case should arise, there will be time enough to consider
whether Missouri should or should not be extended in this manner. In
any case, as previously noted, this theoretical possibility has no bear
ing on the validity of Missouri itself. At most, it raises the question
whether sole executive agreements should be more strictly limited.
Finally, Professor Bradley relies on the vast expansion in the scope
of congressional powers since Missouri. Perhaps, he concedes argu
endo, Missouri was necessary when Congress could not pass legisla
tion on many " 'matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well
being,' " but now Congress's authority is sufficient to cover any matter
of importance to our national interests. Thus, it seems, there is no
longer any pressing reason for Missouri.193
After the New Deal expansion of congressional powers, it is no
doubt true that the importance of Missouri diminished, although it
took some time for the full implications of this development to be ap
preciated. Hence the Bricker Amendment campaign. However, the
resurgence of interest in Missouri
Professor Bradley being a prime
example - is obviously connected to the possibility that Congress's
powers are now in a period of contraction and that Missouri might
therefore reemerge both as an important ingredient in the federal for
eign powers and as a significant factor in federal-state relations. Ar
guably, congressional power has already contracted enough to call into
doubt Congress's authority over some stipulations in human rights
treaties that the United States might ratify. Were this possibility not
serious, the whole subject would appear to be a tempest in a teapot.
Be that as it may, Professor Bradley's argument is easily turned
around to make the opposite point. If there are few matters of impor
tance to our foreign policy that are beyond Congress's powers, why
revisit and revise a venerable Supreme Court decision that settled the
matter nearly a century ago?
-

agreement could extend to a subject within the exclusive legislative powers of the state leg
islatures. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the Iranian
Hostages Agreement). Certainly, the tenor of Belmont and Pink suggests that the Court
would have so held were the issue squarely presented. Whether it would today is another
matter. For discussion, see HENKIN, supra note 16, at 219-24.
793.

See Bradley, supra note 2, at 459 (quoting M!Ssouri).
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Professor Bradley's Solution

Despite his vigorous attack on Missouri and the nationalist view,
Professor Bradley in the end adopts a surprising position. The federal
government, he agrees, can make a treaty on any subject at all. When
it makes one on a subject beyond Congress's regulatory authority,
however, the treaty does not create binding law on the states nor does
the treaty afford Congress a basis for implementing it through legisla
tion. Thus, the states would be free to adopt, or reject, the necessary
legislation at their discretion. As he describes it, "[u]nder this ap
proach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory
powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the United
States on the international plane."794
Whatever else might be said about this proposal, one thing is clear:
it is entirely extraconstitutional in nature. There is absolutely no evi
dence in the text that treaties were to be subject to the approval or
veto of the states, or that the states were to have any role whatsoever
in their implementation. As we have seen, one of the principal con
cerns prompting the Philadelphia Convention was the difficulty expe
rienced with ensuring state compliance with treaty obligations on mat
ters \vithin their legislative authority.795 As Madison observed: "To
counteract [a treaty] by the supremacy of the state laws, would bring
on the Union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in
war."796 Professor Bradley's proposal may warrant no further re
sponse than simply to quote Justice Johnson's reply to a similar pro
posal by Caroliniensis during the controversy over the Negro Seamen
Act: "it is monstrous, it is preposterous."797
The Founders acted in no uncertain terms to obviate the possibility
that the states would interfere with the nation's ability to comply with
its treaty obligations. The Supremacy Clause declared that treaties
were to be "supreme Law of the Land," and, to make the point unmis-

794. Bradley, supra note 2, at 456; see also id. at 450.
795.

See supra Section II.A.

796. 3 DEBATES, supra note 194, at 515 (remarks of James Madison); see also id. at 510
(remarks of Corbin) ("Fatal experience has proved that treaties would never be complied
with, if their observance depended on the will of the states; and the consequences would be
constant war. For if any one state could counteract any treaty, how could the United States
avoid hostility with foreign nations? Do not gentlemen see the infinite dangers that would
result from it, if a small part of the co=unity could drag the whole confederacy into
war'?"). For a similar proposal during the Jay Treaty controversy by Cato (Robert
Livingston), see supra notes 273-277 and accompanying text.
797. Philonimus No. 7, supra note 482; see also supra notes 472-475 and accompanying
text (describing Caroliniensis's proposal); supra note 484 and accompanying text (describing
Philonimus's response). For Jefferson's active opposition to a similar interpretation of the
Articles of Confederation, see supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
For
Eisenhower's condemnation of the effort by Senator Bricker to achieve the same result by
constitutional amendment, see supra notes 682-685 and accompanying text.
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takable, they added "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."798 It is one thing to argue that the Supremacy
Clause only applies to constitutionally valid treaties and that treaties
touching on subjects beyond Congress's legislative authority are un
constitutional. If the latter proposition were correct, the Supremacy
Clause would not make them supreme law of the land. Although I
believe this argument is fallacious for reasons which should by now be
clear, it represents at least an attempt to ground the states' rights view
in the language of the Constitution. Without explanation, however,
Professor Bradley simply disregards the direct and unequivocal com
mands of the text.
There are two types of treaties: those which are self-executing and
those which are not. The latter require legislative implementation,
while the former do not. According to early Supreme Court decisions,
the command of the Supremacy Clause only applies to self-executing
treaties.799 The constitutional text, however, makes equally clear
where authority lies for implementing non-self-executing treaties:
Congress is given the authority " [t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" not only its own
powers, but "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."800 The treaty power is without doubt such a power, and there
has never been any question but that Congress has the power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement any (constitutional)
treaty made by the President and Senate:

The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carry
ing into execution as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of article I
of the Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or the officers thereof, includes the power
to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipula
tions which it is competent for the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power.801
Of course, it is always possible to retract a power granted. The usual
method, however, is constitutional amendment, which is precisely
what Senator Bricker tried (unsuccessfully) in the 1950s. His amend-

798. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. For discussion, see supra notes 95-98, 121-122, 127-142,
171-174, 180 and accompanying text.
799. See Foster & Elam v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also HENKIN,
supra note 16, at 198-204; supra notes 20, 57, 708 and accompanying text.
800. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
801. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901); see also HENKIN, supra note 16, at 199200, 204; 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 21, § 217, at 506-07. For a recent reaffirmation of this
basic principle, see United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ment would have accomplished precisely what Professor Bradley's ap
proach would manage without all the effort.802
Although it is thus clear that Professor Bradley's proposal is with
out support in the text or history of the Constitution, it is worth con
sidering some of the further difficulties which the proposal would cre
ate. Professor Bradley says almost nothing about how he envisions his
proposal working. One possibility, suggested by his brief description,
is that he would permit the President and Senate to make any prom
ises they wish, subject to whatever reaction the states may have. The
states could pass implementing legislation if they wished, and having
passed it, they could later repeal it if they developed second thoughts.
If that is what he has in mind, his proposal seems strikingly irresponsi
ble. It would leave the President and Senate \vith no way to know in
advance whether they could keep the promises they made to foreign
nations, and it would render them subject to state changes of heart at
any point along the way. Perhaps, though, what Professor Bradley has
in mind is to limit the President and Senate to promising that they will
recommend certain measures to the states, leaving the decision ulti
mately up to the states themselves, subject, moreover, to whatever
changes of heart the states may have over time. If that is all that his
proposal would permit the federal government to do, however, then it
simply collapses back into the traditional states' rights view. Even un
der the strictest states' rights position, such a treaty stipulation would
be perfectly permissible, and, in fact, stipulations of that kind have ap
peared in treaties from time to time.803

802. For the Bricker Amendment(s), see supra notes 676-689 and accompanying text.
Professor Bradley also claims support in comparative practice. See Bradley, supra note 2, at
456. His only reference is to the differing practice in Canada, which adheres to the view he is
advocating. See Jeffrey L. Friesen, Note, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in
Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1415, 1428-33 {1994). The fact that another nation has a practice similar to what an
American scholar advocates does not by itself constitute "comparative law" support. Aside
from the very different constitutional provisions which led the House of Lords to construe
the British North American Act in this fashion, and the special circumstances of the very
tenuous Canadian federal system, Professor Bradley simply ignores the fact that this ap
proach has been the subject of scathing criticism and has effectively hobbled Canadian for
eign policy on many occasions. See id. at 1433-41. Notably, Professor Bradley also ignores
the examples of federal systems that follow the Missouri approach. See, e.g., Brian R.
Opeskin & Donald R Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 CASE
W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 1 {1995) (describing the Australian approach). A serious effort at com
parative law might be helpful but is beyond the scope of this article.
803. For early examples, see Hayden, supra note 504, at 576-77, 582. Presumably, if this
is his intention, Professor Bradley wishes to constitutionalize the use of so-called federal
state clauses under which a federal government only binds itself to those obligations which it
has legislative power to fulfill and makes any other obligations conditional on legislation in
its individual states or provinces. Some federal states have pushed for such clauses, as has
the United States on occasion. For understandable reasons, however, non-federal states
have complained bitterly about them, and in recent years, their resistance has stiffened. The
inclusion of such a clause leaves the parties uncertain as to the scope of the obligations which
a federal government has undertaken and thus as to the mutuality of the bargain. For dis-
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It may be, however, that Professor Bradley has another idea in
mind. Perhaps, he is contemplating that the President would act as the
agent for the states in negotiating these sorts of treaties, but that the
treaties would not become binding until all of the states, or perhaps
until any state acting separately as to itself, gave their consent. The
treaty's validity, then, would depend upon the consent of the state, but
the state would thereafter be bound, no longer permitted to change its
mind. This approach, however, immediately falls afoul of the princi
ple, reaffirmed in New York v. United States, that the states cannot
consent to an increase in federal power.804 Moreover, if the treaty's
validity is premised on the consent of the state, there does not appear
to be any reason why the President should have to go to the Senate in
the first place. If the states can consent to treaties brought to them by
the President, why should the Senate be involved at all? Surely, there
is no provision which suggests that treaties are subject first to the ad
vice and consent of the Senate and then to the advice and consent of
the state legislatures. On the other hand, given the explicit prohibition
on state treaties,805 it is difficult to see how this procedure could be
squared with the text. Perhaps, then, these would not be treaties.
Would they be "compacts" or "agreements"? If so, then congressional
approval would seem to be requisite.806
There is no point in trying to work out the details. Professor
Bradley's proposal simply fails to offer a serious alternative to the tra
ditional states' rights view. Even if there were strong policy grounds
supporting his proposal - which in my view there are not - it would
still be necessary to conform to the structures of the constitutional sys
tem which we have. That he has failed to do.
CONCLUS ION
My defense of Missouri has largely been grounded in traditional
sources of constitutional argument - text, structure, precedent, and
history. As I have tried to demonstrate, these sources provide over
whelming support for the nationalist view. Indeed, in my judgment,
that support is so strong that a decision overruling Missouri, far from
being compelled by the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence,
cussion, see REsTA1EMENT (THIRD), supra note 19, § 302 reporter's note 4; HENKIN, supra
note 16, at 191-92, 464-Q5.
804. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-83 (1992). Because "[t]he Constitu
tion does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state govern
ments as abstract political entities," but to secure the liberties of citizens, "[s]tate officials . . .
cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in
the Constitution." Id. at 181-82.
805. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
806. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from making compacts or
agreements without the consent of Congress).
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would raise serious questions about the Court's commitment to the in
terpretive methodologies which it has used in these and other cases.
Although my main aim has been to defend the specific holding in
Missouri, I certainly do not deny that Missouri's affirmation of the na
tionalist view has wider doctrinal and theoretical significance. On the
contrary, Missouri is one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of
the constitutional law of foreign affairs. Commensurately, Professor
Bradley's attack on the nationalist view of the treaty power is a crucial
part of a larger challenge to that edifice which he and a group of allied
scholars have energetically waged in recent years. These scholars
strenuously object to what they call - pejoratively - "foreign affairs
exceptionalism" - the notion that the federal government's foreign
affairs powers should be treated any differently from its domestic
powers, especially when it comes to federalism issues.807 For them,
Missouri understandably presents a major theoretical obstacle: As we
have seen, the nationalist conception of the treaty power is rooted in
an explicit textual grant, is tied to a cognate provision explicitly ex
cluding the states from treaty-making, has a deep historical pedigree
which illustrates the profound importance of federal foreign affairs
supremacy to the national welfare, and finds its ultimate justification
in the Founders' decision to lodge the whole of the foreign affairs
powers exclusively in the national government. It is not surprising,
then, that Professor Bradley and company would see it as an grave
threat to their larger project.
If pace Professor Bradley, "foreign affairs exceptionalism" has a
long and venerable pedigree, stretching back to 1776, his own project
can also claim a long, though perhaps less venerable, pedigree in an
other great American "ism," American exceptionalism, itself inextri
cably intertwined with yet another long pedigreed "ism" - American
isolationism. The underlying notion seems to be that the United
States is better off to the extent that the Constitution can be made to
limit and frustrate full U.S. participation in the burgeoning institutions
and regimes of international society. But if the Constitution "does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"808 neither does it enact an
isolationist foreign policy. Like other essentially political questions,
foreign policy ought to be fought out in the political - not the judicial
- forum. All the more so, given the Constitution's built-in prefer
ence, dramatically manifested in the two-thirds rule for treaty-making,
for inaction over action. Why ought isolationism to be afforded not
only an advantage but a trump?
Missouri's importance extends beyond the constitutional law of
foreign affairs. As Justice Holmes recognized, the treaty power raises

807. Bradley, supra note 2, at 461.
808. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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questions going to the root of our identity as a nation. Its ultimate tri
umph did not come easily but flowed out of the national identity suc
cessfully forged on the field of battle. The Founders may have be
lieved that "[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought
to be in respect to other nations."809 It took a Civil War to make it so.
That national identity is a remarkable achievement and one which
ought to be carefully nurtured. At its core is a sense of unity in our
relations with other nations. Frittering away that national unity can be
accomplished only at the cost of once again raising the question why
we are a nation at all.

809.

THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 176, at 264.
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APPENDIX
STATE OF MISSOURI
v.

HOLLAND, U. S. Game Warden.
252 U.S. 469
No. 609.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued March 2, 1920.
Decided April 19, 1920.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri.
Suit by the State of Missouri against Ray P. Holland, United States
Game Warden. From a decree dismissing the suit on motion (258 Fed.
479), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a
game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Mi
gratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the
regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the
same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional
interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment, and that the acts of the defendant done and threatened
under that authority invade the sovereign right of the State and con
travene its will manifested in statutes. The State also alleges a pecuni
ary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders and other
wise, admitted by the Government to be sufficient, but it is enough
that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged
quasi sovereign rights of a State. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125,
142, 22 Sup. Ct. 552, 46 L. Ed. 838; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U. S. 230, 237, 27 Sup. Ct. 618, 51 L. Ed. 1038, 11 Ann. Cas. 488;
Marshall Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa, 226 U. S. 460, 462, 33
Sup. Ct. 168, 57 L. Ed. 300. A motion to dismiss was sustained by the
District Court on the ground that the Act of Congress is constitu
tional. 258 Fed. 479. Acc. United States v. Thompson (D. C.) 258 Fed.
257; United States v. Rockefeller (D. C.) 260 Fed. 346. The State ap
peals.
On December 8, 1916, a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain was proclaimed by the President. It recited that many species
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of birds in their annual migrations traversed many parts of the United
States and of Canada, that they were of great value as a source of food
and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of
extermination through lack of adequate protection. It therefore pro
vided for specified closed seasons and protection in other forms, and
agreed that the two powers would take or propose to their lawmaking
bodies the necessary measures for carrying the treaty out. 39 Stat.
1702. The above mentioned act of July 3, 1918, entitled an act to give
effect to the convention, prohibited the killing, capturing or selling any
of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty except as
permitted by regulations compatible with those terms, to be made by
the Secretary of Agriculture. Regulations were proclaimed on July 31,
and October 25, 1918. 40 Stat. 1812, 1863. It is unnecessary to go into
any details, because, as we have said, the question raised is the general
one whether the treaty and statute are void as an interference with the
rights reserved to the States.
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States,
because by Article 2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is dele
gated expressly, and by Article 6 treaties made under the authority of
the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the
land. If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of
the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government. The language of the Consti
tution as to the supremacy of treaties being general, the question be
fore us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the pres
ent supposed exception is placed.

It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution,
that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that
one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in
derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.
An earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in
pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within
the States had been held bad in the District Court. United States v.
Shauver, 214 Fed. 154. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288.
Those decisions were supported by arguments that migratory birds
were owned by the States in their sovereign capacity for the benefit of
their people, and that under cases like Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S.
519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793, this control was one that Congress
had no power to displace. The same argument is supposed to apply
now with equal force.
Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not they cannot
be accepted as a test of the treaty power. Acts of Congress are the su-
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preme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitu
tion, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the
authority of the United States means more than the formal acts pre
scribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there
are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be as
certained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of
the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Con
gress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring na
tional action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in
every civilized government' is not to be found. Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U. S. 14, 33, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366. What was said in that
case with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to
the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are in
competent to act. We. are not yet discussing the particular case before
us but only are considering the validity of the test proposed. With re
gard to that we may add that when we are dealing with words that also
are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we
must realize that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of
its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their suc
cessors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in the light of out whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The
treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in de
ciding what that amendment has reserved.
The State as we have intimated founds its claim of exclusive authority
upon an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is em
bodied in statute. No doubt it is true that as between a State and its
inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds,
but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount pow
ers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender
reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is
the beginning of ownership. The whole foundation of the State's rights
is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not
arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand
miles away. If we are to be accurate we cannot put the case of the
State upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that
for the moment are within the state borders, that it must be carried
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out by officers of the United States within the same territory, and that
but for the treaty the State would be free to regulate this subject itself.
As most of the laws of the United States are carried out within the
States and as many of them deal with matters which in the silence of
such laws the State might regulate, such general grounds are not
enough to support Missouri's claim. Valid treaties of course "are as
binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States." Baldwin v. Franks,
120 U. S. 678, 683, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 657, 32 L. Ed. 766. No doubt the
great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the
State, but a treaty may override its power. We do not have to invoke
the later developments of constitutional law for this proposition; it was
recognized as early as Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454, 2 L. Ed. 497,
with regard to statutes of limitation, and even earlier, as to confisca
tion, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 1 99, 1 L. Ed. 568. It was assumed by
Chief Justice Marshall with regard to the escheat of land to the State
in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 275, 4 L. Ed. 234; Hauenstein v.
Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628; DeGeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S.
258, 10 Sup. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333,
340, 21 Sup. Ct. 390, 45 L. Ed. 557. So as to a limited jurisdiction of
foreign consuls within a State. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct.
385, 30 L. Ed. 565. See Ross v. Mcintyre, 140 U. S. 453, 11 Sup. Ct.
897, 35 L. Ed. 581. Further illustration seems unnecessary, and it only
remains to consider the application of established rules to the present
case.
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.
It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of an
other power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State
and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the stat
ute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by
while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our
crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The re
liance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the
United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion that the treaty
and statute must be upheld. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118, 39
Sup. Ct. 403, 63 L. Ed. 886.
Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER and Mr. Justice PITNEY dissent.

